Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 October 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a boy injured by the explosion of a hand grenade in Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring all three disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations in the Petrivske disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Hranitne. It facilitated and monitored repairs and maintenance of essential infrastructure in Shchastia, near Artema, and between Zolote and Popasna. The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. The Mission monitored a gathering in Volyn region, as well as the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 330 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 120 explosions).

On the morning of 10 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded a tracer round in flight from south-west to north-east 2-4km north-east. During the day, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka for over five hours, the Mission heard about 60 undetermined explosions, as well as about 170 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km at directions ranging from east to south. The SMM also heard about 30 undetermined explosions 5-8km west-south-west and west.

In the early morning of 10 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) recorded one illumination flare in vertical flight 1-2km south. Five hours later the camera recorded at least 40 tracer rounds in flight (20 from east to west and 20 from west to east) 1-2km south. During the day, the camera recorded five explosions (four undetermined and one assessed as an impact) 1-2km south.

Positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for almost four hours, the SMM heard: 60 undetermined explosions 5-12km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west; ten undetermined explosions and about 25 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north; and 28 undetermined explosions and 35 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at unknown distances west-south-west and west.

Positioned for about two and a half hours on the south-western edge of Yasynuvata, the SMM heard about 30 undetermined explosions, as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-8km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west.

On the morning of 10 October, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded four undetermined explosions, one airburst, 13 rocket-assisted projectiles in flight, about 160 tracer rounds in flight, and four illumination flares, all at undetermined distances and undetermined directions.

During the day on 10 October, positioned in government-controlled Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions 5km south-east.

Positioned on the north-eastern edge of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 11 explosions assessed as impacts 2-3km east, as well as 35-40 explosions assessed as impacts of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (type unknown) rounds, three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons, and one undetermined explosion, all 3-5km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including eight explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (39 explosions).

Positioned on the south-western outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts 5-7km north-west.

Positioned 1.5km north-east of “LPR”-controlled Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an impact 8-10km west.

The SMM followed up on a report of a civilian casualty, received from a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). At the hospital in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), a boy (aged 16) told the Mission that at about 11:00 on 10 October, he had been at home in Dokuchaievsk handling a hand grenade that he had found, and the grenade had subsequently exploded. Medical staff at the hospital told the Mission that the boy had been injured in his legs, left ear and head, and that pieces of shrapnel remained in his body following surgery.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 7 October, the SMM camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske recorded, in sequence, six tracer rounds in flight from west to east and two projectiles in flight from south to north, all 1-3km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the evening of 8 October the camera recorded, in sequence, one illumination flare in vertical flight and one projectile in flight from west to east, all 2-4km south-west (the Mission was unable to assess whether they had occurred inside or outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 10 October, while on the eastern edge of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-6km south. In the afternoon, positioned about 250m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 0.8-1.2km east. In each case, the Mission was unable to assess whether the explosion had occurred inside or outside the disengagement area.

On the evening of 8 October, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east 4-8km south, followed by, in sequence, five projectiles from north-west to south-east, three flares in descending vertical flight, one flare in vertical flight, one projectile from south-west to north-east, and two projectiles from south-east to north-west, all 3-9km east. All the ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 10 October, the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining team of eight to ten people using metal detectors to check a 2m strip beside a road just to the north of the Zolote disengagement area. Just to the south of the disengagement area, the Mission observed an “LPR” demining team, consisting of seven armed persons, unloading items from a truck assessed to be equipment for demining.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, on 9 October, three stationary towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Hranitne (78km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas, the SMM noted that 12 MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) were still missing from a holding area previously observed to be abandoned.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas on 9 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least six stationary armoured personnel carriers (five MT-LB, one BTR-variant) and one stationary armoured support vehicle (BMP-1KSh) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM saw indications of demining activity – two persons wearing demining suits and two vehicles of an international demining organization – beside a road about 1.5km west of government-controlled Blyzhnie (48km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM saw that a mine hazard sign previously observed near “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 10 October 2017) was no longer present. An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that his group had taken it down, after having placed it there to prevent cars from passing an “LPR” position too quickly.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to the thermal power plant in Shchastia, the Petrivske water pumping station near government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk), and the water pipeline between Zolote and government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. During one hour at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 16 cars (eight with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), seven curtain-sided heavy-goods articulated trucks (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and one empty uncovered flat-bed truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) waiting in queues to exit Ukraine, and 20 cars (11 with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates) and one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. During 30 minutes at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM did not observe any traffic.

On 9 October, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 80 men (aged 35-60) who were blocking a road in Starovoitove (152km north of Lviv) for about four hours. A man who identified himself to the Mission as the head of the independent trade union of coal miners in Volyn region told the SMM that the group consisted of coal miners who were protesting a two-month delay in receiving their salaries, as well as the planned closure of a nearby coal mine. Nine police officers were present. The gathering ended peacefully.

The SMM monitored the administrative boundary line between Kherson region and Crimea. On 8 October, the SMM visited crossing points near Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and noted calm situations.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A person in military-style clothing at a checkpoint west of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) stopped the SMM and did not allow it to pass the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Later in the day, armed persons at the same checkpoint stopped another SMM patrol, citing an “ongoing security situation” in two villages to the south. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• On 9 October, the director of a school in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region told the SMM that, according to instructions received, the director was no longer allowed to provide information to the Mission on school-related issues and that the SMM would need to address any questions it had to “DPR” members in another town.
• On 10 October, two “LPR” members in Metalist (7km north-west of Luhansk) told the Mission that they could not provide any information about an alleged civilian casualty without the permission of their superior, who was absent.

 

[1] Please see the annexed report for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.