Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 19 November 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. In particular, it was denied access to an “LPR”-controlled crossing point on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border. The SMM recorded no ceasefire violations around Donetsk airport.

Positioned at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation post at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk), between 07:45 and 14:45hrs[1], the SMM observed no ceasefire violations. Russian Federation Armed Forces and Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives at the JCCC informed the SMM that there had also been no ceasefire violations recorded there the previous night.

The SMM did, however, record kinetic activity close to “DPR”-controlled Lukove (41km north-east of Mariupol). Positioned in the town, it heard over 40 undetermined explosions 2km to the south-west.[2]

The situation remained generally calm in most areas of Luhansk region. The SMM did, however, record a number of ceasefire violations. In government-controlled Putylyne (44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven outgoing rounds of heavy artillery, approximately 6km south-east of its position; and, small-arms and light-weapons fire, approximately 10km south-east of its position. There is a Ukrainian Armed Forces training ground close to government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the general vicinity from which these rounds and fire emanated. In addition, positioned in the “Lugansk People’s Republic” ("LPR")-controlled towns of Berdianka, Frunze and Khoroshe (45km north-west, 40km north-west and 35km west of Luhansk, respectively), the SMM heard a single undetermined explosion from each location.

On 18 November, after analysing three fresh craters close to a residential area on the northern outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Donetskyi (50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM concluded that they had been caused by 82mm mortars fired from the north-west. Armed “LPR” members accompanying the SMM said they had been fired the previous evening. Later, close to nearby “LPR”-controlled Pugachovka, the SMM observed an unexploded 122mm round, which it assessed, had been fired from a western direction. The armed “LPR” members said it had impacted two days before.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire on the contact line near Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk), enabling Ukrainian Armed Forces medics to recover the body of a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team member who reportedly had been killed, along with two colleagues, when a mine exploded on 15 November.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces and “LPR” permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At the sites, all previously-recorded weapons, which matched the quantity and serial numbers listed in the previously-provided inventories, were present.

In other areas beyond the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed the following Addendum-proscribed weapons:  one main battle tank (MBT; T-64) near "LPR"-controlled Heorhiivka (16km south of Luhansk); 12 MBTs near "LPR"-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); two MBTs (T-64) near government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk); two MBTs (T-64) near government-controlled Svatove (127km north-west of Luhansk); and, 20 MBTs (T-72 and T-64) near "LPR"-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). In violation of the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one MBT (T-64) near “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal and movement of heavy weapons. Neither “DPR” nor “LPR” members have yet provided the requested inventories or locations of most designated permanent storage sites for these weapons as requested by the SMM on 16 October. The Ukrainian military authorities have also as of yet to provide such information. Nonetheless, the SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though most of them did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

At Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM observed in total six anti-tank guns (T-12 Rapira, 100mm), 19 towed howitzers (152mm 2A65 Msta-B) and 12 towed guns (152mm 2A36 Giatsint-B). Of note, 11 MLRS (122mm BM-21 Grad) previously recorded in these areas were missing. At one “DPR” holding area, the SMM was denied access*. At other “DPR” holding areas, the SMM observed, in total six self-propelled artillery pieces (2S1 Gvozdika 122mm) and nine MLRS (BM-21 Grad; 122mm).

An additional “DPR” holding area complied with the criteria outlined in the 16 October notification. At this permanent weapons storage site, the SMM verified weapons withdrawn.

In addition to heavy weapons at holding areas, the SMM observed eight howitzers (D-30, 122mm) near "LPR"-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), which is beyond the withdrawal lines.

The SMM monitored the movement of other hardware. It observed: four armoured tracked vehicles (MT-LB) near government-controlled Stepove  (34km north-east of Luhansk); seven armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR) near government-controlled Svatove (127km north-west of Luhansk);  one military-type truck towing an APC (BTR-70) 15km west of “DPR”-controlled Khartsyzk (26km east-north-east of Donetsk); and, an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city.

The SMM facilitated and monitored demining between “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) and nearby government-controlled Artemove. Despite some small-arms fire – which was not directed towards the deminers – a 200m stretch, along the route of a power line requiring repair, was cleared. The SMM also facilitated and monitored demining – and subsequent repair work on power lines – in an “LPR”-controlled area close to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk).

Five kilometres west of the “LPR”-controlled crossing point on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border at Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk), armed “LPR” members refused to allow the SMM to proceed further*, saying they had standing orders not to allow the SMM to access the area.

In Velyki Kopani (32km south-east of Kherson) on 17 November, the general director of a wholesale fruit-and-vegetable market told the SMM that farmers had lost 30 percent of their profit as it had become more difficult to sell into the Crimean market. He added that many people had complained to him about the behaviour of Right Sector activists at crossing points on the administrative boundary line between the peninsula and the mainland. He cited unwarranted vehicle searches and intimidation tactics. He said that many farmers – anticipating access problems to the Crimean market because of the blockade of the peninsula – had reduced the amount of acreage given over to specific crops.  At one of the three crossing points – Chaplynka (90km south-east of Kherson) – the SMM the same day noted activists stopping and checking vehicles. They asked drivers questions about their travel plans and checked the trunks of their vehicles. Drivers were accommodating and promptly complied.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

• Armed “LPR” members refused to allow the SMM access to an “LPR”-controlled crossing point on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border at Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk).
• In “DPR”-controlled Lukove (41km north-east of Mariupol), armed “DPR” members told the SMM to leave the village, saying written permission was required from their commander.
• Armed “DPR” members at a heavy weapons holding area refused to allow the SMM entry, saying their superior had ordered them to do so.  

Conditional access:

• While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM had a “DPR” “escort” at all times, acceptance of which was effectively a condition for continued monitoring in the city.

[1] All times are in Kyiv time unless otherwise specified.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.