Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 13 March 2017
This report is for the media and the general public.
The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24-hour period. The Mission observed impact sites in Dokuchaievsk. The Mission monitored the disengagement areas in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske but its access remained restricted.* In violation of the Framework Decision the SMM observed hardware and forces inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints. It continued to observe the blockade of routes across the contact line at four locations in government-controlled areas. The Mission visited one border area currently not under government control in Voznesenivka. The SMM followed up on reports of vandalism against branches of a bank in Kharkiv and Kyiv.
In Donetsk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations [1], including about 1,070 explosions, compared with the previous 24-hour period (610 explosions). Most of the explosions were recorded in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area and the Svitlodarsk-Debaltseve area.
On the night of 12-13 March, while in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard about 350 undetermined explosions 8-10km north-north-west and 6-8km north-west.
During the day on 13 March, positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for almost six hours, the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions 1-7km east and south-east. In the early evening the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded 27 explosions assessed as the impacts of rounds from unidentified weapons and five undetermined explosions 4-5km east-south-east.
During the day on 13 March, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) for over six and a half hours, the SMM heard 17 shots from automatic-grenade-launcher fire 3-4km west, and subsequently as many explosions assessed as their impacts 1-2km west, and 13 undetermined explosions 3-7km west. Positioned 1.5km south of government-controlled Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk) for five and a half hours, the Mission heard one explosion assessed as the impact of a mortar round 1km north-west and 23 undetermined explosions 1-3km north-west.
On the evening of 12 March, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-north-east and 27 undetermined explosions 8-10km south-west.
On the same evening, while in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 91 undetermined explosions 4-7km north-west. On the early afternoon of 13 March, positioned in two different locations in Debaltseve, the SMM heard 41 undetermined explosions 3-7km north-west.
On the evening of 12 March, while in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 138 undetermined explosions 3-5km east-south-east. The next morning, while in the same location, the SMM heard 27 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 3-6km east and 11 explosions assessed as the impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 3-5km south-east. In the afternoon, while in Svitlodarsk, the Mission heard 136 undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east.
On the morning of 13 March, positioned in government-controlled Semyhiria (58km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard, within 15 minutes, 54 explosions assessed as artillery rounds 4-5km south.
During the night of 12-13 March the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded 39 undetermined explosions at unknown distances north and north-east. The camera also recorded a total of 146 tracer rounds (77 in flight from west to east, one from north-west to south-east, six from south-west to north-east, 58 from east to west, and four from north-east to south-west), beginning with 22 tracer rounds in flight from west to east, all at unknown distances north and north-east.
In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous 24-hour period (ten explosions).
Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Zymohiria (27km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five explosions assessed as artillery rounds 10km south-south-west. Positioned 2.5km east of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard nine explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds 4km south-east. Positioned in government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds 3-5km south-south-east and south-west. Positioned in government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds 2-3km south-south-west and 2km east.
The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure caused by gun fire. In western parts of “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM, accompanied by Russian officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and two “DPR” members (one armed), assessed two impact sites. On 39A Lenin Street the SMM observed a hole on the west-facing window of a balcony on the second floor of a five-story apartment building. The SMM assessed it as having been caused by a bullet fired from a westerly direction, which had penetrated two windows of the living room. Residents (a man and a woman aged 70) told the SMM that they had heard shelling and shooting during the afternoon on 12 March, and had found a bullet on the windowsill of the living room. On 28 Lenin Street the SMM saw a hole on the west-facing window of a classroom on the first floor of a school building, and assessed it as having been caused by a bullet fired from a westerly direction. A guard of the school told the SMM that she had heard shelling and shooting on 12 March and subsequently had found a bullet in the classroom.
In “DPR”-controlled Khartsyzk (26km east of Donetsk) the administrator of an apartment building on 75 Krasnoznamenska Street told the SMM that having heard an explosion at 19:00 on 10 March, she had gone to an apartment and seen a man (aged 40) lying on the floor bleeding from his face and his left hand and a body of a woman (aged 57) on a sofa without sign of life. The SMM saw a broken window of the said apartment from outside. An employee of a morgue told the SMM that the body of the woman had been transported to the morgue on 10 March and the body of the man, who had died in a hospital, had been brought to the morgue on 11 March.
The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*
On the evening of 11 March, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded seven explosions assessed as outgoing 120mm mortar rounds 700m north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and one flash 1.1km south (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 13 March, positioned south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard four bursts and six single shots of heavy-machine-gun fire 2-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).
In government-controlled Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, in violation of the Framework Decision the SMM observed one high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle without any visible unit signs, heading south-west. The SMM also noted in the vehicle five armed men wearing what looked like Ukrainian Armed Forces uniforms without any visible unit badges (at least one man was armed with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-24) launcher and others with AK-47 automatic rifles). The SMM informed the JCCC. Also inside the disengagement area, about 500m north of the railway bridge, the SMM observed a fresh impact site on the side of road T1316, and assessed it as having been caused by a round from an under-barrel grenade-launcher fired from a south-easterly direction.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Petrivske the SMM heard 11 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south (the SMM was not able to assess whether they occurred inside the disengagement area). The Mission also heard ten undetermined explosions and six shots of small-arms fire 3-7km north-north-west, as well as five undetermined explosions and ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-6km north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures, its Addendum, and the Memorandum. [2]
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines in areas currently not controlled by the Government, the SMM saw ten stationary tanks (nine T-64 and one T-72) - seven of them were severely damaged - in a repair facility in Luhansk city and two mortars (2B14, 82mm) in a trench in Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites the SMM saw in government-controlled areas: six tanks (T-64) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk); one tank (T-64) loaded on a stationary transporter near Dmytrivka (43km north of Luhansk); and two stationary tanks (T-74) near Oknyne (53km north-west of Luhansk).
In areas currently not controlled by the Government the SMM saw three stationary tanks (unidentified type) near a training area in Markyne (94km south of Donetsk).
The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines the SMM noted for the first time that a site was abandoned with six multiple-launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) missing.
The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted that 12 tanks (T-72) and seven mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were still missing. The SMM also observed additional weapons present for the first time.
The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns [3] in the security zone. In areas currently not under Government control the SMM saw: ten infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP), four armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (two BTR-70 and two BTR-80) and about 40 military-type trucks, all stationary in a repair facility Luhansk city; a convoy of three APCs (two BTR-80 and one BRDM-2) and 16 military-type trucks leaving from another facility in Luhansk city*; a convoy of five APCs (four BTR-80 and one BRDM-2) heading east in Luhansk city; one stationary IFV (BMP) near Zymohiria; and one APC (MT-LB) near Pryvitne.
In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) each mounted on a truck (one stationary and another heading north) near Mykolaivka Druha (55km north of Donetsk); and one APC (MT-LB) mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) travelling near Svitlodarsk. Aerial imagery revealed the presence of seven armoured vehicles near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) on 12 March.
On 12 March, the SMM noted tracks of tanks and armoured vehicles in areas around “LPR”-controlled Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) and Oleksandrivsk (10km west of Luhansk). While in the area, four armed men denied the SMM access (see SMM Daily Report 13 March 2017). On 13 March, the SMM noted tracks of tanks and armoured vehicles between “LPR”-controlled Novosvitlivka (16km south-east of Luhansk) and Mykolaivka (15km east of Luhansk).
The SMM monitored and facilitated adherence to the ceasefire, co-ordinated by the JCCC, to enable demining and repair of essential infrastructure. In Avdiivka the SMM observed repair works to a damaged transformer on the electric power lines supplying electricity for Avdiivka. A Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that power supply in Avdiivka had been restored at 17:15. On highway M04 west of Yasynuvata the SMM observed a demining team checking the areas for explosive devices and six DTEK employees repairing power lines. The SMM also observed repair of power lines in government-controlled parts of Zolote.
The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints. At the “DPR” entry-exit checkpoint near Horlivka the SMM observed about 121 cars and four buses waiting to cross towards government-controlled areas. Seven people (four men and three women aged over 60) waiting in the queue at the checkpoint explained that the reason for long queues was an approaching deadline for physical identification by banks in government-controlled areas in order for them to continue receiving their pensions and social benefits.
At 08:45, at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed more than 1,500 pedestrians waiting to walk towards government-controlled areas. A man (aged 60) told the SMM that he had waited more than eight hours the day before but had not been able to proceed before the checkpoint closed at 18:00, adding that he had been waiting for more than four hours this morning. Two men (aged 60) stated that on 12 March several hundred people had not been able to cross the checkpoint towards government-controlled areas as the checkpoint was closed at 18:00, and they had travelled back to Luhansk city and come back today.
The SMM continued to monitor the blockade of railway routes that lead across the contact line. At railway crossings near the government-controlled towns of Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), Shcherbynivka (44km north of Donetsk), Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk), and Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk) the railway tracks were still blocked and activists were present at the blockade sites. In “LPR”-controlled Fashchivka (60km south-west of Luhansk) an employee of a coal mine told the SMM that due to the blockade railway transport of coal from the mine to government-controlled areas had been suspended and on 27 February the mine had stopped producing coal. He added that the number of employees had decreased from 900 before the conflict to 320, and after the blockade started the number had dropped to 70.
The SMM monitored one border area currently outside government control. During one hour at the border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw that 22 cars (six with Russian Federation, seven with Ukrainian and nine with Georgian licence plates) and 21 pedestrians exited, and 30 cars (11 with Russian Federation, 18 with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates), two covered trucks and one bus (with Ukraine licence plates), and 20 pedestrians entered Ukraine.
The SMM followed up on reports of vandalism against branches of a bank. In Kharkiv, the SMM saw sprayed construction foam on an automated teller machine (ATM) outside a bank and spray-painted graffiti on its door and two windows, which had reportedly occurred on 11 March. An employee showed the SMM security camera footage of the incident and stated that two masked individuals had sprayed the bank’s ATM, door and windows. The SMM noted the bank was operating. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a protest in front of a branch of the same bank. The SMM saw about 100 people (mostly young men, some wearing balaclavas and camouflage-type clothes) who were holding about 20 flags of the National Corps party and four red and black flags. The SMM saw three protestors spray ‘RUS BANK’ (in Latin alphabet) on the bank building’s metal security shutters and build a wall from concrete blocks and cement (about 2m tall) at the main entrance to the bank, which was also closed off with metal shutters. The protestors filled the gaps in the metal shutters on the bank’s windows with expanding foam and lit some 20 flares. The SMM noted that the leader of the Right Sector party was also present. The protest continued for about four hours, although when the SMM left at 16:15 some 30 protestors were still building a second layer of the wall. One police car and another car marked “Police Security” were parked nearby.
The SMM continued monitoring the court hearing of the head of the State Fiscal Service (see SMM Daily Report 7 March 2017). The SMM saw around 150 people (mainly young and middle-aged men) gathered in front of the Kyiv Court of Appeal who proceeded to enter the court yard. There, an additional group of 80 young men was also present, some with hats and jackets of the National Corps. Around noon the SMM saw three cars (one with Polish, one with Estonian and one with Lithuanian licence plates), all equipped with Automaidan flags, arrive and then proceed to circle adjacent streets. At around 17:00 protesters dispersed. The SMM saw three patrol police units in front of the court premises and three medium-capacity buses with law enforcement officers in the courtyard.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance.
Denial of access:
- At the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, a Ukrainian officer of the JCCC told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed in the areas surrounding the main road due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- The possible presence of mines and UXO prevented the SMM from travelling further south-east into the Zolote disengagement area from government-controlled Katerynivka.
- At an “LPR” checkpoint at the edge of the Zolote disengagement area, armed men told the SMM that its safety could not be guaranteed in the fields and side roads due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel stopped the SMM on the road between government-controlled Katerynivka and Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and told the Mission that the road was mined that it could not proceed without authorization from senior Ukrainian Armed Forces officers. The Mission informed the JCCC.
- The SMM was unable to travel west from “DPR”-controlled Petrivske due to a lack of security guarantees and the possible presence of mines and UXO. The Mission informed the JCCC.
- The SMM could not travel south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.
- North-west of Luhansk city an armed guard denied the SMM access to a facility. Subsequently the SMM observed a convoy of three APCs and 16 military-type trucks leaving the facility (see section on armoured combat vehicles above). The SMM informed the JCCC.
Delay:
- At a checkpoint in government-controlled Bolotene (22km north-east of Luhansk) Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel delayed the SMM for 22 minutes. The Mission informed the JCCC.
Other impediments:
- In “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk) a local “LPR” member told the SMM that they could only speak with the SMM with written permission from senior “LPR” members.
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
[2] Despite the joint statement of 1 February by the Trilateral Contact Group and the consent reached on 15 February, the sides have not yet provided the baseline information requested by the SMM related to weapons to be withdrawn and locations of units and formations.
[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.