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**Statement by Ambassador Herbert Salber,
Deputy Political Director
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In the view of the Federal Republic of Germany, conventional arms control in and for Europe as well as confidence- and security-building measures remain central and above all indispensable elements of a reliable European security architecture. It is to be assumed that European states will continue to maintain conventional armed forces in the future. However, in contrast to the Cold War era, our states are now bound by a cooperative security concept, which includes conventional arms control and confidence-building. These are our guarantees against Europe falling back into patterns of conflict and military strategies which we put behind us more than 20 years ago. Experience has confirmed the theory that the key to mutual confidence lies in transparent and verifiable armed forces and the disclosure of military activities. Now, we must consolidate and further develop what we have achieved to date.

Germany finds it very regrettable that the talks among “the 36” about a basic document for conventional arms control in the 21st century were unsuccessful. It has not yet been possible to hold concrete negotiations about modernizing conventional arms control in Europe on the basis of previous obligations. The longer we put off modernizing this system of arms control and confidence-building, the greater the danger that it will continue to lose significance and the more challenging the task of developing a regime to fit the times. If conventional arms control is to continue to fulfill its function, it will have to be comprehensively and radically adapted to the current security situation. Wishing to avoid a security-policy vacuum in this process, we advocate a careful approach to the existing obligations. Finding a suitable way to achieve this will be one of the fundamental challenges of the coming months.

Since it was adopted in Istanbul, the 1999 Vienna Document has absolutely proved its worth as the OSCE's essential instrument of confidence- and security-building – but has sadly remained largely undeveloped for more than ten years. The Federal Republic of Germany – in agreement with the final document of the OSCE Summit in Astana of 2 December 2010, the OSCE Ministerial Council's decision of 2 December 2009 and the relevant FSC decisions of 19 May and 29 September 2010 – reiterates its view that this document urgently needs to be substantially amended to fit the altered security, military and technological conditions in Europe. The CFE situation just described has made this all the more urgent.

Far-reaching changes have been made to the armed forces of most participating states which mean that the Vienna Document now (in comparison to 1999) encompasses a far smaller proportion of armed forces involved in missions. These changes include reductions in the size of armed forces, alterations affecting their internal structures, modifications to the nature, principles and objectives of missions, and quantitative as well as qualitative changes in exercise activities. We regret the concurrent loss of transparency and are firmly convinced that it must be possible to reverse this development in the interests of all participating states.

It should also be noted that the participating States' armed forces are nowadays hardly ever involved in any military activity which is subject to the 1999 Vienna Document's notification, let alone observation obligations. Thus the provisions in the Vienna Document for the notification and observation of certain military activities hardly ever apply. This too represents a significant loss of transparency, for which we ought to compensate in the interests of our security.

The changes which have been made to participating States' armed forces also have an effect on the practice of verification under Chapter IX of the Vienna Document. The reduction in numbers of units, with the resulting reduction in the passive quotas for evaluation visits, the deployment of formations and units over large areas, the reduction in military activities, not to mention the technical developments of recent years, all affect the number and nature of inspections and evaluation visits, and it is Germany's view that they should be revised in certain aspects.

Germany therefore advocates strengthening transparency in military activities by not only revising certain aspects of the 1999 Vienna Document's information regime but also increasing the number and efficiency of its confidence- and security-building measures.

In Germany's view, further discussions require the selection of a practical, effective negotiation approach which organizes proposals thematically, balances the participating States' vari-

ous interests and so raises our chances of achieving the necessary, sustainable and fundamental modernization of the Vienna Document. As with any negotiations, all sides will have to show themselves willing to engage in give and take.

On the basis of the current state of discussion in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), Germany proposes the following comprehensive approach for open-minded negotiations:

- Within the framework of Chapter I (Annual Exchange of Military Information), we should respond to the quantitative and qualitative changes to the armed forces of many participating States by entering into a discussion on integrating information about a detailed description of command structures as well as information about quick reaction forces, naval forces and the transit of military units into the information regime of the 1999 Vienna Document. The existing proposals still indicate a considerable need for elaboration and discussion, which we should meet.
- Within the framework of Chapter V (Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities), there are several proposals on the table which enjoy the support of many delegations. The thresholds for military activities to be subject to notification should be lowered, or notification should be given of activities which are below the current thresholds. We also strongly support these measures.
- Within the framework of Chapter IX (Compliance and Verification) we advocate investigating how the quotas for inspections and evaluation visits can be redefined, their duration explained and the number of team members increased in order to improve practical implementation.

In connection with these issues, we do also need to address the cost-effectiveness of additional confidence- and security-building measures; nonetheless, this consideration must not be allowed to stand in the way of necessary changes.

Transparency is a basic prerequisite for mutual confidence. If we in Europe want to enhance confidence, we will need to agree on further measures to create and increase transparency. This goes beyond proposals to improve implementation, though we are pursuing them too.

We believe that the above comprehensive approach, which embraces the existing substantial up dating proposals, represents a suitable basis for negotiations to address fundamental questions. In the coming weeks and months, Germany will continue to participate in this

process and make further contributions as required. We are prepared to talk about any existing or future proposal which will really increase military transparency in the future.

Extensive modernization decisions will in all probability not yet be reached at the next OSCE Ministerial Council in Vilnius. The 2011 Vienna Document which lies before us will be a step on the way. Nonetheless, the FSC should present the Ministers with a clear medium-term negotiations concept on developing the Vienna Document, in order to gain their political support.

The Code of Conduct on politico-military aspects of security plays a central role in the consolidation of common, indivisible security in Europe by encouraging norms of responsible and co-operative behaviour in the field of security, including democratic control in the security sphere within the member States. Germany therefore joins its EU partners, the United States of America and other participating States in strongly advocating the creation of a regular, if possible annual, implementation review on the Code of Conduct within the FSC. Only through joint review and focused discussion of the information exchanged under the provisions of the Code of Conduct as well as any improvements in implementation can we create a sound foundation for further successful implementation.

Germany also strongly supports the proposals from Sweden for a further OSCE conference in May 2012 to review the OSCE Plan of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons. This meeting will enable the OSCE to initiate guiding recommendations and updates for the Plan of Action in the run-up to the UN review conference in July 2012.

That being said, Germany sees the concrete OSCE project activities on small arms and light weapons and on stockpiles as a unique and visible area of the FSC's work, and as a regional contribution by the OSCE to global efforts being made in this field. We are determined to lend our continued support in this area.