Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 17 July 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near and observed again military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three areas as well as, again, in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Zaitseve and Novotoshkivske. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering outside the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 125 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a total of 27 explosions (19 undetermined and eight assessed as outgoing mortar rounds), 78 projectiles in flight (including 34 from east to west, 11 from north-west to south-east and 12 from west to east) and six muzzle flashes all 0.5-4km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west, and a projectile from west-south-west to east-north-east 0.3-0.6km south.

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two tracer rounds in flight from north to south and a tracer round from south to north, followed by a total of 19 projectiles in flight (ten from north to south, five from south to north and four from north-west to south-east), an undetermined explosion and a tracer round from north to south, all 1-3km east.

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded totals of 17 projectiles in flight (12 from west to east, two from north-west to south-east, two from south-west to north-east and one in vertical flight), six bursts, two illumination flares (one from north-west to south-east and one in vertical flight) and four muzzle flashes, all 1.5-3km north and north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 16-17 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about 90 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 12 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

During the day on 17 July, positioned in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 35km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (six assessed as outgoing mortar rounds and six as their subsequent impacts), all 3-5km south.

On 13 July, the SMM lost contact with one of its mid-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Positioned near Nepilivika (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM launched a mid-range UAV. After flying for 27 minutes without any incident, the SMM abruptly lost contact with the UAV as it was flying at an altitude of about 150m approximately 3.7km north-west of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk) and about 4km south-east of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (see below). As of 18 July, the UAV has not been recovered.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 16 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a military-type truck (GAZ-66), a military-type van (UAZ-469) and two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area. The UAV also spotted a trench system (assessed as recently dug) in a backyard 60m from a residential property in Katerynivka, outside the disengagement area, about 300m from its western edge. On 17 July, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka, the SMM saw two armed persons (a man and a woman) in military-style clothing inside the disengagement area, exiting Katerynivka and walking towards a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On the night of 16-17 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst in vertical flight assessed as three rounds of an undetermined weapon 5-8km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 15 July, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM saw a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a field about 2.5m east of a road approximately 100m north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). On 17 July, the SMM noted that the tailfin was no longer present.

During the day on 17 July, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Blahodatne (44km south-west of Donetsk) heading north.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft weapons[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV and three probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (44km west of Luhansk), two probable armoured personnel carriers (APC) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and an ACV near Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (a BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Zolote and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four self-propelled anti-aircraft systems (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol). On 17 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) near Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk).

On 16 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted a 25m-long trench about 400m east-north-east of a previously observed Ukrainian Armed Forces position in a northern area of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018) as well as two trenches (25m- and 150m-long) near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in a compound adjacent to a residential area of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk). On 17 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six IFVs (three BMP-1 and three BMP-2) near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 86km south of Donetsk) and an SMM mini-UAV spotted a military-type position near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 28 June 2018).

On 16 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six craters south-west of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction and at least 13 craters east of Sakhanka, assessed as caused by artillery (122mm and 152mm) rounds fired from a south-westerly direction (all not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018).

The SMM observed  demining activities. Near Makarove (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Luhansk) on the eastern side of road P-22, the SMM saw four men in Ukrainian State Emergency Service uniforms and six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel placing sticks and red tape assessed as part of demining activities.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and water pipelines near a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) and near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated the strengthening of the dam of the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka  (78km east of Donetsk) for approximately an hour, the SMM saw 17 cars (six with Ukrainian and ten with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine and 21 cars (seven with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and nine with “DPR” plates), two vans (with Ukrainian licence plates), two buses (with about 30 passengers each, with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians entering Ukraine.

At a reservoir near a phenol factory near Zalizne, close to the contact line, recent SMM UAV footage from 17 July did not reveal new indications of military presence when compared with imagery from June 2018 (see SMM Daily Report 29 June 2018).

The SMM monitored a gathering in Kyiv and saw two separate groups outside the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office at 11 Isaakiana Street. According to media reports, on 4 April, representatives of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau accused the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office of corruption during a session of Parliament. The first group consisted of about 200 people (men and women, aged 20-40), some of whom were holding banners critical of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. The second group consisted of about 120 people (mostly women, aged 40-60) who stood on the other side of the street and held banners critical of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine; some of them were carrying flags of a political party. The SMM saw about 150 police officers on the street and 20 police officers protecting the front door of the Office. No incidents were observed while the SMM was present.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and again denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018).
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 16 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report 17 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• In Luhansk city (nongovernment-controlled), a member of the armed formations said that he could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• In Luhansk city, hospital staff said that they could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• In Holubivka, a woman who introduced herself as a community representative said that she could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
• In Khoroshe (nongovernment-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk), a woman who introduced herself as a community representative said that she could not provide the SMM with information without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.