Vienna Document 2011: achievements and prospects for further updates

The Vienna Document 2011, which contains the OSCE’s primary military confidence- and security-building measures, was adopted by the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on 20 November 2011 and entered into force on 1 December. Its adoption sends a strong political signal denoting progress in the politico-military dimension of the OSCE. It puts an end to an 11-year deadlock in the field of CSBMs modernization in the FSC and constitutes a positive example of the ability of the participating States to negotiate and adapt important politically binding commitments without linking them to other contested political issues, such as protracted conflicts or the stalemate of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). It could be the start of a comprehensive process of adapting the OSCE’s existing politico-military arrangements to today’s and tomorrow’s politico-military realities.

More than a technical update, the Vienna Document 2011 includes elements that have serious political implications, notably the politically binding provision for a regular assessment of the Document, including its reissuing at intervals of five years or less. In the new introduction, the 56 participating States explicitly reaffirm the political heritage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that was held from 1984 to 1986, as well as all subsequent relevant CSCE/OSCE concluding documents.

From the 2010 OSCE Summit to the 2011 Ministerial Council

The work of the FSC to update the Vienna Document received an important impetus at the 2010 Astana OSCE Summit. The Heads of State or Government of the OSCE participating States expressed their political will to restore trust and confidence in the politico-military dimension and called on participating States to work in a spirit of openness and to foster co-operation by building mutual understanding. The final document of the Summit, entitled “Astana Commemorative Declaration – Towards a Security Community”, contains several elements concerning the politico-military dimension. Paragraph 8 addresses arms control and CSBMs as follows: Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes remain major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and should be revitalized, updated and modernized. We value the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation, and look forward to the updating of the Vienna Document 1999.

Conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building regimes remain major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and should be revitalized, updated and modernized. We value the work of the Forum for Security Co-operation, and look forward to the updating of the Vienna Document 1999.

The FSC adopted nine decisions concerning the Vienna Document during 2010 and 2011, which were incorporated into the Vienna Document 2011. The negotiations demonstrated the ability of the Forum to avoid being hijacked by political divergences and gave proof to the capacity of each of the 56 participating States to do its utmost to reach consensus in the politico-military dimension.

This was reflected at the 2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council, at which the participating States adopted all three of the decisions that issued from the FSC, whereas in other dimensions of the OSCE’s work they were less successful in reaching consensus. The Ministerial Council Decision on Issues Relevant to the FSC (MC.DEC/7/11) welcomes “intensified negotiations to update and modernize the Vienna Document and the decision to reissue the Vienna Document, adopted at the special FSC meeting in 2011”. The preamble reaffirms, inter alia, that “the participating States will ensure that the efforts they make in the Forum to advance arms control, disarmament, confidence- and security‑building, security co‑operation and conflict prevention are coherent, interrelated and complementary. The operational part of the decision tasks the FSC to “give further impetus to negotiations on updating and modernizing the Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures with the aim of increasing military stability, transparency and predictability for all participating States.

The operational part of the decision tasks the FSC to “give further impetus to negotiations on updating and modernizing the Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures with the aim of increasing military stability, transparency and predictability for all participating States.

Achievements of the Vienna Document 2011

As mentioned, the Vienna Document 2011 provides for a regular assessment of the Document, including its reissuing at intervals of five years or less, and contains a new introduction. It is important to note that any decisions taken to amend the document will enter into force on the date of adoption – unless otherwise specified – and will supersede any equivalent existing provision.

Among other improvements, the Vienna Document 2011 facilitates and ameliorates certain procedures for inspections, evaluation visits and contacts. A list of topics and information that may be included in the presentation of commanders or acting commanders during evaluation visits and inspection activities serves to enhance the quality of their briefings. The modalities of the visit of military air bases operating multipurpose attack or specialized attack helicopters have been updated. Organizing demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems is now permitted before their formal deployment, making it possible to combine them with other events and thus to save costs. The accuracy of co-ordinates of formations at the normal peacetime location has also been standardized. Finally, the participating States are requested to take into account the official national and religious holidays of the receiving State when requesting and conducting inspection activities and evaluation visits.

Key elements for further modernization

Updating the Vienna Document is an ongoing process which started at the end of 2010 and will continue with the consideration of more substantive elements in the coming years. As the issues taken up become more strategic, even greater efforts, careful approaches, enhanced imagination, in-depth discussions and comprehensive negotiations will be required.

For some participating States, the uncertainty with regard to the CFE Treaty seems to be influencing their approach to negotiations on further updating the Vienna Document. For others, particular national interests play an important role. It is obvious that priorities, security environments and strategic needs may differ from one participating States to another. These realities will influence the modernization of the Vienna Document. The call for a spirit of openness and co-operation made by the Heads of State or Government at the Astana Summit will become increasingly relevant. It will be important for each participating State to try to understand the particularities of the others. The best proposal can be adopted only when all participating States share its values, creating a 56 win-win situation.

About eighteen proposals for further updating the Vienna Document have been published and are currently under the consideration of the FSC. Two main trends can be observed.

Most of the proposals under consideration aim at improving the current implementation of the Vienna Document. Their purpose is to increase the Vienna Document’s effectiveness in reducing the risk of large-scale offensive military offensives, focusing on the more static aspects of force preparation.

For example, proposals are on the table for augmenting inspection quotas, internationalizing inspection teams or lowering the thresholds for prior notification and observation of military exercises and unusual activities. The current thresholds still reflect the realities of 1992, when the numbers were last updated, and do not reflect the decrease of troops and major weapon systems in Europe. Adapting the thresholds would greatly enhance the effective functioning of the Vienna Document as a strategic early warning tool.

A second group of proposals envisages expanding the scope of the Vienna Document to include new CSBMs that would focus on the more dynamic aspects of force preparation. Taking into account the increasing strategic importance of military mobility, these new provisions would lower the risk of the misinterpretation of the use of existing military capabilities.

The Vienna Document already contains several elements that target the dynamics of force preparation. For instance, participating States are required to give notification of the use of military capabilities outside their peacetime location, and such activities can be subject to observations if they are undertaken while troops or main weapons systems are exceeded. Chapter IX, which provides for the possibility of conducting inspections, is also an important tool for verifying dynamic military activities.

The new dynamic elements being proposed include the notification of large-scale military transit, notification of the military activities of multinational rapid reaction forces and exchange of information on naval forces.

The improvement of current implementation and the introduction of new CSBMs are complementary and both will be required for the Vienna Document’s modernization. As participating States consider the various proposals, it will be important to take into account the evolution in military doctrines, the technological modernization of military equipment and the downsizing of most armed forces and to conduct an assessment of military capabilities.

Several delegations have expressed the view that increasing constraints regarding financial and human resources will affect the modernization of the Vienna Document. These factors ought therefore to be carefully and comprehensively considered. However, most participating States have also highlighted the political importance of fully implementing in good faith the commitments already undertaken in the field of CSBMs, since the lack of effective confidence and verification mechanisms and their substitution would be much more expensive. Simple cost-saving measures undertaken by participating States could also help to reduce the burden of implementing the Vienna Document 2011.

A special interest remains the improvement of the use of the Vienna Document in crisis situations and its relevant provisions for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. Two proposals for special OSCE inspections are currently under consideration and important questions on the mandate and decision-making process remain to be considered carefully. It is necessary to continue the exchange of views and the substantive discussions on this topic, a key political issue concerning the Vienna Document’s modernization.

Conclusion

The Vienna Document has the comparative advantage over other conventional arms control regimes that it politically binds all of the 56 participating States of the OSCE. Since its first version was adopted in 1990, the Vienna Document has proven to be a well-balanced instrument with a high implementation level. It can be considered a success. During the past year, the participating States have created a good climate for negotiation, avoiding artificial linkages to other political divergences and taking into account that in the OSCE security community, priorities, security environments and strategic needs may differ from one participating States to another.

The Vienna Document 2011 represents the first concrete achievement in the process now underway to review, reconfirm and reinvigorate the confidence- and security-building measures of the OSCE. The process will continue in the following years with more substantial issues, concerning both the improvement of current implementation modalities and the development of new CSBMs. Comprehensive discussions and wise negotiations aiming at increasing the significance of CSBMs will lead to a substantial updating of the Vienna Document by augmenting transparency, predictability and prospects for early warning – making the Vienna Document a modern strategic tool and a substantial contribution to our common and indivisible security.