Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 28 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas. Its access there and elsewhere remained restricted, including by mines on road M03.* The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Bakhmut and near Volnovakha. It observed that weapons continued to be absent from storage sites on both sides of the contact line. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Staromykhailivka and Starobesheve. The Mission observed civilian buildings damaged by shelling in Dokuchaievsk. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of infrastructure in Shchastia and Zolote. In Kyiv, the SMM continued monitoring religious commemorations and saw a procession of 4,000-5,000 people.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (88 explosions).[1]

On the night of 27-28 July the SMM, positioned in Donetsk city centre, heard one undetermined explosion 5-8km north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard six explosions all assessed as caused by outgoing infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon rounds (73mm), 16 explosions assessed as impacts – 14 of 152mm artillery rounds and two of rounds of undetermined weapons, four undetermined explosions and bursts and shots of anti-aircraft (ZU-23, 23mm), IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at locations ranging from 4km to 7km east and south-east. While in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the same night, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-2km north-east.

On the night of 27-28 July the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded five tracer rounds and nine rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from east to west followed by an aggregated total of 667 tracer rounds in flight – 448 from east to west, 219 from west to east; 27 tracer rounds fired vertically into the air and 16 explosions (seven assessed as outgoing and nine undetermined), all at unknown distances north of the camera.

On 28 July positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) near the railway station for about six hours the SMM recorded eight undetermined explosions at locations ranging between 3km and 8km west-south-west and north-west, and small-arms fire 1-3km west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including three explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (22 explosions).

Positioned in and south of “LPR”-controlled Holubivske (51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard in 20 minutes, two undetermined explosions 4km north-east and one undetermined explosion 8km north-north-west, respectively.

The SMM followed up on reports by a Russian Federation officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) of civilian casualties. At the Donetsk Kalinina Hospital, a middle-aged man told the SMM that he had been visiting his house on 34 Chkalova Street in “DPR”-controlled Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk), where he no longer resided as it was close to the contact line. On the morning of 28 July, while in his garden, he had heard an explosion about 10m away and had run inside the house where he realized he had been injured to the chest and face. He said he had then called his family who took him to the hospital. An elderly woman’s son (middle-aged) told the SMM his mother had been injured while working in her garden at 9/1 Haharina Street, which was in the same area of Staromykhailivka as the house of the injured man. The son said he had been inside the house and had heard an explosion. A short while later his mother had walked in and told him she had been injured, after which he took her to the hospital. Medical personnel at the hospital told the SMM that the elderly woman and the middle-aged man had been treated there for shrapnel wounds on 28 July and both had been discharged.

The SMM followed up on a media report of a woman allegedly injured by a grenade in “DPR”-controlled Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk). At the Starobesheve central hospital, medical personnel told the SMM a woman had been treated for injuries caused by a grenade, but was not in critical condition. They further alleged the incident had taken place in the woman’s home, but refused to provide any other information about the casualty and referred the SMM to inquire with “DPR” members.*

The SMM followed up on Russian Federation officers’ reports of damage caused by shelling at six locations in “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk). At 16 Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy Street, the SMM saw two fresh impact sites at a hotel, where Russian Federation officers of the JCCC stay. The SMM saw a small hole on a west-facing wall between the ground floor and the first floor windows, as well as plastic sheets replacing the glass of the first floor window. On the inside of the same wall, the SMM noted that a large piece of plaster was missing under that same window and the plaster mesh was exposed. In the courtyard of the same building the SMM saw a small hole in the plaster on a south-west facing wall at the first-floor level of the building. 

At an administrative building on 26 Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy Street the SMM saw a fresh small hole in the west-facing side of the marble cladding on the plinth on the south side of the concrete steps leading up to the main entrance. The SMM also saw a fresh hole in the plaster on the west-facing wall of the building, directly above a window.

At the top floor apartment in a three-storey building on 40/17 Tsentralna Street, on the exterior west-facing wall the SMM saw freshly broken plasterwork near a window and a fresh hole in the interior of the same wall, near the window frame (the window was not broken). A young woman, who presented herself as the owner of the apartment, told the SMM that no one had been home at the time of the incident.

At 27/15 Tsentralna Street the SMM saw a fresh hole less than 15cm away from a ground-floor window on the west-facing wall of a two-storey residential building.

At 7/14 Melnykova Street the SMM saw a fresh hole in the bricks at the ground-floor level and broken bricks next to a bricked-up window on the unoccupied top floor on a west-facing wall of a two-storey residential building. The SMM noted two windows on the same wall covered with plastic sheets and two residents of the building separately told the SMM the windows had been shattered at the same time as all other damage had occurred. The SMM saw two pieces of shrapnel on the ground, below the impact sites, one about 5cm and the other 3cm in size, which it assessed as remnants of at least one IFV (BMP-2) cannon round (30mm). Three residents of the building separately told the SMM the impacts had occurred on the night of 26 to 27 July.

The SMM assessed that all impacts at all locations had been caused by IFV (BMP-2) cannon rounds fired from a westerly direction.

At Kindergarten no.10, on 9A Zhovtneva Street the SMM saw scarring on the asphalt in the courtyard, to the west of the building. As the area appeared to have been cleaned the SMM was unable to assess weapons used or direction of fire. The kindergarten administrator (a middle-aged woman) told the SMM that the area had been cleaned the previous day and that the incident had occurred in the late evening hours on 26 July when the facility was unoccupied. She also said she had heard shelling that evening and that staff had cleaned up the impact site before the start of classes on 27 July. She told the SMM that up to 70 children attend on a daily basis and their activities were currently limited to the section of the courtyard to the east of the building and that a basement area had been turned into a shelter in the event of shelling.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 26 to 27 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) recorded one projectile in flight from north-east to south-west 3km north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

While in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM remained unable to access its camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a convoy consisting of one multiple-launch rocket system (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), two military trucks each transporting a partially covered self-propelled howitzer and one partially covered howitzer towed by a military truck on H20 near Volnovakha (53km south of Donetsk) heading north; and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on a transporter in the southern outskirts of Bakhmut (67km north-east of Donetsk) moving east.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta-S, 152mm) and four towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), three of which were observed for the first time. It observed that the following weapons continued to be missing: 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 53 towed howitzers (28 D-20, 152mm, and 25 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm,) and six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm). The SMM observed that two sites continued to be abandoned.

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site, whose location corresponded with withdrawal lines, and observed that the site continued to be abandoned with 14 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) missing.

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM revisited an “LPR” permanent storage site and noted that three tanks (two T-64 and one T-72) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 July, the SMM saw one armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM-2) on road M03 near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) heading south-east and one APC (BTR-80) towed by a truck near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), moving north. On 27 July, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an APC (BRDM-2) and an artillery fire control vehicle (1V-variant) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 27 July, an SMM mini UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor maintenance works at the power plant in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). A representative of the company that owns the plant told the SMM that workers were continuing to clean canals near the plant’s water pumps. (See SMM Daily Report 28 July 2017.) The head of the water pumping station in government-controlled Artema (26km north of Luhansk) told the SMM by phone that repairs had been suspended for the day as no demining team had been available. The Mission also continued to facilitate and monitor repair works in government-controlled part of Zolote on the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high voltage power lines and the Zolote 2/Karbonit 1200mm water pipeline. (See SMM Daily Report 28 July 2017.)

The JCCC was unable to co-ordinate in a joint manner demining of the M03 road connecting Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve, which impeded the SMM’s freedom of movement. The signatories of the Addendum to the Package of Measures of 29 September 2015 determined that the JCCC should contribute both to rapid response to impediments to the Mission’s monitoring and verification, and to the safety of the Mission’s monitors.

In Kyiv, the SMM continued monitoring commemorations of the adoption of Christianity by the Kyivan-Rus state. (See SMM Daily Report 28 July 2017.) The Mission monitored a procession of between 4,000 and 5,000 people (mostly middle-aged and elderly, about 40 per cent women) organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate. The SMM assessed that about 1,000 police and National Guard officers provided security as the marchers walked between St. Volodymyr Cathedral and Volodymyrska Hill. The SMM did not observe security incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member prevented the SMM from proceeding east at an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol) citing orders from his superiors not to allow the SMM through the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC, but it was unable to facilitate the SMM’s passage.
• The SMM could not travel on road M03 from Debaltseve to Svitlodarsk due to the presence of mines (see above).

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at the central hospital in Starobesheve refused to provide the SMM information regarding a patient (see above section on civilian casualties) and told the SMM to inquire with “DPR” members.

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.