

The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented attempt by governments, international agencies and non-governmental organizations to combat corruption. These efforts began against a history of refusal to accept that corruption was anything more than “a little local difficulty.” East Asia aside, there was a dearth of experience in tackling the problem, scant research had been undertaken and serious academic debate was spasmodic. Corruption was simply not taken seriously.

Widespread action has come with the recent realization of the extent and gravity of the problem. A series of inter-locking international conventions now exists which includes the OECD Convention Against the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and a global UN Convention Against Corruption, as well as conventions within Europe, the Americas, and, soon, in Africa. These have achieved, for the first time, a global consensus on what corruption is, why it should be confronted and how. Although the consensus inevitably reflects a minimum, the conventions have nevertheless been negotiated, ratification is under way and implementation is in train. This should augur well for the future of the global anti-corruption campaign.

But looking back over the efforts of the past ten years or so, how can we gauge success or failure? The phenomenon of corruption is so complex that attributing success to any particular initiative, or set of initiatives, is frequently elusive. Sound reforms have been undertaken without seeming to have affected levels of corruption. However, the situation may well have become even worse without them. We cannot assume simply that because corruption levels have increased, efforts to contain the phenomenon have necessarily been ineffectual. We need much more sophisticated means of surveying the phenomenon of corruption before we can answer many of the questions to which efforts to contain it give rise.

The suggested lessons learned given here is by no means exhaustive, and space does not permit their detailed elaboration. It simply suggests some of the salient lessons, but nothing is more certain than that we all still have much more to learn.

1. NO COUNTRY CAN CLAIM MORAL SUPERIORITY

There was a time when some industrialized countries would regard themselves as being morally superior when it came to corruption. “They do things differently abroad,” the argument ran. “We have to do things there we would not dream of doing at home.” The involvement of these countries’ exporters in systematic corruption throughout the world has now been exposed, and the degree to which their own political institutions have been corrupted through “black” money, have caused most of them to change their views.

2. EVERYONE HAS TO ADDRESS CORRUPTION FOR THEMSELVES AND IN THEIR OWN WAY

Reform efforts have to be homegrown and locally driven. They can be encouraged and fostered by outside partners (e.g. donors and international financial institutions), but the motivation and the leadership must come from within. Internal corruption must be dealt with from within, and corruption in international business transactions has to be dealt with from both sides of the equation. There is no “one size fits all” solution.

3. THERE ARE NO “QUICK FIXES”

There is no such thing as a “quick fix” when it comes to containing corruption. There may be areas in which quick wins can be gained – such as streamlining procedures in customs administration, opening up public procurement to make it more transparent, prosecuting a large number of corrupt officials, but there is no over-all “quick fix.” Combating corruption is a long, arduous and never-ending process.

4. THERE IS NO PLACE FOR EXIT STRATEGIES FOR DONORS

Anti-corruption strategies do not have fixed timeframes. Reforms take time to design, implement and to bear fruit. When donors are involved, they should not be looking for an early exit, but be prepared for a sustained period of involvement.

5. A CLEAR ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN ARE NEEDED

A piecemeal approach to reforms is not reliable. The strategy must be all-embracing and should address all aspects of the national integrity system. Once a determined effort gets under way, public perceptions can be adversely affected by reports of commissions of inquiry or by seeing senior officials being prosecuted for serious offenses. If the reform process is not accompanied by an appropriate public awareness and information program, impressions can be formed that things are going from bad to even worse. It is crucial to pay special attention to public relations from the outset. Public expectations must be managed and the political risks contained.

6. CODES OF ETHICS AND CITIZENS' CHARTERS

These documents must not be used as decorations, but as agents of change. Codes of ethics are useful, but only when the staff in question supports them. Staff members must be involved in their drafting, and training programs for all must be conducted. Training programs need to be highly participatory and involve the discussion of hypothetical situations, perhaps with some role-playing. Mere lectures or hand-outs are ineffectual. Similarly, citizen's charters can have the effect of making highly visible commitments to the public, and constitute a challenge to a government agency to deliver what it promises. This means that the commitments in the charters should be realistic. The charters themselves must be publicized.

7. STREAMLINING BUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURES

Red tape should be cut, bureaucratic requirements reassessed and kept to a minimum. Staff in sensitive positions should be rotated wherever possible, and, particularly in vulnerable areas, contact between staff and the public depersonalized to reduce the chances of personal relationships developing. Customs, for example, is just one of several areas which lends itself to such a streamlining of procedures. When personal contact is necessary, the introduction of elements of unpredictability as to which particular official may handle a matter or cli-

ent reduces the potential for bribery. Computerizing a customs system can advance these processes, while enhancing the speed with which goods are cleared, identifying delays and enabling investigations of the reasons for any delays. However, in many countries the cumbersome bureaucracy has developed, not haphazardly, but precisely with the creation of bribe-taking opportunities in mind. These reforms may be self-evident, but they are nonetheless difficult to achieve.

8. WHISTLEBLOWERS MUST BE ENCOURAGED AND PROTECTED

Aggrieved citizens and whistleblowers inside the administration can be encouraged to complain to new institutions such as anti-corruption commissions or ombudsman offices, or through telephone hot-lines. Unless they do so, necessary actions will be delayed, perhaps indefinitely. Complainants must be assured that their complaints will be taken seriously, and that they themselves will not be placed at risk. In some countries, social taboos about "denouncing" fellow citizens may have to be overcome. Raising public awareness in these matters is much talked about, but is left almost entirely to civil society to address.

9. CONTINUOUS MONITORING IS NEEDED

Experience shows that, for example, in police corruption, it is not enough to clean up a corrupt force. Unless processes are established for continuous monitoring, sooner or later a force will subside into a morass of corruption and require yet another extraordinary effort to try to rehabilitate it. It is not enough to remove corrupt officials without also removing opportunities and ensuring that honest officials are being appointed to positions of trust. "Integrity testing" can help ensure that honest officials are identified and considered for promotion.

10. FOCUS ON THE OVERALL SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE OR MANAGEMENT

To win public cooperation, a reform program should not focus on simply eliminating individuals with

questionable records on corruption. In a situation of systemic corruption, the corrupt individual is not a single “bad apple” and removing him or her will not save the barrel. Instead, the whole system needs to be addressed or else the person brought in as a replacement will be subjected to the same temptations. Prevention can be more effective and infinitely more economic than investigation and prosecution. At the end of the day, a government must have competent staff available and be capable of discharging the affairs of state within a functioning institutional framework and subjected to an effective enforcement regime.

11. AMNESTIES MAY BE UNAVOIDABLE

Escaping from a corrupt status quo is extremely difficult. Many powerful interests have reason to fear if a new dispensation is going to be unduly threatening to them. Where corrupt interests have acquired major holdings, action against them can have the potential of destabilizing a country’s economy. How can the position be redressed without making matters worse? Amnesties are unpalatable, but may be unavoidable. They certainly are unavoidable in the context of small infractions by junior officials. Although the question of amnesties is problematic, there is something to be said for absolving certain staff from blame. Some senior staff may need to be removed or disciplined, but more junior staff, other than those who have been seriously abusing positions of trust, should not feel that they are at risk. Until workable solutions can be developed (“truth and reconciliation commissions” have been considered), the question of dealing with the past will remain one of the largest single stumbling blocks to any reform.

12. LEADERSHIP IS VITAL, BUT NOT ENOUGH BY ITSELF. COALITIONS OF INTERESTS (PRIVATE SECTOR, CIVIL SOCIETY, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, CONSUMERS, ENVIRONMENTALISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS ETC.) CAN HELP

Without leadership from the top, any attempt to achieve major reforms in an environment of systemic corruption will be bound to fail. Personal leadership is vital, and a leader must be seen to not just be

mouthed platitudes. However, just as laws alone will not suffice to achieve reform where corruption is systemic, so, too, is leadership not enough. Coalitions can be created to support leadership, but there is a danger when they embrace interests whose pasts are questionable. Yet if only groups untainted by suspicion or past corruption problems are admitted to a coalition, they will number far too few. What is important is that coalition partners commit themselves to building a new future and, having made that commitment, that they be held to it.

13. CIVIL SOCIETY SHOULD NOT BE OVERLOOKED

There appears to be a correlation between high levels of corruption and low levels of civil society activity. Efforts to assist the emergence of a creative and vibrant civil society call for the development of both a legal framework within which civil society can establish its institutions free of government interference and control, and for the building of a positive dialogue between civil society and governments. This is not always easy to achieve, particularly in an emerging democracy, as it may cut across preconceived notions of how government decisions should be developed and imposed. One way of testing the genuineness of a government’s anti-corruption pledges is to see whether the government is prepared to work with civil society.

14. CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS THEMSELVES CAN BE SOURCES OF CORRUPTION

In a number of countries, civil society organizations have sprung up ad hoc, simply to tap into the assistance dollars which external donors have been prepared to provide to organizations for developmental efforts conducive to the strengthening of civil society. Civil society organizations must be transparent and accountable in their own practices. No less than official institutions, they cannot be taken at face value and need to be monitored for transparency.

15. LEGISLATURES CAN GO FROM WATCHDOG TO THIEF

A serious flaw has emerged in a number of countries where the legislature is not only a watchdog

over official expenditure, but spends public money (including increases in its members' own salaries) and in allowing public contracts. This combination of watchdog role with that of the executive branch gives rise to conflicts of interest and effectively poisons the body politic. It also breeds contempt for democratic institutions among the public at large. Unless these contradictions are resolved satisfactorily (e.g. by effecting a clear separation of powers) it is doubtful whether effective anti-corruption reforms can be achieved in those countries.

16. POLITICAL PARTY FUNDING REMAINS A PROBLEM

Until recently, the issue of political party funding had been largely ignored by the international community. Some argue that the best way to restrict the influence of "money politics" is not so much to restrict money flowing into a political party, but to restrict the amount of expenditures and what money can be spent on. The change of Taiwanese government in March 2000, however, has shown that an affluent political party with large investments and powerful cronies can nonetheless be voted out of office. This encourages the belief that the manipulation of political party funding need not necessarily be an insuperable barrier to changes of government.

17. INDEPENDENT AGENCIES WITHOUT SECURITY OF TENURE FOR THEIR LEADERS

The institutions of ombudsman and of auditor-general are attractive in theory, but can only function effectively if their office-holders are protected from arbitrary removal by the very executive they are required to watch.. Constituencies outside the political processes have to be built to defend these officeholders and, when necessary, make their voices heard.

18. ACCESS TO INFORMATION CAN BE A HIGHLY-EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOL

Some governments have recognized transparent access to information as the most effective tool for curbing corruption and have enacted appropriate legislation. Government agencies can be required

to post details of the services they provide and the official charges for them. Indonesia is an example where local information displays with details of development projects have equipped the public with the information they need to keep a watchful eye on what is taking place.

19. SOUND RECORDS MANAGEMENT ARE ESSENTIAL TO TRACING CORRUPTION

Public access to information requires sound records management. So, too, does holding individual public servants to account. A government agency should be charged with overseeing public sector document handling processes by individual departments and making provision for the archiving of spent documentation.

20. THE MEDIA AND WHISTLEBLOWING JOURNALISTS COMPLETE SENTENCE

Most murders of journalists in recent years have been attributed to their investigating corruption cases and there is, thus, a need to render their work less risky as well as to raise standards of professionalism. Several institutions are running training courses in investigative journalism. However, in many parts of the world the media itself is blighted by corruption. The media is an "integrity pillar" which requires serious attention in many countries.

21. PUBLISHING LISTS OF THOSE ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION OFTEN DOES NOT HAVE THE INTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Efforts to "name and shame" in the Kenyan Parliament drew a blank in 2000 when a committee report which "named names" had all the names censored, and some of those "named" threatened to sue newspapers which published details – even though the information was already in the public domain. In India, the Vigilance Commissioner resorted to the Internet to post the names of hundreds of officials suspected of corruption. The flamboyance with which the President of the Nigerian Senate, voted out of office in August 2000, protested his innocence in the face of overwhelming

evidence of abuse of office, suggests that political leaders may have much thicker skins than do those who strategize to combat corruption. In any event, extreme care is needed to avoid any appearance of denying individuals a fair chance for self-defense.

22. INCREASING SALARIES ALONE IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FOR REDUCING LEVELS OF CORRUPTION

It stands to reason that inadequately paid public servants must be more vulnerable to temptation than those who are well paid. However, the depressing truth emerges that many of the most corrupt officials are in leadership positions, which they have abused to amass large fortunes through “grand corruption.” Salaries, then, are more a question for those in low positions, whose insistence on payments for services may be seen by their peers as a form of “user pays.” Surveys suggest that people may be ready to pay for the services they receive, provided the fees are affordable and legal. What they bitterly resent is being subjected to extortion. One observer has noted that: “The evidence is at best unclear whether increasing public sector wages can reduce corruption. Yes, within a comprehensive package of civil service reform, proper compensation and incentives can play a role, but an in-depth look at country specific data does not support the notion that merely increasing official salaries to existing staff incorrupt agencies helps.”¹

23. INCREASING SALARIES CAN BE AT LEAST A PART OF THE SOLUTION FOR FIGHTING CORRUPTION

Real wages have declined in the public sector in many countries over substantial periods of time. In several cases, this decline has been mirrored by declines in the efficiency of the public sector. One study shows that higher wage levels are accompanied by the chance to recruit better skilled people into government service, raising the quality of the services provided and, as described in the paper, the amount of tax collected. Simply raising tax rates may not raise additional state income; enhancing the skills of those involved in collecting it can.

24. INDEPENDENT REVENUE AUTHORITIES CAN FACILITATE REVENUE COLLECTION

Independent revenue authorities can be established with closely monitored and well-paid staff, employed outside the public service salary structures. These authorities can boost the collection of revenue and enable a developing country to pay its officials and service the financial needs of its institutions more adequately.

25. RETIREMENT BENEFITS, ESPECIALLY FOR POLITICAL LEADERS, ARE OFTEN NOT AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO CORRUPTION

Logic suggests that a lack of security in retirement is a factor in the corruption equation. However, when it comes to senior government officials, the anecdotal evidence to the contrary suggests otherwise.

26. NEW ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS ALONE ARE NOT THE ANSWER

Certainly, laws alone do not offer a quick route to curb corruption, except perhaps when they confer on courts a jurisdiction they have not had before: to review the legality of administrative decisions taken by officials. Repeatedly, legislatures have passed new anti-corruption laws with great fanfare, and have regarded the job of reform (or at least the appearance of corruption reform) as a job completed. But laws are failing in every country where corruption is systemic, and they fail more from lack of enforcement than from any inadequacies in the laws themselves. There are also ways of achieving reforms, even in public procurement, without changing the law, but using contracts and civil penalties to ensure that standards of conduct improve.

27. CORRUPT JUDICIAL SYSTEMS CANNOT SUPPORT THE RULE OF LAW

There is an inherent contradiction in trying to use a corrupt judicial system to uphold the rule of law. Provisions have to be made for institutional elements of the judiciary, particularly those related to appointment, removal and accountability. An ombudsman

may offer a way of introducing redress that can be quick and effective, and not be subject to the distortions that may hamstring a judiciary, but questions of judicial independence and judicial integrity have to be addressed from the outset.

28. THE LAW SHOULD NOT BE AN OBSTACLE TO CORRUPTION PROSECUTIONS

There still needs to be laws that are workable. The burden of proof that is placed on a prosecutor should not be unnecessarily demanding. Guaranteeing an accused a fair trial does not mean making it impossible for a prosecutor to prove his or her guilt. Laws of evidence need to be kept up-to-date and consideration given to including in them specific offenses which an anti-corruption initiative would target. This technique enjoyed a particular success in Hong Kong.

29. TIME LIMITS FOR PROSECUTIONS NEED TO BE REALISTIC

Considerable time can be required to detect cases of “grand corruption,” and even additional time to prepare a case thoroughly to prosecute those responsible. For these reasons, time limitations for prosecutions or cases need to be realistic. In some countries, it is virtually impossible to prosecute a case to its conclusion. Prosecutions and/or appeals to “run out of time” merely serve to bring the law into disrepute and increase levels of public frustration.

30. A LAW ON ILLICIT ENRICHMENT BY CIVIL SERVANTS CAN SPEARHEAD AN ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN

One particular law, which has proven to be effective in some countries, is that of “illicit enrichment.” This law refers to a civil servant’s acquisition of inexplicable wealth. Such a law, coupled with a functioning legal and judicial system, spearheaded the Hong Kong anti-corruption reforms. However, some legislatures have refused to enact such laws, ostensibly on the grounds that they may infringe human rights. In reality, however, refusals to enact such a law seem to stem from a desire to preserve the status quo.

31. MONITORING THE ASSETS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS REMAINS AN AS YET UNTESTED TOOL

There is widespread belief that this is potentially an effective tool for containing corruption, but the case to date has only been made on paper. Parliamentarians are remarkably shy when it comes to enacting laws to provide for the monitoring of the assets and incomes of senior officials. When laws are enacted, declarations are seldom required to be made public. They are, still less, routinely investigated for their accuracy. Initiatives in this area are being followed closely.

32. OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES SHOULD NOT SHIELD THE CORRUPT FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR CRIMES

In many countries, senior public figures’ immunities and privileges effectively shield them from the rule of law. Indeed, in some countries, criminals opt for elected office simply to gain immunity. These privileges and immunities need to be reassessed and their scope minimized to practical requirements. They are not granted to honor an individual, but to enable an individual to discharge his or her duties effectively.

33. THE INTERNET CAN BUILD AN OPEN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNED

The Internet can help build more open systems of governance. Legislatures can establish websites that allow citizens to interact with their elected representatives and keep them informed about parliamentary business. Government departments can post their documentation online. Reformers can advertise their national anti-corruption plans to the world at large, and monitor the progress being made very publicly. The Internet can be used for online public tendering, thereby reducing opportunities for making potentially corrupt personal contacts. Of course, the usefulness of the web in this respect is limited by the number of people who may have access to it. Much of the Internet’s potential is presently denied to many in the world’s poorest countries, but growing numbers there do have access to the web, and

any gains made by rendering their institutions and individuals more accountable should help to promote the interests of all.

34. PROCUREMENT IS A BATTLEGROUND

The field of public procurement has been a battleground for corruption fighters. It is in public procurement that most of the “grand corruption” occurs with much of the damage visibly inflicted upon the development process in poorer countries and countries in transition. Although initially there were skeptics who fought against the idea of “integrity pacts”, successes are increasingly being recognized. “Integrity pacts” are a process in which voluntary agreements are made, involving bidders and the government, to restrict opportunities for corruption in a particular project. The use being made of the Internet for public procurement by the city of Seoul and in Mexico is likewise promising.

35. THE COMMISSIONS THAT BIDDERS PAY TO AGENTS SHOULD BE DECLARED

Some thought that legislation requiring disclosures of commissions would undermine international competitive bidding and that some corporations would not wish to abide by such a rule. However, when such a requirement has been introduced, there has been little evidence of it having such a negative effect. The honest have nothing to hide, and if the corrupt leave a bidding process, all concerned benefit from their absence. The experience in New York City has been an inspiration to corruption fighters.

36. CORRUPT BIDDERS SHOULD BE BLACKLISTED

The blacklisting of firms caught bribing can be a potent weapon. Of course, this requires that the system is fair and any penalties proportionate. But there can be no doubt that the international corporations blacklisted by Singapore in the 1990’s received a considerable shock. Since then, others have thought twice before attempting to bribe Singaporean officials. The World Bank subsequently went down the same blacklisting path. The Bank posts the names of blacklisted firms and individu-

als on its website. At the national level this remedy works best in countries where the rule of law functions properly and adequate appeal mechanisms are in place. However, care has to be taken to guarantee due process so as to ensure that the blacklisting process itself does not become an instrument of extortion and corruption.

37. INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS REQUIRE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS

To the surprise of many Americans, two surveys have revealed that the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, passed as long ago as 1977, is apparently not having the effect that had been supposed. American companies exporting into key emerging markets were shown to be about as corrupt as German exporters, operating without any such deterrent and with the added advantage of tax deductions for the bribes they paid. It would seem that unilateral action by a single government, even of the world’s most powerful country, is insufficient to reverse a global problem. Rather, the problem requires a coordinated international response. Hence, the need for international accords such as the OECD Convention Against the Bribing of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. The intentions of this Convention must be translated into reality, and there are still few signs of individual governments’ readiness to do this. The same surveys showed that awareness of the Convention among international businessmen is extremely low. They can hardly be expected to comply with provisions of which they know nothing.

38. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS REQUIRE MONITORING

It is not enough for a country to sign a convention. The convention must be put into effect. When a convention strikes at a country’s successful export strategies, it is not altogether surprising that some exporting countries may be less than enthusiastic about the goals of the accord. On the other hand, those who support the aims of a convention may regard some competitor countries with suspicion and need reassurance that they are not falling into a trap. Close evaluation and monitoring of implemen-

tation and enforcement, both by the governments involved and by civil society and the private sector, become essential. Monitoring of a particularly constructive kind is provided in the European Conventions through the GRECO mechanisms, but is, unfortunately, absent elsewhere. Although styled as “monitoring,” the GRECO process is, in reality, an exercise in technical cooperation delivered in a highly effective and user-friendly fashion.

39. SURVEYS CAN MEASURE AND IDENTIFY SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

Reform programs should be monitored for desired results. Monitoring requires effective measurement and is best done through surveys – and with the data made public. Surveys can measure the impact of corruption on business, public perceptions, and, by targeting selected service providers, measure the levels of corruption in the services being provided. These surveys can be international, national or local, but their practical utility increases the closer they get to the grass roots. By comparing the results from agencies in differing parts of the country, the least efficient, and perhaps most corrupt, agencies can be identified and steps taken to redress their performance. International surveys help raise the issue on the national agenda and keep it at the forefront of public debate. However, international surveys are comparative and fraught with statistical difficulties, and so are of limited usefulness. One of their most valuable aspects has been to raise the issue of corruption on the national political agenda, and to highlight the need for national surveys, which are now being undertaken with an increasing thoroughness.

40. INSTITUTIONS THAT CAN ASSIST WITH PREVENTION NEED STRENGTHENING

There is a role for schools of public administration in the training and retraining of public servants. These schools need increased capacity, particularly in the field of ethics training and in corruption risk management. Business schools, too, are in need of compulsory courses on corruption risk management, and should cease treating business ethics as an unimportant option for a MBA degree.

41. THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS AN UNRELIABLE PARTNER

Although some private sector partners have made positive contributions to fighting corruption and have embraced corporate social responsibility, the private sector, by and large, has a long way to go before it embraces anti-corruption risk strategies as Being in its own self-interest. Notwithstanding the current publicity given to corrupt activities, major corporations continue to flout both the law and public opinion, and are all too frequently supported by their host governments in this conduct. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has been extremely energetic in promoting its anti-bribery policies, but as a voluntary organization, it lacks the ability to monitor the activities of its members.

42. EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES CAN BE RENDERED VOID IN THE EVENT OF CORRUPTION.

A number of governments have removed the cover afforded by export credit guarantees granted to underwrite contracts when these are found to have been tainted by corruption. Nevertheless, some governments continue to turn a blind eye to corruption when contracts are large and judged to be in the national interest.



The task of achieving sustainable anti-corruption reforms will be a long and arduous one. That the stakes are high is beyond dispute. Yet the amount of time required to realize this goal is uncertain.

It could be that people in the most corrupt countries lose heart, lose faith in democratic practices and turn to authoritarianism as an apparently logical reaction to democracy’s failure. There is, of course, no reason to suppose that a further round of autocracy would be any less disastrous than it has been in the past.

The international community, too, may start to dilute their commitment to the cause. Other issues may attract their attention and may seem to offer more immediate responses to their interventions.

But one thing is clear. If governments, civil society, the private sector and international organizations do not grasp the opportunities they now have to confront corruption effectively, then the chances will pass. Corruption will steadily and inexorably undermine the new democracies and reduce the standing of the established democracies. It will also continue to impact negatively on human rights, the environ-

ment and all aspects of globalization. The stakes could not be higher than they are today.

ENDNOTES

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