Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 3 July 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Marinka and observed damage to civilian properties due to shelling in Uzhivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations near Stanytsia Luhanska area. The SMM’s access remained restricted there and elsewhere, including again to a border area not controlled by the Government in Novoazovsk.* The Mission monitored weapons on both sides of the contact line. It continued to follow up on the water and gas supply situation in Avdiivka and Yasynuvata and to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Mykhailivka-Almazna high-voltage power lines. The SMM visited one border area not under government control in Luhansk region.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 80 explosions).

On the evening and night of 2-3 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west.

On the evening and night of 2-3 July the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 20 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, two projectiles in flight from east to west, one explosion assessed as an impact, two illumination flares in vertical flight and four tracer rounds and two projectiles in flight from west to east, all 3-4km east-south-east. Approximately three hours later, the same camera recorded four tracer rounds in flight from west to east 4-6km east-north-east, followed by one projectile in flight from west to east and two explosions assessed as impacts 4-5km east-south-east. The following day, positioned in Avdiivka for about five hours, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion about 5km south-east and five undetermined explosions about 2km east-north-east and east.

On 3 July, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 0.5-3km at directions ranging from west to north-north-west. The SMM also heard one shot of small-arms fire 50-100m west of its position.

On the evening and night of 2-3 July, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), in about one hour the SMM heard 33 undetermined explosions 10-12km south-west and west.

On the evening and night of 2-3 July, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), in about two hours the SMM heard 55 explosions (47 undetermined, eight assessed as outgoing mortar (120mm) rounds), six minutes of  uncountable and overlapping bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-6km west-south-west.

On the night of 2-3 July the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, ten tracer rounds in flight (five in vertical flight, followed by five from east to west), one rocket-assisted projectile in flight from west to east, followed by aggregated totals of 25 tracer rounds in flight (18 from west to east and seven from east to west) and one rocket-assisted projectile from south-west to north-east, all at unknown distances north.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (20 explosions).

On the night of 2-3 July, while in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard at least 18 overlapping explosions assessed as impacts of artillery or mortar rounds (calibre unknown) and outgoing artillery or mortar rounds (calibre unknown) 10-16km north-west.

On the evening and night of 2-3 July, while in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions about 6-8km south-east.

On 3 July, positioned at the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), in about ten minutes the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions about 10km south-west.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty and damage to civilian properties in residential areas caused by shelling. The SMM visited a hospital in government-controlled Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk) following up on separate reports from the local police and a Ukrainian officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) that a 59-year-old man, a resident of government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), had been struck by a bullet while walking past 173 Zhovtneva Street at about 09:50 on 3 July. Medical staff at the hospital told the SMM that the injured man had been admitted with a gunshot wound on the back of his waist and was awaiting surgery.

In “DPR”-controlled Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, 24km north-east of Mariupol), led by an unarmed “DPR” member, the SMM saw a fresh crater on soft ground about 4m north-west of a house (with the sign “Medical Facility” written in Russian) at 46 Haharina Street. The SMM observed shrapnel spray on the north-facing wall of the house, shattered north-facing windows and damage to the north-facing side of the roof. Thick steel fence posts between the crater and the northern side of the house had been penetrated by shrapnel. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a 120mm mortar shell fired from a north-westerly direction. The same “DPR” member claimed that the shelling had taken place between 17:00 and 19:00 on 1 July.

Near non-government-controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), on 3 July the SMM lost contact with its mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The SMM informed the JCCC and requested that it facilitate recovery.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 1-2 July the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote recorded one undetermined explosion 7-9km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 3 July, positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zolote-5 (61km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 6-10km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 3 July, positioned 200m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM heard 29 shots of small-arms fire 2km west-south-west. About an hour later, positioned at the northern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM hear 28 undetermined explosions 5-7km west. Positioned at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge the Mission also heard four shots of small-arms fire about 1.2km west. All of these violations were assessed as having occurred outside the disengagement area.

While present in government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, for about one hour, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM saw two stationary tanks (T-72) at a railway station in government-controlled Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the withdrawal lines the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). (The SMM could not access two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas due to security restrictions but it was able to see the abovementioned weapons from the distance.)

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw one stationary infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.

Aerial imagery available to the SMM as of 26 June revealed the presence of 14 armoured vehicles, eight of which were spotted for the first time, and 21 military-type trucks near “DPR”-controlled Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk). Aerial imagery as of 27 June showed that some existing trenches had been expanded near Yasynuvata; imagery also revealed the presence of 46 new craters near the trenches.

The SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign (a wooden plate with the word “Mines: Passage is Prohibited” written in Russian) on M-03 road at the eastern edge of “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). A Russian Federation officer of the JCCC told the SMM that the sign had been placed by “LPR” members due to the presence of an undetermined explosive object.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM observed eight workers carrying out ongoing repairs to the high voltage Mykhailivka-Almazna power line near “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to follow up on the water and gas supply situation. In Avdiivka the SMM saw about ten elderly residents (both men and women) with containers queuing at a well. They told the SMM that the town was without water as the reservoirs had run out of water. Two other residents (both women in their twenties) also told the SMM that there was no water or gas supply to the town. At two different facilities in Avdiivka the SMM observed that there was no running water. In Zolote-5 the SMM saw eight residents (men and women, aged between 30 and 65) filling up their containers with water from a water pipeline. They told the SMM that water was available for a few hours a day but that its pressure was low.

The SMM visited one border area not under government control. At the border crossing point in Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), in about one hour the SMM saw 16 civilian vehicles (nine with Ukrainian, four with Russian Federation and three with Georgian licence plates), three passenger buses (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 34 pedestrians in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw five civilian vehicles (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians enter Ukraine.

On 3 July, the SMM attempted to visit the border area in Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol); however, it was again denied access.* (See SMM Daily Report 3 July 2017.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member at a checkpoint on road E58 north of “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk prevented the SMM from crossing the checkpoint and proceeding east towards the border with the Russian Federation or south towards Novoazovsk, citing orders from his supervisor. The SMM informed the JCCC, which told the SMM that it could not facilitate its access.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.