Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 June 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission observed damage caused by shelling in and near residential areas of Donetskyi as well as nearby positions. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The SMM observed a newly extended trench north of the Petrivske disengagement area and again observed military-type hardware and positions inside the disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Izvaryne and Sievernyiat the border with the Russian Federation, as well as in Krasnolutskyi. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station and to monitor the security situation around the station. It continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 280 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (315 explosions). 

On the evening and night of 10-11 June, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from east to west and a projectile from west to east, followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 28 projectiles (17 from east to west and 11 from west to east) and four illumination flares in flight (two from west to east, one from east to west and one from south to north), all 0.5-1.5km south.

During the day on 11 June, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and about 80 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km at directions ranging from south-west to west.

The same day, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions and about 30 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-6km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south. 

On the evening and night of 10-11 June, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 230 undetermined explosions and about 370 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-south-west. During the day on 11 June, while at the same location, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from south-east to south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 10-11 June, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an illumination flare in flight from north to south, eight projectiles in flight from south to north and an undetermined explosion, followed by totals of 11 undetermined explosions, about 350 projectiles (235 from south to north and about 115 from north to south), three illumination flares (two from south to north and one from north to south) and seven bursts from south to north, all 2-5km east.

During the day on 11 June, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an outgoing artillery round 2-3km south-south-east as well as eight undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-west.

In Luhanskregion, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations (no explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (six explosions). 

The SMM observed damage caused by shelling in and near residential areas of Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk). On 9 June, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 38 fresh craters near firing positions and dugouts about 300m south of a residential area of the village, assessed as caused by probable 120mm mortar rounds fired from a north-westerly direction. In the southern part of the village, the same UAV also spotted a hole in the roof of a school building and four members of the armed formations near the building, as well as debris on the roof of a kindergarten about 100m further south-east (the SMM was unable to assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire or whether the damage and debris were fresh). Near a bridge in the eastern part of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), on 8 June, a man and two women who identified themselves as residents of Donetskyi told the SMM that they had heard shelling between 22:00 and 02:00 on 7-8 June and between 05:00 and 07:00 on the morning of 8 June. (The SMM was unable to access Donetskyi due to security reasons.)

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardwareof 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

On the evening of 9 June, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded three tracer rounds in flight from south to north, followed by an undetermined explosion, all 1-2km south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 9 June, inside the Petrivske disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) 1.8km east of its western edge and 1.2km south of its northern edge. About 600m further north, inside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted a mortar (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) under camouflage netting in a recently dug mortar pit, a heavy machine gun in a recently dug firing position and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. (See SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018.) The UAV also spotted three IFVs (BMP variants) along a tree line about 600m south of the disengagement area and 25 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road about 150m north of the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 14 March 2018).

On 10 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a 70m-long extension of a trench system about 100m north of the disengagement area, about 150m north-east of Petrivske (not visible in imagery from 7 February 2018).

On the evening of 10 June, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from north to south 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area), a projectile from north-west to south-east 5-8km south-east, a projectile from south-west to north-east 5-8km east and seven projectiles from north-west to south-east 5-10km east and east-north-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

On 11 June, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 9 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Zoria (22km north-east of Mariupol). On 11 June, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 9 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw seven tanks (T-64) in firing positions in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft weapon[2]in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk), two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-60 and one BTR variant) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), a fire control vehicle (MT-LB 1VXX variant) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), two APCs (one BTR-70 and one BTR-80) and four ACVs (BMP variants) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk). On 11 June, the SMM saw a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Sopyne.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 8 June, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-2) and an APC (MT-LB) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). On 9 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Novolaspa and an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Donetskyi (see above). On 11 June, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to and from the DFS, as well as demining activities around the station, through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard about 160 ceasefire violations in the area, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below for ceasefire violations).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). 

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for ten minutes, the SMM saw five cars (four with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a bus (licence plates not visible) exiting Ukraine and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations then told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for five minutes, the SMM observed no traffic or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations then told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access: 

• Near Izvaryne, at the border with the Russian Federation, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Near Sievernyi, at the border with the Russian Federation, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• In Krasnolutskyi (non-government-controlled, 52km south-west of Luhansk), the director of a kindergarten denied the SMM access to the kindergarten, saying that it was not allowed to enter without permission from members of the armed formations.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. At a checkpoint south of the bridge, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.