Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 14 June 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas and recorded ceasefire violations inside those near Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote. Its access remained restricted in these areas and elsewhere.* The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas and weapons missing from storage sites and holding areas on both sides of the contact line. It continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to power lines between “LPR”-controlled Almazna and Kalynove-Borshchuvate. The SMM monitored two border areas not under government control.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region including about 300 explosions, compared with about 400 in the previous reporting period.[1]

On the night of 13-14 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded 28 undetermined explosions 4-6km east-south-east, followed by 12 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds fired in an easterly direction, seven projectiles in flight from west to east and 19 explosions assessed as impacts 3-5km east-south-east.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the same night, the SMM heard 46 undetermined explosions; bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 3-10km south, south-east and south-west; and 20 undetermined explosions 10-15km west-south-west. The following day the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions 7-10km south-west and nine 3-5km south-east.

On 14 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions 3-5km west and 5-10km west, 12 explosions assessed as impacts caused by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) 5-10km south-west and one undetermined explosion 0.5-1km west. The SMM also recorded small-arms fire 1-3km south-west, west and north-west. 

Positioned in Avdiivka, the SMM recorded 16 undetermined explosions 5-8km west, as well as one undetermined explosion and small-arms fire 1-2km south.

Positioned about 1km north of “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM heard a total of 15 undetermined explosions: six 5-7km north-west and nine 4-5km west.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period (38 explosions), including about 60 explosions.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 12 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) recorded 139 ceasefire violations, ten of which were assessed as inside the disengagement area and 129 outside. The camera recorded one undetermined explosion assessed as artillery or mortar fire 4km south-south-east, followed by one projectile in flight from north to south 3km east, and four bursts of small-arms fire about 1.7km south-south-east. The camera also recorded a total of 121 tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east (all about 3km east); two projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west 3-5km east; and east-south-east and one undetermined explosion 3-4km east-south-east. The camera also recorded heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire about 1.7km south-south-east and 3km east.

On 14 June, positioned about 1km south of Zolote, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned 3km north of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk), and on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 50 undetermined explosions 10km south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. Later the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 3km south-west of its position, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 13 June the SMM camera in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded one explosion assessed as an impact of an automatic grenade launcher (AGS) round approximately 800m south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed four self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) heading south-west through the centre of government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Zhelanne (36km north-west of Donetsk). An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) also observed three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, 120mm) near government-controlled Zelene Pole (40km north-west of Donetsk) on 11 June.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 11 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and noted that three anti-tank guns (MT-12) were missing for the first time. One such site continued to be abandoned.

In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm). The SMM also observed that one such site continued to be abandoned.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, the locations of which corresponded with the withdrawal lines. In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM revisited one such site but could not enter a locked barn as “DPR” members denied access.*

In government-controlled areas the SMM observed that one permanent storage site continued to be abandoned, with all 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In areas not under government control an SMM UAV observed two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (probably BMP-1) in Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) on 13 June.

The SMM observed an unidentified UAV flying south above highway H20 about 1.5km west of government-controlled Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed demining and signs warning of the presence of mines. On the northern edge of government-controlled Krasna Talivka (51km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed a demining team from an international humanitarian mine clearance organization in a field with mine detecting equipment. The head of the team told the SMM that they planned to demine an area of 50 hectares. The area was marked with mine signs. 

The SMM observed the situation of civilians crossing the contact line. At the Stanytsia Luhanska crossing point the SMM observed a larger than usual number of people waiting to travel in both directions in mid-morning, with many on both sides complaining about long waiting hours. The SMM estimated that about 350 people were waiting to exit government-controlled areas and that about 1,000 were waiting to travel in the opposite direction by mid-morning. Earlier on the “LPR”-controlled side the SMM had observed up to 600 people waiting to travel towards government-controlled areas, and up to 100 in the opposite direction. At the government entry-exit checkpoint in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM spoke with three women (aged in their fifties) waiting at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) stand after being told that their names were not on the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) database. According to them their permits had been renewed. They complained about the inconvenience of additional checks. An SBU officer told the SMM that the SBGS database was not updated regularly and that in some cases civilians must undergo additional checks.

The SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to essential infrastructure, co-ordinated by the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair of high voltage power lines between the Mykhailivka substation in an “LPR”-controlled part of Zolote and “LPR”-controlled Almazna (55km west of Luhansk). Near “LPR”-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate (61km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed about 25 workers carrying out repairs and five men using mine detectors. The SMM, in co-ordination with JCCC, had arranged to facilitate repair work at the water pumping station in Vasylivka (“DPR”-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Prior to the planned start of repair works, however, the SMM heard multiple, sustained ceasefire violations near the pumping station (see above).

The SMM visited two border areas not under control of the Government. The Mission observed that no one was present at the border crossing point in Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk). Over the course of about an hour the SMM observed seven pedestrians enter Ukraine and 11 leave. The SMM also monitored the border crossing point in Dovzhanskyi (84km south-east of Luhansk). Over about an hour the SMM observed three stationary trucks (with “LPR” plates) with agricultural company logos, all loaded but could not observe the type of cargo as it was covered by tarpaulins. The SMM observed 17 passenger vehicles (eight with Ukrainian licence plates, seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates) enter Ukraine. Eight cargo trucks and two buses (all with Ukrainian licence plates) with “Rostov on Don-Stakhanov” and “Moscow-Donetsk”) also entered Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations, including at the disengagement area near Petrivske.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further east into the Zolote disengagement area from government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk) due to the possible presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said the road south of the bridge was mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Armed “DPR” members denied the SMM access to a barn at a weapons site. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.