Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and noted a calm situation. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including at Verkhnoshyrokivske where armed “DPR” members impeded the SMM’s access to areas east of Mariupol for a sixth consecutive day. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs at the power plant in Shchastia and at the Petrivske water pumping station in Artema. The SMM monitored one border area not under government control.

The SMM recorded an increased number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 135 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 33 explosions).[1]

On the night of 1-2 August the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded a sequence that began with one airburst, followed by 12 tracer rounds in flight from west to east, four from east to west, one airburst, seven tracer rounds from east to west, one from west to east, and 21 tracer rounds from east to west, followed by 51 projectiles in flight assessed as multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm) fire from east to west. The SMM camera then recorded a total of eight undetermined explosions, 539 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, 318 tracer rounds in flight from west to east and three airbursts, all north of the camera. Positioned about 0.8km south-west of Shyrokyne on 2 August, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 0.5-1km east.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard 41 undetermined explosions, including four assessed as caused by a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm), small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire and anti-aircraft cannon fire (ZU-23, 23mm) 5-9km east and south-east and 3-4km south and south-east. The SMM assessed that the anti-aircraft cannon fire was targeting an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) it observed flying in the area. The SMM also heard small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire including periods of overlapping uncountable bursts 4-6km east-south-east and 6-9km north-north-east.

On the same night, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions followed by 11 projectiles in flight from south to north, all 4-6km east-south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka for about six hours on 2 August, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south-east.

Positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 2-3km west and north-west. Positioned at an observation post in Yasynuvata for another four hours the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 1-3km north and west and 8-10km west-north-west and small-arms fire 1-2km north and 2-3km west-north-west.

Positioned on the eastern side of government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard nine explosions assessed as outgoing rounds from an undetermined weapon 1-1.2km east-north-east, followed by five undetermined explosions 1-3km north and north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 148 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions). Positioned in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard 55 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds (82mm), and heavy-machine-gun and automatic-grenade-launcher fire 8-10km south-south-east. The SMM also heard 90 undetermined explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds (82mm) and small-arms, heavy-machine-gun and automatic-grenade-launcher fire 5-8km east and 4-6km south-east. The SMM heard three explosions assessed as mortar round (82mm) impacts 3km south-east.

Positioned in Luhansk city the SMM heard three undetermined explosions assessed as caused by stun grenades and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1km north-west, which “LPR” members said were related to celebrations they organised in the city centre.

In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed remnants of cluster munitions. The SMM observed old damage to a shop (now shut) it assessed as caused by cluster sub-munitions fired from an MLRS (either 9M27K, Uragan, 220mm or 9M55K Smerch, 300mm). Around the building, the SMM observed the old remnants of cluster sub-munition (tails) and rusted steel pellets, including cluster sub-munition bomblets (9N210 or 9N235). A number of residents (four women aged 30-60 years old and a man, aged about 40) told the SMM that they think that the cluster sub-munitions date back to 2015.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

While present in the disengagement areas near Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM noted that both areas were calm. Positioned in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM noted the Petrivske disengagement area was also calm.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines an SMM UAV spotted one possible anti-tank gun (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) near government-controlled Popasna on 1 August.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited one such location and observed four MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines. The SMM was denied access to a permanent storage site in a “DPR”-controlled area as warehouses were locked and no guards were present to open them.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon[2] and a UAV in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-4), one APC (BRDM) and an automatic grenade launcher, all stationary and covered with camouflage nets at a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk). An SMM UAV flight near Popasna on 1 August spotted one probable IFV (BMP) partly obscured by foliage and one possible IFV (MTLB). On the night of 1-2 August the SMM observed a UAV flying near Svitlodarsk.  

In areas not under government control the SMM observed: two armoured combat vehicles (BMP-2) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) stationary in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka; and one APC (BTR-70) heading west near “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Near government-controlled Avdiivka the SMM observed two military trucks moving east each towing trailer mine layers (PMZ-4) and carrying two containers, each loaded with about 200 anti-tank mines on flatbed trailers.

In government-controlled Sopyne the SMM observed about 40-50 residents (of various ages, over half of whom were women) angrily confront ten Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers. Residents told the SMM they were angry that soldiers were building a dugout within the village. The SMM saw a fresh 2m-deep dugout about 20m from the nearest house. After the soldiers withdrew from the area the SMM observed some residents filling it in with shovels.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC). The SMM monitored from both sides of the contact line to enable the Popasna Vodakanal Company to carry out maintenance work at the Petrivske pumping station in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor maintenance works at the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited one border area not under control of the Government. At the border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) two people waiting to cross told the SMM that there had been an explosion between 09:00-10:00 that morning and that a man had been injured. The road to the alleged scene of the explosion was blocked by armed “LPR” members. “LPR” members refused to share information with the SMM about the alleged incident. The SMM observed one “LPR” member with de-mining equipment near the crossing point. Over the course of about an hour, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates) and eight pedestrians (five men and three women) enter Ukraine. Four cars (with Ukrainian licence plates), a passenger bus with Ukrainian licence plates displaying the sign “Sverdlovsk-Gukovo” written in Russian, one truck (with Ukrainian licence plates, cargo not visible) and five pedestrians (three men and two women) exited Ukraine. The SMM observed that traffic moved particularly slowly and was told by a man (about 35-45 years old) that it had been slow for a few days.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• Armed men prevented an SMM patrol from proceeding east from an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), for the sixth consecutive day. The SMM informed the JCCC. (See SMM Daily Report 2 August 2017.)
• The SMM was denied access to a “DPR” permanent weapons storage site as warehouses were locked and no guards were present to open them. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel on the road from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) to the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining activities had taken place in the area during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delayed access:

• Armed men delayed an SMM patrol from proceeding west from an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), for about 40 minutes. The SMM informed the JCCC. (See SMM Daily Report 2 August 2017.)

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.