Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 February 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and while present in Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote it observed calm situations. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Manuilivka and to a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled part of Donetsk region.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Makiivka and Novoamvrosiivske. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair and maintenance works to essential civilian infrastructure near Vasylivka, Artema and Kadiivka. The Mission visited a border area not under government control. The SMM observed a gathering at the Polish consulate in Lviv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] including about 220 explosions compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

On the evening and night of 5-6 February, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 13 projectiles in flight from west to east, a projectile from east to west and a projectile from south-east to north-west, followed by totals of 11 undetermined explosions and 29 projectiles (16 from east to west, eight from north-west to south-east and five from west to east), all 0.5-1km south. During the day on 6 February, the camera recorded two undetermined explosions and two projectiles from west to east, all 0.5-1.5km south.

On the evening and night of 5-6 February, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 56 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 4-5km north and north-east as well as 50 bursts of small-arms fire 3-5km south-east.

During the day on 6 February, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for over six hours, the SMM heard 92 undetermined explosions and 35 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north-west.

Positioned about 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and at least 70 bursts and shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and small arms fire, all at unknown distances north-east and east-south-east.

Positioned at a water pumping station between the forward positions of the sides 2km west of Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) to facilitate repairs to the station (see below), the SMM heard two bursts of small-arms fire 1-1.5km south-south-west and four bursts of small-arms fire 1-1.5km north-north-west, despite security guarantees having been given for the repair works. The repair works continued.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations).

Positioned south-west of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 45 explosions 5-10km north-west, assessed as a live-fire training.

Positioned north-west of Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), the SMM hear 800 shots of small-arms fire 2km south-west, assessed as a live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

While flying its mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over a military position in Mykhailivka (government-controlled, 82km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard thirty bursts of small-arms fire 700m north of its position, which it assessed as being directed at its UAV, which was also flying 700m north of the SMM’s position. The SMM retrieved the UAV, which remained undamaged, and left the area.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in areas outside government control, an SMM mini-UAV spotted seven stationary surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) on the northern outskirts of Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) on 5 February. The following day, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in areas outside government-control, on 6 February, the SMM saw ten tanks (T-72) near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), two tanks (a T-64 and a T-72) near Myrne, two tanks (T-64) near Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk) and three tanks (T-64) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites near Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk), on 6 February, the SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In areas outside government control, the SMM observed six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and noted as missing a towed howitzer (2A65) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) on 5 February. The following day, the SMM observed three IFVs (two BMP-2, one undetermined) in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-1) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In areas outside government control, an SMM mini-UAV spotted six IFVs (BMP-1) and two APCs (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and three APCs (MT-LB) in Makiivka on 5 February.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works at a water pumping station near Artema and to high voltage power lines near Kadiivka (non-government-controlled former Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). Repair works at a water pumping station between the forward positions of the sides 2km west of Vasylivka were completed despite ceasefire violations in the area (see above). According to a utility company representative, an electric sub-station of the pumping station had been leaking fuel since 26 January, when it was struck by shrapnel. The repairs ensured access to water for people on both sides of the contact line.

Two members of the village council of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) told the SMM that they are advising persons walking close to the village cemetery to be aware of possible unexploded ordnance, which is made difficult by high grass.  

The SMM visited a border area not under government control near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 90 minutes, where it observed 18 cars (nine with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates; two with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine, as well as 25 cars (ten with Ukrainian and ten with Russian Federation licence plates; five with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR“ plates) entering Ukraine.

On 5 February, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Polish Consulate in Lviv. At 110 Ivana Franka Street, the SMM saw about 80 people (mostly men, aged 30-35), some of whom were carrying red-and-black flags and flags with insignias of National Corps and Svoboda. Speakers protested amendments to the Polish Law on the Institute of National Remembrance. (See SMM Report 6 January 2018.) The SMM saw 25 police officers in the area. The gathering ended peacefully.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government, citing orders to do so. (See, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 February 2018.) The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from entering a compound near Manuilivka (non-government-controlled, 65km east of Donetsk), citing “orders” from another “DPR” member.
• An armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from accessing part of a heavy weapons holding area, citing “orders” from another “DPR” member.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that he had no information regarding de-mining in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Two SMM cameras continue to be tested until the end of February 2018. The video stream to the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka, was not operational during the entire reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.