Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period and none in Luhansk region. The Mission followed up on a civilian casualty in Zalizne. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed a recently fortified position in the disengagement area near Zolote. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Novoazovsk (where the SMM was turned back after waiting for five hours, preventing it from accessing Novoazovsk and the nearby border crossing point on the border with the Russian Federation) and at two border crossing points on the border with the Russian Federation in Luhansk region.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi, Mius, Vuhlehirsk and Debaltseve. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to a pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions).

On the evening and night of 2-3 August, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded nine undetermined explosions, 97 projectiles in flight (about half from north-westerly directions to south-easterly directions) and five bursts, all 0.3-4km south.                                                                                                          

On the evening and night of 2-3 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded 22 undetermined explosions, 175 projectiles in flight (most from west to east), four illumination flares and a muzzle flash, all 1-4km north.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded four explosions.

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 3 August, in Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), a woman (80 years old) told the SMM that on 8 June at around noon, she felt a sharp pain in her right shoulder and went to her neighbour, who called her an ambulance. The woman showed the SMM a scar on her shoulder as well as a hole in a south-east-facing window in the living room of her ground-floor apartment on Papanina Street in Zalizne. On 10 June, medical staff at a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that the woman had been admitted on 8 June with a non-penetrating bullet wound to her right shoulder.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM did not observe any ceasefire violations. Inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces position which was recently fortified with sandbags and logs, as well as three green small-arms-ammunition-type boxes nearby.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas on 2 August, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) travelling north in convoy near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk), six MLRS (BM-21) driving south on road M03 near Mius (65km south-west of Luhansk), six towed howitzers moving in convoy (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a government-controlled area on 2 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela‑10, 120mm) near Hranitne (78km south-west of Donetsk). On 3 August, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) near Rivnopil (86km west of Donetsk) as well as eight MLRS (BM-21) near Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area on 2 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six towed howitzers (D-30) and a tank (T-64) near Khrustalnyi.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas on 2 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variants) near Fashchivka (60km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a mine hazard sign approximately 200m from houses in Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), at the edge of a road near a field. The sign was a red rectangle displaying a white skull-and-crossbones and the text “Danger Mines!” in English. Local residents told the SMM that these houses were inhabited and the nearby fields had been mined since 2014.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a gathering of approximately 50 people (mainly elderly women) in Stanytsia Luhanska. Some of them told the SMM that they were upset about lengthy waiting times required to cross the nearby entry-exit checkpoint. According to a commander of the State Border Guard Service, 11,000 people cross the entry-exit checkpoint daily – well above its capacity of 3,000.

The SMM visited three border areas outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for two minutes, the SMM saw a covered cargo truck (with “LPR” plates) and two buses (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine before a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw two women and six men (in their early thirties) entering Ukraine and two women and two men (in their fifties) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for five minutes, the SMM saw a man and a woman (in their fifties) exiting Ukraine before a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial:

• Armed members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), citing orders from a “superior,” thus preventing the SMM from accessing Novoazovsk and the nearby border crossing point on the border with the Russian Federation (approximately 10km east of the checkpoint). The SMM waited at the checkpoint for over five hours before turning back. The SMM observed numerous civilian cars passing through the checkpoint, including, at one point, two SUVs with rotation lights and two sedan vehicles, none bearing licence plates, which passed through the checkpoints in the direction of the border.
• At the border crossing point near Izvaryne, a man in military style clothing again demanded that the SMM leave the area.
• At the border crossing point near Sievernyi, a man in military style clothing again demanded that the SMM leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern side of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that mines had not been cleared on the road leading north toward Shchastia. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]   Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]   This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]   The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.