Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 June 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations in the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas and also observed military personnel in the latter. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as in Komar and Zaichenko and at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance to a water pumping station near Artema. In Mukacheve and Lviv, the SMM continued following up on an attack on members of the Roma community in Lviv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including, however, fewer explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions).

During the evening and night of 25-26 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south and south-east. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 2-4km south-east.

During the day on 26 June, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions and about 600 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 2-3km south-east, as well as three shots of small-arms fire 300-500m south-east.

During the day on 26 June, positioned near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions and 24 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at undetermined distances north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 140 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions).

During the day on 26 June, positioned in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 4km south-south-east as well as 40 undetermined explosions and 15 bursts and shots of undetermined weapons 7-8km south-south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 25 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight (two assessed as inside the disengagement area, the remainder outside), one burst of an undetermined weapon (assessed as outside the disengagement area), five flares (three assessed as inside the disengagement area, the remainder outside) and five tracer rounds in flight (assessed as outside the disengagement area), all 1.5-8km at directions ranging from east to south.

On 26 June, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed about twenty soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as three cars with Ukrainian military licence plates in Katerynivka, inside the Zolote disengagement area, entering and exiting the village.

On 2 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded two tracer rounds in flight 1-1.5km north-north-east (assessed as flying from inside the disengagement area).

While present at the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area on 26 June, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) about 2.5km south-east of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) on 25 June. On 26 June, near Sopyne (government-controlled, 16km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed on 21 June 49 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area about 3km west of Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). On 26 June, the SMM saw two tanks (type undetermined) in the same area. The same day, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64): one near Donske (57km south of Donetsk) and the other near Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing and that additional weapons were present. At a second such site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, the SMM noted that six tanks (four T-64 and two T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon[2] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 25 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two BTR variants and one MT-LB), an IFV (BMP-1) and 50m of recently dug trenches near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk). On 26 June, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZSU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne.

On 25 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four men in camouflage clothing – two of whom were carrying what appeared to be rifles – exit a military-type truck on the eastern edge of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), walk about 2.3km east and enter a house on Zarichna Street in the Chyhari area of Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). (The SMM had previously observed damaged houses on the same and nearby streets in the area. See SMM Daily Report 8 June 2018.)

The SMM observed mine hazard signs. The SMM saw ten red-and-white signs with a skull-and-crossbones and the words “Beware mines” in Russian printed on them on a fence near a checkpoint of the armed formations in Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) on 26 June. These signs were not observed when the SMM visited this location the previous day.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) as well as demining activities around the station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard over 1,100 ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for one hour and 40 minutes, the SMM saw 43 cars (18 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates; ten with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates) and three pedestrians exiting Ukraine, as well as 30 cars (11 with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates; eight with “DPR” plates), eight buses (four with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates; one with “DPR” plates) and five pedestrians entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued to follow up on the attack on members of the Roma community on 23 June in Lviv city (see SMM Daily Report 26 June 2018). In Mukacheve in Zakarpattia region (157km west of Ivano-Frankivsk), the SMM spoke with a boy (ten years old) who had stab wounds to his hip and thigh; the SMM saw that he had difficulties walking. The boy told the SMM that on the night of 23 June, a group of people wearing balaclavas had entered the settlement where he was staying with his family and began setting their shelters on fire, stabbing the people in the settlement and shouting that they would “kill all the Roma.” Medical staff at the Lviv Children’s hospital told the SMM that a boy (ten years old) had been admitted to the hospital at 00:30 on 24 June with knife wounds to his hip and released shortly after. A doctor from the hospital told the SMM that the boy and his mother (30 years old), who was also injured in the attack, were then transferred to the Lviv Clinical Municipal Communal Emergency Hospital.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM it could not conduct a mini-UAV flight near Komar (government-controlled, 78km west of Donetsk).
• Members of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and said that the SMM was not permitted to access Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) due to “specific orders” prohibiting the SMM from visiting these locations. (The SMM has conducted impact sites in Pikuzy on four occasions in the past week (see SMM Daily Report 26 June 2018, SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018, SMM Daily Report 23 June 2018, and SMM Daily Report 19 June 2018).)
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]     Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]     This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.