Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 4 February 2016

This report is for media and the general public

The SMM observed a relatively low number of ceasefire violations in Donbas. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The Mission encountered freedom-of-movement restrictions, the majority in areas not under government control.* Zaitseve residents told the SMM that the nearby crossing point was closed to vehicular traffic. The SMM learned that a large number of people crossed the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.

For the second consecutive day, the SMM recorded a relatively low number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region[1]. Positioned in a “DPR”-controlled area 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre between 8:50 and 15:30hrs,[2] the SMM heard a number of bursts and single shots from light and heavy machine-guns 2-4km to the west and north-west. Whilst facilitating and monitoring repairs to gas pipelines in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 1-3km to the south-east and nine undetermined explosions (assessed as training related) 20km to the west. An SMM mirror patrol in nearby “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) heard four mortar explosions 3-8km to the west.

At 07:07hrs, an SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) captured images showing three undetermined explosions in the area of Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol). Later in Kominternove, residents told the SMM that there had been fighting in the area the previous evening at approximately 17:00-18:00hrs. The SMM observed a house with a shell-damaged roof, which a resident said was the result of shelling the previous evening. Near “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol), 3.5km north-east of Kominternove, between 12:48 and 13:10hrs the SMM heard eight undetermined blasts and explosions, small-arms-and-light-weapons fire and anti-aircraft gun fire 5-7 km to the north-west.

Positioned 2km north of “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) for an hour, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10-12km to the west-south-west; two undetermined explosions 6-10km to the west; and, two undetermined explosions 5-7km to the north-north-west.

In the area around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM recorded two explosions. Whilst in the town at 9:44hrs, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion approximately 1km to the south. A few minutes later, positioned in an area not controlled by the Government, approximately 1km south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, another SMM patrol heard an undetermined explosion, and saw a rising plume of smoke, 50m to the north-east. The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) later told the SMM that the explosion had been caused by a dog that had activated a booby-trap. Near government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM at 10:50hrs heard an undermined explosion 5-10km to the south-west. A short time later, it heard an additional four undetermined explosions 5-10km to the south. Other ceasefire violations were assessed to have been part of live-fire training near government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk) and near “LPR”-controlled Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Close to a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Krasnyi Lyman (30km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM analysed a fresh crater, which it assessed to have been caused by an 82mm mortar. Crater analysis was inconclusive as to the direction of flight. An armed “LPR” member present told the SMM that it was one of approximately 20 rounds that had been fired at the checkpoint the previous evening from nearby Trokhizbenka. The SMM observed no other craters in the area. Later in Trokhizbenka, the SMM examined two fresh craters. The SMM assessed that undetermined rounds fired from the south had caused the craters. Earlier a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that approximately 50-82mm mortar and automatic grenade launcher rounds had been fired at the checkpoint. The SMM observed no other craters.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures, the SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to this site were present.

Beyond the withdrawal lines – but outside storage sites – the SMM observed the following Addendum-regulated weapons: two disassembled mortars (PM-38, 120mm) close to “DPR”-controlled Stepanivka (75km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the 16 October 2015 notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 32 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 12 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm); six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm); and, four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm). In addition, the SMM recorded the following Addendum-regulated weapons: 27 tanks and one mortar (2B11, 120 mm), the latter for the first time. The following weapons previously recorded at these sites were missing: six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm); ten Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120 mm); and, four Addendum-regulated tanks.

In areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines not controlled by the Government, the SMM revisited such locations and observed five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm); six towed howitzers (D-30, 122mm), five of which were hitched to trucks loaded with ammunition boxes; six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS, BM-12 Grad, 122mm); and, four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm).   

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed the following heavy weapons: four towed howitzers (2A65, 152mm) near government-controlled Kremenivka (27km north of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation affecting the civilian population near the contact line. Residents of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) – including the deputy head of the village council – told the SMM that the nearby Maiorsk checkpoint had been closed to all traffic on 3 February, preventing them from reaching their places of employment and/or evacuating their families and possessions from an area increasingly affected by fighting. They said Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had allowed pedestrians – but not vehicles – to cross on 4 February. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint close to the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the checkpoint commander told the SMM that approximately 2,000 people had crossed the bridge in both directions in the morning. Eleven people waiting to cross expressed their concern to the SMM that the crossing point could be closed because of fighting. An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint on the other side of the bridge told the SMM that approximately 2,000 people had crossed in both directions in the previous 24 hours. He attributed such a high number to people’s fears that the crossing point may be closed.

Close to the administrative boundary line, just outside the village of Chonhar (161km south-east of Kherson), the SMM on 3 February observed a new pylon and heard the sound of electric current flowing through the high-voltage line suspended from it. The line had been inactive since the pylon then in place was destroyed on 20 November 2015 (see Daily Report, 23 November 2015).

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas alongside the border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces refused to allow the SMM to enter a military compound near government-controlled Pryvilne (31km north of Mariupol);
• An armed “DPR” member in charge of a heavy weapons holding area allowed only two monitors and one language assistant to enter the site.

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members delayed the SMM for 33 minutes at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members insisted on opening the trunks of SMM vehicles at a checkpoint near Debaltseve;
• Fifteen kilometres north-east of Luhansk, armed “LPR” members insisted on inspecting SMM monitors’ identification and seeing their patrol plan;
• Armed “LPR” members at the Stanytsia Luhanska Bridge insisted on seeing and photographing SMM monitors’ identification.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] All times in this report are in Eastern European Time