Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas; its access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including again in Novoazovsk and Siedove, both areas close to the border with the Russian Federation, as well as in Horlivka and Olenivka.* The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Oleksandrivka. Aerial imagery revealed the presence of a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines and in close proximity to residential areas in northern Trudivskyi area of Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city. The SMM visited five border areas not under government control.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], however, more explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). Almost all recorded ceasefire violations occurred during night time.

On the night of 25-26 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three undetermined explosions, one projectile in flight from west to east, one undetermined explosion, 17 projectiles in flight from west to east, two projectiles from north to south, followed by aggregated totals of 19 projectiles in flight (14 from west to east, four north to south and one south-east to north-west), and three tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east, all 3-4km east-south-east.

On the evening of 25 July, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, of which two were 2km south and the rest 2-4km south-east, seven explosions assessed as impacts of rounds from recoilless gun (SPG-9) cannon (73mm) fire 2-4km south-east. The SMM also heard 30 undetermined explosions and more than 150 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, mostly 2-4km south-east.

On the same evening, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard, within ten minutes, 34 undetermined explosions 5-7km north-west.

On the evening of 25-26 July, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, 56 tracer rounds in flight from east to west, 11 tracer rounds from west to east, 163 tracer rounds from east to west, followed by a total of 127 tracer rounds (110 from west to east, seven from east to west and ten from south-east to north-west) and five undetermined explosions, all at undetermined distances north and north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions).

On the evening of 25 July, while in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 19 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 7-8km south-south-east. On 26 July, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 6-8km west.

The SMM followed up on media reports of a civilian casualty. The SMM contacted by phone the reported casualty, a 17-year-old boy, who told the SMM that the previous evening he had been walking on Shkilna Street in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) on his way home when he heard several explosions and felt pain and was bleeding from his head. He added that he was sent to the hospital where he had received first aid and was then released. A medical staff member at the hospital in Oleksandrivka confirmed to the SMM that the previous night the boy had been admitted and that he had suffered a light injury to his head.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 24 July, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded one projectile in flight from north to south 5-8km east-north-east, assessed as having occurred outside the disengagement area.

While in the disengagement areas near Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM remained unable to access its camera in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 26 July of one piece of towed artillery (type unknown), in violation of withdrawal lines, and in close proximity to residential areas in northern Trudivskyi area of Petrovskyi district of “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, with eight military-type trucks nearby.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) about 2km north-west of government-controlled Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk).

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent weapons storage site, whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal line. The SMM could access only a part of the site* and noted that eight tanks (three T-64 and five T-72) were missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and fresh tracks of military-type vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (one BTR-4 and one BRDM variant), one IFV (BMP-1) loaded on a truck, and one automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk), as well as one IFV (BMP-1) in Stanytsia Luhanska, outside the disengagement area.

In areas not under government control, the SMM observed three sets of fresh tracks assessed as those of tanks (T-64) on a road in the northern outskirts of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk) and similar fresh tracks about 3km north-east of Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk) which continued east and ended in Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk), multiple fresh tracks assessed as those of APCs (MT-LB) south of Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), as well as multiple fresh tracks, some assessed as those of APCs (MT-LB) and six pairs of tracks assessed as those of tanks (T-64 and T-72) in two different parts of Rozivka (61km south-east of Donetsk).

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 26 July of an area of probable firing positions in western Trudivskyi area and a compound with three military-type trucks, along with three impact sites nearby.

The SMM visited five border areas not under government control. During half an hour at the border crossing point in Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) the SMM saw ten cars, one bus and two trucks with closed cargo areas in a queue to leave Ukraine and seven cars enter Ukraine. At the border crossing point in Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), during 35 minutes, the SMM saw 43 cars, three buses and 27 trucks with closed cargo areas in a queue to leave Ukraine. In about 25 minutes at the border crossing point in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), which the SMM reached using a different, longer route (see below section on restrictions of freedom of movement) the SMM saw 29 cars (including five with “DPR” plates) in a queue to leave Ukraine. The SMM observed no traffic during 40 minutes at the border crossing point in Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk).

During 75 minutes at the border crossing point in Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw 30 cars (18 with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates), one minivan and fives buses with passengers inside and three heavy trucks with covered cargo areas (all with Ukrainian licence plates), and two pedestrians, leave Ukraine. The SMM also saw 12 cars (most of them with Ukrainian licence plates), four heavy trucks with covered cargo areas and three buses with passengers inside (all with Ukrainian licence plates), as well as three pedestrians, enter Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.            

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing a part of a permanent weapons storage site in an area not under government control as the place was locked and no “DPR” members were present. The SMM informed the JCCC and left the area after half an hour.
• Three armed “DPR” members at a checkpoint on road E58 north of Novoazovsk prevented the SMM from proceeding south towards the town and east towards the border with the Russian Federation. (See SMM Report 24 July 2017.) The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint about 1.2km north-west of “DPR”-controlled Siedove (33km north-east of Mariupol) armed men again prevented the SMM from proceeding towards the town, citing orders from superiors. (See SMM Daily Report 15 July 2017.) The SMM informed the JCCC.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said that there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint on road T0513 south of “DPR”-controlled Horlivka, an armed man stopped the SMM citing a new order given by a senior “DPR” member requiring SMM patrols to wait in the queue. He also demanded the SMM to open the back door of the vehicle and open the boxes in the back of the vehicle. After the SMM opened the back door, but refused to open the boxes, the armed man told the SMM to wait for his superior to arrive. Upon arrival of the superior, about 25 minutes later, the SMM was allowed to proceed. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.