Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 May 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

In Donetsk region the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions compared with the previous 24-hour period. In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions. The Mission observed multiple impact sites in Krasnohorivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The SMM heard explosions near the Zolote disengagement area and observed the removal of unexploded ordnance in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere.* An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines. The SMM continued to monitor demining and repairs to a water well near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM also visited centres for internally displaced persons in Lyman, Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka and Horlivka.

In Donetsk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including fewer explosions (about 270), compared with the previous 24-hours (about 320).

On the night of 28-29 May, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard about 120 undetermined explosions 6-8km north.

On the evening and night of 28-29 May the SMM camera at the “DPR”-controlled Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded, in sequence, ten tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east, eight in flight from south-east to north-west, four airbursts, and one tracer round in flight from east to west, followed by aggregated totals of three explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, 15 tracer rounds in flight (seven from north-west to south-east and eight from south-east to north-west) and one airburst, 3-10km north-east.

On the evening and night of 28-29 May the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three explosions assessed as impacts, two airbursts, and nine explosions assessed as impacts, followed by aggregated totals of seven tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east, about 100 tracer rounds in vertical flight assessed as anti-aircraft cannon fire, five projectiles in flight (three from north to south and two from south to north) and seven explosions assessed as impacts, 3-6km south-east. The same camera also recorded 36 tracer rounds in flight from north-west to south-east assessed as anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) fire 4-6km east.

On the evening of 28 May, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 8-10km north, about 70 shots of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, seven undetermined explosions, and saw and heard ten tracer rounds in vertical flight, all 3-10km west. The following day, positioned in the western outskirts of Horlivka, the SMM, in about 30 minutes, heard about 30 shots of automatic-grenade-launcher fire and 12 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-2km south-west.

On the evening and night of 28-29 May, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 60 explosions (40 undetermined and 20 assessed as impacts of 122mm artillery rounds), all 7-12km south and south-east.

On the evening and night of 28-29 May the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, five tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east, one undetermined explosion, two tracer rounds in flight from south-west to north-east, two undetermined explosions, and 27 tracer rounds in flight from north-east to south-west, followed by aggregated totals of 13 explosions (five assessed as impacts and eight assessed as outgoing), 175 tracer rounds in flight (121 from west to east and 54 from east to west) and 37 rocket-assisted projectiles in flight from west to east, all at unknown distances north-east.

On 29 May, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 30 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 2-5km at directions ranging from west to north-west.

On 29 May, positioned south-east of government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), in about one hour, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts and shots of anti-aircraft cannon, mortars (type undetermined) and small-arms fire, 5km north-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 25), compared with the previous 24-hours (15 explosions).

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of damage from shelling in residential areas. On 29 May, led by Ukrainian officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), the SMM observed impact sites in government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).                                                                                                                   

At 4 Nakhimova Street, the SMM observed a fresh crater (five-six metres in diameter and two metres deep) about six metres east of a house, assessed as caused by an artillery round fired from an easterly or south-easterly direction. At 1 Nakhimova, the SMM saw a hospital with broken windows and damage to the south-eastern side of its roof. The SMM saw damage to a tree on the south-eastern side of the hospital and assessed that a projectile had hit the tree and blown out the windows of two wings of the hospital. There was also damage to the north-facing part of the hospital garage’s roof and to the windows of a building ten metres west of the garage. The SMM saw that another building nearby had been completely destroyed and spoke with the resident of the building (a middle-aged man). He told the SMM that an impact had occurred early in the morning on 28 May. At 15 Tsentralna Street, the SMM observed damage to the north-facing roof and walls of a school, as well as broken windows. The SMM was unable to assess the cause of the damage or the direction of fire.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 29 May, positioned 1km north-east of government-controlled Zolote, in about ten minutes, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 8-12km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

While present in Stanytsia Luhanska and government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM noted a calm situation.

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, in “LPR”-controlled areas south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed an “LPR” demining team remove the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round and the tail fin of a multiple launch rocket system round (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) from the western edge of the tarmac road between the bridge and the Prince Ihor monument.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Memorandum, the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary near “LPR”-controlled Metalist (7km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas the SMM saw 19 self-propelled howitzers (11 2S1 and eight 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) on stationary train wagons at a railway station in Lyman (110km north of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun, a recoilless gun,[2] as well as tracks of military-type vehicles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Pavlopil (26km north-east of Mariupol) and a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) near Zolote. On 26 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (two BMP-1, two BMP-2, and two BMP-variant) and three APCs (two BRDM-2, one BTR-variant) near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk). On 27 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-70) near Vilkhove (22km north-east of Luhansk). On 29 May, the SMM saw fresh tracks assessed as those of three tanks (T-64) near government-controlled Kalchyk (24km north of Mariupol).

The SMM also saw fresh tracks assessed as those of two to four vehicles with the chasses of APCs (MT-LB) or self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near “DPR”-controlled Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, in co-ordination with the JCCC, the SMM monitored the Luhansk Civil-Military Administration demining team clear an area just north of the bridge to dig a water well. The SMM observed the start of the digging with the assistance of the fire brigade. In co-ordination with the JCCC, the SMM also monitored to facilitate access to a water pumping station for an “LPR” demining team in the northern outskirts of Luhansk city for repair works to take place.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and visited centres in government-controlled Lyman (formally Krasnyi Lyman, 110km north of Donetsk), government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk), government-controlled Druzhkivka (72km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka. In Lyman, the Head of the Social Centre informed the SMM that there were 150 IDPs (120 of whom were single mothers) in the town; according to him, there had been 600 IDPs in 2016. In Kostiantynivka, the administrator of the centre said there were 25 IDPs living there. The SMM saw around 15 elderly people at the centre living in poor conditions with old furniture, common washrooms and about six people per room. The SMM noted similar conditions in Druzhkivka where, according to the centre co-ordinator, there are about 50 IDPs, 20 of whom were elderly. At the centre in Horlivka, the SMM saw that the facility had about 30 apartments and had been recently renovated.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv, Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the Mission’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• An armed “LPR” member told the SMM that that he could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel at the checkpoint north of the bridge said that no demining had taken place and that the road south of the bridge remained mined. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• At a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Kreminets (16km south-west of Donetsk), a civilian car with “DPR” plates approached the SMM and an armed man aggressively told the SMM that it could not proceed further and that the patrol should take an alternate route on highway H-15 through another “DPR” checkpoint in Kargil (17km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM informed the JCCC.

Delay:

• An SMM patrol including a civilian truck transporting an SMM container was stopped at the entry-exit checkpoint in government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) by a Ukrainian commander of the State Fiscal Services, who requested a written and signed statement of purpose in order for the patrol to pass. The SMM did not provide the written statement. The SMM informed the JCCC. After one hour and 43 minutes, the SMM was allowed to pass.  
• Later, an SMM patrol with two SMM cars and the same civilian truck transporting an SMM container was stopped at a checkpoint on the edge of “DPR”-controlled Snizhne (72km east of Donetsk). Three armed men (all middle-aged) told the SMM that it could not proceed because the SMM had not obtained a “DPR” “customs stamp” when travelling between government- and “DPR”-controlled areas. The SMM informed the JCCC and, after waiting almost four hours, it was allowed to continue.
• At a checkpoint on the western outskirts of non-government-controlled Debaltseve (58km north east of Donetsk), an armed “LPR” member gestured to the SMM to turn around and go back. Another “LPR” member made similar gestures. The SMM moved 400m back and informed the JCCC. Approximately 40 minutes later, the SMM was allowed to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.