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### Note Verbale

The Permanent Mission of Iceland to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) presents its compliments to all Delegations and Permanent Missions to the OSCE and to the Conflict Prevention Centre, and with reference to the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation Decision No. 2/09 on Technical Update of the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, has the honour to enclose the response to the questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security for 2024 including the indicative list of issues pertaining to Women, Peace and Security.

The Permanent Mission of Iceland to the OSCE avails itself of this opportunity to renew to all Delegations and Permanent Missions to the OSCE and the to Conflict Prevention Centre the assurances of its highest consideration.

Permanent Mission of Iceland  
Reykjavík, 20 August 2024



To all Delegations/Permanent Missions of the OSCE participating States  
and to the Conflict Prevention Centre  
V i e n n a





**OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects on Security**

***ICELAND***

**Annual Information Exchange on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct**

**Valid as of 21 May 2024**

## Section I: Inter-State elements

### 1. Account of measures to prevent and combat terrorism

#### 1.1 To which agreements and arrangements (universal, regional, sub-regional and bilateral) related to preventing and combating terrorism is your State a party?

##### The 12 Universal Anti-terrorism Conventions and Protocols

1. Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963) *	P (R)
2. Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970)*	P (R)
3. Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971)*	P (R)
4. Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (1973)	P (R)
5. Against the Taking of Hostages (1979)	P (a)
6. Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980)	P (a)
7. Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Intl. Civil Aviation, supp. to 1971 Convention	P (R)
8. Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988)	P (R)
9. Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988)	P (R)
10. Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991)	P (a)
11. Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997)	P (R)
12. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)	P (R)

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##### The 4 Universal Anti-terrorism Conventions and Protocols concluded in 2005

1. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)	Signed	16.9.2005
2. Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (2005)*	-	
3. Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (2005)*	P (R)	
4. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (2005)*	P (R)	

P = Party, (R) Ratification, (a) accession, \* - not yet in force

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**Other international and regional legal instruments related  
to terrorism or co-operation in criminal matters**

1. UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)	P (R)	
1.a. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New York, 15 November 2000	P (R)	
1.b. Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New York, 15 November 2000	Signed	13.12.2000
1.c. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. New York, 31 May 2001	Signed	15.11.2001
2. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977) CETS No: 090	P (R)	
3. Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (2003) CETS No: 190*	Signed	
4. European Convention on Extradition (1957) CETS No: 024	P (R)	
5. Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (1975) CETS No: 086	P (R)	
6. Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition (1978) CETS No: 098	P (R)	
7. European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959) CETS No: 030	P (R)	
8. Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (1978) CETS No: 099	P (R)	
9. Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (2001) CETS No: 182	Signed	
10. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters (1972) CETS No: 073	Signed	
11. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (1990) CETS No: 141	P (R)	
12. Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (2005) CETS No: 196	Signed	

13. Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (2005) CETS No: 198	Signed	16.5.2005
14. Convention on Cybercrime	P (R)	

P = Party, (R) Ratification, (a) accession, \* - not yet in force

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## **1.2 What national legislation has been adopted in your State to implement the abovementioned agreements and arrangements?**

- (1) UNSC resolutions are implemented by the Law on Implementation of International Sanctions and freezing of assets, No. 68/2023
- (2) Law on Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, No. 140/2018.
- (3) General Penal Code, No. 19/1940.
- (4) Law on the arrest and extradition of persons to and from Iceland for criminal acts on the basis of an arrest warrant, No. 51/2016.
- (5) Law on carrying out penal sentences pronounced in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden et. al., No. 69/1963.
- (6) Law on extradition and other assistance in penal matters, No. 13/1984.
- (7) Law on international co-operation in carrying out penal sentences, No. 56/1993.
- (8) Law on the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, No. 43/2001.
- (9) Law on criminal liability of legal persons for bribery and terrorist acts, No. 144/1998.
- (10) Article 100 (b) of the General Penal Code, No. 19/1940, deals with the financing of terrorist groups.

## **1.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces and the police in preventing and combating terrorism in your State?**

Iceland has no military, paramilitary or security forces.

The Minister of the Justice is the supreme head of the **police** in Iceland as well as the Icelandic Coast Guard. The National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police administers police affairs under the Minister's authority, cf. Article 4 of the Police Act No 90/1996. The National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police's role is to perform various administrative functions in fields related to law enforcement, such as providing general instructions to regional commissioners of police and making proposals for rationalisation, co-ordination, development, and safety in policing. His/Her office shall grant the regional commissioners of police assistance and support and carry out any police work which calls for centralisation or co-ordination among the offices involved. His/Her office is responsible for international police relations. The role and special tasks of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police are laid down in detail in Article 5 of the Police Act.

In addition to crime prevention and investigation, the Icelandic Police are responsible for public security and maintaining law and order. Iceland has no armed forces and the police force is organized along non-military lines with members having civilian status.

The National Security Unit (NSU) of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police co-ordinates counter terrorism measures, in collaboration with district commissioners. The NSU is tasked with analysing organised crime and also the threat of terrorism in Iceland. Furthermore the NSU is tasked and to issue forward-looking-assessments in the field of law enforcement. In the event of a terrorist act or terror related offences the NSU is responsible for the investigation. An annual threat assessment is made by the National Security Unit of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police on the threats of terrorism. In addition, the NSU investigates offences which constitute a threat to public and/or state security, including treason and all terrorist offences. The District Prosecutor's Office has the power of prosecution for these offences as well as for serious economic offences, including large scale money laundering and terrorist financing.

The police in Iceland are very restricted in their use of force and the police are unarmed while on duty except for a short baton and an OC-canister, but all policemen are trained in the use of firearms. A Special Weapons and Tactics Team is operated within the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police. It tackles security cases and police duties that require the use of arms countrywide and its economic zone. All aspects of running the team, such as training, operations, equipment and policy regarding tasks and working methods, are in the hands of the National Commissioner. Members of the team are on a day-to-day basis involved in ordinary police work and are unarmed in the course of their normal duties.

Although there is not an independent security or an intelligence service in Iceland, the NSU is the designated national security authority. The National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police coordinates the work of the police in internal security affairs with the goal of preventing conduct that may be in breach of the provisions X and XI of the General Penal Code No 19/1940 and preventing acts of terrorism and other organized crime. Iceland has close co-operation with international bodies such as Europol and Interpol. Since 2008 Iceland has been a member of PWGT (Police Working Group on Terrorism). Iceland is a member of NATO's AC/46 Committee.

Surveillance of the sea territory falls under the mandate of the Icelandic Coast Guard.

#### **1.4 Provide any additional relevant information on national efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, e.g., those pertaining inter alia to:**

##### **Financing of terrorism;**

The aim of the Act on Measures against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing No. 140/2018 (entry into force 1 January 2019, as amended by Act No. 55/2019, Act No. 91/2019, Act No. 163/2019, Act No. 8/2020, Act No. 45/2020, Act No. 96/2020, Act No. 10/2021, 116/2021 and act No. 62/2022, transposing i.a. EU directives and regulations no. 2015/849, 910/2014, 2011/61, 2013/14, 2018/843, 2018/1108, 2019/758, 2007/16, 2009/65, 2013/14, 2014/91 and 2010/78) - as defined in Article 2 of the Act No. 140/2018, is to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing by imposing on parties engaging in activities which may be used for the purposes of

money laundering and terrorist financing the obligation to obtain knowledge of their customers and their business activities, maintain adequate reports, report to the competent authorities any knowledge of such illegal activities and avoid to carry out suspicious transactions.

Article 2 of the Act defines a broad range of Obligated Entities, that i.a. includes financial undertakings (authorized to carry out any of the following activities: carry deposits, credit institutions, provide payment services, issue e-money, pension funds, securities firms, life insurance etc.), virtual asset service providers, business/profession service providers and agents/dealers in high value goods and assets (lawyers, dealers in high value goods, real estate agents etc.), casinos and lotteries, and any business which handles cash transactions over 10.000 Euros. For a complete list please refer to Article 2 of the Act.

The act provides legal framework in which the Icelandic Financial Intelligence Unit is responsible for receiving, analysing, and disseminating Suspicious Activity/Transaction Reports (SAR/STR regime) of all types, i.e., money laundering, terrorist financing and sanctions evasion.

Terrorist Financing is defined in article 3(7) of the Act as obtaining of funds, directly or indirectly, for the purpose or by knowing the funds are wholly or partially to be used to commit act(s) punishable under article 100(a) – 100(b) of the General Penal Code No. 19/1940 (acts of terrorism).

The National Security Unit of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police (NSU) is the primary domestic authority competent to investigate terrorist financing. Consequentially FIU Iceland will disclose reports of such activities to the NSU. In case FIU Iceland obtains information on terrorist financing pertaining to a foreign jurisdiction report thereof are to be spontaneously disseminated to the FIU of the jurisdiction in question. To this effect FIU Iceland can freely exchange information with FIUs within the European Economic Area (EEA/EU). Cooperation with non-EEA FIUs is subject to prior Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs). FIU Iceland is continuously enhancing its MoU portfolio and has competence to enter into such arrangements at it's own discretion.

### **Border controls;**

Since 25 March 2001, Iceland has been a member of the Schengen Agreement. The Schengen cooperation opened up free movement of individuals within the borders of the Member States by terminating personal control of individuals travelling between the States, but coordinating instead control on the outer borders of the Schengen area.

The Icelandic Police is responsible for all border control and the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police plays a leading role in Iceland's participation in the Schengen scheme and operates a specific Border Management division which has the task of organizing and coordinating border control within the Icelandic Police.

The Directorate of Customs in Iceland is responsible for the control of import, transit and export, and secondly the collection of duties, taxes and various state revenue. The Directorate of Custom's main objectives are to strengthen control, hinder importation of illegal goods, ensure correct levy of import charges and improve collection results.

### **Travel document security;**

As of May 2006 Icelandic passports are issued with biometric identifiers and equipped with high quality security features and are security printed. Since July 2009 passports



have been equipped with a microchip that stores the same information as the passports data page in addition to two finger prints of the holder.

The control of foreign travel documents is in accordance with Schengen rules.

### **Container and supply chain security;**

On July 1st 2004 new legislation no. 50/2004 on maritime security took effect in Iceland. According to the law customs authorities handle cargo security, which involves making preventive measures to protect cargo from any kind of terrorism or other illegal activity. In accordance with the law the Directorate of Customs issued Cargo Security Rules number 141/2010. The Icelandic customs territory covers the country together with islands and reefs as well as twelve nautical miles of territorial waters around it with boundary in accordance with law No. 41/1979, Article 1, on territorial waters, economic jurisdiction and the continental shelf. The Icelandic customs territory also includes the airspace above the aforementioned land and sea territories.

Together with the provisions of the ISPS Code and SOLAS chapter XI-2, container security has been established in Icelandic ports under the auspices of the Directorate of Customs. The mandatory ISPS Code and regulation (EC) No 725/2004 of the European Parliament has been fully implemented with regard to Icelandic port facilities.

According to the Icelandic Maritime Association Iceland's participation in the international maritime security system is sound and at present there are no evident obstacles in maritime security aspects. Icelandic ports are in full compliance with international maritime security laws and regulations.

### **Security of radioactive sources;**

There are no nuclear power plants in Iceland and no nuclear weapons. With regard to other radioactive sources, the Icelandic Radiation Safety Authority ensures that all international safety requirements are met.

Iceland is a party to the Convention on the physical protection of nuclear material (1980) and participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

### **Use of the Internet and other information networks for terrorist purposes;**

The Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland is responsible for the implementation of rules on internet security. Act No. 62/2012 amending Act No. 69/2003 on the Post and Telecom Administration and Act No. 81/2003 on Electronic Communication establishes CERT-IS defined in Art. 2(1) as:

*A computer security and incident response team (CSIRT) operating under the aegis of the Post and Telecom Administration in Iceland for the protection of critical information infrastructure against cyber-attacks*

CERT-IS participates and serves as the contact for the Icelandic authorities in national and international cooperation on incident response for network and information security. The aim of CERT-IS activities is to prevent and mitigate as much as possible the risk of cyber-attacks and other security incidents against its constituency, and to counteract and minimise any critical information infrastructure damage resulting from such attacks and incidents.

CERT-IS enjoys generous rights to data and when a major cyber-attack is suspected, CERT-IS is authorised to scan the control information of electronic communication

packets relating to possible security threats for more detailed information on their origin, destination and technical properties. Where there is reasonable suspicion that individual transmissions contain malicious code, CERT-IS is authorised, with the consent of individual critical information infrastructure operators, to analyse the content of individual electronic communication transmissions to and from the network concerned.

In cases where national security and the public interest are at stake, CERT-IS may notify the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police of any major cyber-attacks against its constituency and of any serious or wide-spread security incidents which have caused damage or the risk of damage to critical information infrastructure. At the request of the Police Commissioner, CERT-IS shall engage in co-operation on prevention and response. Breaches are enforced by police authorities.

#### **Legal co-operation including extradition;**

The National Commissioner of the National Police, including the National Security Unit of that office, in collaboration with district commissioners as well as the Strategic Response Unit co-ordinates counter terrorism measures, in cooperation with several institutions and organizations, such as Interpol, Europol, PTN and regional police authorities in the Nordic countries.

See also the above list of international and regional legal instruments related to terrorism and co-operation in criminal matters.

Iceland is an active participant in the European Arrest Warrant, a simplified cross-border judicial surrender procedure for the purpose of prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order. The Ministry of Justice and the Director of Public Prosecution are responsible for providing and requiring bilateral mutual legal assistance with other states on the basis of the EAW and several other international treaties.

#### **Safe havens and shelter to terrorists and terrorist organizations;**

The stipulations of UNSCR 1373 on safe havens and shelter to terrorists are implemented by the Regulation on international security measures regarding terrorism, No. 122/2009.

## **2. Stationing of armed forces on foreign territory**

Iceland has no armed forces.

### **2.1 Provide information on stationing of your States armed forces on the territory of other participating States in accordance with freely negotiated agreements as well as in accordance with international law.**

Iceland has no armed forces.

## **3. Implementation of other international commitments related to the Code of Conduct**

### **3.1 Provide information on how your State ensures that commitments in the field of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building as an element of indivisible security are implemented in good faith.**

Iceland is a state Party to most multilateral arms control-, disarmament- and non-proliferation treaties and agreements, such as;

- Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) , operation suspended as of 13 April 2024
- Treaty on Open Skies
- All Confidence- and Security Building Measures agreed upon in the OSCE
- Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (CWC)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC)
- Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti- Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.

Iceland implements the above-mentioned treaties and agreements as well as other international instruments and initiatives in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. Iceland implements all UNSC resolutions on non-proliferation, including 1540. It sponsors and supports non-proliferation initiatives at the UN, IAEA, CTBTO and other international fora. In addition to its membership in the organisations mentioned above, Iceland is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*NATO*), the Financial Action Task Force (*FATF*), the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (*GICNT*) and supports the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (*GTRI*)

Iceland is a member of the following export control regimes:

- the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
- the Australia Group (AG) and
- the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
- fully compliant applicant to the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).

Iceland supports minimizing the threat of conventional weapons through stricter controls, including by an Arms Trade Treaty.

### **3.2 Provide information on how your State pursues arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures with a view to enhancing security and stability in the OSCE area.**

Iceland supports international efforts in the area of non-proliferation through international co-operation and implementation of all international obligations in this area. Iceland supports arrangements promoting arms control, disarmament and

confidence and security building applicable to the OSCE area. Iceland is a party to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (*CFE*), operation suspended as of 13 April 2024, the Treaty on Open Skies, the Vienna Document 2011 and other confidence- and security building measures agreed upon in the OSCE/Forum for Security Cooperation.

## **Section II: Intra-State elements**

### **1. National planning and decision-making process**

#### **1.1 What is the national planning and decision-making process in determining/approving military posture and defence expenditures in your State?**

Iceland has no military.

Iceland is a member of NATO. The Minister for Foreign Affairs is responsible for foreign policy aspects of defence and security and NATO matters. The Minister is constitutionally and politically responsible to the Parliament for all activity carried out by the Ministry and its subordinated organs. The Icelandic Defence Agency (*IDA*) was abolished as of 1 January 2011. On that same date, agreements entered into force allocating the defence-related functions previously carried out by the IDA to the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police and the Icelandic Coast Guard. Operations continue to be carried out within the security zone at Keflavik Airport. The Althingi (*Parliament*) adopts the State budget, including budget for defence related tasks.

#### **1.2 How does your State ensure that its military capabilities take into account the legitimate security concerns of other States as well as the need to contribute to international security and stability?**

Iceland has no military and no military capabilities.

Iceland is active across a broad range of multilateral organisations aimed at strengthening global security, including NATO, OSCE and UN.

The Iceland Crisis Response Unit (*ICRU*) was established in 2001 as a civilian peacekeeping entity. Its objective is to maintain a roster of trained personnel available for deployment to international organisations in the field of post-conflict reconstruction and for emergency and humanitarian assistance. Since Iceland has no military forces, it contributes civilian personnel only. The ICRU's chief international partners are UN funds and programmes, (*UNICEF*, *UN Women*, *UNRWA*, *OCHA*, *UNHCR* and *WFP*) the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*NATO*), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (*OSCE*).

Prior to deployment, all civilian experts learn about the essential elements of UNSCR 1325, including gender mainstreaming. They are taught how to recognise the special needs of women in conflict areas and how to engage women in post-conflict reconstruction. The ICRU emphasises gender balance among seconded civilian personnel.

### **2. Existing structures and processes**

## **2.1 What are the constitutionally established procedures for ensuring democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, intelligence services and the police?**

Iceland has no military, paramilitary and internal security forces and no intelligence services.

The Minister of Justice is the supreme head of the **police** in Iceland and is responsible to the Parliament (*the Althingi*). The Parliament is democratically elected at least every four years. The National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police administers police affairs under the minister's authority. According to Article 28 of the Police Act, the Minister of Interior appoints the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, the Deputy Commissioner of the Icelandic National Police, the Commissioner of the Reykjavík Police, the Deputy Commissioner of the Reykjavík Police, the Commissioner of the Suðurnes Police and the Deputy Commissioner of the Suðurnes Police for periods of five years at a time. The Minister also appoints District Commissioners for a five-year period. The National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police, the Commissioner of the Reykjavík Police and the Commissioner of the Suðurnes Police shall meet the same general requirements as district commissioners. Their deputies shall meet the same general requirements, but the requirements for their education and experience are not as substantial. Chief constables, deputy chief constables and other policemen are by the relevant police commissioner. The Commissioners of Police are in charge of criminal investigation and are authorised to prosecute minor offences in the lower judicial instance. According to Article 8(1) of the Police Act, the police shall investigate offences in consultation with the prosecuting authority. Article 11(1) stipulates the general rule that the police shall assist the prosecuting authority in its work.

The Code on Criminal Procedure No. 88/2008 (hereinafter referred to as the “CCP”) contains rules concerning the appointment of public prosecutors, their role and duties. The CCP also sets forth rules concerning police investigations and criminal proceedings.

A Code of Conduct for law enforcement personnel was issued by the National Police Commissioner in 2003 and amended last in 2016. It drew inspiration from the European Code of Police Ethics. The Code regulates the handling of confidential information and various other requirements related to the professional conduct in daily work and in connection with hierarchical orders and colleagues, confidentiality etc. Some of the principles deal with corruption, gifts, conflicts of interest and bribery.

The Code does not explicitly provide for sanctions. However, it must be read in conjunction with the Police Act, as well as with the Government Employees Act No. 70/1996 which deals with disciplinary aspects concerning all Icelandic civil servant.

The Icelandic Coast Guard (ICG) has its own Code of Conduct for employees, published in 2006 which is quite similar to the above Code as regards the content and spirit.

A new code of conduct for the Icelandic Police was issued in the fall of 2023.

### **The Police Supervisory Committee**

The Committee for the Supervision of the Police is an independent administrative committee. The committee took office on 1 January 2017.

One of the main roles of the committee is to receive reports from citizens concerning the alleged criminal conduct of a police officer, the working methods of the police or the conduct of a police employee.

The Committee for the Supervision of the Police also has the role of examining cases when a person dies or suffers major bodily injury in connection with the work of the police. The committee is also authorized to examine incidents and procedures of the police on its own initiative when it deems it necessary.

All cases concerning the potential criminal behavior by a police officer are forwarded to the District Prosecutor's Office for investigation.

## **2.2 How is the fulfilment of these procedures ensured, and which constitutionally established authorities/institutions are responsible for exercising these procedures?**

The fulfilment of the above procedures are ensured by the courts and through the democratic political process.

There are several procedures for administrative control. The control is both internal and external. First, all decisions by public bodies, or bodies vested with public authority, are subject to review from a higher authority, unless otherwise provided for by law. Second, decisions made by independent authorities may in some cases be reviewed at a ministerial level and in some cases they may be referred to special review boards. Third, decisions by municipalities may in some cases be referred to the relevant ministry. Fourth, the Courts are competent to review any executive decision, whether taken by a ministry, an independent authority or a municipality. Fifth, Althingi can obtain reports on executive acts and conduct follow up with the relevant minister. And finally, decisions by the executive may be subject to review by the Althingi Ombudsman.

## **2.3 What are the roles and missions of military, paramilitary and security forces, and how does your State control that such forces act solely within the constitutional framework?**

Iceland has no military, paramilitary or security forces.

## **3. Procedures related to different forces personnel**

### **3.1 What kind of procedures for recruitment and call-up of personnel for service in your military, paramilitary and internal security forces does your State have?**

Iceland has no military, paramilitary or security forces.

### **3.2 What kind of exemptions or alternatives to military service does your State have?**

Iceland has no military service.

### **3.3 What are the legal and administrative procedures to protect the rights of all forces personnel as well as conscripts?**

Iceland has no military service.

## **4. Implementation of other political norms, principles, decisions and international humanitarian law**

**4.1 How does your State ensure that International Humanitarian Law and Law of War are made widely available, e.g., through military training programmes and regulations?**

Iceland has no military.

The Icelandic Red Cross regularly hosts seminars on International Humanitarian Law for various groups of professionals and students.

**4.2 What has been done to ensure that armed forces personnel are aware of being individually accountable under national and international law for their actions?**

Iceland has no armed forces personnel.

**4.3 How does your State ensure that armed forces are not used to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of human and civil rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups nor to deprive them of national, religious, cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity?**

Iceland has no armed forces.

**4.4 What has been done to provide for the individual service member's exercise of his or her civil rights and how does your State ensure that the country's armed forces are politically neutral?**

Iceland has no armed forces.

**4.5 How does your State ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law?**

Iceland has no military and has no intention of establishing armed forces.

The respect for established norms of international law has always been central to Iceland's policies, including human rights and humanitarian law.

With respect to the relationship between domestic law and international law, Iceland adheres to the principle of dualism. The method most commonly used in Iceland to implement international conventions, is adaptation; the provisions of international conventions that may have, or are intended to have, effect in domestic law are transcribed in the form of general statutes, executive regulations or as appropriate, constitutional laws, or Icelandic legislation is amended in such a way as to be compatible with the undertakings involved in the relevant international convention.

### **Section III: Public access and contact information**

#### **1. Public access**

**1.1 How is the public informed about the provisions of the Code of Conduct?**

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs homepage includes a link to the OSCE's politico-military dimension website.

**1.2 What additional information related to the Code of Conduct, e.g., replies to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct, is made publicly available in your State?**

The replies of Iceland to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct are available to the public on the OSCE website.

**1.3 How does your State ensure public access to information related to your State's armed forces?**

Iceland has no armed forces.

**2. Contact information**

**2.1 Provide information on the national point of contact for the implementation of the Code of Conduct.**

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Iceland

Directorate for Defence

Raudararstigur 25, 150 Reykjavik, Iceland

Tel: +354 545 9900

Fax: +354 562 2373

E-mail: [external@utn.stjr.is](mailto:external@utn.stjr.is)

Website: [www.mfa.is](http://www.mfa.is)



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11. June 2024

ENGLISH only

**UPDATE OF THE INDICATIVE LIST OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO WOMEN,  
PEACE AND SECURITY PROVIDED VOLUNTARILY IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE  
ON THE CODE OF CONDUCT ON POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF  
SECURITY**

By the delegations of Belgium and the United Kingdom (also endorsed by: Andorra; Armenia; Austria; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Canada; Croatia; Cyprus; the Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Kazakhstan; Latvia; Lichtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; the Netherlands; North Macedonia; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Serbia; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Ukraine; and the United States of America).

In 2011, 30 participating States agreed to expand the scope of the Questionnaire on the OSCE Code of Conduct, by introducing the Indicative List of Issues Pertaining to Women, Peace and Security (FSC.DEC/5/11).

Since 2011, the field of Women, Peace and Security has continued to evolve. We believe the issue of gender continues to constitute an integral part of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. To ensure that our reporting remains in line with the latest developments, we have updated the 2011 indicative list of issues.

We encourage all participating States to use this updated Indicative List of Questions for future responses to the Questionnaire.

**UPDATED INDICATIVE LIST OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY TO BE PROVIDED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE OSCE CODE OF CONDUCT**

This document provides an indicative list of issues, which aims at providing useful information on Women, Peace and Security aspects for participating States replying to the Questionnaire on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

It is structured around the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 (Prevention, Participation, Protection and Sustaining Peace) and is set out in two parts for each pillar:

- PART A Checklist of key commitments and measures taken by participating States;
- PART B More detailed information for sharing good practice between participating States.

**3.1. PREVENTION**

**A. Checklist of key commitments taken by participating States**

**LIST OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS**

Please indicate if your State is party to the following universal and regional legal instruments relevant to protecting women, peace and security. If your State is not a party to a treaty, but considers becoming a party, kindly indicate at which stage is such consideration (e.g., undergoing inter-ministerial co-ordination, approved by government and sent to parliament, approved by parliament and awaiting enactment by president, etc.)

	Party by: ratification <b>P(R)</b> , accession <b>P(a)</b> , succession <b>P(s)</b> , acceptance <b>P(A)</b> , approval <b>P(AA)</b> , or <b>Not party</b>	Law and date of ratification, accession, succession, acceptance, or approval
<b>Universal legal instruments</b>		
1. Protocol Supplementary to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2000)	P(R)	22.6.2010

2.	United Nations Convention on All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)	P(R)	18.6.1985
<b>The Council of Europe legal instruments</b>			
3.	European Convention Against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) CETS No: 197	P(R)	23.2.2012
4.	European Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (2011) CETS No: 210	P(R)	1.8.2018

	<b>Other arrangements</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
5.	National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security	X	
6.	National legislation to implement the UN CEDAW convention (if a party), with reference to combating discrimination in employment, education, access to health services and participation in institutions ensuring democratic oversight and public scrutiny of the security sector.	X	
7.	Other related information, clarification or details to share:		

### **B. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States**

Please indicate if your State has the following preventative measures in place. More detailed information of the preventative measures can be included in Part B below.

	<b>Type of Measure</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
1.	Mechanism to assess risk of abuse of small arms to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence and violence against women and children	X	
2.	Inclusion of women's organizations and women in religious, ethnic minority or community groups in measures to counter and prevent terrorism and violent extremism N/A		X
	to raise awareness of the potential risks of exploitation and radicalization <sup>1</sup>		X

	N/A		
3.	Inclusion of gender perspective and special needs of women and girls in a national counterterrorism strategy <sup>2</sup> N/A		X
4.	Inclusion of specific matters related to the protection of women's and girls' rights in the basic education of armed forces. N/A		X
5.	Availability of specialized in-service training for armed forces personnel on the protection of women's and girls' rights. N/A		X
6.	Inclusion of specific matters related to the protection of women's and girls' rights in the pre-deployment training for international peacekeeping missions.	X	
7.	Plans to address and gather information from local women's populations in areas at risk of conflicts. N/A		X
8.	Mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of gender mainstreaming into operations	X	
9.	Feedback mechanisms: - from operations to chiefs of defence or military planners - between forces leading multi-national missions and forces providing personnel to such missions N/A		X
10.	Membership of a regional network or leadership network such as the WPS Chiefs of Defence Network N/A		X
11.	Other related information, clarification or details to share:		

### **C. More detailed information for sharing good practice between participating States**

#### **1 National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security**

1.1 In case you have a National Action Plan on WPS, how is your NAP developed, implemented and its impact assessed, including involvement of women's organizations and other civil society organizations and co-ordination across government.

*Iceland is in the final stages of designing the fourth National Action Plan (NAP) for the period 2024-2030. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for developing the NAP through consultations with other ministries, agencies, civil society organizations, academia and research organizations. The NAP focuses on Iceland's contribution to the women, peace and security agenda through its international cooperation in*

*addition to practical implementation of WPS principles in the work of our law enforcement agencies. The MFA will coordinate implementation and impact assessment through an annual review and report on the progress, including through the annual report of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to parliament.*

1.2 In case you have a National Action Plan on WPS, who takes the lead and owns the budget? What contribution is made by your defence ministry and security forces?

*The outline of the NAP and implementing documents provide the basis for Iceland's actions in the field of WPS. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsible and provides a budget as appropriate for implementing actions for which the MFA is responsible. Stakeholders participating in the NAP are responsible for budgeting their own actions.*

<sup>1</sup> See also similar question 3a in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

<sup>2</sup> See also similar question 3a in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

1.3 In case you have a National Action Plan on WPS, how does the NAP support enhancement of institutional capacity in defence and security?

*Iceland's NAP provides support in this area through resource allocation for gender initiatives and gender responsive practices and programs in collaboration with multilateral and civil society organizations. The latter supports security institutions in conflict areas to become more effective and equitable, contributing to sustainable peace and security. Despite not having armed forces of its own Iceland's NAP contributes to the enhancement of institutional capacity through promoting women's participation and capacity building in the security sector domestically and in international activities and missions, as well as more systematic integration of gender perspectives into their policies and practices.*

1.4 In case you have a National Action Plan on WPS, how do you publicize progress on implementation of your NAP?

*The MFA publishes information accessible to the public on the NAP implementation process and impact assessment in relation to the Minister's reporting to the Government and Parliament and to civil society. Additionally, the results of independent evaluations normally done in the third year of each NAP are published in Icelandic and English language on the MFA's homepage. For example, the evaluation of Iceland's third NAP, which was conducted by the Institute of International Affairs in 2022, was published there.*

## **2 Measures to prevent sexual and gender-based harm**

### **2.1 Horizon scanning, intelligence and risk?**

How do you include systematic gender analysis of areas at risk of conflict, including gender disaggregated socio-economic indicators, power over resources and decision-making, increases in sexual and gender-based violence, on-line and other threats of violence against women in public life, journalists and those providing humanitarian assistance.

N/A

How do you incorporate a gender perspective into actions preventing and combatting the tensions, which lead to conflict, such as increases in sexual and gender-based violence, terrorism, violent extremism and human trafficking?

*The government of Iceland has put gender equality high on its agenda in the past decade. This is reflected in various policies, action plans, and resolutions, which have been adopted and implemented, such as the following:*

- *A parliamentary resolution put forward every four years by the Prime Minister's office with an action plan on gender equality based on proposals made by the ministries (Framkvæmdaáætlun í jafnréttismálum).*
- *Several resolutions have been adopted by the Parliament on preventing and eliminating gender-based violence such as one on handling of GBV in 2023 and one on education and prevention measures on GBV for children and young adults adapted in 2021.*

- *Iceland's first NAP on the Istanbul Convention is expected to be issued in year 2021.*
- *An action plan preventive measures against human trafficking from year 2019 is being implemented.*
- *In June 2024, Iceland was among the first countries to endorse the Common Approach to Protection from Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse and Sexual Harassment (CAPSEAH), and adheres to the OECD DAC Recommendation DAC on Ending Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment.*
- *Iceland inserts PSEAH clauses in all development cooperation contribution agreements requiring partners to have adequate processes and response and reporting mechanisms in place.*

- What is the role of your military, police and other security personnel in such activities?

*N/A*

## **2.2 Planning.**

- How do you incorporate a gender perspective into operational planning?

*Iceland has no armed forces. However, in Iceland's fourth NAP key security institutions such as at the office of the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police will incorporate a gender perspective into their operational planning. In the past few years, the number of women serving at all operational levels at the NCO, including at leadership level, has increased. The current National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police is a woman. Furthermore, institutions in the security field strive to promote the inclusion of women's perspectives in policymaking, operational planning, and day-to-day implementation. Finally, the NAP also calls for men to participate actively in advocating for equality of men and women in security and defense.*

- How do you plan to address and gather information from local women's populations in areas at risk of conflict?

*N/A*

## **2.3 Awareness and understanding of WPS at all levels and types of security personnel.**

- What training do you give on incorporating a gender perspective and protecting the rights of women and girls to security personnel at basic education, officer training and specialized in-service training?

*Raising awareness of the importance of WPS and increasing knowledge by key actors in the security field has been an integral part of the process in designing Iceland's fourth NAP. Main emphasis has in the past years been on an informal on-the-job training for key personnel, diplomats, and seconded personnel, especially those engaged in the areas of crisis management, security and defense, humanitarian affairs and gender equality at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and key missions abroad such as at the UN, NATO and OSCE. As a part of the*

*fourth NAP the Prime Minister's Office in collaboration with the MFA will develop an online training course on gender equality and WPS in collaboration with the School of Central Government (Stjórnarráðsskólinn). The course is intended for diplomats and key actors and officials from NAP partner organizations, who have been identified by the MFA.*

*The National Police Commissioner of Iceland, the Police, the Coast Guard are responsible for security and civil defence planning in Iceland. As an example, in cooperation with universities in Iceland, the has developed specialized courses and diploma programs on gender-responsive policing, including for programs for police officers to improve the handling of cases involving gender-based violence, domestic violence, disability, LGBTI+, hate crime, human trafficking, and other similar issues.*

- How do you train security personnel to protect women and girls, men and boys from sexual and gender-based violence?<sup>3</sup>

*Gender perspectives have been integrated in the operational planning of the NCP (as above). Also, among other actions the NCP is collaborating with UN Women HQ on implementing UN Women's and UNDOC handbook on gender responsive policing. Security institutions participating in the fourth NAP aim to integrate gender perspectives into their planning and training.*

## **2.4 Vetting of security personnel, especially pre-deployment**

- What measures do you take to vet and prevent the recruitment, retention, promotion and deployment of security personnel with a record of sexual or gender-based violence or other violations of human rights?<sup>4</sup>

*The NCP conduct evaluations as an integrated part of the recruitment and promotion process.*

## **2.5 Other preventative measures**

N/A

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<sup>3</sup> See also similar question 6a in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

<sup>4</sup> See also similar question 2 and 8 in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.



- What other preventative measures do you have, for example to prevent sexual abuse or sexual exploitation on deployments and other forms of engagement of security forces abroad?<sup>5</sup>

*Iceland has no military or security forces abroad. However, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has already introduced accountability measures preventing sexual exploitation, abuse and harassment, which would be a part of training for officials serving in missions relevant to related WPS issues and/or SEA policy. This work will continue as a part of Iceland's Fourth National Action plan.*

### **3 Leadership, accountability and assurance**

#### **3.1 Integrating WPS into the command climate**

- How do you integrate a gender perspective and WPS into your policy and operational framework, including military manuals, national security policy frameworks, codes of conduct, protocols, standard operating procedures and command directives?

*The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and partners will, as part of the fourth NAP, integrate better awareness of all aspects of the WPS both domestically, as described above, and, in particular, in the international context relating to conflict and conflict prevention.*

#### **3.2 Accountability and Performance assessment**

- What measures, systems or procedures do you have on individual and collective accountability for acting in accordance with such policies or directives?

*The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police have in place a policy and response plan on bullying, sexual harassment, of gender-based harassment and violence.*

#### **3.3 Assurance**

- How do you provide specialist advice to operational commanders on WPS?

N/A

- What systems or measures do you use to co-ordinate specialist advice on WPS throughout your security forces and to provide democratic oversight?

N/A

### **4 Sharing of good practice**

- 4.1 How do you share good practice and learn from others?

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<sup>5</sup> See also similar question question 7 in the NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

### 3.2. PARTICIPATION

#### A. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States

Please indicate if your State has the following measures in place to increase women's participation in security forces and decision making, including at all stages of any peace-making process. More detailed information of such measures can be included in Part B below.

	Type of Measure	Yes	No
1.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics on applicants to armed forces <i>N/A</i>		X
2.	Policies to attract female candidates (targeted campaigns, review of accession tests etc.) <i>Yes at NCP</i>	X	
3.	Policies to promote equal opportunities for women and men across the security sector	X	
4.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of armed forces personnel: - By rank - By promotion - By retention <i>N/A</i>		X
5.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of complaints by armed forces personnel of: - Discrimination - sexual harassment - gender based harassment - sexual violence - gender-based violence <i>N/A</i>		X
6.	Collection and monitoring of sex disaggregated statistics of complaints by civilian personnel in the security sector of: - discrimination - sexual harassment - gender based harassment - sexual violence - gender-based violence	X	
7.	Anonymous staff surveys/climate assessment surveys or similar (monitoring incidences of behaviour contrary to military standards of conduct) <i>N/A</i>		X

8.	Collection and monitoring of sex-disaggregated statistics of: - personnel deployed on operations and peace-keeping missions - and by rank  <i>N/A</i>		X
9.	Collection and monitoring of sex-disaggregated statistics of decision makers in the security sector Yes to the police	X	
10.	Other related information, clarification or details to share:		

### **B. More detailed information for sharing good practice on participative measures between participating States**

#### **1. Measures to increase the number of women in general and in decision-making positions in the armed forces and the ministry of defence (and other security forces- optional).**

*Iceland has no armed forces. As a part of the fourth NAP, security organizations such as the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police and other organizations in the security field aim to increase the number of women at all levels of decision making within their organizations.*

##### 1.1 What are the numbers and percentages of women and men applying for and recruited to your military forces?

*N/A*

##### 1.2 What are the numbers and percentages of women and men in your military forces, disaggregated by rank?

*N/A*

If you regularly analyze retention and promotion statistics disaggregated by gender and rank, what are the trends and what action, if any, are you taking as a result?

*The percentage of women working at the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police has increased by 12% in 10 years, or between 2013 and 2023. On February 1, 2022, men made up 66% and women 34% of all police personnel. For police officers, 25% were women and 75% were men. The most equal percentage in the job levels of police officers was among detectives or 37% women and 63% men, followed by police officers. Only one woman has been appointed as chief superintendent in 2018. In 2023, women accounted for 40% of police commissioners and men for 60%. Only male police officers are in the Viking unit of the NCI. Emphasis has been on equalizing the ratio of the*

*sexes in the program and encouraging individuals with diverse backgrounds and origins to apply to it. Thus, there was an equal proportion of the sexes admitted to the police training in 2024.*

1.3

*N/A*

1.4 What are the numbers and percentages of complaints raised by women and men about discrimination, harassment, sexual or gender-based violence?

*Study published in 2024 indicated that about 15% of staff have been sexually harassed in their work or in connection with their work at the police, and women are more likely to have been sexually harassed than men. Educated female police officers are the most likely to have been sexually harassed. Of the women who have been sexually harassed at work, 60% identified male colleagues as the perpetrator. It is most common for men to be sexually harassed in their work by a female outsider (74%).*

1.5 How do you monitor outcomes?

*There is a special council at the National Commissioner of the Icelandic Police monitoring outcomes.*

1.6 How is a gender-perspective integrated into a 'climate assessment' or similar anonymous staff survey, if used?

*Various assessments are conducted across the public sector in Iceland (ministries and organizations) including an annual poll where staff attitudes and well-being are monitored. As a result of this one public organization is chosen as the "best public organization of the year".*

## **2 Measures to increase the numbers of women and specialist WPS advisers in peacekeeping forces.<sup>6</sup>**

2.1 What are the numbers and percentages of women and men in peacekeeping forces, disaggregated by rank?

*N/A*

2.2 What are the numbers and percentages of international missions to which you appointed Gender Advisers, Gender Focal Points or Women Protection Advisers?

*N/A*

## **3 Democratic oversight of Security Forces and WPS**

3.1 How do your security forces publicize, report on and account for their actions on policies and plans related to WPS?

*As a part of the fourth NAP, a plan has been developed allowing for better*

*information sharing, publishing, and reporting on actions related to WPS.*

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<sup>6</sup> See also similar question B1 in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report.

3.2 What is the representation of women in decision-making positions in institutions ensuring democratic oversight and public scrutiny?

*Political participation of women in Iceland is high. Currently, women hold around half of the seats both in parliament and government.*

*Overall statistics are not available for institutions overseeing democratic oversight and public scrutiny.*

### 3.2 PROTECTION

#### A. Checklist of measures taken by participating States

Please indicate if your State has the following protective measures in place. More detailed information of the protective measures can be included in Part B below.

	Type of Measure	Yes	No
1.	Specialist Advisers on WPS: - Gender Advisers - Gender Focal Points - Women Protection Advisers	X	
2.	Policies to protect women and others in conflict and post-conflict areas from sexual abuse and exploitation by your state's security personnel <sup>7</sup>	X	
3.	Policies, which set out the duties of commanders and other superiors to prevent abuse or exploitation by their subordinates.		X
4.	Collection and monitoring of reported cases of exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by military, paramilitary and security forces: -referred -investigated - acted upon		X
5.	Measures to increase your state's capacity to investigate alleged violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in areas of conflict or post-conflict including sexual and gender-based violence <sup>8</sup>		X
6.	National legislation conferring powers to prosecute alleged extra-terrestrial violations of human rights	X	
7.	Other related information, clarification or details to share:		

#### B. More detailed information for sharing good practice on protective measures between participating States

##### 1 Measures to embed protection of women and girls in operations and international missions

N/A for all questions below

<sup>7</sup> See also similar question B2 in form to input to UN SG UNSCR 1325 report as well as question 3a in NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

<sup>8</sup> See also similar question 4a in similar question in NATO Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) Implementation Progress Report.

1.1 How do you define conflict-related violence in your policies, manuals, standard operating procedures and training material?

- Does it include sexual and gender-based violence, forced sterilisations and abductions, also of men and boys, and forced pregnancy and forced abortions?
- Does it include victims of terrorism or other armed groups?

1.2 Number and percentage of participating State's international missions that address specific issues affecting women and girls in their terms of reference and the mission reports.

1.3 How are military, para-military and security forces trained to respond to sexual violence and gender-based harm?

## 2 Investigating alleged violations

2.1 How do you identify, record, investigate and prosecute any alleged violations, cases of exploitation and abuse perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces? What experience do you have of such investigations and prosecutions?

2.2 What are the number and percentage of reported cases of exploitation and abuse allegedly perpetrated by military, para-military and security forces that are referred, investigated and acted upon?

2.3 How do you ensure access to justice for victims of conflict related violence including cases of exploitation and abuse by military, para-military and security forces?

## 3 Other measures to protect women and girls

3.1 What lessons could you share in relation to protective measures?

### 3.3 SUSTAINING PEACE

#### A. Checklist of key measures taken by participating States

Please indicate if your State has the following measures in place to sustain peace, especially regarding relief and recovery and post-conflict situations. More detailed information about such measures can be included in Part B below.

	Type of Measure	Yes	No
1.	Measures to ensure the involvement of women from the outset in seeking a peaceful settlement of potential or actual conflicts.	X	



2.	Measures to support those who have experienced sexual or gender-based violence during or post-conflict to support their recovery from trauma	X	
3.	Measures to support the role of women as agents of change and transformation in areas emerging from conflict	X	
4.	Measures to support capacity building in the security and other sectors of fragile states or post-conflict situations to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially relating to women and girls	X	
5.	Other related information, clarification or details to share:		

**B. More detailed information for sharing good practice between participating States**

*N/A for all questions below*

1.1 How do security personnel support and seek to embed the involvement of women in peacekeeping and throughout the peace building and post -conflict process?

1.2 What training are your security personnel given as regards survivor focus?

1.3 What roles do your security personnel or other personnel play in support of demobilisation, access to humanitarian assistance or to facilitate re-integration post-conflict?

1.4 What lessons could you share in relation to recovery and relief issues in the WPS agenda?

3.4 Final reflections

1. What do you consider biggest obstacles as well as what are the priorities for your country on WPS in the context of the Code of Conduct?

2. Would you like to share any additional information, clarification or details?

## **BACKGROUND TO THE 2023 UPDATE OF THE INDICATIVE LIST OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY TO BE PROVIDED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE OSCE CODE OF CONDUCT**

### **1. Background on Women, Peace and Security**

#### **1.1. The importance of Women, Peace and Security in the Code of Conduct Context**

In 2011, 30 OSCE participating States decided to advance their commitments on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda in the context of the Code of Conduct, by adopting an annexe to the questionnaire specifically targeting WPS related activities. The link between the Code and WPS is undeniable for two reasons. Firstly, women take up a variety of functions in many armed and security forces, thus rendering them compliant to the same Code as their male peers. Secondly, the activities of armed and security forces have an impact on the civilian population, including on women and girls. It is therefore important to take into account the gendered impact of their efforts and integrate this throughout the Code.

While the initiative from 2011 was an excellent start, the WPS agenda continuously evolves and the OSCE documents need to follow this trend. Therefore, it was not only necessary to update the Indicative List of Questions with all the WPS resolutions and findings that have been adopted since 2011, but the Code itself also merits gender-mainstreaming in order to better reflect the link with the WPS agenda.

For policy leads reporting on WPS, there are plenty of questions and questionnaires from various (inter)national organisations with only limited guidance. Therefore, this background aims to clarify not only the developments since 2011 and to put into perspective the updated OSCE documents, but also to underline why reporting on WPS is crucial.

The reason why it is highly encouraged for OSCE participating States to report on WPS in the context of the Code of Conduct, is to map out the state of play for each participating State. In a next step, this allows States to benchmark their own efforts and to use the reports by others as both best practices and lessons learned.

This updated guidance has taken steps to streamline the existing questions (e.g. by introducing checklists where possible). It also recognizes that different participating States are part of different organizations, with different reporting requirements on WPS (e.g. UN, NATO). To keep this inclusive, but also user-friendly, the guide has used footnotes to flag where questions are similar to those in other questionnaires. The guidance remains a living document. It is the first update since the OSCE guidance was first drafted in 2011. The first update has been in 2023. The next update

should happen sooner, to account for feedback from capitals (e.g. on how easy it is to use in practice) as well as reflecting the latest developments on WPS.

## **1.2. Developments in Women, Peace and Security since 2011**

The UNSCR 1325 of 2000 is the founding document internationally recognising the particular vulnerabilities of women and girls in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict and the threats conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence pose to peace and security. It sets out the important role of women in maintaining and promoting peace and the need to increase women's participation in decision-making roles in preventing and resolving conflicts. It has raised awareness of and confirmed a willingness to incorporate a gender-perspective into peace-keeping operations, including training and special measures to protect women and girls. States' National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325, which followed, have been the impetus for action internationally and nationally over the last 22 years.

Between 2000 and 2010 four UNSCR resolutions developed the general principles set out in UNSCR 1325 into progressively more specific actions required both at the UN level and by States.

Six further UNSCR resolutions specifically on WPS<sup>9</sup> in the last 11 years are more specific and comprehensive, both in terms of scope and action required on implementation.

### **Scope**

The development of scope in more recent UNSCRs is set explicitly in a changing global context of peace and security. These changes include rising violent extremism, increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, climate change and global health pandemics. Sexual violence and gender-based violence is identified as a potential tactic of terrorism, not just as a tactic of war. Such violence can affect men and boys as well as women and girls, not only as direct victims but also as witnesses, causing wide scale terror, trauma and insecurity. Sexual violence and gender-based violence can also be used to finance terrorism, for example as part of human trafficking. The resolutions also note the links between sexual and gender-based violence and both the illicit trade in natural resources and the illicit transfer, accumulation and misuse of arms. Effective prevention requires action beyond the security sector, for example in national legal and judicial systems to tackle all forms of violence against women and girls and vulnerable groups.

Scope is also expanded in terms of protection: acknowledging the concept of 'intersectionality' i.e., multiple vulnerabilities some women face, for example women with disabilities, older or refugee women; identifying the needs and issues concerning children born of war and their mothers; and explicitly adding forced abduction, forced pregnancy and forced sterilisation to the definition of conflict-related violence.

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<sup>9</sup> UNSCR 1998 (2011- adopted one day before ILQs), UNSCR 2068 (2012), UNSCR 2106 (2013), UNSCR 2122 (2013), UNSCR 2467 (2019) and UNSCR 2493 (2019).

Greater emphasis is placed on a survivor focus, including access to health and humanitarian assistance, reparations and a range of actions to reduce stigma and facilitate re-integration. Health services explicitly include sexual and reproductive health services, psychological and trauma support. Survivors include victims of terrorist violence, men, boys, refugees, those forced to join armed groups and other demobilized combatants.

## **Implementation**

In 2013, the Security Council recognised the need for a significant shift in implementation of commitments in 1325 and subsequent UNSCRs<sup>10</sup>. Key themes in UNSCRs since then include:

- more systematic data recording, gender disaggregated statistics, analysis, monitoring and recording
- more individual and collective accountability within security forces, including integration of WPS into planning, delivery and performance assessment of operations
- more focus on the roles and responsibilities of high-level commanders
- enhanced action on vetting to reduce the risk of violations by security personnel<sup>11</sup>
- improved investigation and prosecution of alleged sexual and gender-based violence
- greater emphasis on women's participation and leadership, particularly in peace-building and post-conflict
- more victim and survivor focus to enhance the indivisibility of security
- WPS activities to be adequately resourced, given a higher priority and to be mainstreamed. These activities include pre-deployment and in-mission training, increased representation of women in security forces and WPS specialist roles.

## **Embedding WPS developments internationally**

This wider understanding is being implemented at UN level as shown by the integration of WPS in the Arms Trade Treaty Article 7(4) in 2014, Security Council Resolutions on Trafficking (UNSCR 2331 in 2016 and UNSCR 2388 in 2011), the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Humanity 2019 and the decision of the Committee on the Convention on All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in March 2022 in the case of *Rosanna Flamer-Caldera v Sri Lanka*<sup>12</sup>.

At Council of Europe level, the Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings 2005 (CETS No. 197) explicitly incorporates a gender perspective, including committing parties to gender mainstreaming in the development, implementation and assessment of measures to protect and promote the rights of victims. The Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence 2011

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<sup>10</sup> UNSCR 2122.

<sup>11</sup> UNSCR 2467 refers to safeguards to prevent individuals credibly suspected of committing sexual violence related crimes from being recruited, retained or promoted

<sup>12</sup> CEDAW Communication No. 134/2018

(the Istanbul Convention CETS No. 210) applies in times of war as well as peace. It commits Parties to co-operating with each other to prevent, combat and prosecute all forms of violence covered by the scope of the Convention, to protect and provide assistance to victims, in investigations and proceedings and enforcing judicial decisions and orders.

The OSCE has several key resources on WPS including Ministerial Council Declarations, an Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality and a range of reports and practical guides.

The provisions of the OSCE Code of Conduct appear sufficient to encompass key elements of the WPS agenda. Although there is no mention of women throughout the document, 21 of the 47 responses from participating States to the questionnaire on the Code did integrate information on initiatives and actions on WPS.

