Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, but fewer explosions in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas. The SMM cameras recorded ceasefire violations between 2km and 10km east and east-north-east and west of the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas respectively, all assessed as outside the disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere. Armed “DPR” members impeded the SMM’s access to areas east of Mariupol for a fifth consecutive day in Verkhnoshyrokivske. For more than seven hours “DPR” members held the SMM and its monitoring equipment at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Olenivka and prevented it from leaving.* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of infrastructure in Shchastia, Zolote and Artema. The Mission visited one border area not under government control.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (33), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions).

Positioned at the railway station and a gas station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions, one explosion assessed as an outgoing round of an undetermined weapon and its subsequent impact, and bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire all at locations ranging from 1km to 10km west, west-north-west and north-north-west.

Positioned at the south-western edge of “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (25km south-west of Donetsk), in the evening hours of 1 August, the SMM heard four shots 2-3km west and north-north-west (see below).

On the night of 31 July-1 August, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 6-10km south-west. The following day, while at the same location the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 3km to 10km south-south-east.

On the evening and night of 31 July-1 August, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, followed by aggregated totals of seven undetermined explosions, 12 rocket-assisted projectiles in flight (seven from west to east, five from east to west) and 489 tracer rounds in flight (59 from west to east, 430 from east to west), all at unknown distances north.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded less ceasefire violations (two explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions).

In the early hours of 1 August, while in Luhansk city, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 1.5-2km north-north-west. The following day, at the estimated location of the explosion, the SMM saw two armed men in uniform-type clothing bearing “LPR” patches and about 14 workers cleaning the area. A monument at the location was partially covered with a tarpaulin, but the SMM saw no damage. An “LPR” member present told the SMM he was not allowed by his superiors to provide any information to the SMM. The SMM did not observe damage to the surrounding buildings.

Positioned 4km south of “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined round and saw a plume of smoke 10km north-north-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 30 July, in one minute, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence: one projectile in flight from north to south 2-3km east, four undetermined explosions 2-3km east and one undetermined explosion 10-12km east-north-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the night of 31 July, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded one flare in vertical flight 3km west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 1 August, while positioned in the disengagement areas near Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM saw seven multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM21 Grad, 122mm) near government-controlled Rivnopil (65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). The SMM noted that 11 MLRS (BM21) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing. The SMM noted that one area was abandoned, as previously observed.

Referring to orders from their superiors, “DPR” members held an SMM convoy at two checkpoints (50m apart) on road H20 at the south-western edge of “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (25km south-west of Donetsk) for more than seven hours. The SMM convoy, including a lorry with technical monitoring equipment (camera) to be installed at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), was stopped despite the fact that on 31 July the SMM had requested the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) to facilitate the passage of this convoy. Immediately after being stopped at 13:20, the SMM informed the JCCC about this freedom of movement restriction requesting facilitation of safe and secure passage. Having been held for three hours and the JCCC being unable to facilitate the SMM’s passage, the SMM tried to return to government-controlled areas, but was prevented from doing so by “DPR” members. After repeated facilitation attempts by the JCCC and intervention from a senior “DPR” member, the SMM convoy together with its technical monitoring equipment was released and left the area at 20:44. It reached Donetsk city at 21:30.

The SMM facilitated repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC and monitored them on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor maintenance works at the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). The SMM saw five workers operating a dredging machine. (See SMM Daily Report 1 August 2017.) The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor maintenance works at a water pumping station in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 1 August 2017.) The Mission saw a team of 15 workers with one truck cutting and trimming tree branches near the power lines. The SMM also facilitated and monitored repairs to the Zolote 2/Karbonit 1200mm water pipeline. (See SMM Daily Report 29 July 2017.)

The SMM visited one border area not under government control. In about one hour at the Izvaryne border crossing point (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 38 civilian cars (32 with Ukrainian licence plates and six with Russian Federation licence plates) and two buses (both with Russian Federation licence plates, both bearing signs written in Russian - one reading “Stakhanov-Kyiv, the other – “Luhansk-Kyiv”) exit and two civilian cars (both with Ukrainian licence plates), one covered cargo truck (with Belarusian licence plates) and two buses (both with Russian Federation licence plates, both bearing signs written in Russian - one reading “Moscow-Luhansk”, the other – “Moscow-Kirovsk”) enter Ukraine. The SMM also saw about 100 pedestrians exit and some 15 pedestrians enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• Armed men again prevented an SMM patrol from proceeding east at an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), for the fifth consecutive day. The SMM informed the JCCC. (See SMM Daily Report 1 August 2017.)
• “DPR” members held the SMM for more than seven hours (from 13:20 until 20:44) at two checkpoints (50m apart) on road H20 at the south-western edge of “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (25km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC (see above section on ceasefire violations and section on the incident).

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• In Luhansk city, armed men refused to provide the SMM information regarding a monument reportedly damaged in an explosion during the night, citing orders from their superiors (see above section on ceasefire violations).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.