Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 29 March 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

The number of ceasefire violations observed in Donetsk region remained at a similar level compared with the previous day.[1] Whilst at the Donetsk central railway station (“DPR”-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 43 undetermined explosions, six bursts and 72 single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, mostly 3-8km south-west of its position. 

On the evening of 28 March, positioned in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven impacts of artillery rounds, 19 impacts of mortar and automatic-grenade-launcher rounds, and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-south-east and south-south-west of its position. During the evening hours of 28 March, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 57 impacts of mortar rounds, eight explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher rounds and 40 single shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, 6-12km south-west of its position.  

In an area between government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed numerous ceasefire violations. Whilst stationary 3km west of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 135 undetermined explosions, 22 bursts and 43 single shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-5km south-west of its position. Whilst in Avdiivka, the SMM heard one impact of an artillery round (122mm), one impact of a mortar round (82mm) and 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km east-south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM continued to record a low number of ceasefire violations. Whilst in the south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 400m-1km east of its position. Whilst near the Karbonit water supply plant in government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3-5km south of its position.  

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were present. At one site, it noted the presence of an additional weapon whose serial number was not included in the inventory list.

The SMM also revisited “DPR” and “LPR” permanent storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were present. 

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside the storage sites, the SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near government-controlled Ocheretyne (29km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.

The SMM revisited an “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage site and observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (D44, 85mm). The SMM also noted that one of those areas was abandoned and eight tanks (T-72) were missing as was observed on 14 March.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one surface-to-air missile launcher (9K33 Osa, 210mm) near government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), and one surface-to-air missile launcher (9K33 Osa, 210mm) near government-controlled Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed the presence of other hardware within the security zone in Luhansk and Donetsk regions: four armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-70) heading south-east in the vicinity of government-controlled Bakhmutivka (40km north-west of Luhansk); one APC (BTR-80) towed by a military-type truck heading east near “LPR”-controlled Yuvileine (10km west of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed one infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) and two multi-purpose armoured vehicles (MT-LB) parked inside and outside a compound, to which armed men denied the SMM access and demanded that the SMM leave the area immediately*.

The SMM observed the presence of mines. In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel showed the SMM six-eight anti-tank mines attached to each other by a string and laid on the road. The SMM did not observe any mine hazard signs in the area. At the same location, the SMM observed ongoing construction work for opening a checkpoint for civilians, including 20-30 workers clearing the area, building a sidewalk for civilians, installing kiosks for checking documents, and containers for fiscal service.

The SMM continued to observe the marking of areas possibly mined within the security zone. The SMM observed mine hazard signs (wooden boards painted in white and red stating “Mine”) around military installations and checkpoints in government-controlled Bobrove (56km north-west of Luhansk). Between government-controlled Katerynivka and Popasna (62 and 69km west of Luhansk, respectively), the SMM saw a newly established checkpoint and the road in front of the checkpoint was completely blocked with two lines of metal anti-tank barriers. Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel present told the SMM that the road had been closed for civilians due to the presence of mines. The SMM also saw that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel were putting up mine hazard signs (triangular signs in red print) after the SMM asked them about marking of the mined area. Outside the security zone, the SMM also observed mine hazard signs (wooden boards painted white stating “Mine”) in an uncultivated field in the vicinity of government-controlled Novookhtyrka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored the humanitarian situation in an area close to the contact line. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), a “village council” member told the SMM that shelling had occurred the same morning, which had caused damage to ten houses in the village but there had been no casualties. She added that 27 pupils in the village attended classes in the former premises of a library, which, the SMM observed, was closed. While in the village, the SMM heard an impact of a mortar round (120mm) 2-3km west of its position.

The SMM followed up on allegations that two women had been wounded by grenade fire near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the previous day (see SMM Daily Report 29 March). An armed man at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge told the SMM that the two wounded women had been admitted to the Luhansk regional hospital for medical treatment the previous day and had left the hospital in the morning as the wounds had been minor.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of essential infrastructure on both sides of the contact line. In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM monitored ongoing repair work on the gas pipeline distribution station. In “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed repairs to a water pipeline.    

The SMM monitored border areas not controlled by the Government. At the Uspenka (72km south-east of Donetsk) border crossing point, the SMM saw 36 civilian vehicles (mostly with Ukrainian license plates) and four trucks with trailers, waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. Two women (aged 50) told the SMM that they had driven to the crossing point and rushed to catch a train on the other side of the border.

The SMM monitored the situation at railway lines in government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), where it observed a long freight train loaded with coal travelling from “LPR”-controlled areas to a north-westerly direction.

The SMM monitored the activities of the civil formation Asker at crossing points at the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 19 February). On 28 March, at a crossing point in Chonhar (162km south-east of Kherson), an Asker member, who introduced herself as head of shift (Crimean Tatar woman), present told the SMM that they had started their operation at 10:00hrs at three crossing points in Chonhar, Kalanchak and Chaplynka (95 and 90km south-east of Kherson). According to her, Asker members provide legal consultation on all inquiries and/or complaints for people passing the crossing point, and, in addition, they monitor the activities of authorities at the crossing points. She added that their work was scheduled in 24hr shifts and each shift consisted of three Asker members. On the next day, at crossing points in Kalanchak and Chaplynka, the SMM also observed the presence of people in camouflage clothing, some of whom were wearing the Asker ID.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint on the south-western edge of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM encountered a roadblock with a tree branch and a power line post, which were lying across the road, and  could not proceed further to Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol) (see SMM Daily Report 23 February). Two armed men present told the SMM that they could not remove the tree branch and the power line post without permission from their “superiors”.
• In “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne, a man denied the SMM access to a fenced compound and demanded that the SMM leave the area immediately.
• In “LPR”-controlled Bilorichenskyi (21km south-west of Luhansk), armed men did not allow the SMM to enter a building guarded by them.

Conditional access:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint on the south-eastern edge of Yasynuvata, armed men allowed the SMM to proceed to an area close to the contact line only under escort by them.

Delay:

• In “LPR”-controlled Stakhanov (50km west of Luhansk), armed men denied the SMM access to a military-type compound guarded by them. The SMM contacted the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and was allowed access after an hour.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.