Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 12 September 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote; in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a demining unit checking a roadside leading to the bridge and, subsequently, a crew installing electric poles along the same roadside. Its access remained restricted in the disengagement areas and elsewhere.* The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Ptyche, and non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Azov. In government-controlled areas, an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a military encampment adjacent to residential areas.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 24 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the night of 11-12 September, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, three tracer rounds in flight from west to east, one tracer round from east to west, four tracer rounds from west to east, 35 tracer rounds from east to west, one tracer round from west to east, 11 tracer rounds from east to west, one tracer round from west to east, and seven tracer rounds from east to west, all at undetermined distances north.

On the evening of 11 September, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5-12km at south-westerly directions, and saw one tracer round in flight from north-east to south-west 7km south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 30 explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but it was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 10 September, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded ten projectiles in flight ascending from south-west to north-east 5km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 11 September, while in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 12 September, positioned near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM observed demining activities in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces demining unit equipped with a mine detector and two dogs checking the roadsides from the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward positions near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge to the entry‑exit checkpoint and, subsequently, a crew of ten workers using a crane to install electric poles along the same roadside.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in a government-controlled area, on 11 September an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self‑propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) under camouflage netting near Ptyche (32km north-west of Donetsk). In areas outside government control, the SMM mid-range UAV spotted two self‑propelled howitzers (2S1) near Zaichenko (93km south of Donetsk) on 8 September and, on 6 September, three mortars (120mm) near Azov (formerly Dzershynske; 96km south of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, an SMM mid‑range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Ptyche.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons,[2] and tracks of military-type vehicles and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted indications of an active military encampment – including two recently dug fighting positions and older bunkers, trenches and tents, one soldier, and camouflage netting – directly adjacent to houses and farm buildings in Vyskryva (76km west of Luhansk). Near but outside the disengagement area in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw two military trucks (Kraz Cougar) with 7.62mm machine-guns mounted atop heading north.

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM observed an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a Ural truck near Zaichenko and tracks of at least two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-variant) near Verhulivka (61km west of Luhansk). Near Azov, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (BTR-60, BTR-4, and MT‑LB), an IFV (BMP-variant), and a truck-mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm).                                                        

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), to the thermal power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). An unarmed “LPR” member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC at a checkpoint on the northern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• In an area outside government control two persons at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) told an SMM patrol that it was not permitted to proceed through the checkpoint. The SMM left the checkpoint and informed the JCCC; when it returned after some thirty minutes, it was able to pass the checkpoint.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During this reporting period the SMM camera at the Oktiabr mine (Donetsk) remained non-operational.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.