



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.AIAM/51/03
12 March 2003

ENGLISH only

Conference Services

Please find attached the Chairperson's Report and reports of the Working Session Rapporteurs of the 2003 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.



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**2003 ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION
ASSESSMENT MEETING**

Vienna, 4 and 5 March 2003

CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY

CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT

REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS

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CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT

CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT TO THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION ON THE ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING

Vienna, 4 and 5 March 2003

Mr. Chairperson,

As the Chairperson of the closing plenary of the thirteenth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM), held in Vienna, I have the honour to report to the Forum for Security Co-operation on the proceedings, discussions and results of the Meeting.

The objective of the Meeting, in accordance with Chapter XI of the Vienna Document 1999, was to discuss the current and future implementation of agreed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The participating States, in open and constructive discussion, exchanged views on the implementation of agreed obligations, application and operation of the OSCE commitments in the field of CSBMs. The common goal of the participants was to contribute to an enhancement of confidence and security in the OSCE area. The flexible agenda of the conference agreed by the participating States afforded a good opportunity to organize plenary and working sessions in an efficient manner.

The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, as well as the Partners for Co-operation, were invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings.

The AIAM comprised two plenary sessions and two working sessions. Each working session was divided into two parts. The opening plenary session and the working sessions were chaired by Turkey, while the closing plenary session was chaired by Ukraine. Four designated co-ordinators facilitated the discussion.

At the closing plenary session, the four rapporteurs presented their comprehensive reports on the results of the discussion. The following comments are based on those reports.

At the opening plenary meeting, the Chairperson of the FSC delivered a report on implementation of CSBMs since the twelfth AIAM. He stressed the need to further enhance the fulfilment of agreed measures and highlighted some of the major implementation issues that had arisen during the year 2002. The FSC had focused its work on the response to the challenge of terrorism. A number of documents had been examined in the course of targeted discussion, with the aim of analysing their potential in the fight against terrorism. The meeting of experts from capitals had taken place in Vienna on 14 and 15 May 2002. Among other important activities of the FSC, the Chairperson mentioned the Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Third Follow-Up Conference on the Code of Conduct. The proposals made during the twelfth AIAM had been discussed in FSC Working Group A. Not all of them had received the expected support. Nevertheless, the Chairman's perception document on the implementation of certain provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 had been agreed on. Other issues continued to be at the focal point of the participating States' attention. Considerable progress in modernization of the OSCE communications network was highlighted. New tasks stemming from the Porto Ministerial Council Decision were also outlined.

In its Situation Report to the FSC, the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre presented an overview of the support provided by the CPC during the past year. The year 2002 had been a particularly busy year, during which the Conflict Prevention Centre had maintained its core functions and had fulfilled new tasks. The following traditional activities had been referred to: the compilation and circulation of a survey of suggestions made by the delegations during the twelfth AIAM, the facilitation of information exchange and the modernization of the OSCE communications network. The CPC had also contributed to the work on the problem of small arms and light weapons by preparing the model answer for the information exchange on SALW and a set of templates and best practice guides. A number of regional meetings and workshops had been organized in Central Asia, sponsored by Germany and the Netherlands. Special attention had been paid to providing assistance for the implementation of the Code of Conduct and other documents that had been agreed by the FSC. The Director of the CPC asked the delegations to indicate the possible areas in which the Conflict Prevention Centre could further enhance its support.

The discussion in Working Session 1, Part A, on implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 confirmed that participating States were continuing to pay close attention to a full and timely exchange of military information. It was stressed that, in a number of cases, information for the year 2003 was either late or incomplete. One delegation raised the issue of rapid reaction forces and proposed that the information on RRFs should be included in a yearly exchange of military information. The same proposal was made with regard to transport aviation. However the delegations did not have a common view on the issue.

Two delegations emphasized that a number of participating States had submitted information on defence planning either late or not at all. The particular importance of information on military budgets was noted. The delegations discussed the issue of standardized formats for submission of defence planning information. One delegation strongly disagreed with the proposal.

In the deliberations on risk reduction, the delegations discussed the implementation of CSBMs in crisis situations. One delegation proposed that a new chapter of the Vienna Document 1999 devoted to that problem should be developed. The opinion was expressed that a new chapter should be directly linked with the relevant provisions of the stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations that had been agreed on by the FSC. The next topic of discussion was the issue of thresholds. It was proposed that the possibility of lowering the levels for notifiable military activities should be considered. Some delegations supported the above-mentioned proposals, while others stated that they would oppose any attempt to reopen negotiations on the Vienna Document 1999. Under the topic "Military activities", the delegation of one participating State provided information on its practice of inviting observers to the military exercises that had taken place in 2002, although all the activities had been carried out at a lower level than that at which invitation of international observers was required under the Vienna Document 1999. The same State Party announced its intention to organize a demonstration of a new type of weapon system in August 2003.

Working Session 2, Part B, dealt with contacts, evaluation visits and inspections. It was recalled that the measures under the Chapter IV had to be fully implemented by all the participating States. However, a number of participating States had not fulfilled their obligation to organize visits to air bases during the five-year period from 1997 to 2001. The

recommendation that the announcing and reminding mechanism, especially level C, should be used was reiterated. One delegation highlighted the need for participating States having more than one air base to organize visits to a different air base during the coming five-year period. It was also suggested that procedures for demonstration of new types of weapon and equipment systems should be standardized with a view to better using the time allotted for demonstrations. The delegations of eight participating States announced plans to organize visits to air bases and military formations during 2003.

Many delegations once again expressed their concern about the “quota race” and early exhaustion of inspection quotas in the third month of the year. Despite the fact that that problem had repeatedly been discussed during previous AIAMs, no solution had been found. There was a proposal to revert to the idea of co-ordinating inspections in advance in Vienna. However, that proposal was not supported by the delegations. A number of specific points were identified as needing further consideration in the FSC: the question of auxiliary personnel, the size of inspection teams, the subject of limited access to military installations and sensitive points, the size of the specified area and the lack of a common understanding about it, the definition of *force majeure* and the rules and procedures for providing briefings.

One delegation explained its policy regarding the briefings required to be provided by the commanders of military units in the course of an inspection. As a matter of good will and transparency, it declared its readiness to provide information regarding the units located within the area of inspection. That information would not be as detailed as the information provided on the forces outside their garrisons. Many delegations welcomed that initiative and asked for further clarifications.

The delegations also addressed the issue of availability of helicopters for inspection overflights, the need to provide a list of POEs, the fact of a declining quality of inspection reports and the subjects of transit and additional technical equipment.

The following points were touched upon with regard to the modalities of evaluation visits: access to the formations and the possibility of seeing personnel, the content of the briefings and the need to provide precise explanations regarding differences in holdings, the problem of “counting” major weapon systems and the signing of the reports on evaluation visits by both the evaluating and the evaluated State. One delegation recalled its offer to expand the duration of evaluation visits up to two days.

In Working Session 2, Part A, the delegations discussed the regional measures and the communications network. Based on the information distributed by the CPC, the Co-ordinator informed the delegations that, in 2002, 12 inspections and 26 evaluation visits had been carried out pursuant to bilateral agreements. Most of those events had taken place in the areas adjacent to State borders. The CPC representative provided information on two multilateral agreements on co-operation in the naval field. The agreement on BLACKSEAFOR and the document on CSBMs in the naval field in the Black Sea were mentioned.

The Director of the regional verification centre RACVIAC presented an overview of its main activities in 2002. Special attention had been paid to the training courses as well as to co-operation with other international agencies. The tasks for the future were outlined. One of them was training of inspectors for arms control activities. Reference was made to the goal of avoiding unnecessary duplication and making reasonable use of available resources.

Several delegations welcomed the presentation of the Director of RACVIAC. They also recalled the need for OSCE participating States to provide financial support to RACVIAC's activities.

The delegations of seven States provided information on their bilateral and regional agreements and expressed their satisfaction with the results of relevant activities in 2002. The discussions confirmed that many States Parties considered the bilateral and regional agreements to be an important tool for further strengthening relations between neighbouring States. The increased number of inspections and their even distribution throughout the year was assessed as an essential advantage of regional co-operation.

One delegation stressed that the OSCE-wide measures should retain their significance, while bilateral and regional activities should be considered as secondary measures.

The modernization of the communications network was then discussed. The representatives of the CPC and the Project Management Team recalled in their statements that, at the current stage, a timely transition to the modernized network very much depended on the co-operation of capitals. In order to ensure that the projected deadline was met, the end-users of the communications network should strictly follow the instructions issued by the Communications Group.

The importance of the modernized network for information exchange was underlined by many delegations. In that context, one delegation stressed the need to complete all the necessary preparations at the end-user stations in good time. One delegation drew attention to the fact that 14 OSCE participating States were not connected to the network. The Project Management Team Leader offered the Team's assistance to those States.

Working Session 2, Part B, addressed the issues of SALW, the Code of Conduct, principles governing conventional arms transfers and non-proliferation, stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations, global exchange of military information and questionnaires on anti-personnel landmines and on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The CPC provided an overview of the status of information exchange on small arms and light weapons. Lack of submissions was mentioned especially with regard to the June 2002 information exchange. Several delegations provided information on the SALW workshop organized in Bucharest in 2002. The idea of sharing the OSCE experience in the field of small arms and light weapons with the United Nations was supported in general. Some delegations proposed that the Best Practice Guides should be sent to the United Nations to that end. Special attention was paid to implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on SALW. The idea of undertaking an analysis of the information provided by the participating States in the 2002 exchange was mentioned. However, one delegation suggested that the issue should be reverted to after the June 2003 information exchange.

In the discussion on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (CoC), the delegations focused on improving the structure of the CoC Questionnaire. The proposal by two delegations that the Questionnaire should be streamlined was welcomed by

many delegations. It was, however, stressed that changes to the structure of the Questionnaire should not affect its substance.

Implementation of the principles governing arms transfers and non-proliferation was considered to be an important part of the OSCE-wide measures. Two delegations drew attention to the need to avoid duplication of the information being disseminated by OSCE participating States in the framework of other organizations and agencies.

Several delegations provided information on their activities in the field of anti-personnel landmines. A number of States had completed the destruction of their stockpiles, while others were attaching great importance to the demining process. It was noted that 14 OSCE participating States had not ratified the Ottawa Convention banning landmines.

At the closing plenary meeting, the Chairperson stated that the 2003 AIAM had been a valuable workshop aimed at ensuring full and timely implementation of all the OSCE confidence- and security-building measures. It had afforded an opportunity to review the operation of existing measures and documents agreed by the FSC and to identify the issues that needed to be further addressed.

The participation of the experts from capitals was appreciated. It was also mentioned that the open and substantive debates, along with informal dialogue and consultations, would help to remove any differences in understanding the way in which the agreed CSBMs and other measures should be implemented in practice.

The conviction was expressed that all the proposals made by the delegations would be duly reflected in a survey of suggestions to be prepared by the CPC and then carefully studied and discussed at the meetings of the FSC and its Working Group A.

The Chairperson expressed appreciation for the participation of the Mediterranean Partners and the Partners for Co-operation in the plenary meetings and reiterated his thanks to all the participants in the AIAM, in particular the Chairperson of the FSC and the Troika members, the Chairpersons of the opening session and working sessions, the CPC, the co-ordinators and rapporteurs, the Department for Conference Services and the interpreters.

Mr. Chairperson,

This is a short overview of the two days of discussion. More detailed information can be found in the reports of the working session rapporteurs.

And, finally, let me inform the FSC that AIAM agreed to hold the fourteenth AIAM in the first half of March 2004.

REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS

WORKING SESSION 1

Part A

Tuesday, 4 March 2003

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

- Annual exchange of military information
 - Defence planning
 - Risk reduction
 - Military activities
 - (i) Prior notification of certain military activities
 - (ii) Annual calendars
 - (iii) Constraining provisions
 - (iv) Observation of certain military activities
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Introduction

The session, co-ordinated by Mr. Vasily Pavlov of Belarus, discussed the topics, “Annual exchange of military information”, “Defence planning”, “Risk reduction” and “Military activities”. The debate was initiated with some thoughts on each of the topics presented by the Co-ordinator (FSC.AIAM/11/03/Corr.1), and followed an overview provided by the CPC on its report, “Statistical Data Relating to the Implementation of the CSBM” (FSC.AIAM/17/03). The discussions are summarized below.

1. Annual exchange of military information

Although many delegations offered their assessment of implementation in 2002, and suggested concrete ways to improve implementation, considerable time during the session was devoted to discussing new ideas and proposals.

The German delegation opened the discussions by presenting two proposals. The first (FSC.AIAM/5/03) suggested simplifying the provisions contained in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Vienna Document 1999 by abandoning the exchange of data in the form of hard-copy text and photographs. They suggested that the electronic form should instead be recognized as the only official form of the data exchange. The second proposal suggested tasking the CPC with collecting all data on reportable systems and posting the information on the OSCE delegates website. That would in essence establish a database that all the participating States could access, and which the CPC could update as participating States reported changes. Some delegations saw a need to first provide a solid basis by achieving better participation and fulfilment of the technical specifications. Responding to that concern, and others raised by delegations, the German delegation emphasized that it was not their intention to replace FSC

Decision No. 6/01: Implementation of Data Exchanges Relating to Major Weapon and Equipment Systems of 14 November 2001 (FSC.DEC/6/01). Rather, they suggested that participating States should provide one copy of data to the CPC to enable the CPC to build a database that could be accessed by all the participating States. Six delegations fully supported both proposals, while an equal number of delegations expressed qualified support for the proposals and suggested that they merited further study. A possible model for electronic submissions was demonstrated, which a number of delegations considered very useful. It was also recommended that the FSC Communications Group organize a workshop for all participating States focusing on the electronic submission of reports. Such a workshop could provide basic assistance and information for experts. That would improve the quality of reports and also better ensure compliance with the technical specifications for electronic submissions.

Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) were also the subject of extended debate. Expressing the view that RRFs and multinational RRFs are something new, and are of increasing importance in the OSCE region, the Russian delegation proposed (FSC.AIAM/26/03) that information on RRFs, i.e., their formation, composition, missions, and associations with or earmarkings to multinational contingency packages, be included in future information exchanges. The Russian delegation also suggested that the Forum should consider including transport aircraft in the information exchange, citing the essential and important role they play in short-notice deployment of units to peacekeeping missions. Delegations made a number of comments on that proposal. One delegation believed that the Russian proposal implied a permanency of RRF units and formations, an opinion they did not share. By their very nature, such forces represented temporary, sometimes *ad hoc* arrangements. Another delegation echoed the view that RRF units are in many cases not permanent structures, but instead drawn from a pool of units that might have cyclical states of readiness. Delegations that took the floor on the issue said that, while the proposal warranted further study, additional information on the purpose, nature and scope of such reporting would be needed.

Implementation. A number of delegations expressed concern with uneven implementation on the part of a number of participating States. Delegations cited a number of cases in which information had been either late or incomplete, and - in the case of photographs - of poor quality. One delegation expressed concern that eight of 51 participating States had not stated the annual evaluation quota, as required by paragraphs 10.1.1 and 109 of the Vienna Document 1999. In instances where there were systemic, recurring problems, delegations said that participating States had an obligation to identify shortfalls in expertise or resources to the CPC. Most delegations concurred that the CPC was the logical focal point to co-ordinate technical assistance. It could conduct some initial analysis, and then report to the FSC with recommendations and an estimate of what would be required to correct the problems. The FSC could then conduct informed deliberations. One delegation, noting that many States shared a common language, suggested that bilateral assistance would continue to play an important and useful role in improving implementation.

2. Defence planning

One delegation expressed concern that seven participating States had not submitted defence planning information. They reiterated the opinion that participating States that needed assistance must themselves identify problem areas and seek assistance. It was also suggested that the FSC should look into ways to discuss, in a systematic manner, broad issues

of military policy, planning and force structuring - an idea presented in detail in FSC.DEL/377/02. A delegation proposed that the Forum should consider organizing a seminar on military doctrine in calendar year 2004.

Two delegations suggested standardized formats for submission of defence planning information with the aim of increasing the quality of the reports. However, another delegation disagreed; formats would likely increase the cost and administrative workload involved in producing such reports and in the end might not help to achieve a free flow of information.

3. Risk reduction

The Russian delegation presented a proposal for the preparation of a new chapter to be inserted into the Vienna Document 1999, on implementing CSBMs in crisis situations. In that connection, it cited several ways in which the existing document was inadequate. A specific example provided was the case in which one party to a conflict was not a State. That idea was echoed by another delegation, which also considered that the existing provisions left a gap in the implementation of CSBMs in crisis situations. That delegation offered the suggestion that the matter should be addressed in a separate document, and that it might be advisable to discuss the proposal at a special meeting of the FSC. The starting point, they suggested, might be the German proposal that had been presented in 2002. Not all delegations agreed. One delegation said that it considered the Vienna Document to be an “all-weather document”, one that covered all situations, and that the current provisions, including paragraph 16, afforded sufficient mechanisms for implementation in crisis situations.

A second topic of discussion was thresholds. As a consequence of the reduced number of troops involved in military activities, the number of compulsory notifications and invitations had become minimal. At the same time, while reform and modernization had reduced armed forces in numerical terms, those same processes had in many cases increased the relative combat power of the forces. Two delegations argued that those and other factors might warrant a reduction in thresholds, perhaps by 30 per cent. A number of delegations expressed reservations, noting that the reduction of forces and reduced level of military exercises reflected the improved stability and security in the OSCE area. Those delegations also considered that existing provisions regarding transparency below thresholds were sufficient, and that the thresholds ought to be kept, in the event - however unlikely - that the security situation in the OSCE area were to deteriorate. More information would be required, including statistics on voluntary invitations and below-the-threshold activity. Several delegations were very clear in stating that they would not favourably consider reopening negotiations on the Vienna Document 1999. One delegation offered an alternative suggestion according to which participating States could, on a voluntary basis, submit notifications on their largest military exercise each year.

4. Military activities

Only one delegation made an intervention under this topic. Although Turkey had not conducted any exercises that required notification during 2002, it nonetheless had extended invitations to 65 countries, 35 of which were OSCE participating States, to observe seven different military exercises. Turkey announced that it would be inviting representatives of participating States at an appropriate time to a demonstration of the T55 Panther towed

howitzer, which had been fielded on 8 August 2002, as had been duly notified to all participating States.

5. Final remarks

The exchange of views in working session 1 was frank and constructive. Delegations offered concrete thoughts on how to improve implementation in the future. They also identified several possible solutions that the Forum for Security Co-operation may wish to study in detail.

WORKING SESSION 1

Part B

Tuesday, 4 March 2003

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

- Contacts
 - Inspection
 - Evaluation
-

Introduction

The session was co-ordinated by Gen. Pierpaolo Tempesta of the Italian delegation and the rapporteur was Lt. Col. (GS) Pierre von Arx of the Swiss delegation. The co-ordinator based his introduction on FSC.AIAM/2/03, and stressed that chapters IV and IX of the Vienna Document 1999 contain central measures fostering transparency and confidence. All participating States must preserve their implementation from erosion; they should clarify practice and make practical proposals in order to solve problems.

1. Contacts

The co-ordinator recalled the data for 2002 related to the implementation of “visits to air bases”, “visits to military facilities, to military formations and observations of certain military activities”, “observations visits” as well as “demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems”. The measures under Chapter IV were to be implemented fully by all the participating States. The revised announcing and reminding mechanism should be used to remind the participating States to fulfil their obligations, especially level C, which foresees that the chairperson of the FSC should make direct contact with the participating States that had not fulfilled their commitments in order to assist participating States in overcoming implementation problems.

Several delegations noted that ten participating States had not fulfilled their obligations during the five-year period from 1997 to 2001, in terms of organizing visits to air bases. One delegation suggested that those participating States should be reminded at the end of the first year of the five-year period from 2002 to 2006. Another delegation further suggested that that should already be done at the end of the third year.

The CPC could assist participating States of Central Asia by organizing common visits to air bases in order to save resources and decrease organizational work. Furthermore, participating States having more than one air base should organize the visit to a different air base in the five-year period, in order to increase transparency.

One delegation stressed that “demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems” showed different practices and circulated a proposal (FSC.AIAM/7/03) on how to organize a demonstration in order to ensure common implementation standards, because the Vienna Document 1999 did not provide very detailed explanations on how to conduct such demonstrations. The co-ordinator suggested that the time allocated for demonstration should be better used. Some delegations were of the view that a demonstration of new types of major weapon and equipment systems is not a purely technical matter, and that the concept of their employment as well as exercises or demonstrations of live firing are of interest. However, other delegations pointed out that the proposals should not go beyond the relevant provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 and that live firing exercise would involve extra costs. One delegation considered that there should not be a rigid model for the way to organize a visit of air bases.

The conclusion was that, for the demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment systems, the suggested proposal should be refined and put to the FSC for discussion.

2. Inspection

On the basis of a circulated overview, the co-ordinator recalled the data for 2002 concerning inspections, highlighting, together with several delegations, the high total number of inspection (97 requests, see FSC.GAL/7/03/Rev.1/Corr.1) and the internationalization of the inspection teams, but also recalling the problem of the rush at the beginning of the year and regretting that only half the participating States were active in making inspections.

The question of auxiliary personnel in inspection and evaluation teams was discussed by several participating States, after that one delegation circulated a proposal (FSC.AIAM/8/03). Several delegations stated that the category of “observers“ does not exist. One delegation stressed the need to stick to the letter regarding the size of the inspection teams. Auxiliary personnel are commonly air crews; several delegations agreed that interpreters should not be considered as inspectors, but as auxiliary personnel. The co-ordinator stressed that interpreters as auxiliary personnel represented a cost increase but ensure greater efficiency in conducting inspections. One participating State stated that interpreters should be accepted only if the receiving State was not able to provide the interpretation itself, after having proposed two working languages in the request.

The question of the quota race was once again discussed by several participating States. One delegation recalled the paper circulated at the AIAM in 2002, proposing a system whereby inspections would be co-ordinated beforehand in Vienna and spread out over the year (FSC.AIAM/10/02); one delegation stressed that that would be almost impossible to achieve.

Three participating States directly concerned recalled the pressure that such a race created in the inspected State; that situation entailed numerous disadvantages, for instance, making it necessary to have increased staff resources; they would appreciate further reflections on future approaches to spreading inspections out over the whole year. One delegation was of the view that such a distribution should not restrict the use of the inspection quota, but the need should be patterned on the situation. One delegation, expanding on the co-ordinator’s statement about the marked tendency to conduct inspections in the same

geographic area (FSC.AIAM/2/03, Annex 2), mentioned that nine participating States of a group of States had not been inspected at all; this trend is undercutting the spirit of paragraph 74, which foresaw that inspection activities should be conducted OSCE-wide. The co-ordinator summed up, saying that all participants were fully aware of the problem of the rapid exhaustion of the inspection quota.

The subject of limited access to sensitive points was discussed by several delegations. One delegation stressed that only the full implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 would lead to confidence and openness. Therefore, sensitive points and denied access should be the exception; access to military installations should be widely permitted (FSC.AIAM/41/03).

Some delegations raised the subject of the size of the specified area and the lack of common understanding about it, stressing that that topic came up for discussion each year. One participating State mentioned a size of 18,000 km² and a maximum length of 200 km (FSC.AIAM/31/03) and suggested that the subject should be discussed by the FSC; delegations should bring forward proposals.

In response to concerns raised in 2002, the United States had reviewed its policy and implementation procedures regarding providing briefings on forces in peacetime garrison locations during Vienna Document 1999 specified area inspections. For US forces located inside their garrison locations exempt from a Vienna Document 1999 inspection within a specified area, there is no requirement under the terms of paragraphs 81 and 98 for the US to provide formal briefings. However, if requested, as a matter of good will and to promote transparency, the US is prepared to provide information regarding those forces. This information will be delivered by an appropriate military representative and will not include the level of detail provided on forces outside their garrisons, or forces undergoing VD evaluation visits.

One delegation stressed that the receiving State must provide helicopters for inspection overflights; the unavailability of helicopters for economic reasons was not a valid argument, and goodwill should make it possible to reach an understanding (for example by sharing the cost of the fuel). Another delegation explained that small aircraft allowed even better visibility and were cheaper than helicopters.

In order to clarify the situation and to facilitate the choice of the point of entry/exit (POE) closest to the specified area, one delegation proposed that a list of POEs should be appended to the Vienna Document 1999 or that a notification with a list of POEs should be sent on a voluntary basis at the beginning of the year. That proposal was supported by another delegation.

One delegation asked for a clearer definition of *force majeure*, and recalled the guidelines proposed by one delegation in 2002.

The fact of declining quality of the reports of inspections was highlighted by one delegation, recalling that detailed and consistent reports with qualitative statements were part of confidence-building.

One delegation raised the subject of transit, explaining that paragraph 123 of the Vienna Document 1999 does not specify in which way the transited participating State should facilitate transit (FSC.AIAM/22/03). One delegation suggested that all kinds of additional technical equipment should be accepted, including microcomputers. The co-ordinator said that digital cameras were now commonplace on the civilian market.

Multinational inspection teams were unanimously welcomed and seen as a positive development in the implementation of CSBMs.

3. Evaluation

One delegation referred to the lack of a common understanding regarding different topics (counting, visits to the subordinated units, briefings given by the unit); it suggested the possibility of revisiting or amending the relevant paragraphs in the Vienna Document 1999. One delegation replied that the way to implement actively is very important; however, amending the Vienna Document 1999 would represent a precedent; and suggested that a separate document might also be developed.

One delegation stressed that there should be a common understanding regarding the execution of an evaluation visit; the evaluated participating State had the obligation to provide access to the formation and could provide the possibility to see the personnel. Another delegation stressed the minimal requirements for the briefing by the evaluated unit, which was sometimes not transparent and of poor quality. The briefing should mention the structure of the evaluated unit and provide precise explanations regarding differences in holdings. That proposal should be discussed in Working Group A.

The problem of “counting” major weapon systems was mentioned by several participating States. For one delegation, counting had to be done on a voluntary basis and did not entail access rights. For another delegation, there is not a great difference between seeing (according to paragraph 127.1-2) and counting major weapon systems: something that is seen is also counted. The co-ordinator recalled the chairperson’s perception that “during evaluation visits, the evaluation team will be enabled to make full use of the possibility of Vienna Document 1999 in order to evaluate the consistency of the data exchanged by the receiving State with the actual situation” (FSC.DEL/595/02/Rev.2).

The question of the obligation to give briefings and the content of the briefings was discussed by several delegations. One delegation drew the conclusion that, concerning briefings, the spirit rather than the letter of the Vienna Document 1999 should be borne in mind and that guidelines or formats for briefings would be helpful.

A delegation proposed that the evaluation visit report should be signed by the evaluated as well as the evaluating State immediately at the end of the evaluation visit. That was questioned by other delegations, which pointed out that the Vienna Document 1999 was different from the CFE Treaty.

The co-ordinator stressed the positive effects of regional and bilateral measures.

Germany recalled its offer concerning the conduct of two-day evaluation visits in Germany, owing to the restructuring of the armed forces, resulting in a spreading of the units over its territory.

Announcements

(In chronological order)

- Serbia and Montenegro will organize the visit to the military air base Ladevci in Kraljevo and a military formation (252nd Armoured Brigade) in Kraljevo from 23 to 26 June 2003.
- The United Kingdom announced its intention to organize a demonstration of four new types of major weapon and equipment systems (“Merlin” helicopter, “Viking” APC, “Stormer” APC and HMV “Shielder”), on 8 July 2003, as well as an air base visit on 9 July 2003.
- Denmark will organize the visit of the Air Base Aalborg - Barrack of Skive, from 25 to 29 August 2003.
- The Netherlands will host a visit to an airbase and a military facility from 15 to 18 September 2003; Luxembourg will also organize a visit to a military facility from 22 to 24 September 2003. In order to reduce unnecessary travel costs for participants to all participating States planning to attend both events, the transportation from the Netherlands to Luxembourg and back, if required, will be provided free of charge. Arrangements for accommodation and meals for the interim period will be made by the organizing countries although the costs will have to be born by the participants.
- Finland will organize a combined event from 30 September to 3 October 2003: visit to the Carelian Air Command and visit to the military facility by the Carelian Jaeger Brigade.
- Italy will organize the visit to an air base near Lecce, as well as the demonstration of two armoured vehicles, from 21 to 24 October 2003.

WORKING SESSION 2, Part A

Wednesday, 5 March 2003

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

- Regional Measures
 - Communication Network
-

Dr. Szabolcs Osvát of Hungary co-ordinated the first part of the session, and Mr. Nenad Kolev was the rapporteur.

A. Regional measures

Introduction

The co-ordinator opened the session by giving a short overview of his perception paper, which had been distributed beforehand. He stressed that many bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements had been concluded and had significantly contributed to regional stability since the middle of the 1990s. He recalled the discussion in Working Session 1, which had also touched upon regional measures in the context of the debate on contacts, inspections and evaluations.

On the basis of a report by the CPC, he stated that, in 2002, 12 inspections and 26 evaluations, mainly in border areas, had taken place pursuant to bilateral agreements, primarily in the regions of the Baltic and South-Eastern Europe, but also in Central Europe. A full overview of the bilateral agreements was available from the CPC upon request.

The presentation of the Director of the Regional Arms Control Verification and Supplementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC) focused on four areas:

- Overview of activities in 2002, especially the training courses provided
- Co-operation with other international organizations

The goal was to avoid unnecessary duplication and to achieve better synergy. In contacts with other international organizations the following areas for joint action had been explored: border management, SALW, reform of the security sector, CSBMs, aspects of fighting terrorism, localized conflicts and crisis management, etc.

- Regional ownership

It was pointed out that RACVIAC represented an exemplary form of co-operation in South-Eastern Europe, and thus a significant example of regional ownership. The idea

had been mooted that countries should start thinking about formalizing their participation in it.

- Prospects

RACVIAC's relevance for the region needed to be maintained. Moreover, RACVIAC could become a model for other OSCE subregions. Future action could encompass further multinational training in arms control and move from a narrow interpretation of arms control to broader activities, in accordance with participating States' needs. It was particularly stressed that securing a broad financial basis for RACVIAC was very important.

Discussion

Seven countries provided information on their activities carried out under various regional security arrangements or on their plans for concluding new regional arrangements. All of them stressed how satisfied they were with the implementation of those agreements.

One delegation stated that it had managed to strike the right balance between regional and OSCE-wide measures, and it used the same personnel and budget for both. Another delegation stressed that, for the first time in the OSCE's history, a whole region appeared in which CSBMs covered naval activities. The view was expressed that, while regional measures were common for a number of OSCE subregions, some of them had specific features. It was suggested that different CSBMs were needed regarding non-OSCE neighbouring States.

It was indicated that there were issues that had been resolved at the subregional, but not at the OSCE, level, such as the increased number of inspections and their even distribution throughout the year. In addition, in many bilateral agreements, thresholds had been reduced and notification of military activities not covered by the Vienna Document 1999 took place.

One delegation stressed that regional measures were matters of direct interest for all the participating States. It was argued that it was still unclear whether there was an ever-growing spread of regional measures, which were considered secondary compared to the OSCE-wide measures. Whether there was an ever-growing need for those measures was more important. A delegation requested information by two States on the resources available, in terms of money and time, for regional measures.

One delegation announced the imminent holding of a seminar on terrorism as a threat to regional stability.

Regarding RACVIAC, two States stressed the need to ensure appropriate financing and called for all States involved in the region to share the financial burden. One delegation advanced the view that the question of RACVIAC's content/programme should be addressed, i.e. whether issues broader than arms control should become part of its activities.

Conclusions

There was a general agreement that the regional measures complemented OSCE-wide CSBMs and were often more specific, focused, cost-effective and flexible. They contributed greatly to increased stability, transparency, openness and confidence among States. Genuine regional measures must not be imposed from outside. Bilateral agreements were assessed as a useful tool for security-building. The fact that co-operation at the regional level was not limited to military matters was welcomed.

While positive in itself, the growing importance of regional measures meant that there was a risk that the Vienna Document 1999 might decline in significance in the future. That must be prevented. Vision was needed to address the issue of how to maintain the relevance of the Vienna Document 1999 and of current CSBMs in the changing European security environment in the years to come.

B. Communication network

Introduction

The co-ordinator recalled the presentations of the FSC Chairman and CPC Director at the opening plenary, indicating that the modernization of the communications network within the projected deadline (30 June 2003) was one of the most significant tasks that lay ahead. Touching upon his perception paper, the co-ordinator outlined the steps taken so far towards achieving that goal. He stressed that the current X.25-based network should be replaced by 30 June and highlighted the two outstanding issues:

- Transition to a cheaper, Internet-based Virtual Private Network (VPN), for which the participating States had been asked to provide a stable Internet connection with the necessary configuration; and
- The development of a new software (INA, Integrated Notification Application), to make possible unified handling of different notifications.

The leader of the project management team pointed out that, despite the delay, the OSCE communications network modernization project, on which he presented a clear and detailed report, was proceeding well. He stressed that the CPC or the contractor alone could not complete the project; its successful and timely completion depended on co-operation from delegations and capitals. He stated that, in 2002, users had three times been requested to provide IP addresses. The approved priorities for transition to the modernized network would follow objective criteria based on current cost data and achievement of the greatest savings. Non-network States would be converted last, after all the network States had been connected. Any delay encountered in one capital would not be allowed to delay the project as a whole.

The representative of the CPC/Chairman of the Communications group emphasized that the capitals needed to be urged on, if the project was to be completed on time. The CPC and the project management team were dependent on the voluntary co-operation of ministries, often thousands of kilometres away and with many different priorities.

Discussion

One State recalled that all the participating States had undertaken a political commitment to connect to the network. Two delegations urged distribution of notifications by non-connected States to all the participating States and the CPC by means of provision of hard copies in the pigeon holes. One delegation pointed out that 14 States were still not connected, and expressed the hope that they would soon join. It inquired what the project management team intended to do in order to assist them. The team leader answered that representatives of those States would be contacted with regard to the Internet-based protocols and everything would be done to connect them, possibly including meetings with them on the spot.

Conclusions

There was a general agreement that the communications network itself was a valuable confidence-building measure, which contributed to enhanced transparency by making it possible to send notifications in a most expeditious way. The introduction of VPN and INA, providing a secure, user-friendly and cost-effective means of communication, was strongly supported, and the importance of all participating States' joining the network as soon as possible was repeatedly stressed.

WORKING SESSION 2

Part B

Wednesday, 5 March 2003

Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

- Principles governing conventional arms transfers
 - Principles governing non-proliferation
 - Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations
 - Global Exchange of military information
 - Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines
 - Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
 - Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security
 - Small arms and light weapons
-

The session was co-ordinated by Col. Aapo Cederberg from the Finnish delegation, and Ms. Raluca Karassi Radulescu from the Romanian delegation was the rapporteur.

The session was divided into three phases. The first one was devoted to small arms and light weapons, the second to the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and the last one considered the other documents on the Agenda.

A. Small arms and light weapons (SALW)

The co-ordinator opened the session by giving a short overview of his perception paper and by underlining the importance of the OSCE Document on SALW as a means of providing effective tools to combat terrorism. He noted that its implementation was twofold, some of the responsibility lying with the Organization itself and some with the participating States.

He emphasized the importance of two processes under way, the decision of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on Expert Advice on Implementation of Section V of the OSCE Document on SALW, and the process of providing Best Practice Guides on SALW issues.

The sponsors of the Regional Seminar on the Implementation of the OSCE SALW and the United Nations Programme of Action, which took place in Bucharest, from 24 to 26 February 2003, announced that the report and proceedings of the Seminar would be distributed to all participating States and other interested parties.

The issue of improving the implementation of Section V of the SALW document led to a lively discussion. Numerous delegations mentioned the need to look further at that issue. One delegation stressed that the creation of a voluntary fund was a precondition for implementing Section V, but one delegation expressed its reservations.

The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) delivered a short update on the June 2002 SALW information exchange and encouraged the participating States to follow the model answer agreed by the FSC in order to update the returns. Several delegations underlined the usefulness of the CPC Overview on the exchange of information on export and import. A lively debate was initiated on the suggestion that the CPC might prepare a similar Overview on the 2002 information exchange. Some delegations expressed their concern regarding discrepancies in export and import figures contained in that document and suggested further elaboration of a model answer that would prevent such discrepancies in the future.

Following the discussions on the importance and relevance of elaborating OSCE Best Practice Guides (BPGs), the possibility of the OSCE assuming the leading role in that matter was emphasized. There was general agreement that BPGs provided a unique opportunity for the OSCE to highlight its leading role in that matter. One delegation proposed that the BPGs be presented at the United Nations 2003 SALW Biennial Meeting of States and in other relevant international forums. This proposal was widely supported, on condition that the short timeframe would not affect the quality of the documents. It was also proposed that the BPGs be introduced at the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC). One delegation mentioned the issue of increased interaction between the OSCE and the United Nations, building on and expanding FSC Decision No. 9/02 concerning the provision of a model answer for the OSCE information exchange on SALW to the United Nations. There was general agreement that the BPGs provided a unique opportunity for the OSCE to make a specific contribution to SALW matters.

One delegation suggested that hand-grenades and ammunition be included in the definition of SALW and that the marking system be improved. It was also pointed out that SALW had been included in a bilateral agreement concluded by that State with neighbouring countries, non-participating States in the OSCE.

The importance of the SALW issue and the common concern of all participating States regarding the issue of illicit trade in SALW and the illegal possession of arms were underlined. In that respect, one delegation appealed to the other participating States to provide further assistance in the process of collecting and destroying SALW on its territory.

One delegation expressed its interest in including the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation and the Partners for Co-operation in the annual exchange of information on a voluntary basis. The CPC noted that a special OSCE decision would be required for such active participation of all the Partners for Co-operation.

The need to avoid duplication of efforts by assuring co-ordination and co-operation with all regional and international organizations was underlined.

B. Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (CoC)

The co-ordinator stressed the importance within the OSCE toolbox of that document as a means of combating and preventing terrorism and recalled the Third Follow-up Conference on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, which had taken place in September 2002. Several delegations mentioned the importance of the recommendations emerging from that Conference. The proposal to improve the CoC Questionnaire received wide support. In that respect, there was general agreement that the technical update of the Questionnaire (document FSC.DEL/41/03) should not give rise to discussion on the document itself. A debate on the need for a model answer that would permit the implementation of the CoC was initiated.

One delegation said that the OSCE Strategy to Address New Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century offered an opportunity to adapt the content of the Questionnaire. The need for better co-operation with other relevant forums in order to avoid duplication of efforts was also stressed.

Information concerning the regional CoC seminars was shared, as they were considered to be a valuable tool for improving the level of CoC implementation. The need to increase awareness of the CoC among parliamentarians was mentioned.

One delegation stated that courses on international humanitarian law had been available within its units and sub-units of the armed forces since August 2002. Another delegation announced that the Partnership for Peace centre based in its country made available, to the interested parties, mobile teams that provided relevant information on SALW issues.

C. Principles governing conventional arms transfers (CAT)

This document was considered to be an important tool in the fight to combat terrorism. The need to improve the interaction between the OSCE and the United Nations was emphasized.

The CPC pointed out that only 50 per cent of the participating States provided replies to the CAT Questionnaire on time. There was general agreement that countries should improve their level of implementation.

The proposal to discuss the issue at the FSC level under “Security Dialogue” was supported.

The importance of active participation of the CPC in regional United Nations seminars on CAT issues was emphasized.

D. Principles governing non-proliferation and questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapon Convention

The document was recognized as playing an important role in the campaign against terrorism. The discussion stressed the utility of having such a tool in the OSCE toolbox,

while at the same time recognizing that OSCE was not the main actor in that field and that duplication of efforts should be avoided.

The proposal of discussing the issue at the FSC level, under “Security Dialogue” was supported.

E. Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations

The co-ordinator recalled the lively debate that had taken place on that issue at the Twelfth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting the previous year. The document was an integral part of the OSCE’s capacity regarding confidence- and security-building measures in crisis situations and was particularly relevant in dealing with specific crisis situations. It could therefore be regarded as part of the OSCE endeavours in the ASRC and when discussing new threats and challenges. The co-ordinator also mentioned the possible link with the ongoing work to review the OSCE peacekeeping capabilities.

F. Global exchange of military information

The co-ordinator mentioned the need to improve the level of implementation and to look at the possible added value of this mechanism of exchanging information in the light of a proposal made at previous working session. There was no intervention from the delegates.

G. Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines

One delegation provided a detailed overview over the implementation of the Ottawa Convention. Information was also shared on national endeavours to improve implementation. The destabilizing effect of anti-personnel landmines on the security situation within the OSCE area was emphasized.

Several delegations pointed out the need to increase the participation of the OSCE States in the Convention. One delegation promised to distribute its update on the ratification situation in written form.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.DEC/1/03
5 February 2003

Original: ENGLISH

380th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 386, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 1/03
AGENDA AND MODALITIES OF THE THIRTEENTH
ANNUAL IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT MEETING**

4 and 5 March 2003

I. Agenda and indicative timetable

Tuesday, 4 March 2003

10-10.45 a.m. Opening plenary meeting

- Opening of the meeting by the chairperson;
- Report of the Chairperson of the FSC on CSBM issues discussed in the FSC during 2002;
- Situation report by the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).

10.45 a.m.-6 p.m.
(to be continued,
if needed)

Working Session 1: Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999:
clarification, assessment and conclusions

- Annual exchange of military information;
- Defence planning;
- Risk reduction;
- Military activities:
 - (i) Prior notification of certain military activities;
 - (ii) Annual calendars;
 - (iii) Constraining provisions.
 - (iv) Observation of certain military activities;
- Contacts;
- Evaluation;
- Inspection.

1-3 p.m. Lunch Break

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Wednesday, 5 March 2003

- 10 a.m.-4.30 p.m. Working Session 2: Operation and implementation of other
(continued from FSC-agreed measures/documents: clarification, assessment and
Working Session 1, conclusions
if needed)
- Regional measures;
 - Communications network;
 - Principles governing conventional arms transfers;
 - Principles governing non-proliferation;
 - Stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations;
 - Global exchange of military information;
 - Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines;
 - Questionnaire on the process of ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
 - Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
 - Small arms and light weapons.
- 5-6 p.m. Closing plenary meeting
- Working sessions reports;
 - Discussion;
 - Concluding remarks;
 - Date of the 2004 AIAM;
 - Closure.
- 1-3 p.m. Lunch Break

II. Organizational modalities

1. The AIAM will be for two days and will be organized in the format of opening and closing plenary meetings together with working sessions dealing with all the topics contained in the agenda (I). The indicative timetable provides more detail.
2. The organizational meeting of chairpersons, co-ordinators, rapporteurs, and the CPC will be held on 3 March 2003 at 3 p.m. The working hours of the AIAM will be 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and 3 to 6 p.m.
3. Interpretation into the OSCE official languages will be provided.
4. The meeting will be chaired by participating States, in rotation in accordance with the French alphabetical order, following on from the chairing of the closing plenary meeting of the 2002 AIAM by the Czech Republic. The chair of the opening plenary meeting and working sessions will be held by Turkey, while the chair of the closing plenary meeting will be held by Ukraine.

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5. Debates in the working sessions will be oriented to problems and solutions and there will be no formal statements. Possible national statements for the opening plenary should only be presented in written form and distributed in advance. These sessions are designed to be very informal meetings of national experts with the objectives of answering questions, exchanging information and allowing for constructive debate between participating States. Delegations are strongly encouraged to provide detailed explanations and concrete examples of their own implementation procedures. All delegations are strongly encouraged to provide national experts to participate in the AIAM.
6. The CPC will circulate the revised Annual Survey 4/02 on CSBM Information Exchanged, the AIAM 2002 Survey of Suggestions, and an indicative list of implementation problems and questions gathered from delegations, by the middle of February. These will serve as a basis for preparatory work by delegations and co-ordinators.
7. Each working session will have one designated co-ordinator and one rapporteur. The task of the co-ordinators will be to facilitate the discussion, while the task of the rapporteurs will be to present an oral report to the closing plenary meeting.
8. The co-ordinators will circulate a list of topics and questions for facilitating the discussion in their working sessions. They will be supported by the CPC in this regard. They will ensure that all relevant areas are addressed.
9. During the first part of the closing plenary meeting, the rapporteur from each working session will give an oral report to the delegates on the issues that were addressed during the working session. This report should include problem areas, improvements in implementation accomplished by OSCE participating States, suggestions for further improvement, and any other relevant information. After each oral report, the rapporteur will answer questions. Delegations are encouraged to comment on or add to the reports presented by the rapporteurs.
10. Delegations with volunteers for co-ordinators or/and rapporteurs for the working sessions should provide the names of the individuals and working session to the Chairperson of the FSC as soon as possible, but not later than 14 February 2003. The names of the co-ordinators and rapporteurs for each working session will be made known to all delegations not later than 21 February 2003.
11. During the first FSC plenary meeting, the chairperson of the closing plenary meeting will submit a report on the AIAM to the FSC. Not later than 7 April 2003, the CPC will provide a written report of suggestions made during the meeting aimed at improving the implementation of CSBMs.
12. The Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) and the Partners for Co-operation (Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand) are invited to attend the opening and closing plenary meetings of the 2003 AIAM.