Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 30 March 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM observed a sharp increase in the number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded a low number of ceasefire violations. It facilitated dialogue within the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination. The SMM observed the marking of mined areas in the security zone. It followed up on reports of injured civilians. The Mission reached one border crossing point in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM was restricted in its freedom of movement in areas not controlled by the Government, including in the border area*.  

The number of ceasefire violations observed in Donetsk region sharply increased compared with the previous day.[1] Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city during the night hours of 29 March, the SMM heard 84 undetermined explosions 8-11km north-north-west and 17 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position. Whilst at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard exchanges of fire including at least 30 airbursts, 113 undetermined explosions, 150 bursts and more than 200 single shots of small-arms fire at locations ranging from 3-7km north, north-north-east and north-east, west, north-west, and north-north-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), between 17:00hrs on 29 March and 08:00hrs on 30 March, the SMM heard at least 65 impacts and outgoing mortar (120 and 82mm) rounds, 22 bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher fire, at least 58 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and 15 single shots of small-arms fire 3-5km south-west of its position. During the day, the SMM also heard three mortar impacts (82mm) 3-5km north-north-east of its position.

During the evening hours of 29 March, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 13 explosions of automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, 25 impacts of mortar (120 and 82mm) rounds, at least 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and at least five explosions assessed as artillery rounds (152mm) ranging from 4-12km north, west and south-west of its position.

Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 incoming mortar (120 and 82mm) rounds, at least 30 explosions of automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) rounds, and intermittent heavy-machine-gun fire at locations 7-8km south of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM continued to record a low number of ceasefire violations. Whilst near government-controlled Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion approximately 1km south-west of its position. Positioned near “LPR”-controlled Novooleksandrivka (64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, five short bursts of small-arms fire, and one explosion, possibly from an 82mm mortar round, at locations ranging 1-2km south and south-west of its position. Whilst in “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 10km north-west of its position.

The SMM followed up on reports from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) of shelling in Avdiivka on 29 March and facilitated unobstructed observation by all members of the JCCC. According to a Russian Federation Armed Forces JCCC representative, on 29 March whilst positioned at a JCCC observation post on the roof of the coke plant in Avdiivka together with a Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC representative, they had observed heavy artillery shelling from Avdiivka in the direction of “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), and subsequently observed the artillery pieces being removed from the site. Following the shelling, the Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC representatives prevented the Russian Federation JCCC representative from accessing the roof of the plant for further observation, citing security concerns. On 30 March the SMM confirmed this information with both sides of the JCCC and following intervention with both sides to reduce tension, the SMM confirmed that they had resumed joint observation. Whilst there, the SMM together with the Russian Federation and Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC representatives observed explosions from mortar, automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless gun rounds, as well as heavy-machine-gun fire.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations correspond with the withdrawal lines and noted that ten tanks (T-64, 125mm) previously verified as withdrawn were missing, as first noted on 15 March.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: 42 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), three anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm), 17 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 18 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), and 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad¸122mm).  The SMM also observed 22 Addendum-regulated mortars (17 2B11 Sani¸120mm and five PM-38, 120mm) and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). The SMM noted that three sites were abandoned and 18 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 31 tanks (T-64, 125mm) and four mortars (120mm) were missing.

In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm). While the SMM was present, one howitzer was transported away from the site and five others were being hitched to trailers.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited a location and observed five MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), noting that one previously recorded MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) was missing.

The SMM observed the presence of other hardware within the security zone: one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-2) heading east in Donetsk city centre; one multi-purpose armoured vehicle (MT-LB) approximately 4km south-east of “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk); one IFV (BMP-2) near a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk); two IFVs (BMP-1) near government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk); one IFV (BMP-1) and one military truck mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) at an “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); three APCs (BTR-70) north-west of Shchastia; and six IFVs (BMP-1) and several personnel lying in a ditch with weapons pointed south as well as three IFVs (BMP-1) near a government-controlled checkpoint in Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe the marking of mined areas within the security zone. The SMM observed mine hazard signs for several hundred metres in government-controlled Zolote-3 (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Zolote-4.The SMM also observed Ukrainian Emergency Services personnel putting up mine hazard signs (white wooden signs) on both sides of the road leading from government-controlled Zolote-4  to “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5.

The SMM followed up on reports of several wounded civilians. At a hospital in Avdiivka, the SMM met with a man who had been admitted on 28 March with wounds to his head, which he said he had sustained from an explosion during the night of 27 March. The SMM subsequently met with the chief of police in Avdiivka, who said that the police would conduct analysis on the shrapnel collected from the man’s home to determine the type of explosive. At a hospital in government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM spoke with a man who said he had been injured in an explosion on 29 March near his home in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). The SMM also spoke with a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander who said that following alleged shelling on 29 March, the man had approached their position with visible wounds on his arms and face, and that they had transported him to the hospital after providing first-aid. At a hospital in Popasna, medical staff informed the SMM about a male civilian from government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) who had been admitted with wounds to his head, face and arms, which were assessed as caused by an explosion. The SMM later spoke to a 55-year old woman in Troitske who said that the man was her neighbour, and that he had been injured by a booby trap that had detonated when he had opened the gate to her property. 

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government. At Dovzhanskyi (84km south of Luhansk) border crossing point, the SMM observed a queue of 22 civilian cars (20 with Ukrainian license plates, one with Azerbaijani plates, and one with Russian Federation plates) and a large bus full of passengers waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. Four trucks (Ukrainian license plates) loaded with coal were parked alongside the road. Over the course of one hour, three civilian cars and two civilian trucks (all with Ukrainian license plates) crossed into Ukraine.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint on the eastern edge of Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), armed “DPR” members stopped the SMM. Despite informing the JCCC, armed “DPR” members refused to allow SMM access to Yasynuvata and the SMM left the area after an hour.
• At an “LPR” checkpoint in the border area near “LPR”-controlled Parkhomenko (29km east of Luhansk), armed men refused to allow the SMM to proceed and told it to leave the area. The SMM informed the JCCC about the restriction, but it was unable to facilitate access. The SMM departed the area after 20 minutes.

Other impediments:

• While following up on reports of an wounded “LPR” member at a hospital in “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), hospital staff refused to tell the SMM without “authorization” whether an “LPR” member had been admitted.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.