Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 31 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties caused by shelling and gunfire in Yasne. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas. The SMM camera recorded one explosion inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including again in Verkhnoshyrokivske (twice).* The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of infrastructure in Shchastia and Artema. The Mission visited two border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 120), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions).

On the night of 30-31 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 45 undetermined explosions 5-8km at directions ranging from west to north.

On 31 July, positioned at the railway station in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 2-6km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north-west, one undetermined explosion 3-6km north-north-east, and 76 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 1-4km at directions ranging from west-south-west to north. Later in the day, positioned in Yasynuvata city centre for about one hour, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km west and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-4km west.

On the evening and night of 30-31 July, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), in about two hours the SMM heard 47 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-south-west and about 30 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 3-5km south-east.

On the evening and night of 30-31 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, one airburst, 24 tracer rounds and three rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from east to west, one undetermined explosion, five tracer rounds in flight from east to west, two undetermined explosions, 23 tracer rounds and one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from east to west, all at unknown distances north.

On 31 July, positioned in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), in less than a minute the SMM heard five undetermined explosions at unknown distances east-north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (one explosion).

On 31 July, positioned in government-controlled Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), in less than a minute the SMM heard ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire about 800m south-east.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties in residential areas caused by shelling and gunfire. On 30 July, the SMM observed three impact sites in “DPR”-controlled Yasne (30km south-west of Donetsk):

At 7a Lenina Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater on a tarmac road about 7m west from a house, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a southerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the west-facing front wall of the house and broken windows on the same front. The owner of the house (man in his sixties) and his neighbours (women, aged 62 and 47) told the SMM that they had heard impacts at about 17:00 on 27 July.

The SMM also saw a fresh crater and a shrapnel piece in the yard of a compound of an agricultural company 100-150m south-east of the first impact site. The SMM assessed that the crater had been caused by recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) fire but was not able to assess the direction of fire. A resident (a woman, aged 42), who lives in a house about 200m away from the compound, told the SMM that she had heard explosions at about 17:00 on 27 July.

At 22 Peremohy Street, the SMM saw a hole (about 30cm in diameter) in the west-facing roof of a house. The SMM was not able to assess the weapon used or the direction of fire. The owner of the house (a man, aged 59) told the SMM that he had heard the impact at about 19:00 on 23 July. While at the impact site, the SMM saw two armed “DPR” members exiting an adjacent house about 7m south-west. The Mission also observed one stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) covered with camouflage netting in front of another house about 120m north-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 29-30 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded, in sequence, one projectile in flight from north-west to south-east, two undetermined explosions, one projectile in flight from north-west to south-east and three undetermined explosions, all 3.5-6km south-south-east and south and assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same camera recorded one undetermined explosion 3-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

On 31 July, while in the disengagement areas near Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw one APC (MT-LB) in a residential area of Yasne (see above). On 28 July, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (two BMP-2 and one BMP-variant) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). The SMM, from both sides of the contact line, continued to facilitate and monitor maintenance works at the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 29 July 2017.) The SMM also facilitated and monitored maintenance works at a water pumping station in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk) – from both sides of the contact line. (See SMM Daily Report 29 July 2017.)

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. At the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), in about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 21 cars (ten with Russian Federation, eight with Ukrainian and one with Azerbaijan licence plates and two “DPR” plates) and one truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw 11 cars and one bus enter Ukraine.

At the border crossing point in Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), in about one hour, the SMM saw 34 cars (19 with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation, one with Polish, one with Azerbaijan and one with Latvian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw 19 cars (nine with Ukrainian, eight with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) and eight pedestrians enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Lviv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• Armed men again prevented an SMM patrol from proceeding east at an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol), claiming that provocative activity directed at the SMM might take place in the area. The SMM informed the JCCC. (See SMM Daily Report 31 July 2017.)
• Later the same day, another SMM patrol passed through the same checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske and proceeded west towards government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol). About 80 minutes later, however, when the SMM on its return attempted passage through the checkpoint for the second time, armed “DPR” members prevented it from proceeding east, citing orders from a senior “DPR” member not to allow the SMM through the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area. Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the disengagement area told the SMM that no demining activity had been conducted in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from accessing secondary roads north of the Zolote disengagement area. At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing the surrounding areas in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.