Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 15 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including more explosions compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region the Mission registered more ceasefire violations, but fewer explosions compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas; an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted that 12 anti-tank mines previously observed at the edge of the Zolote disengagement area were no longer present. Its access remained restricted in these areas and elsewhere.* The SMM followed up on reports of two civilian casualties and damage to houses caused by shelling in Olhynka and Donetsk city. The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines and weapons missing from holding areas. It continued to follow up on the water supply situation and to facilitate and monitor repairs to power lines between “LPR”-controlled Almazna and Kalynove-Borshchuvate. The SMM saw 17 trucks with “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” written on the sides in Luhansk city.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including about 540 explosions, compared with about 300 in the previous reporting period.[1]

On the night of 14-15 June, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions 10-15km north and north-west.

On the night of 14-15 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 14 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of unknown weapons, 4-7km south-south-east and three explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds of unknown calibre about 1km south, followed by a total of: 51 explosions (22 assessed as outgoing and 29 as impacts of rounds of unknown weapons), 18 projectiles in flight (nine from north to south and nine from south to north), 17 tracer rounds in flight (16 from south to north and one north to south), at locations ranging from 1km to 8km south and south-south-east. The following day, the camera recorded five explosions (three assessed as impacts of rounds of unknown weapons and two undetermined) at locations ranging from 2km to 7km north-east and east-south-east. Positioned in Avdiivka for about six hours, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east.

On the evening of 14 June, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), within about two hours, the SMM heard 250 undetermined explosions, about 40 shots of small-arms fire and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-10km south and south-west.

On the evening of 14 June, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka, the SMM heard 37 explosions (17 assessed as impacts of artillery rounds of unknown calibre, 13 as outgoing artillery rounds of unknown calibre and seven undetermined) and 17 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, at locations ranging from 3km to 5km west and south-west.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard about 40 undetermined explosions, about 40 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and about 100 shots of small-arms fire, mostly at locations ranging from 2km to 5km west and north-west.

Positioned about 1km north of “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw 16 airbursts of anti-aircraft cannon of undetermined calibre 4km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM heard four explosions (one assessed as an outgoing round of an unknown weapon and three undetermined) 1-2km east.

Positioned 3km north-east of government-controlled Hnutove (22km north-east of Mariupol), 30 minutes in the afternoon the SMM saw and heard eight explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds as well as 80 explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds of unknown calibre 3-4km east. The SMM saw the impacts near two treelines in an area 3.5km to 5km south-west of “DPR”-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

Positioned about 2km south-south-east of “DPR”-controlled Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance west. 

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions), but fewer explosions (26).

Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk), within ten minutes in the afternoon, the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions 7-8km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned 2km south of government-controlled Muratove (51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds of unknown calibre 10km south.

Positioned 3km south-west of government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 200 shots of small-arms fire 0.3km north, assessed as live-fire exercise, outside the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and observed damage to civilian properties caused by shelling. On 15 June, in Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city (4km north-west of Donetsk city centre) in the presence of a Russian Federation officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and five unarmed “DPR” members at the Partyzanskyi bus stop located at Kyivskyi Avenue, where a civilian had reportedly been injured, the SMM saw ten small holes in the west-facing side of the bus station. The civilian casualty (an elderly man), who the JCCC officers had arranged to meet the SMM at the spot, told the SMM that he had been injured about 21:30 on 14 June as he had been waiting at the bus stop. He said he had heard a whizzing sound and a loud explosion close to him, had felt a pain in his neck, left shoulder blade and had noticed some bleeding. He said he had been treated that night at the Donetsk Trauma Hospital. The SMM saw a white bandage covering his left shoulder blade. Behind the bus stop, the SMM saw some damage to the west-facing façade of an eight-storey building, but was unable to assess whether those were recent.

At a hospital in “LPR”-controlled Perevalsk (38km west of Luhansk) the SMM followed up on an alleged explosion of a hand grenade in the garden of a private house. Medical staff at the trauma unit told the SMM that five people had been brought to the hospital on 14 June with shrapnel injuries. Three patients had already been released and one woman had been transferred to the regional hospital in Luhansk city, according to them. The fifth injured person, still in the hospital, told the SMM that one person had been taken into custody in relation to the incident. The SMM saw a bruise on the man’s arm, but was unable to assess if he had other injuries.

On 14 June, in government-controlled Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM saw several impact sites. At 12 Tsentralna Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in a garden 3.5m west of a house, which had its north-north-east-facing front wall completely destroyed. A small shed north of the house had a hole in its south-facing wall. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. A resident of the house told the SMM the house had been struck on 13 June about 02:00, but she and her husband had not been at home at the time.

At the western edge of the village the SMM saw that an electrical substation was burnt and non-operational due to penetrating shrapnel damage in what appeared to be the control box. In the asphalt of the T-0509 road, 5m south of the substation, the SMM saw a fresh crater, which it assessed had been caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. The SMM saw a military checkpoint about 50m west of the crater. Four residents, who were near the impact site told the SMM that the first impact in the village on the night of 12-13 June, had been at that location.

At 17 Tsentralna Street the SMM saw ten shattered windows and a fresh crater in a back garden 20m west of a house. The Mission assessed the damage had been caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. A resident of the house told the SMM that a projectile had landed in his garden on 13 June at 02:15.

At Pryvokzalna Street, the SMM saw that the roof of a brick house had been destroyed, there was a large hole in the wall at the base of the roof and an internal side of a wall of the house had collapsed. The SMM assessed the damage had been caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. A resident of the house, an elderly man with disabilities, told the SMM that the incident had happened about 00:30 on 13 June. He said he and his wife had been sleeping in the room next to the one that had been hit, but had not been injured.

At the north-west edge of the village, the SMM saw a fresh crater on the asphalt surface at the base of the north-eastern corner of a brick building and damage to the building and shrapnel scarring on the adjacent north- and east-facing walls. The SMM assessed the damage had been caused by a 152mm artillery round fired from an east-north-easterly direction.

On the grounds of an oil storage depot the SMM saw two fresh impact sites: a tree 1.5m north of the north-western corner of a building and a tree 4m south of the south-eastern corner of the same building had been struck and the SMM saw several medium-sized branches on the ground, while branches that remained on the trees bore shrapnel marks. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from an east-north-easterly direction.

The SMM also saw several fresh impacts inside the perimeter of a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound in the north-western part of the village. Pieces of wreckage from several vehicles were strewn across the compound; one truck chassis had puncture marks from shrapnel in dense concentration on the passenger door, front cabin, and roof, while the cargo area was destroyed. The SMM also saw soot and heavy scorching from fire in the central courtyard of the compound. The SMM was unable in all cases to make an assessment of the direction of fire and type of weapons used as some burnt-out vehicles had already been removed. Shrapnel patterns on an adjacent building indicated that at least some shells had been fired from a north-easterly direction. The SMM also noted that a corrugated steel roof had been blown off of an adjacent hangar, and that small pieces of the roof had fallen onto the hangar floor. The hangar also had several cracks in its west-facing wall. The commander of the unit told the SMM that the first shelling had occurred at 02:24 on 12 June and the impacts had caused the ammunition that had been loaded on three vehicles to explode, while on 13 June, around midnight, a second shelling had occurred.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 14 June, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted that the 12 anti-tank mines last observed on 4 June at the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area were no longer present. (See SMM Daily Report 5 June 2017.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas the SMM observed four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) 5km south-west of Stepanivka (54km north of Donetsk), heading south-west and one mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) towed by a military truck moving east to south near Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk). An SMM mini UAV spotted three MLRS (BM-21) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) on 14 June.

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw 36 tanks (34 T-64 and two of unknown type), 32 of which at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk); two tanks (unknown type) at the railway station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM mini UAV spotted six self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka on 14 June.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and noted that four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were missing and one such site continued to be abandoned.

The SMM observed an armoured combat vehicle and anti-aircraft guns[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw one military truck loaded with Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel and mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) moving south near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

In areas not under government control the SMM saw four tarpaulin-covered lorries and one lorry with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) with a gunner sitting in position moving south-west in Metalist (42km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to follow up on the water supply situation. In government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw members of an international organization distributing canisters of water to residents (about five litres per person). In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), four residents (three middle-aged women and one middle-aged man) told the SMM that they had been without water for eight days. They added that the only source of water was 2km away. At the Yasynuvata railway station, the SMM saw running water in the station building and a large cistern being filled from an outdoor water main. An employee of the station told the SMM that the station was not supplied by the Donetsk Water Filtration Station.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the JCCC. The SMM continued to monitor repair of high voltage power lines between the Mykhailivka substation in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote and “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a convoy of 17 covered white trucks with “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” written on the sides in Luhansk city*. The convoy was escorted by six vehicles, two of which had Russian Federation licence plates. As the convoy was stationary outside a warehouse compound on Lutuhynska Street in Luhansk city, the SMM spoke with an occupant of one of the vehicles, who wore the uniform of the Russian Federation Ministry of Emergency Situations. According to him, the trucks carried medicine and food for children. The SMM observed trucks enter two warehouse compounds on Lutuhynska Street. The SMM was denied entry to both compounds.*

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further east into the Zolote disengagement area from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “LPR” members told the SMM that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said the road south of the bridge was mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• An armed “DPR” member denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint 1.6km north-west of “DPR”-controlled Mineralne (10km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission informed the JCCC.
• On two occasions an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM passage through a checkpoint at the eastern entrance to Yasynuvata. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members denied the SMM passage through an entry-exit checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• Unarmed guards denied the SMM access to two compounds in Luhansk city (see above).

 

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.