Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. In Donetsk city, the SMM saw a gathering relating to the reported death of Aleksandr Zakharchenko and at least one hundred members of the armed formations securing the area. The SMM recorded a ceasefire violation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement area as well as near Yasynuvata.* The SMM observed a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines near Ozarianivka. The Mission observed anti-tank mines near Popasna. The SMM saw that the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska was closed and observed that checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region had been re-opened. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM’s observations were limited during the reporting period for security considerations.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including nine explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (18 explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (seven), compared with the previous 24 hours.

Following the explosion that reportedly killed Aleksandr Zakharchenko and injured another member of the armed formations and at least nine other people on 31 August, the SMM observed a calm situation in Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled). (See SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018.) On 2 September, the SMM saw several thousand people (men and women, aged 18-60) gathered in front of the opera house at 82 Artema Street for a pre-announced “lying-in-state ceremony” relating to the death of Zakharchenko. The Mission also saw a large poster of Zakharchenko on the façade of the opera house. There were at least one hundred members of the armed formations, some of whom were armed with assault rifles and pistols, securing the area. The SMM also observed at least one hundred members of the armed formations, some of whom were armed with assault rifles, on Pushkina Boulevard where the explosion had occurred. Some of them told the Mission that their presence on Pushkina Boulevard was related to “anti-terrorist attack drills”.

On the evening of 31 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded six projectiles in flight (all from north-west to south-east) and four illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 31 August-1 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 12 projectiles in flight (six from south to north, five from north to south and one from north-west to south-east), all 3-3.5km east-north-east. On the evening and night of 1-2 September, the camera recorded 80 projectiles in flight (64 from south to north, 14 from north to south and two from north-west to south-east) and two undetermined explosions, all 3-3.5km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-south-east. 

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 31 August and 1 September, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations (two explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). Between the evenings of 1 and 2 September, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 31 August-1 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening of 1 September, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the evening and night of 1-2 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an  undetermined explosion 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), followed by an undetermined explosion 1-2km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and a projectile in flight from east to west 1-2km west-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 2 September, positioned about 650m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as artillery rounds 3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 31 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) west of Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 1 September, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S5 Giatsint-S,152mm) and five towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), all stationary at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 31 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Ozarianivka and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 2 September, the SMM saw two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1), a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 31 August, the SMM saw an ACV (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 22 craters, assessed as probably caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from west-north-westerly, north-westerly and northerly directions (not visible in imagery from 22 August 2018), near well-maintained trenches, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 31 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time nine anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field north-east of Popasna about 550m north of road T0504 (not visible in imagery from 21 August 2018) which appeared to have been damaged, assessed as possibly due to a fire.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of the temporary closure of the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska from 2 to 7 September (see SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018). On 1 September, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw about 15 pedestrians in a queue to travel towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians in the opposite direction. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw about 50 pedestrians in a queue to travel towards government-controlled areas and no pedestrians in the opposite direction. Five people (men and women, aged 40-60) told the SMM that the opening of entry-exit checkpoints near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) and the replacement of wooden ramps of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge with a straight bridge installation were needed. On 2 September, the SMM saw both checkpoints closed and did not observe any pedestrians queuing at either of the checkpoints. The same day, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw a crane, an excavator and three trucks and observed a container module arrive at the site. A representative of the water company Popasna Vodokanal onsite told the SMM that new facilities, including a civilian shelter and 16 sanitary facilities (two for disabled people), would be installed at the checkpoint.

The SMM followed up on reports of temporary closures of checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, following the reported death of Aleksandr Zakharchenko (see above). On the evening of 31 August, members of the armed formations told the SMM that checkpoints of the armed formations near Horlivka, Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk) in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region had been closed. On the afternoon of 1 September, they said that the checkpoints had been re-opened. During the same afternoon, the SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Pyshchevyk – across the contact line from Horlivka, Oleksandrivka and Verkhnoshyrokivske, respectively – recorded pedestrians and vehicles travelling in both directions. Later in the day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted civilian vehicles passing through the entry-exit checkpoints near Maiorsk and Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk, across the contact line from Olenivka) as well as the checkpoint near Horlivka.

On 2 September, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 1 and 2 September, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[3]

Conditional access:

• On 2 September, two armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage through a checkpoint north of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) only after inspecting the SMM vehicle trunks.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and on the northern edge of Popasna were not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.