Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 1 July 2015

This report is for the media and the general public

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by third parties and security considerations*. The fighting at and around Donetsk airport continued with increased intensity. The SMM revisited a number of Ukrainian Armed Forces, “DPR” and “LPR” heavy weapons holding areas.

The fighting at and around Donetsk airport continued with increased intensity. Between 08:00 and 18:00hrs, at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation point at Donetsk central railway station (“Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled, 8km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard a total of 306 explosions.[1]

At the JCCC headquarters in Soledar (government-controlled, 75km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Russian Federation Armed Forces representatives at the JCCC presented the SMM with two separate logbooks. Out of 66 recorded ceasefire violations, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attributed 53 to the “DPR” and the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”). The logbook presented by the Russian Federation Armed Forces indicated that 57 out of the recorded 74 ceasefire violations had been attributed to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The acting “mayor” of Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that the settlement Molochnaia in Vuhlehirsk (“DPR”-controlled, 48km north-east of Donetsk) had been shelled on the evening of 30 June, no casualties reported. Speaking to the SMM in Vuhlehirsk, residents confirmed that Molochnaia had been shelled. A middle-aged woman, resident of Debaltseve, informed the SMM that the city’s tap water was contaminated with sewage and therefore not usable. The doctor in charge of the central hospital of Debaltseve confirmed this, adding that inhabitants use water from their wells.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives at the JCCC told the SMM that there had been heavy shelling (120mm, 82mm mortar, tank and anti-aircraft gun ZU-23-2 fire) towards government-controlled area of Novhorodske (34km north of Donetsk) and environs for two hours on the evening of 30 June, coming from Shakhta 6/7 (mine) ("DPR"-controlled, 43km north-east of Donetsk). According to them, three persons had been injured by the shelling in Novhorodske.

In Luhansk, while in Nyzhnie (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard explosions. The JCCC posts in government-controlled Lysychansk (90km west of Luhansk) and Novoaidar (57km north of Luhansk) jointly reported four ceasefire violations that were all attributed to the “LPR”, including the use of mortar 82mm, and anti-aircraft machine-gun fire.

The general director of the Luhanskvoda company informed the SMM that the ongoing repair work on a water pump station at “LPR”-controlled Raivka (18km north-west of Luhansk) would have a limited impact, since, only one of the 12 wells (in government-controlled area) are currently feeding the pump station. The repair work is being carried out during a ceasefire window arranged through the JCCC, and monitored by the SMM (see Daily Report 25 June).

The SMM revisited three “DPR”*, two “LPR” and seven Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, the location of which complied with the respective withdrawal lines. At one “DPR” site, the SMM noted that a previously recorded artillery piece (122mm 2S1 “Gvozdika”) was missing. At the two “LPR” holding areas, the SMM found all previously recorded weapons to be in situ. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces holding areas, the SMM found some previously recorded weapons missing: one self-propelled howitzer (152mm 2S3 “Akatsiya”), two anti-tank guns (100mm 2A19 MT-12 “Rapira”), three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (122mm BM-21 “Grad”), four towed howitzers (152mm “Msta-B”), and three towed howitzers (152mm 2A36 “Giatsint-B”).

Despite claims by all sides that the withdrawal of heavy weapons was complete, the SMM observed the following weapons’ movements/presence in areas that are non-compliant with the respective withdrawal lines: in different government-controlled areas, the SMM saw three anti-tank guns (MT-12 100mm) on the move in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 55km north of Donetsk), as well as two self-propelled howitzers (152mm 2S3) near Smolianynove (government-controlled, 70km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), in “DPR”-controlled areas, spotted two main battle tanks (MBTs) and three artillery pieces in Oktiabr (26km north-east of Mariupol); four MBTs in Sartana (19km north-east of Mariupol); four MBTs in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol)  and two towed artillery pieces in Zaichenko (25km north-east of Mariupol). The UAV also saw three MBTs in government-controlled Pionerske (13km east of Mariupol).

On 1 July, the SMM visited the site of an explosion, which occurred the previous night, in close proximity to a dormitory of the Polytechnic University in Kharkiv. The SMM was shown the location of a small crater, situated 30m from the building entrance. The dormitory manager told the SMM that some windows of the building had been broken as a result of the shockwave. The head of the district police told the SMM that the initial findings indicate that the explosion was caused probably by trinitrotoluene (TNT). No casualties were reported. An investigation has been launched on charges of hooliganism, under Article 296 of the Criminal Code.

On 30 June, in Odessa the SMM visited three border crossing points along the western border with Moldova: Kuchurhan (75 km north-west of Odessa), Kardamycheve (110km north-west of Odessa), and Hrebenyky (120 km north-west of Odessa). At Kuchurhan, an officer of the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) told the SMM that SGBS units had been reinforced by locally-mobilized members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and National Guard.

On 30 June, in Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM monitored a hearing of the case against a journalist, Ruslan Kotsaba, accused of high treason for his statements against mobilization. The court heard five witnesses, who had seen the video with Kotsaba’s alleged message against mobilization. The court prolonged detention for the defendant until 28 August.

On 1 July, the deputy chief of police and the chief of criminal police for Ivano-Frankivsk region told the SMM, that since the start of 2015, the police had seized 101 weapons, smuggled from the Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) zone.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Lviv and Kyiv.

* Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM by both “DPR” and “LPR”. The SMM UAVs cannot operate in the Luhansk region as it is beyond their range.

Delay:

- In government-controlled Bilovodsk (74km north-east of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel staffing the checkpoint at the south-eastern end of the town checked the trunk of an SMM vehicle. The procedure took three minutes, after which the patrol continued.

- At government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel staffing the checkpoint on the southern exit of town stopped two SMM vehicles for five minutes and searched their trunks. The soldiers claimed that he had an order from his superior command to search the SMM vehicles.

Prevented access:

- At one “DPR” heavy weapons holding area, only one SMM monitor, accompanied by a language assistant, was allowed to inspect the weapons.

- At another “DPR” holding area, the SMM was not allowed to register the serial numbers to compare them with previous SMM records.

Interference with the UAV:

- An SMM UAV was subject to jamming in Zaichenko (“DPR”-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol). At the same location, the UAV spotted what appeared to be components of a jamming system (a direction finding antenna), mounted on a camouflaged armoured personnel carrier.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions on SMM access and freedom of movement” for further information.

[1]  For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.