Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 May 2017

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations. In Donetsk region the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations on 6 and on 7 May compared with the previous reporting period. In Luhansk region it recorded more ceasefire violations on 6 May compared with the previous reporting period but fewer on 7 May. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. Its access remained restricted there and elsewhere. The SMM assessed impact sites and damage to residential areas caused by shelling. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines, as well as mines and unexploded ordnance, predominantly in non-government-controlled areas. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of bodies to government-controlled areas via the Shchastia bridge, as well as repairs to the Donetsk Water Filtration Station. The Mission monitored two border areas currently not under government control.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region on both 6 May (151 explosions) and 7 May (152 explosions) compared to the previous reporting period (132).[1]

On the evening and night of 5-6 May the SMM camera in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions followed by a total of 21 projectiles (12 in flight from west to east, six north to south and three south to north); 80 tracer rounds (50 in flight from south to north, 15 from north to south and 15 from west to east); and six undetermined explosions, all at locations ranging from 4km to 6km south-east. The following afternoon, evening and night, the camera recorded 23 undetermined explosions followed by a total of 38 projectiles (19 in flight from west to east, 19 from east to west); five undetermined explosions; and two airbursts, all at locations ranging from 3km to 5km east-south-east.

During the same period the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (9km north-west of Donetsk city centre) recorded nine undetermined explosions, followed by a total of 18 projectiles (16 in flight from west to east, two from east to west); 62 tracer rounds in flight from west to east; and two undetermined explosions, all 4-6km north-north-east. On the evening and night of 6-7 May, the camera recorded one airburst, followed by a total of 139 projectiles (49 in flight from north to south, 90 from south to north); three airbursts; two undetermined explosions; and two tracer rounds (one in flight from north to south, the other from south to north), all 3-4km north-north-east. On the morning of 7 May the camera recorded ten explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of unknown weapons, 3-5km north-east. In ten minutes in the early afternoon, the camera recorded 11 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-east.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five hours on 6 May, the SMM heard 51 undetermined explosions at locations ranging between 1km and 5km west. The following day, from the same position and within the same observation time, the SMM heard 34 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire, mostly 3-6km west-south-west.

Positioned in Avdiivka for about five hours on 6 May, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions, mostly 2-4km north-east. The following day, from the same position and in a similar observation period, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre on the afternoon of 7 May the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-5km south.

While in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 5-6 May the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 11km north. The following evening the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 6-8km north and small-arms fire.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the night of 6-7 May the SMM heard 12 explosions, assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds, six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) cannon fire (73mm), and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km south-east; and two explosions, assessed as outgoing rounds of unknown weapons, 5-7km south-east.

On the evening and night of 5-6 May the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 66 tracer rounds in flight from south to north, followed by a total of 95 tracer rounds (44 from west to east, 25 from south-west to north-east, 25 from east to west, one from south to north) and one airburst, all at unknown distances north-north-east. The following evening and night, the camera recorded one tracer round in flight from west to east followed by a total of 20 undetermined explosions, two explosions assessed as impacts, 224 tracer rounds (138 in flight from east to west, 41 from north to south, 22 from south to north, 21 from west to east, two from south-west to north-east) and one airburst, most at locations ranging from 7km to 9km north-north-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), on 6 May the SMM heard five explosions, assessed as outgoing mortar rounds of unknown calibre, at an unknown distance east. On 7 May, positioned 1km north of government-controlled Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance south-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period on 6 May, including 116 explosions (compared with 22) but fewer on 7 May compared with 6 May, including 37 explosions. On the evening and night of 4-5 May, the SMM camera in government-controlled Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from north to south 2.7km east-north-east; one impact 6-10km east-north-east and two illumination flares rising vertically 5.5km east-north-east. The following night the camera recorded, in sequence, one illumination flare in vertical flight, then falling about 6km east-south-east and eight projectiles being fired approximately 3km east, traveling from north to south. On 6 May, positioned 1.5km east of government-controlled Zolote-1 (60km north-west of Luhansk), within 40 minutes in the afternoon, the SMM heard 113 undetermined explosions 10-15km south-west of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Zolote-4 (60km north-west of Luhansk) in the afternoon of 7 May, the SMM heard 36 undetermined explosions. All these violations were assessed as taking place outside the nearby Zolote disengagement area.

The SMM assessed impact sites and damage to residential areas caused by shelling. At a bus stop in “DPR”-controlled Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), on 6 May the SMM saw a fresh crater located approximately 50-80m from the nearest civilian buildings and 25m east of a “DPR” checkpoint. The crater was located on a tarmac road. The SMM assessed that it had been caused by a grenade fired from a westerly or west-south-westerly direction.

The same day, in “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), the SMM assessed fresh impact sites near the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) premises at 5 Sadova Street, about 7km from the contact line. In a residential area next to the JCCC office, the SMM saw that one garage had been completely destroyed and four other garages, connected to the first one, had been burned down. Two other buildings (one located at 5 and the other at 7 Sadova Street) had light shrapnel damage to their facades, where windows were also broken. The concrete driveway into the main entrance of the houses was also directly hit and damaged, as was the nearby fence, adjacent to the JCCC office. The SMM assessed that the damage had been caused by tank rounds fired from a westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 6 May, positioned inside Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, about 100m south of the pedestrian bridge, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as caused by outgoing rounds of under-barrel grenade launchers about 200m north-east and their two subsequent impacts 500m north-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM continued to observe (on 6 and 7 May) seven multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm; and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), and seven tanks (T-72) at an aerodrome on the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city. On 6 May a Russian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that a letter had been sent to “LPR” and “DPR” members with regard to these and similar violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but did not outline any concrete steps taken to remedy them. In Donetsk city a senior “DPR” member repeatedly refused to meet with the SMM and in Luhansk city a senior “LPR” member met the SMM, but did not provide steps to remedy the violations reported by the SMM.

In government-controlled areas, on 7 May, the SMM saw one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near government-controlled Sukha Balka (36km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines, but outside storage sites, the SMM saw on 7 May 40 stationary tanks (unidentified type) near “DPR”-controlled Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 May, the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-1) on a flatbed truck travelling from north to south on the main road between Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk) and Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-2) on a flatbed truck moving south on a road 3km south-east of Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 6 and 7 May, at the aerodrome on the south-eastern outskirts of Luhansk city, the SMM saw 17 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (ten MTLB and seven BTR-80) and seven IFVs (BMP-2). The SMM also saw about 300 armed men marching. On 7 May, the SMM saw one APC (BTR, type unknown) and one military truck towing a covered anti-aircraft gun, moving south-west along Oboronna Street in Luhansk city centre.

The SMM observed the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the security zone. On 6 May, between the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint (3.5km north-north-west of the Donetsk Water Filtration Station) and the Station itself, the SMM saw for the first time four anti-tank mines (two on either side of the northbound carriageway).

On 6 May the SMM saw also for the first time, five anti-tank mines and one stake-mounted trip-flare (possibly used) about 2km east of government-controlled Zolote-1. They were located in grass south of the road, stretching from 1m to 5m away from the asphalt road. The same day the SMM saw the tail fin of one 120mm mortar sticking out from the asphalt on the southern side on the T0504 road on the western edge of “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk). The SMM  saw again the tail fin of one 120mm mortar protruding from the pavement at the eastern edge of the road (covered by a piece of metal) 100m south-west of the Prince Ihor Monument, outside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. (See SMM Daily Report 13 April 2017.) In early May, “LPR” members had told the SMM that the area had been cleared of UXO. Near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint, about 3.5km east of government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw for the first time an anti-tank mine (TM-62M) fixed to a plank at the southern edge of the road. About 4km east of Popasna the SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar sticking out from the asphalt on the northern side of the T0504 road. The SMM noted that a previously observed tail fin from an 82mm mortar near an “LPR” checkpoint, at the T-junction about 2km south-west of “LPR”-controlled Molodizhne (63km north-west of Luhansk) had been removed. Armed “LPR” members at the checkpoint told the SMM that an “LPR” demining team had removed it during the past week.

On 7 May the SMM saw for the first time six mine hazard signs (red plates reading “Mines” in Russian affixed to sticks) at a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk), which had not been installed. Two armed “LPR” members told the SMM that they were preparing for the laying of a new mine field in this area.

The same day, the SMM saw for the first time a demining team from an international non-governmental organisation working in an area 3.5km north of government-controlled Krasna Talivka (51km north-east of Luhansk). The team told the SMM that they were clearing mines from a small forest road, which leads to the Derkul river. In a shop in Krasna Talivka the SMM saw a notice requesting residents to avoid until further notice an area near a cemetery due to demining activities.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable the handover via the Shchastia bridge of bodies of three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, who, according to representatives of the Afghan War Veterans Association, had been killed on 2 May in the area of Debaltseve. On 6 May, positioned in “LPR”- controlled areas south-east of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed members of the Association, based in Luhansk city, travel towards the bridge to transfer the remains across the bridge and then return to the SMM’s position.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire, co-ordinated by the JCCC. On 6 and 7 May the SMM facilitated and monitored repairs to electricity pylons supplying the Donetsk Water Filtration Station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata.

The SMM visited two border areas currently not under control of the government. On 7 May, in about one hour at the Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 40 civilian cars (20 with Ukrainian licence plates, 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, one with Lithuanian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), two vans (one with Ukrainian licence plates, the other with “DPR” plates), as well as two covered cargo trucks (with Belarusian licence plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The same day, in about half an hour at the Ulianivske pedestrian border crossing point (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw one civilian car (with “DPR” plates) bring two men to the crossing point who then exited Ukraine. The SMM also saw two civilian cars in the adjacent parking lot (one with Lithuanian licence plates, the other with “DPR” plates).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.

Denial of access:

• On 6 and 7 May armed “LPR” members told the SMM that that they could not guarantee the safety of the Mission in fields and side roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both days.
• On 6 and 7 May, a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place during the previous 24 hours in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and that, with the exception of the main road, the SMM’s safety could not be guaranteed in the surrounding areas due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both days.
• On 6 and 7 May, armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from moving west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske. The SMM informed the JCCC on both days. 
• On 6 May, the SMM was unable to proceed eastward from government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces officers said they could not ensure its safety. A Ukrainian JCCC officer was present and told the SMM that anti-tank mines were still present on the road to Petrivske.
• On 6 and 7 May the SMM could not travel across the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said no demining had taken place and that the road south of the bridge remained mined. The SMM informed the JCCC on both occasions.
• On 6 May, on two occasions, an armed “DPR” member denied the SMM access at checkpoint near the settlement of Trudovskyi in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district. The “DPR” member cited orders from his commander not to allow the SMM through. The Mission informed the JCCC.
• On 7 May, armed "DPR" members denied the SMM access to the village of “DPR”-controlled Sosnivske (35km north-east of Mariupol) at a checkpoint on the eastern side of the village. As the SMM was waiting for the local commander to arrive, it saw the armed “DPR” member, who has initially denied it access, fire one shot of his assault rifle (AK-47) vertically in the air and motion with his hands towards the SMM to move further away from the checkpoint. The SMM moved and after about ten minutes the commander approached the SMM and said access will not be granted as there were ongoing demining activities on the western side of the checkpoint. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• On 7 May, the SMM was unable to access a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area as no “DPR” member was present to ensure access. The SMM informed the JCCC.

[1] Please see the annexed table for complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.