Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 5 August 2015

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations.* The SMM continued to facilitate local ceasefires in the Donetsk region enabling repair works for water pipelines.  

The SMM observed a relatively low number of ceasefire violations at and around the Donetsk airport. Between 08:49 and 11:12hrs, at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk central railway station (“Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 14 explosions, 1.5-5km north, north-east, west, and north-west of its position, and sporadic exchange of small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire 2km north of its position.

At the north-western entrance of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 10:40 and 11:00hrs, the SMM heard several bursts of small-arms fire, as well as two explosions, approximately 2km north-east of its position.

For the third consecutive day (see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2015), the SMM facilitated a local ceasefire for the repair of water pipelines in Spartak (“DPR”-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre). Whilst there, at 10:08hrs, the SMM heard outgoing small arms-fire 200m north-east of its position, followed by one outgoing rocket-propelled grenade from the same general area, as well as outgoing mortar fire at 10:25hrs. At 10:34hrs, the SMM heard one incoming 82mm mortar at the same location. Shortly after, the workers completed their activity for the day and left the area.

The SMM continued to facilitate a local ceasefire for repair works of a water pipeline between government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) and “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2015). At 12:56hrs, the SMM heard a burst of small arms and light weapons (SALW), at 14:32hrs one explosion, and at 14:57 and 15:00 busts of SALW, all from the same location 700m north-east of the SMM’s position. At 15:14 and 16:21hrs, the SMM heard an outgoing automatic grenade launcher (AGL) round 700m to 1km to the north-west as well as SALW fire from the north-east at 15:30hrs. The works for the day were completed at 16:25hrs and the SMM departed at 16:30hrs while they heard nine AGL explosions approximately 1km from their position.

In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Luhansk), at 14:00hrs, the SMM observed six black smoke plumes from the area of Vesela Hora (“Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) near Shchastia, as well as a white smoke plume from approximately 1km north-west of the Shchastia power plant. Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that shelling was on-going in Shchastia and had occurred intermittently since the early morning hours of 5 August.

In Vesela Hora, the SMM observed several fires on houses and fields. An elderly woman showed the SMM a crater which she said had been caused on 29 July. The SMM found remnants of munitions in the 80cm diameter crater, but was unable to determine its cause.

The SMM followed up on information from the JCCC on alleged shelling on 4 August in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk) near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint. The SMM analyzed two craters in a non-residential area 1km east of Novotoshkivske, and assessed them to have been caused by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (Grad, 122mm) originating from the south.

In Sverdlovsk (“LPR”-controlled, 61km south-east of Luhansk), a member of Kovcheg charity foundation told the SMM that they provide meals for 2,000 persons a day through five soup kitchens in the Sverdlovsk district. He expressed concerns that there were large amounts of people in need that did not fall within the criteria of the soup kitchens operated by the “LPR”, and explained that the cost per meal in Sverdlovsk district had doubled since October 2014. During the distribution of lunch at the soup kitchen, the SMM saw that the majority of beneficiaries were women of middle age and above, as well as approximately 20 per cent of children and persons with disabilities.

On 4 August, the SMM revisited one Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area and tried to revisit another at locations which complied with the respective withdrawal lines. At one of these sites, all previously recorded weapons were in situ. The SMM was not granted access to the other site on the grounds that the commander was not present to escort the SMM to inspect the weapons*. On 5 August, the SMM revisited six Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the locations of which complied with the respective withdrawal lines. At four of these sites, in total, 33 heavy weapons were missing: seven towed artillery guns (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm); four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm); eight MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm); six anti-tank guns (2A19 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and eight anti-tank missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S). The SMM also revisited three “DPR” holding areas, the locations of which complied with the respective withdrawal lines. At one of these sites, the SMM was initially denied access* and was later only allowed to inspect the weapons from a distance*. The SMM observed that three anti-tank guns (2A19 MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were missing. At the second “DPR” site, two artillery pieces (152mm) were missing. At the third site, the SMM saw that all the previously recorded weapons were in situ.

In a western, government-controlled part of the Luhansk region, the SMM saw one main battle tank (T-64), which had not been withdrawn at least 15km from the contact line.

The SMM followed up on the attack by armed individuals of a building in Kharkiv associated with the Opposition Bloc (see SMM Daily Report 4 August 2015). The acting head of the Kyvskyi district police told the SMM that investigations under charges of hooliganism committed with the use of arms (Article 296 of the Criminal Code) were on-going.

The commander of the border guard in charge of the Pletenivka border crossing point at the international border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (80km north-east of Kharkiv) told the SMM that the daily average for crossing in both directions was of 2,000 individuals, 700 civilian vehicles, 20 civilian trucks and ten buses. At the border crossing point, the SMM observed 30 civilian vehicles waiting to cross to the Russian Federation.

The SMM followed up on media reports of an explosion at the restaurant Villa u Moria on Luzanovka beach (10km north of Odessa city centre), which had occurred during the night of 4 to 5 August. On site, the SMM observed that the left side of the restaurant building was completely destroyed by fire with nothing but concrete walls left and that the interior also had suffered substantial damages. One of the restaurant owners told the SMM that a guard had heard a small explosion shortly after midnight and then noticed that the building was on fire. A representative of the regional police told the SMM that they had launched an investigation based on charges of intentional destruction or damage of property (Article 194 of the Criminal Code).

On 3 August, in Horodenka (70km west of Ivano-Frankivsk), the SMM followed up on media reports about arson on 2 August targeting two police cars, the office of the Right Sector (Pravyi Sektor), and the administration offices of three villages Luka, Ostrivets and Semakivtsi (36km, 53km and 63km south-east of Ivano-Frankivsk), all located in Horodenka district. The head of the district state administration told the SMM that the regional police had reinforced its presence in the district with 24/7 patrolling and guarding of administrative buildings and that the chief of police of Horodenka had been suspended.

In Kyiv, the SMM followed the parliament’s fourth session of the “temporary investigation commission on the Mukacheve shootout” (see SMM Spot Report 12 July 2015). A senior prosecutor stated that there were seven Right Sector members involved, of whom one had died, two had been detained, two were in hospital and two remained at large.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Lviv, and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM. 

Denied access:

• At a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area, the SMM was allowed to inspect heavy weapons only from a distance. 
• The SMM was not granted access to a Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area on the grounds that the commander was not present to escort the SMM to inspect the weapons.

Delay:

• At a “DPR” checkpoint near Oleksandriivka (“DPR”-controlled, 19km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM was asked to open the trunk of its vehicles, and was delayed for five minutes.
• At a checkpoint operated by the Right Sector in Iskra (government-controlled, 123km west of Donetsk) the SMM was asked if it transported weapons and was requested to open the trunks of both vehicles. The SMM was allowed to proceed after five minutes.
• On the road leading to the western outskirts of Shyrokyne, the SMM was stopped by Ukrainian Armed Forces and was told to wait for clearance before being allowed to proceed ten minutes later.

For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please, see the annexed table.