Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the three disengagement areas; it recorded ceasefire violations near Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* It assessed impact sites in Vesela Hora. The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored repairs to electricity lines and water pipes near Zolote. The SMM visited a border area not under government control. A vehicle explosion killed a Ministry of Defence official in Kyiv.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region including a similar number of explosions (59), compared with about 55 explosions in the previous reporting period.[1]

On the night of 26-27 June the SMM, positioned in Donetsk city centre, heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and small-arms-fire 3-5km south, 2-4km and 5-7km south-east.

On the same night, the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded a total of 20 tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east, four from north-east to south-west, one from south to north and one from north to south, all 3-6km east-south-east. On 27 June the same camera recorded three undetermined explosions 4-5km east-south-east and south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka for about five hours the SMM recorded one undetermined explosion 2-3km south-east.

On 27 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions 2-6km west, 3-10km north-west and an unknown distance south-east.

Positioned at “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard, over a three-hour period, six undetermined explosions: three of which were 2-3km north-east, two 2-5km north-west and one 3-4km west-north-west

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period (13 explosions), including two explosions.

While in government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)   on the night of 26-27 June the SMM heard 24 shots assessed as outgoing fire from an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) 4-5km south-east.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned on the western outskirts of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (“LPR”-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Near the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed the installation of wooden beams supporting a trench system inside the disengagement area.

The SMM assessed a number of impact sites in “LPR”-controlled Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). The SMM observed a fresh crater on the street about 25m west of the nearest house at 57 Kirov Street, which it assessed had been caused by a mortar (82mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. No damage was observed to the house. Three residents (two women and a man aged about 50-60 years old) told the SMM that they had heard explosions at about 20:15 on 26 June. The SMM observed a second impact site and a damaged house at 52 Kirov Street. It observed that the north-facing wall of the house had a 40cm diameter hole, which the SMM assessed had been caused by a round fired from a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) from a northerly direction. The SMM observed repair workers fixing damaged gas pipes. About 200m south of the house the SMM also observed that an electricity line had been completely severed. An “LPR” member told the SMM it had been cut in the shelling.

The SMM observed four fresh impact sites on the road about 200m east of a “DPR” checkpoint on Petrovskoho Street in Trudivskyi area of Petrovskyi district (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre). The SMM saw mortar tail fins in the impact sites. “DPR” members said the area had been shelled in the early morning of 27 June.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM spoke with a couple from Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) (now living in Mariupol) who said their house (at 54 Akhmatova Street) and car had been damaged in shelling on the night of 26 June. The SMM observed three holes assessed as caused by shrapnel, each approximately 15mm wide in the trunk of the couple’s car. They told the SMM that they had hoped to spend some time in their house in Pikuzy during the “harvest ceasefire” but had left, they said, in fear.

The SMM followed up on reports that a man had died on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge on 26 June. Staff from an international organization told the SMM that a 62-year-old man had died on the “LPR”-controlled side of the bridge. Two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said they had seen a coffin being transported to the government-controlled side on the afternoon of 26 June. Four women (aged in their sixties) in government-controlled Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) told the SMM that the man was a resident of Makarove and that he had died on the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas the SMM observed a self-propelled howitzer (2S1, Gvozdika 122mm) stationary 4km west-north-west of Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol).                       

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in non-government controlled areas the SMM observed two tanks (one T-72, the other partly covered with a tarp) stationary near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed twelve self-propelled howitzers (2S19 Msta S, 152mm). It observed that the following weapons continued to be absent: 19 self-propelled howitzers (seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 12 2S19 Msta-S), twelve towed howitzers (D20, 152mm) and six anti-tank guns (D48, 85mm). The SMM observed that three sites continued to be abandoned.

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent storage site, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, but could not access it as its gates were locked.*

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle and anti-aircraft weapons[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed: an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-4) stationary in government-controlled Nyzhnia Vilkhova (27km north-east of Luhansk); an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) on a military truck near Svitlodarsk; and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) near government-controlled Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. Positioned near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed repairs to high voltage power lines between the Mykhailivka substation in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote and “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk). The SMM observed three teams of repair workers at three different locations. In an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote the SMM also monitored as five workers from the Luhansk water company repaired water pipes.

The SMM visited a border area not under control of the Government. The SMM visited the border crossing point in Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) and observed, over about an hour, 48 vehicles waiting to exit Ukraine (38 with Ukrainian, eight with Russian Federation licence plates and two with “LPR” plates), none of which crossed. Two passenger buses were queued to leave Ukraine (one with a sign marked Luhansk-Moscow with Ukrainian licence plates and one with a sign indicating Pervomaisk-Moscow with “LPR” plates) and two buses (marked with signs indicating Luhansk-Moscow and Pervomaisk-Moscow, both with Ukrainian licence plates) entered Ukraine. Six covered cargo trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) left Ukraine.

The SMM followed up on reports of a vehicle explosion in the Solomianskyi district of Kyiv. The Ministry of Defence said in a statement that a colonel of the Ministry’s intelligence department had been killed in the blast. Later, the SMM observed that Mekhanizatoriv Street was cordoned off by police and saw investigators gathered around a burnt out black Mercedes car at the scene. The police said that the incident was being treated as an act of terrorism under Article 258 of the Criminal Code.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• Armed “LPR” members positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area (3km north of Pervomaisk) told the SMM that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission on side roads in due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no de-mining had taken place over the previous 24 hours and that, due to the possible presence of mines and/or UXO, they could not guarantee the SMM’s safety. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not access a “DPR” weapons storage site as its gates were locked.

Delay:

• Armed “DPR” members stopped and delayed the SMM for 17 minutes at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.