

**EXPLANATORY NOTES TO THE PRESENTATION BY
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THE MAIN OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT OF THE
GENERAL STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AT THE 612th MEETING OF THE
OSCE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION**

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**Russian military reform – preliminary results and prospects and the new
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation**

Good morning gentlemen,

During the time allocated to me I shall provide information about the progress made in the reform of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, the reasons that necessitated these reforms and the results achieved to date.

In my presentation I shall also cover some aspects of the new Russian Military Doctrine, which is an essential national defence document.

The far-reaching reform of the armed forces we are carrying out is an objective necessity brought about by a number of reasons, the principal ones being in my view:

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- A change in the scope of threats to the military security of the Russian Federation, which are at times difficult to predict;
- Scientific and technological progress, especially in the field of information technology;
- The appearance around the world of a new quality of weapons and military equipment;
- As a result of the aforementioned factors, a change in the nature of armed conflict in the twenty-first century.

In our country, however, the armed forces have continued to be designed essentially to wage large-scale classical warfare and are not fully equipped to meet modern demands, threats and challenges.

For that reason, the politico-military leadership of the Russian Federation decided in 2008 to reform the armed forces.

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The main aim of the reforms under way in the Russian army is the creation of a compact, highly mobile, professionally trained army equipped with modern weapons. It must be capable of waging classical warfare and of using innovative methods and means of engaging in military activities, *inter alia*, in the fight against international terrorism and piracy.

It should be mentioned that the modernization of the Russian army did not begin from scratch. We are taking into account our own country's experience in previous reforms along with the experience in military organization of leading nations.

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The Russian military reform to be carried out by 2016 has five major tasks.

The first task was dictated by the fact that prior to the start of the current reforms, most formations and military units of the armed forces had a significant mobilization component. More than 80 per cent of the military units within the Russian Ministry of Defence were of this kind. This meant that in order to carry out their missions they were required to call up citizens from the reserve, collect vehicles from automotive companies within the State sector of the economy, obtain equipment supplies from depots and bases and see to the operational co-ordination of the established formations and military units.

Even in formations and military units that were classed at that time as being in a state of constant combat readiness, more than 20 per cent of the personnel were drawn from the reserve.

The second task arose due to the fact that the pool of equipment in the armed forces had not been substantially renewed since the 1990s. There were few defence orders, and the weapons system was maintained in a state of combat readiness primarily by being repaired. This meant that while the armed forces were fairly well equipped in general terms, the proportion of modern weapons was less than 10 per cent, whereas in many other countries' armies this indicator stands at 50 to 70 per cent.

The third task was dictated by the fact that with the reform of the armed forces and the change in the methods and means by which they were employed, statutory documents needed to be revised.

The fourth task is inextricably linked with the third, since without a new type of professional officer with the practical and instructional skills needed for training

subordinates, it would be impossible to ensure the proper leadership of troops in modern warfare situations.

The fifth task was due to the fact that the armed forces had to be in a position to pay its servicemen decent salaries.

What do the results of the reform look like today?

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As regards the first task, the organizational basis for the armed forces was created in 2009.

The classic structure and the different spheres of activity have been retained: three branches (army, navy and air force), three types of armed forces (strategic missile forces, landing forces and space forces). The armed forces consist of approximately one million servicemen.

These structures and composition are, in our view, the most appropriate and make it possible to effectively manage the troops and ensure the military security of the State on land, at sea, in the air and in space.

The army currently has six operational strategic commands and seven operational commands, along with tactical brigades.

The air force consists of an aerospace defence joint strategic command, a long-range aviation command, a military transport aviation command, four air force and air defence commands, aerospace defence brigades and air bases.

As regards the navy, all components from fleet control to brigade control now have a new manning system.

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All formations and military units are maintained in a state of constant readiness. They are fully staffed and equipped with the necessary weapons and military equipment.

The combat capabilities of the aforementioned formations were verified during the Osen-2009 (Autumn-2009) manoeuvres and the Kavkaz (Caucasus), Ladoga and Zapad (West) strategic operational exercises conducted in 2009. During these exercises the reformed formations carried out the tactical missions they had been assigned with assurance.

Their operational co-ordination, development and improvement of the organizational structure are scheduled for completion this year.

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As regards the second task, the re-equipping of the armed forces with new types of weapons and modern military equipment is continuing.

In the course of the reform the proportion of new types of equipment and weapons should be increased considerably.

New types of equipment and weapons should account for 30 per cent of our equipment by 2015 and between 70 and 100 per cent by 2020.

Strategic nuclear forces are a priority for us. They include strategic missile forces, naval and airborne nuclear forces, ballistic missile defence and air defence facilities, the air force, space systems and facilities, intelligence systems, electronic warfare, communications and automatic control systems.

As regards the third task, statutory documents on the training of the armed forces and on their preparation for and conduct of military operations under the new conditions have been completely revised. There are more than 140 such documents. Regulatory documents were approved by the forces last year and have demonstrated their viability, and this procedure is continuing this year.

As regards the fourth task, one of the priority questions for us is the reform of officer training.

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We are working to create a number of basic institutions of higher military education. There will be ten in total: three military science and training centres, six military academies and one military university.

They will combine research and teaching. In addition to the academies, the centres will incorporate all courses, colleges and scientific research institutes related to the training of military personnel or scientific research in the interests of the navy, air force or army.

This year we are planning to switch to new training programmes and to introduce quite a number of statutory documents.

At the same time we have not forgotten the role played by non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the modern-day army.

In 2009, an NCO training centre was established at the paratrooper college in Ryazan. Training there takes two and a half years. This parachute corps base was selected deliberately. Future NCOs must also have the mentality of paratroopers, the elite corps within the armed forces.

It is envisaged that in addition to training in the military profession, an NCO will also receive general vocational training enabling him to become a professional in his field.

As regards the fifth task, the reform of the armed forces involves not only equipping them with new types of weapons and improving their organizational structures but also ensuring the necessary social guarantees for servicemen.

With respect to the salaries of servicemen, by 2012 the level of pay in the armed forces will be such that officers will be proud to serve and carry out their professional duties.

With a staffing level of 150,000 officers and on the basis of the existing Ministry of Defence budget, we shall be able to ensure that these officers are adequately paid.

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Ensuring that servicemen have somewhere to live remains a pressing issue. In 2009, the Ministry of Defence met its obligation to provide servicemen with housing. A total of 50,400 apartments were made available, including 45,400 on a permanent basis and 5,000 service apartments.

As instructed by the President of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defence will ensure that all servicemen in need of permanent housing will be provided with such accommodation by the end of this year, and 45,300 apartments are to be made available.

By 2012 we intend to have resolved the problem of ensuring that officers and other categories of military personnel have service housing.

The tasks set in 2009 with a view to modernizing the armed forces have on the whole been completed. The tasks set for 2010 are being carried out according to plan.

I will, however, stress that so far only the basis for a modern Russian army has been created. It still needs to be given substance. A priority in this respect is the training of officers and NCOs who are well educated and professionally trained and, most importantly, able to think unconventionally.

The current Russian military reform will inject a new quality into the armed forces, making them capable of covering all the requirements of a modern army. They will be able to neutralize military threats and repel any aggression against Russia and its allies.

The reform of the armed forces is rooted in the State's conception of the military security of the Russian Federation. This was reflected in the new Military Doctrine approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 5 February 2010, which was drawn up on the basis of the provisions of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 and the Concept for the Foreign Policy and Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation.

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The Military Doctrine takes into account, first and foremost, the new military dangers and threats to our State and to peace to which I have referred above.

The Doctrine outlines the characteristic features of modern-day military conflicts and provides a more accurate classification of them.

In our opinion, the military conflicts likely to arise in the world will emerge unpredictably and be fast-flowing, and nuclear weapons will remain an important factor in their prevention.

The principal aspects of the State's military policy are set out in the Doctrine on the basis of an assessment of military dangers and threats as well as the nature of possible military actions.

A priority here is the neutralization of military dangers and possible military threats by political, diplomatic and other non-military means with a view to preventing military conflicts.

At the same time, a most important factor in safeguarding the stability of the Russian Federation and deterring potential aggressors is to ensure that the military might of the State is improved.

A clear position has been taken on the use of nuclear weapons, according to which the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons or other forms of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, or in response to the use of conventional weapons if the very existence of Russia is threatened.

In this connection we are proposing the development of ground-based, naval and airborne components of a nuclear triad.

Russia will ensure its ongoing democratic development, maintaining a strategic nuclear potential at a level that can serve as an effective strategic deterrent.

Also identified are the main tasks of the Russian Federation in containing and preventing military conflicts with due regard for the activities of international organizations of which our country is a member State – the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO). The list of priorities for politico-military co-operation – the Union State, the CSTO, the CIS and the SCO – is being expanded.

In view of the specific nature of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and its mandate, I should like to point out that one of the basic priorities of politico-military co-operation set out in the new Military Doctrine is our active involvement in the drafting, agreement and implementation of international agreements in the area of arms control and the strengthening of military security.

The new Military Doctrine recognizes the legitimacy of using the armed forces to defend our citizens outside the borders of the Russian Federation in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law.

We have also identified areas for the development of the industrial defence complex to ensure that the armed forces are equipped with modern weapons and military equipment.

On the whole, the principal task involved in ensuring defence in military-economic terms is the creation of a basis for the sustainable development and maintenance of the military-economic and military-technical potential at the level needed to implement the country's military policy and to reliably meet the needs of the military organization of the State in times of peace and war.

The new Military Doctrine has a number of fundamental differences and advantages compared to the 2000 Doctrine. The previous Doctrine was created for the transitional period during the establishment of the Russian State, whereas the new Military Doctrine is more conceptual and has a long-term focus.

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In keeping with the Doctrine, Russia does not accept any kind of military conflict, whether conventional or nuclear. The prevention of such conflicts remains the basis of the Russian Federation's military policy.

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As can be inferred from what has been said so far, the operations of the Russian armed forces will continue to be of a defensive nature. They must be ready to neutralize armed conflicts, combat terrorism and piracy and repel any aggression against Russia and its allies as quickly possible. Our army and navy, which are equipped with nuclear weapons, are designed to ensure global strategic stability and safe economic operations in the world's oceans.

I would ask that the text of this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.