Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 7 October 2015
This report is for the media and general public.
The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The situation in Donetsk and Luhansk regions was relatively calm, although the SMM heard several explosions. In Luhansk region, the SMM received further withdrawal plans. Verification of withdrawal stipulated in the Addendum to the Package of measures was not scheduled for the reporting period.
The SMM observed a relatively calm situation in Donetsk region. In Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three explosions south-west of the SMM’s position. Additionally, the SMM observed four men wearing camouflage fatigues loading a hatchback civilian-type vehicle, who promptly drove away when they noticed the SMM.
In government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as likely demining. The Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in Mariupol had informed the SMM that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are conducting demining activities in the area of government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol).
At the government checkpoint in Buhas (46km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM again observed long queues of civilian vehicles (see SMM Daily Report 5October 2015) with 156 civilian vehicles heading north (in the direction of Donetsk city) and approximately 400 civilian vehicles heading south (in the direction of Mariupol).
The SMM conducted a focus group discussion at the Internally Displaced Person Centre in Yenakiieve (“DPR”-controlled, 37km north-east of Donetsk). The internally displaced persons currently residing in the Centre stated to the SMM that they needed better provision of food supplies and medicines, particularly for those suffering from physical disabilities and chronic illnesses.
In Luhansk region the SMM observed a generally calm situation. In government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard approximately 30 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery from a northerly direction. The SMM assessed the explosions as likely training activities. At a checkpoint in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers assured the SMM that the explosions were part of training. Ukrainian JCCC officers had informed the SMM of planned training activities in the vicinity of government-controlled Chervonyi Zhovten (38km north of Luhansk).
In government-controlled Troitske (69km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a damaged military excavator that the local Ukrainian Armed Forces commander in Troitske claimed had been struck by an anti-tank guided missile earlier in the day. The SMM observed remnants consistent with parts of anti-tank guided missiles (9M111). The SMM assessed that the missiles had been fired from the east or south-east. The SMM observed a military prosecutor, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC and military police arriving at the site.
In Myrne (“LPR"-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) and Uspenka (“LPR"-controlled, 23km south-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed what was described as combat training areas. Both areas are in compliance with the respective withdrawal lines. At the first area the SMM noted 23 stationary main battle tanks (T-64). At the second, the SMM saw 10 stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1, 122mm).
In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM, after facilitating a local window of silence, met and escorted an engineer from the Ukrainian government roads agency to two improvised wooden crossing points that connect the damaged parts of the bridge over the Siverskyi Donets river. A second SMM patrol accompanied the "LPR" deputy commander of the checkpoint on the "LPR"-controlled side of the bridge and three armed guards as they held a meeting with the engineer in the vicinity of the checkpoint. As a result of the conversation between the engineer and the "LPR" members, a decision was made to replace the wooden hand rails with metal rails. Nonetheless, the engineer and the “LPR” members were of the opinion that pedestrian traffic will still have to be controlled in order to prevent overcrowding, as the engineer deemed the bridge potentially unsafe for heavy loads.
The SMM re-visited seven Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas. The SMM noted that previously-recorded weapons were absent from six of the areas and the seventh area was not in use, as the SMM first observed in late May. At the first area the SMM observed that two previously registered self-propelled artillery (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) were absent as they have been since September and seven previously registered self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) were absent. At the second area, the SMM noted that seven previously recorded anti-tank guns (2A29 MT12 Rapira, 100mm) were absent. At the third area, the SMM noted that nine previously registered anti-tank guns (2A29 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were absent. At the fourth area, the SMM observed one main battle tank (T-64) absent. At the fifth, the SMM noted that five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) were absent. At the sixth area, the SMM observed that the following previously recorded weapons were absent: one anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mmfour self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), four towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and eight anti-tank guided missile systems (9K114 Shturm).
The SMM re-visited two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas. At one of the areas, all previously recorded weapons were present. At the second area, however, the SMM observed that two Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were absent, as previously recorded in April.
In a video teleconference the SMM and Ukrainian and Russian heads of the JCCC agreed that the extensive removal of heavy weapons from holding areas remained a serious concern. The SMM reiterated its request for updated lists of locations of all weapons previously withdrawn. The heads of the JCCC assured the SMM that these updated lists, requested by the SMM on 14 and again on 24 September, would be provided. Progress with regard to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measure was also discussed. In Luhansk region, the SMM received further withdrawal plans by the sides.
The SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) continued to observe, in violation of respective withdrawal lines, presence of heavy weapons in “DPR”-controlled areas. In the area of Sontseve (60km north-east of Mariupol) twelve main battle tanks (MBTs), in the area of Michurine (56km north-east of Mariupol) three MBTs and in the area of Kozlivka (42km east of Mariupol) four 122mm self-propelled howitzers 2S1 “Gvozdika” were observed.
The SMM followed up with the spokesperson of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for Odessa region on the explosion that reportedly occurred at a recruiting centre in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (45km south-west of Odessa). The interlocutor confirmed the case and informed the SMM that it had occurred during the night, and that an explosive device in the equivalent of 200 gr trinitrotoluene (TNT) had been placed on the ledge of a ground floor window. The interlocutor informed the SMM that nobody had been injured and the police had initiated an investigation under the “intentional destruction or damage of property” article of the Criminal Code.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. Armed individuals continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.
Conditional access:
- A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier stopped the SMM at a checkpoint 1km north of government-controlled Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk) and demanded to inspect the trunk of one of the SMM’s vehicles. The SMM complied with the request and was allowed to proceed shortly after.
Delayed access:
- Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers stopped the SMM 2km north of government-controlled Novobakhmutivka (27km north-west of Donetsk). The soldiers consulted their commander and the SMM was able to proceed after a 15-minute delay.
Other impediments:
- The SMM UAVs were subject to intermittent heavy video jamming over “DPR”-controlled areas east and north-east of Mariupol.
For a complete breakdown of incidents, please see the annexed table.