Security Sector Governance and Reform

Guidelines for OSCE Staff

Security Sector Governance and Reform

Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R

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Acronyms

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	M&E	monitoring and evaluation
CBM	confidence-building measure	MoI	ministry of interior
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear	MoIA	ministry of internal affairs
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre (of the OSCE Secretariat)	MoU	memorandum of understanding
		MoV	means of verification
CSBM	confidence- and security-building measure	NAP	national action plan
		NGO	non-governmental organization
CSCE	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe	NHRI	national human rights institution
CSI	Community Security Initiative (of the OSCE)	OCEEA	Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (of the OSCE Secretariat)
CSO	civil society organization	ODIHR	OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
DCAF	Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance	OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
DCAF/ISSAT	International Security Sector Advisory Team of DCAF	OIO	Office of Internal Oversight (of the OSCE Secretariat)
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
DNH	do-no-harm principle	PBPB	performance-based programme budgeting
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	PMD	politico-military dimension (of the OSCE)
EED	economic and environmental dimension (of the OSCE)	RBM	results-based management
EU	European Union	RFoM	OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
EXB	extra-budgetary	SALW	small arms and light weapons
FBA	Folke Bernadotte Academy	SDG	sustainable development goals
GRECO	The Group of States against Corruption (of Council of Europe)	SMART	specific, measurable, available, realistic, time-specific
HCNM	OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities	SOPs	standard operating procedures
HD	human dimension (of the OSCE)	SR/CTHB	Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (of the OSCE)
HR	human resources		
IRMA	Integrated Resource Management System (of the OSCE)	SSG	security sector governance
LGBTQI	lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex	SSG/R	security sector governance and reform

SSR	security sector reform
THB	trafficking in human beings
TNTD	Transnational Threats Department (of the OSCE Secretariat)
UB	unified budget
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

UNSCR	United Nations Security Council resolution
UNTOC	United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
VERLT	violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism
WFD	Westminster Foundation for Democracy
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

Foreword by the OSCE Secretary General

As the world's largest regional security organization, the OSCE has a long track record of supporting its participating States in strengthening security sector governance and in undertaking reforms in line with OSCE principles and commitments. These, in particular, include the commitments made within the 1994 'Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security'. Numerous other OSCE commitments have been made in the areas of democratic policing, human rights protection, gender mainstreaming, the rule of law, anti-corruption and good governance.

By providing more coherent and co-ordinated assistance on security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) to its participating States, the OSCE can better enable them to implement their OSCE commitments. Thus, by using it as a framework to support participating States, SSG/R forms an integral part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach as it increases synergies across the OSCE's three dimensions of security. Such a framework encourages a move away from ad hoc activities towards more strategic, holistic and long-term programming that supports sustainable security sector governance. It also provides better value for money, as increased cross-dimensional co-operation results in a more strategic, efficient and coherent use of resources.

An accountable security sector that is subject to democratic civilian control, respects the rule of law, upholds human rights and is gender-responsive ensures trust among the entire population. Therefore, at the heart of SSG/R is the people-centred approach, which aims to address the security needs of all people, including women, men, boys and girls. Good security sector governance therefore plays an important role in achieving the goals of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda. SSG/R has also been increasingly recognized, both within the OSCE and by its partners, as making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and sustainable peace. In these ways, a comprehensive SSG/R framework also supports the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions) and SDG 5 (gender equality).

Several key principles underpin the OSCE's approach to SSG/R. First and foremost is the principle of national ownership: SSG/R support is provided by the OSCE solely at the request of interested participating States and is aligned with their national priorities. Second, to effectively support national SSG/R processes, OSCE support is holistic and inclusive, promoting the mean-

ingful participation of all segments of society, including civil society. Finally, as SSG/R processes are long-term and complex endeavours, specific emphasis is placed on co-ordination and co-operation on the local, national, regional and international levels, building on the OSCE's added value and comparative advantage.

In today's increasingly complex security environment, working to achieve sustainable security sector governance is of fundamental importance, both within the OSCE area and beyond. For this reason, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre has been promoting a more coherent and co-ordinated approach that supports nationally led SSG/R processes since 2014. To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of OSCE support in this area, a first edition of the *Guidelines on SSG/R for OSCE Staff* was published in 2016 in order to guide OSCE staff in providing practical assistance to security sector institutions in their programmatic work.

Now, five years later, we have updated and expanded the Guidelines. Like the previous iteration, these Guidelines were developed with the invaluable input of the SSG/R focal points in all OSCE Executive Structures and the Parliamentary Assembly. The updated Guidelines also incorporate the profound expertise of our long-standing partners, the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA). I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who supported this important process. I trust that this second edition will prove instrumental to OSCE staff in their daily work.

Helga Maria Schmid
OSCE Secretary General

Introduction

About the Guidelines

Security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) is increasingly recognized by the OSCE and its participating States for its essential role in conflict prevention, early warning, crisis management, as well as post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding. When preparing to chair the OSCE in 2014, Switzerland commissioned a study by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) titled *The Role of the OSCE in Security Sector Governance and Reform* (CIO. GAL/18/14). One of the recommendations from this study was to develop guidance for OSCE staff to facilitate more effective and coherent support in the area of SSG/R. In response to this recommendation and at the request of the consecutive Swiss and Serbian OSCE Chairs, the OSCE proposed to develop internal guidelines for specific topics with an operational focus, which entailed neither new commitments nor revisions to existing ones.

These *Guidelines on SSG/R for OSCE Staff* provide OSCE Executive Structures and their staff with the tools to pursue a coherent and co-ordinated approach to supporting nationally led SSG/R processes. Their aim is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization's ongoing SSG/R efforts.

The first edition of the Guidelines was published in April 2016. It was developed with the support of DCAF as well as SSG/R focal points in all OSCE Executive Structures. The first edition consisted of four chapters but foresaw regular updates to integrate the lessons identified from ongoing work as well as to respond to emerging needs and new developments in the field. For this purpose, regular reviews of the Guidelines' continuing relevance and practical application were conducted in 2017, 2018 and 2020, by the OSCE Secretariat and DCAF, and in close co-operation with OSCE SSG/R focal points. Based on these reviews as well as discussions during the annual meeting of OSCE SSG/R focal points in September 2020, it was decided to develop this second edition of the Guidelines. Building on first edition, these updated Guidelines retain the elements that were most important and worked well, while incorporating improvements and updates from the most recent developments in the field of SSG/R.

The process to update the Guidelines was launched in January 2021. Four working groups were established, consisting of SSG/R focal points from various OSCE Executive Structures, and nine online workshops were organized between January and July 2021. Two rounds of drafting and review were conducted for each chapter. An outline of the new edition was then presented at the annual meeting of OSCE SSG/R focal points in Vienna on 7 and 8 October 2021, and later to the OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R on 16 November 2021. The Guidelines were formally launched at side event of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Stockholm on 3 December 2021.

This second edition consists of the following six chapters:

1. Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context
2. Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R
3. Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R
4. Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R
5. Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R
6. Supporting Governance-Driven Approaches to Building Integrity in the Security Sector

Various visual elements are presented throughout the Guidelines to help orient the reader:

Case study: practical examples of programmatic activities in the field of SSG/R implemented by various OSCE Executive Structures.

Info box: additional information that complements the content discussed in the main body of the text.

Additional resources: references to practical tools and further reading relevant to the topic discussed.

Checklist: a summary of key action points and considerations from the chapter (except chapter 1).

Acknowledgements

Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context

Executive Summary

This chapter presents the working definition of security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) in the OSCE context, clarifies its key components and outlines the guiding principles of the OSCE's approach to SSG/R assistance. It then discusses the relevance and benefits of a more coherent and co-ordinated OSCE approach. Particular attention is paid to the role of SSG/R within the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security and in all phases of the conflict cycle, demonstrating the cross-dimensional nature of SSG/R and its role in conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding. Finally, the SSG/R work of other key multilateral actors is briefly discussed, where relevant to the OSCE.

Key points from the chapter:

- **SSG/R is a political and technical process through which a country seeks to enhance the good governance of its security sector:** While there is no exhaustive and universally accepted definition of the security sector, it is generally understood to encompass all state and non-state security actors, as well as all the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for their management and oversight. Good security sector governance (SSG) means that the security sector is subject to the same standards of good governance as any other public sector. Commonly accepted principles of good SSG include respect for human rights and the rule of law, as well as accountability, effectiveness, efficiency, gender equality, participation, inclusivity and responsiveness. Activities that aim to improve and strengthen SSG are referred to as security sector reform (SSR).

- **The OSCE's SSG/R assistance is guided by several key principles:** The OSCE assists participating States in strengthening the governance of their security sectors in line with OSCE commitments. The Organization's SSG/R work is underpinned by several key principles, in that it:

  - Is nationally owned;
  - Fosters good and democratic security sector governance;
  - Promotes gender equality;
  - Is comprehensive and inclusive;
  - Is responsive to the security needs of the entire population;
  - Is co-ordinated and co-operative.

- **Applying an SSG/R approach to the OSCE's work with security sector institutions benefits both participating States and Executive Structures:** A more strategic approach to SSG/R strengthens cross-dimensional co-ordination and co-operation in the OSCE's work with security sector institutions. To that end, SSG/R provides a conceptual framework for operationalizing and fulfilling many OSCE commitments in all three dimensions of security, and

provides a framework for results-oriented, sustainable and efficient OSCE programming. By increasing responsiveness and efficiency of the security sector, SSG/R also helps to more effectively counter contemporary security threats. Furthermore, the security sector plays an important role in all phases of the conflict cycle, including conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding. In that connection, good SSG enhances public trust in security sector institutions, thus strengthening stability and reducing structural risks for instability and conflict. A well-governed security sector will also be more effective in managing and resolving crises and emergencies, should they arise. Thus, good governance of the security sector is important for sustainable peace and security and contributes to achieving the UN's sustainable development goals.

- **Other multilateral actors work on SSG/R:** A number of international and regional organizations play an active role in SSG/R by establishing policies, norms and standards, and implementing projects and programmes. Such organizations include, for instance, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

1. Rationale

1.1 A Comprehensive Approach to Security

Changes in the international security environment since the end of the Cold War and in the nature of conflicts, from predominantly inter-state to intra-state or hybrid conflicts, have created a paradigm shift in the understanding of security. The conventional state-centred model that primarily emphasized military aspects of security has been gradually complemented by a new concept that also recognizes non-military aspects of security and applies a people-centred approach, in that it centres on the security needs of all individuals and communities. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act can be seen as a precursor of this shift, as it pioneered a broader understanding of security at both the state and individual level. This broad understanding later evolved into the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security with its three dimensions: the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimension.

Security began to be seen as a matter of concern for all institutions – from legislative bodies and justice systems to all citizens, both as individuals and as members of civil society. It also began to be seen as a public good, which should be provided according to the same standards and principles as any other public service. The term "security sector" was coined and with it the concept of "security sector governance" and "security sector reform."

1.2 Relevant OSCE Commitments

The OSCE has a long track record in supporting participating States in strengthening the governance of their security sectors and undertaking reforms in line with OSCE commitments. Many of the principles underpinning the concept of SSG/R are reflected in the OSCE's normative framework, such as in the 1994 'Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security'. The Code of Conduct sets clear standards for effective democratic and civilian control of the military, paramilitary, police, intelligence and other internal security forces in national and international law, in ensuring respect for human rights, and in preventing excessive use of force. The commitments made within it therefore provide an important basis and entry points for the OSCE to assist participating States in ensuring good SSG.

Moreover, SSG/R principles can be found in many other existing OSCE commitments, such as those on democratic policing, human rights protection, gender mainstreaming, the rule of law, anti-corruption, good governance and many others. Consequently, SSG/R can be considered an integral part of the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security and can be understood as an approach for practical application of many of the existing OSCE commitments in the work with security sector institutions.

Info Box 1

Key Aspects of SSG/R in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

Chapter VII:

20. The participating States consider the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security.

21. Each participating State will at all times provide for and maintain effective guidance to and control of its military, paramilitary and security forces by constitutionally established authorities vested with democratic legitimacy.

22. Each participating State will provide for its legislative approval of defence expenditures. Each participating State will, with due regard to national security requirements, exercise restraint in its military expenditures and provide for transparency and public access to information related to the armed forces.

25. The participating States will not tolerate or support forces that are not accountable to or controlled by their constitutionally established authorities.

Chapter VIII:

35. Each participating State will ensure that its defence policy and doctrine are consistent with international law related to the use of armed forces, including in armed conflict, and the relevant commitments of this Code.

36. Each participating State will ensure that any decision to assign its armed forces to internal security missions is arrived at in conformity with constitutional procedures. Such decisions will prescribe the armed forces' missions, ensuring that they will be performed under the effective control of constitutionally established authorities and subject to the rule of law. If recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal security missions, each participating State will ensure that its use must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property.

Figure 1: OSCE documents of relevance to SSG/R (non-exhaustive)

Copenhagen Document on **the Human Dimension** — **1990**

1991 — Moscow Document on **the Human Dimension**

Code of Conduct on **Politico-Military Aspects of Security** — **1994**

OSCE Strategy to **Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century** — **2001** — Decision on **Police-Related Activities**

2002 — OSCE Charter on **Preventing and Combating Terrorism**

Decision on **Combating Trafficking in Human Beings** — **2003**

2004 — Decision on OSCE Action Plan for **the Promotion of Gender Equality**

2005 — Decision on **Combating the Threat of Illicit Drugs**

Brussels Declaration on **Criminal Justice Systems** — **2006** — Decision on **Enhancing Legal Co-operation in Criminal Matters to Counter Terrorism**

OSCE **Border Security and Management Concept**

Decision on **Enhancing Criminal Justice Responses to Trafficking in Human Beings** through a Comprehensive Approach — **2008** — Decision on **Upholding Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Criminal Justice Systems**

2011 — Vienna Document on **Confidence- and Security-Building Measures**

Document on **Small Arms and Light Weapons** — **2012** — Decision on **Elements of the Conflict Cycle,** Related to Enhancing the OSCE's Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation

Decision on OSCE **Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities** — **2014**

Declaration on **Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism** — Decision on the **Prevention of Corruption**

2016

Decision on **Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity**

Decision on **Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency** — **2020**

1.3 Building on Efforts towards a More Coherent and Co-ordinated Approach to SSG/R

There is no formal OSCE definition for SSG/R. In addition, there are different views among participating States as to what the OSCE's SSG/R assistance should entail. Nonetheless, SSG/R as a concept has been increasingly gaining recognition in recent years. Discussions about an "OSCE Concept on Security Sector Governance" go back at least to 2005 and were later taken up by the 2006 Belgian Chair. In 2007, the Spanish Chair issued a perception paper on SSG/R, "emphasizing that security sector reform/governance may play an essential role in a long-term process of peace-building, early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and thus represents an important confidence- and security-building measure."[1] Following a comprehensive mapping study conducted by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) at the request of the Swiss Chair, a number of important steps were taken to promote and apply a more coherent and co-ordinated approach to SSG/R since 2014.

The first major milestone was the establishment by Slovakia, Switzerland and Serbia of the Group of Friends of SSG/R in June 2014, consisting of delegations of OSCE participating States in Vienna. Later that year, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) launched a dedicated extra-budgetary project to support, raise awareness and build capacity on SSG/R within the OSCE. That same year, the CPC established a network of SSG/R focal points in all OSCE Executive Structures. Another milestone was the publication of the 'Guidelines on SSG/R for OSCE Staff' in 2016. In 2018, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Berlin adopted the resolution on *'Strengthening the OSCE's Approach to Supporting Security Sector Governance and Reform in Participating and Partner States'.* Further progress was made in the course of 2019 when the Slovak Chair put SSG/R high on the Organization's political agenda. The then Secretary General, Thomas Greminger, published the first ever report on the OSCE's approach to SSG/R and, in a joint statement at the 2019 Ministerial Council meeting in Bratislava, 44 participating States acknowledged SSG/R's relevance in the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security.[2] A similar statement at the 2021 Ministerial Council meeting in Stockholm was supported by 46 participating States.

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1   For discussions back in 2005 and 2006, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The OSCE Norms and Activities Related to the Security Sector Reform: An Incomplete Puzzle," *Security and Human Rights*, 4, 2008, pp. 280–282.

2   The Group of Friends of SSG/R issued joined statements also at Ministerial Councils in 2014 (MC.DEL/72/14), 2015 (MC.DEL/55/15), 2016 (MC.DEL/52/16), 2017 (MC.DEL/54/17) and 2018 (MC.DEL/65/18).

- ‣ Spanish OSCE Chair (2007), *Chairmanship's Perception Paper on OSCE Basic Norms and Principles in the Field of Security Sector Governance/Reform*
- ‣ DCAF (2013), *Executive Summary: Mapping study on the Role of the OSCE in Security Sector Governance and Reform*
- ‣ OSCE (2016), *Guidelines on SSG/R for OSCE Staff (First Edition)*
- ‣ OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (2018), *Resolution on 'Strengthening the OSCE's Approach to Supporting Security Sector Governance and Reform in Participating and Partner States'*
- ‣ OSCE Secretariat (2019), *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE*
- ‣ OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R (2019), *Statement on the OSCE's role in supporting security sector governance and reform as part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security*
- ‣ OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R (2021), *Joint statement on the OSCE's role in supporting security sector governance and reform as part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security*

2. **A Working Definition of SSG/R in the OSCE Context**

The 2019 Secretary General's report underlines that, while there is no formal definition of SSG/R in the OSCE, a working definition has developed over time:

Good security sector governance means that the security sector is subject to the same standards of good governance as any other public sector.

Good governance standards and principles mean that the security sector is to provide security to the State and its people in an **accountable and effective way, within a framework of democratic civilian control, rule of law, respect for human rights**, and the **promotion of gender equality**.

Activities aimed at improving security sector governance are defined as **security sector reform** even if they are not always explicitly referred to as such.

Accordingly, **security sector governance and reform** is a political and technical process through which a country seeks to enhance the good governance of its security sector.[3]

To better understand this working definition, it is necessary to explore its individual components. These include the security sector, security sector governance and security sector reform. All of these components are underpinned by a people-centred approach to security, complementing the traditional state-centred approach.

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3   See OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019), SEC.GAL/42/19, p. 5.

2.1 **The Security Sector**

Providing security for men, women, boys and girls is one of the key functions of every state. While there is no exhaustive and universally accepted definition of the security sector, generally it is understood to encompass state- and non-state security actors, as well as all the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for provision, management and oversight of security.[4] It is important to recognize that components of the security sector are always country-specific and will differ depending on the national context. Examples of some of the main security sector actors are included in the figure 2.

2.2 **Security Sector Governance**

Security sector governance relates to the principles of good governance and how they apply to security provision – i.e., the use of force, management and oversight – with the aim of meeting the security needs of all people in a society and making the most efficient and sustainable use of existing resources. Commonly accepted principles of good governance encompass the following:[5]

- **Accountability and transparency:** Accountability is the responsibility of duty bearers (the State and its security sector institutions, who hold the monopoly on legitimate use of force) towards rights holders (individuals and communities) in meeting their security needs and the existence of fully functioning oversight mechanisms to provide adequate checks and balances. Accountability in the security sector is pursued through internal and external mechanisms of control and oversight to ensure compliance with standards of conduct, integrity and legal obligations for the discharge of security functions. Internal formal control mechanisms can consist of disciplinary and other sanction procedures connected to the adherence of personnel to codes of conduct and other rules and procedures related to the provision of

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4   OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (Paris, 2007). Including non-state actors, in particular non-statutory armed forces (e.g., guerilla forces, militia), as security actors is a controversial issue due to the concern that recognizing their impact may indirectly contribute to their political legitimacy. This text only highlights that these actors can affect public safety and national security. Therefore, when mapping the security sector of a specific country, non-state (armed) actors need to be taken into consideration. This does not mean that they should be considered stakeholders or counterparts in any OSCE activities. Engaging other types of non-state actors, such as private security and military companies, may be highly relevant for SSG/R-related activities, as their regulation is an important element of good security sector governance. For the sake of consistency throughout these Guidelines, "security sector institutions" will be used when speaking about state security sector actors (e.g., police, armed forces, etc.) and "security sector actors" for both state and non-state actors.

5   What follows should not be considered formal definitions of the principles. In fact, many of the concepts included in this overview do not have officially agreed definitions. The purpose is to explain their meaning in the context of SSG/R and provide examples of how they translate into practice.

Figure 2: Security sector actors

MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT

NON-STATE ACTORS

STATE ACTORS

SECURITY

Civil society
(e.g., national and international NGOs monitoring corruption, ill-treatment and human rights violations by security actors)
Media
(e.g., investigative journalism on security-related issues)
Academia and think tanks
(e.g., research on military spending)
The public
(e.g., individuals involved in security-related advocacy and policy debates)
Customary and traditional authorities
(e.g., village councils)

Executive bodies
(e.g., national security council)
Government ministries
(e.g., ministries for defence, the interior, justice and finance)
Parliament and its specialized committees
Prosecution services
Judiciary
Special statutory institutions
(e.g., ombuds institutions, human rights bodies, anti-corruption bodies or independent complaint authorities)

Private military and security companies
Community security initiatives
Neighbourhood volunteer patrols
Self-defence groups
Customary security providers
Non-statutory armed forces
(i.e., unofficial armed groups, such as guerrilla forces/militia)

Armed forces
National guard
Police services
Gendarmeries
Border guards
Coast guards
Customs authorities
Prisons and penitentiary services
Executive protection forces
(e.g., presidential guard)
Intelligence services
Emergency services
Other internal security forces

security services. External oversight typically focuses on compliance with standards of the rule of law and human rights and is exercised through formal democratic civilian control (e.g., by parliaments and national human rights institutions) and informal control and monitoring (e.g., by civil society, media and academia).

Transparency is a key element of accountability. A transparent security sector is one in which the necessary information is freely available and accessible to those who will be affected by decisions and their implementation. Moreover, the process of planning, programming, budgeting and implementation of security sector institutions is publicly available and adequate. Instances exist in which limitations in transparency are legitimate, and these are principally for the protection of state secrets or individual privacy.

Figure 3: Good security sector governance principles

- **Effectiveness and efficiency:** Security sector institutions fulfil their respective mandates to a high professional standard according to the diverse needs of all segments of society. Institutions work efficiently, making the best possible use of public resources – for example, by ensuring adequate organizational and managerial capacities, professional leadership, integrity of staff, sound financial management and planning, among others.

- **Rule of law**[6]**:** All security sector institutions are accountable and subjected to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated and consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Rule of law also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency. In practice, this means that the use of force and the mandates of different security sector institutions are clearly defined by law and that their activities are compliant with human rights standards. The rule of law is relevant to security sector governance as it provides safeguards against arbitrariness by security sector institutions and, at the same time, safeguards for justice in case of human rights violations by members of the security sector.

- **Human rights:** Respecting and protecting human rights is a core function of security sector institutions, and as such, should inform the approach of relevant actors in providing security to the communities they serve. The right to a fair trial, the absolute prohibition of torture, the right to non-discrimination and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly are, among others, all directly relevant to the work of security sector institutions. Security sector institutions that respect and protect human rights enjoy public confidence, making their work more effective and conducive to stability in a given society. The respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is an integral element of the Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE's regional security framework. As stated in the Charter of Paris, protection and promotion of human rights is the first responsibility of government; respect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State.[7]

- **Gender equality:** Gender plays an important role in societal inequality, as it puts women, men, boys and girls in different positions of power, risk, security and insecurity. For example, women, men, boys and girls have different needs and experiences when accessing security and justice services. Therefore, security sector institutions need to integrate a gender perspective throughout their work to effectively respond to different needs and avoid perpetuating discrimination. Achieving gender equality involves a positive obligation to transform unequal power relations; to address the underlying causes and structures of gender inequality, including discriminatory norms, prejudices and stereotypes; and to transform institutions that perpetuate discrimination and inequality. Security sector institutions must uphold gender equality within their own structures through inclusive policies and practices that promote the recruitment, retention and promotion of women and under-represented groups. Likewise, they must create conducive environments that are free of harassment and abuse and that address gender stereotypes that hamper effective security delivery.

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6   There is also a broader understanding of the rule of law as an entire system of governance rather than only as one of the principles of good governance or a statutory body of laws.

7   OSCE, *Charter of Paris for a New Europe* (Paris, 1990).

- **Participation and inclusivity:** All persons of all backgrounds have the opportunity to participate in decision-making and security provision on a free, equitable and inclusive basis, either directly or through legitimate representative institutions. Security sector institutions should also be representative of the communities they serve and ensure equal participation and representation – at all levels, including in senior management positions – of women and other underrepresented groups (e.g., ethnic and other minorities).

- **Responsiveness:** Institutions are sensitive to the different security needs of all parts of the population and perform their missions in the spirit of public service, without discrimination. They recognize that the security needs of men, women, boys, and girls vary and actively apply gender and youth perspectives in executing their mandates.

2.3 **Security Sector Reform**

Activities to improve and strengthen SSG are referred to as **security sector reform (SSR)**. SSR can be understood as a continuous political and technical process through which a country seeks to enhance the good governance of its security sector. In short, the goal of SSR is good SSG. However, not all activities aimed at improving SSG are explicitly referred to as SSR, even though they share the same purpose and principles. All countries, including those with well-functioning and well-governed security sector institutions, need to engage in continuous reform processes in order to maintain their resilience to crises, to evaluate service effectiveness and to adjust their capacities to respond to emerging trends and evolving security needs. Furthermore, many broader public administration reforms may also have an impact on SSG, for example, reforms of civil service or human resources policies for state employees or changes in budgeting and procurement.

SSR activities can take place at different (and at times overlapping) levels:

- Strategic (e.g., related to legal, political and policy frameworks)
- Organizational (e.g., related to organizational structures, guidelines, regulations)
- Operational (e.g., related to specific procedures and processes)

SSR activities address a wide range of political and technical aspects of security and focus on processes that affect the following:

- The entire security sector (e.g., gender mainstreaming)
- A particular locality or level of government within the security sector (e.g., municipal security provision)
- One sub-sector of security policy or provision (e.g., police reform)
- The role of a particular institution that is engaged in security provision, management or oversight of the security sector (e.g., ombuds institutions)

Concepts Related to SSG/R

Women, Peace and Security (WPS): The ground-breaking United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) recognized the importance of women's full and equal participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Also recognizing that conflict affects women differently than men, it calls for measures to address the specific needs of women and girls before and after conflict. By the year 2020, the UN Security Council had adopted nine additional resolutions, which together comprise the WPS agenda.[8] Five of these WPS resolutions explicitly refer to SSR, linking it with preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence. As a priority for SSR in addressing sexual violence, they identify the need for more women to be included in the security sector and for current and potential members of the security sector to be vetted to exclude perpetrators of sexual violence. More holistically, the WPS resolutions recognize that SSR should help ensure women's protection from violence during and after conflict, women's equal and effective participation in SSR processes and women's access to justice. Similarly, when the UN Security Council adopted resolutions 2151 and 2553 on SSR in 2014 and 2020 respectively, it emphasized the importance of women's equal and effective participation in SSR processes, of including more women in the security sector and of vetting processes to exclude perpetrators of sexual violence.[9] The WPS agenda also calls for a gender perspective to be mainstreamed in all international peace and security missions.

Transitional justice: Transitional justice consists of the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, to serve justice and to achieve reconciliation. Transitional justice may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none at all), as well as individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof.[10]

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): DDR is a process through which members of armed forces and groups are supported in laying down their weapons and returning to civilian life. Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of the small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of combatants. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other groups. Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and

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8   DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN Women, "Security Sector Governance, Security Sector Reform and Gender," in *Gender and Security Toolkit* (Geneva, 2019), p. 2.

9   DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN Women, *Policy Brief: A Security Sector Governance Approach to Women, Peace and Security* (Geneva, 2019).

10 United Nations SSR Task Force, *UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform* (New York, 2012), p. xi.

gain sustainable employment and income.[11] While different in their objectives, DDR and SSG/R intersect in many areas. Certain security actors will be subjected to DDR processes, while others can be deeply involved in DDR implementation and oversight.

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): OSCE participating States recognize that the accumulation and uncontrolled spread of SALW have contributed to the intensity and duration of most recent armed conflicts. An ineffective, corrupt and overly centralized security sector can create a demand for SALW among individuals and groups, due to increased feelings of insecurity. When the security sector is not capable of providing protection, individuals and groups seek alternative ways to ensure security, including by acquiring SALW.[12] SALW-control measures are consequently linked to SSG/R at the strategic and operational levels. At the strategic level, they can provide a framework for SALW control in political negotiations and agreements, such as national security policies, reforms, strategies, plans and legislation; national dialogues; and national management and oversight capacities. At the operational level, SALW-control measures can help to ensure the practical application of SSG/R principles, for example, through train-and-equip programmes, upgrades of SALW infrastructure, the development and/or improvement of regulations, and the strengthening of intra- and inter-agency co-ordination and co-operation. Furthermore, a well-functioning security sector contributes to restoring and extending the legitimacy of state authority, thereby decreasing incentives for individuals and groups to acquire SALW.

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
11   Inter-Agency Working Group on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, *Briefing Note for Senior Managers on the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards* (2019).

12   United Nations, *Small arms and light weapons in the context of Security Sector Reform* (2020).

3. Guiding Principles of the OSCE's SSG/R Assistance

The OSCE assists participating States in strengthening the governance of their security sectors in line with the Organization's commitments. The provision of such assistance is underpinned by several key principles, as outlined in the statements on the OSCE's role in SSG/R made by participating States at the 2019 and 2021 Ministerial Councils[13] and in the 2019 OSCE Secretary General's report on the OSCE's approach to SSG/R.[14] As such, the OSCE's SSG/R assistance:

- Is **nationally owned:** Support provided by the OSCE should be based on a request for assistance from a participating State and be aligned with its national priorities for reform. The concept of SSG/R acknowledges national ownership as a necessary element for success. Thus, SSG/R processes are fundamentally demand-driven and nationally-led.

- **Fosters good and democratic SSG:** The OSCE's support should foster democratic civilian control, the rule of law and full respect for human rights.

- **Promotes gender equality:** An essential element of SSG/R is the full, equal and active involvement of women in SSG/R, as well as the promotion of women's meaningful participation in the security sector on strategic and operational levels.

- Is **comprehensive and inclusive:** SSG/R support should take a cross-dimensional approach, based on the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security, in order to take account of the holistic nature of national SSG/R processes and to promote the meaningful participation of all segments of society, including civil society.

- Is **responsive to the security needs of the entire population:** SSG/R support should take into consideration needs of all segments of society, including youth, and follow approaches that are gender-responsive and respect human rights. All SSG/R support should be grounded in a thorough understanding of the given context and based on a comprehensive needs assessment.[15]

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13   OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R, *Statement on the OSCE's role in supporting security sector governance and reform as part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security* (Bratislava, 2019), MC.DEL/63/19. OSCE *Group of Friends of SSG/R, Joint statement on the OSCE's role in supporting security sector governance and reform as part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security* (Stockholm, 2021), MC.DEL/44/21.

14   OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019), SEC.GAL/42/19.

15   For more, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R".

- Is **co-ordinated and co-operative:** OSCE activities should be co-ordinated with other relevant actors at the local, national, regional and international levels. Such co-operation should build on the OSCE's added value and comparative advantages.

4. The Relevance and Benefits of a Coherent and Co-ordinated OSCE Approach to SSG/R Assistance

SSG/R is highly relevant for the OSCE's engagement with security sector institutions, as it brings multiple benefits to both participating States and OSCE Executive Structures.

4.1 SSG/R as an Integral Part of the OSCE's Comprehensive Approach to Security

The principles underpinning SSG/R are very much in line with the **OSCE's comprehensive concept of security**, which encompasses the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions. SSG/R promotes the need for a comprehensive approach when working with the security sector that takes into account inter-linkages between various actors and thematic issues.[16] It calls for due consideration of different reform processes that are mutually reinforcing (police reform, justice reform, etc.), instead of dealing with such processes individually. SSG/R also recognizes that successful security sector reform goes beyond the changes made in individual components of the sector, which often only enhance the capacities, effectiveness and professionalism of individual security sector institutions. Activities related to SSG/R therefore usually cut across all OSCE dimensions and involve a holistic understanding of security and the actors involved in security provision, management and oversight. SSG/R can thus be understood as an approach that operationalizes the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security when working with security sector institutions.

A more strategic, coherent and co-ordinated approach to SSG/R can therefore help to strengthen cross-dimensional co-ordination and co-operation. By following such an approach, the OSCE can move beyond fragmentation in its programmatic activities towards more comprehensively integrating commitments and mandates that have previously been addressed in isolation. In this way, more effective support for national reform processes can be facilitated. Given that the security sector is often mainly viewed through a politico-military lens, it is important to underline that many aspects

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16   For concrete examples, see the figure 1 in the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R".

within the human, economic and environmental dimensions are indispensable elements in the over-all approach to SSG/R. By taking such a comprehensive approach to SSG/R, a high level of synergy can be created when working with security institutions.[17]

4.2 SSG/R as a Framework for Results-Oriented, Sustainable and Efficient OSCE Programming

In times of an increasingly complex security environment, which is putting many different demands on states and their security sector institutions, it is crucial to make the most efficient use of all available resources and expertise. Strengthening cross-dimensional co-ordination and co-operation also means making more strategic, efficient and coherent use of resources to obtain better value for money. With regard to SSG/R activities, efficiencies can be achieved by working jointly with relevant actors rather than with individuals. This could mean, for example, implementing joint activities with all actors in the criminal justice sector rather than separate activities with police, prosecutors, judges or prison officials. Furthermore, the OSCE's work on SSG/R is embedded in a long-term process of transformation focused on broader institution building, with the aim of ensuring the good management and financial sustainability of reform efforts. SSG/R as a framework for programming means moving away from ad-hoc projects and moving towards applying a (more) strategic, holistic and long-term approach to change.[18]

4.3 SSG/R as an Important Contribution to National Reform Processes

SSG/R principles are enshrined in multiple OSCE commitments related to the functioning of security sector institutions in areas such as democratic and civilian oversight, democratic policing, human rights protection, gender mainstreaming, the rule of law, anti-corruption, good governance, countering terrorism, border management, SALW reduction and many others. SSG/R thus provides a **conceptual framework for operationalizing and fulfilling many OSCE commitments** in practice.[19]

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17 For more, see the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R".

18 For more, see the chapter "Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R".

19 For example, see the chapter "Supporting Governance-Driven Approaches to Building Integrity Building in the Security Sector".

Furthermore, by placing emphasis on increasing the effectiveness and professionalism of security sector institutions, SSG/R contributes to an accountable, well-governed security sector, which follows a people-centred approach and is able to serve as a provider and guardian of security for all people. This **contributes to enhancing public trust**, as an accountable security sector increases confidence and trust between public and the state, strengthens legitimacy of state institutions and reduces the potential for tension and conflict in a given society.

Good SSG also helps to **more effectively counter existing and evolving security threats**, in particular, transnational threats. Security threats and risks are becoming more complex and inter-connected than ever before and are often exacerbated by economic asymmetries, social divisions, poor governance and weak institutions. Many of today's security threats – such as organized crime, terrorism, cybercrime, trafficking in human beings and illicit goods, as well as the security risks arising from pandemics – require multi-dimensional responses. None of these issues can be effectively addressed by one institution or state alone. They require close co-operation among various actors at the local, national and international levels. As a framework that promotes a comprehensive approach to security, trying to break silos, at the same time fostering regional co-operation, SSG/R can contribute to preventing and countering transnational threats.[20] By applying good governance principles, the resiliency and agility of security sector institutions can be strengthened, thus increasing their ability to adapt to the rapidly evolving security needs of the individuals and communities they serve.

4.4 **SSG/R and the Conflict Cycle**

Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on 'Elements of the Conflict Cycle' recognizes the need for a comprehensive and cross-dimensional response in addressing the multi-faceted causes of crises and conflicts.

Many violent conflicts around the world have links to structural deficiencies in the security sector. Security sector institutions that are poorly managed, corrupt, politicized, ineffective, neither inclusive nor representative of the population they serve, commit human rights violations and are not sufficiently accountable are themselves a root cause of conflict. Moreover, they have the potential to destabilize already fragile situations and can become a driver of conflict instead of contributing to conflict prevention. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with poorly governed security sectors have a 30 to 45 per cent higher risk of violence and civil conflict.[21] On the other hand, a

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20   For more, see the chapters "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R" and "Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R".

21   Dorith Kool and Tim Sweijs, *The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Framework to Assess Security Sectors' Potential Contribution to Stability* (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2020), p. 20.

well-functioning security sector, governed in line with OSCE commitments and principles, increases crisis resilience and contributes to stability. An accountable security sector that responds to the needs of the entire population is therefore vital to effective conflict prevention.

Figure 4: Conflict cycle

Many participating States have acknowledged the importance of effective and accountable security sector institutions and their significant contribution to early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and resolution, post-conflict rehabilitation and sustainable peacebuilding. This has also let the OSCE Secretary General to recommend in his report to "further integrate SSG/R into the OSCE's conflict cycle toolbox in order to strengthen the OSCE's work in SSG/R in the context of global efforts to prevent conflict and sustain peace."[22]

For these reasons, any conflict analysis needs to recognize the role of the security sector, as well as SSG/R in conflict prevention. By the same token, SSG/R assistance should always be conflict sensitive and conscious of the different phases of the conflict cycle and the respective role that SSG/R can play in these phases. This will help to ensure long-term sustainability and effectiveness

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22   OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019), SEC.GAL/42/19, p. 14.

of reform efforts, e.g., by allowing for adequate consideration of conflict dynamics and applying a do-no-harm approach, especially vis-à-vis groups that are in a situation of vulnerability, when engaging with security sector institutions.[23]

A key conceptual foundation of the OSCE's conflict cycle toolbox is a 'tiered approach' to addressing the different phases of the conflict cycle. This approach encompasses primary, secondary and tertiary prevention.[24]

4.4.1   **Primary prevention:** Conflict prevention, early warning and early action

Primary prevention refers to preventing violent conflict by successfully applying early warning and early action instruments and by implementing long-term measures that address root causes of conflict. It aims at sustaining peace through fostering peaceful mechanisms for management and conflict resolution, thereby preventing conflicts from escalating into violence.

As state security sector institutions have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, they are by default one of the key players in both **long-term structural and short-term operational prevention**. Unlike civil society, the contribution of security sector institutions to structural prevention is not always visible. This contribution is related to the way how they provide security (i.e., use of force) and how they are managed and overseen. Good governance of the security sector in line with OSCE commitments and principles helps to avoid the risk of security sector institutions becoming root causes or even drivers for conflicts and instability. Engaging in SSG/R assistance to ensure the full implementation of OSCE commitments and principles is thus vital in terms of structural prevention.

On the other hand, in the case of operational prevention, especially in crisis situations, security sector institutions receive a lot of attention, and depending on how they handle the situation, they can contribute either to de-escalation or to a further escalation. Therefore, it is equally important in the context of operational prevention that security sector institutions act in line with OSCE commitments and principles and contribute to the de-escalation, rather than to the escalation, of a crisis situation. OSCE assistance to SSG/R thus supports both structural and operational prevention.

In addition, SSG/R promotes approaches that foster the participation of women and other marginalized groups (e.g., ethnic minorities) in security sector institutions, which is also key to structural

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23   The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (The Hague, 2006) and *Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities* (The Hague, 2017) offer practical guidance in this regard.

24   Michael Raith, "Addressing the Conflict Cycle – The OSCE's Evolving Toolbox" in *OSCE Insights* (Hamburg: IFSH, 2020).

prevention. Only an inclusive security sector can ensure effective service delivery, ensuring that security needs of the entire population are effectively addressed and avoid grievances that may fuel conflict.

For all of these reasons, SSG/R is relevant for **early warning** and **early action**. Potential deficiencies in a country's security sector and their impact on the country's capacities to address security needs and challenges represent important early warning signals. Only accountable security sector institutions that respect the rule of law and human rights can fully gain the public's trust and be able to respond effectively to the security needs of the entire population, thereby ensuring equal access to security and justice and contributing to structural conflict prevention and peace. On the contrary, unequal or no access to security and justice due to security sector institutions being ineffective, corrupt or without democratic oversight, committing human rights violations, or discriminating against specific groups, instigates collective grievances that may lead to social unrest and violence or fuel already existing conflicts.

In the area of early action, the OSCE has a set of formal instruments to defuse tensions before they escalate into violence.[25] Security sector institutions are among the most relevant interlocutors at this stage, as they will often be the ones operationally contributing to preventing further tensions and violence (or escalating them). Moreover, the OSCE has a long track record in applying military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), as well as non-military confidence-building measures (CBMs). CSBMs include various transparency and verification measures, risk reduction mechanisms or the exchange of military information. SSG/R can provide a number of thematic entry points for development and implementation of such CSBMs and CBMs and vice versa.

4.4.2 **Secondary prevention:** Crisis response and management

When conflicts escalate into violence, secondary prevention aims to contain the violence and return the conflict to a non-violent level, thereby paving the way for non-violent means of conflict resolution. While the performance of security sector institutions at this stage will very much depend on previous SSG/R efforts, it needs to be recognized that SSG/R activities as such may often only play a limited role during crisis response and management, as they usually consist of more long-term processes. However, there are some entry points for SSG/R also in secondary prevention.

When violence escalates, efforts must be taken to cease hostilities. In that regard, dialogue facilitation, mediation and ceasefires provide a critical space for conflict parties to engage in discussion with each other. Such talks can set the tone for further peace negotiations, including on issues relevant for SSG/R that might form an important part of a peace agreement. Working actively

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25 A brief summary of the main mechanisms and procedures available within the OSCE is provided in OSCE, *OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures: Summary/Compendium* (Vienna, 2011).

with security sector actors is also important for agreeing on and ensuring security arrangements necessary for peace processes to take place. Many definitive, conclusive peace agreements include SSG/R elements, such as provisions on defence, police, justice, and intelligence reforms. Specific roadmaps can be developed for SSG/R provisions in peace agreements.[26]

Another entry point for SSG/R in secondary prevention is the need to engage with security actors even before full cessation of military hostilities. Such engagement is often important not only for providing security operationally on the ground but also as a foundation of future reform processes.

The success of conflict resolution processes and related SSG/R processes, such as protection of civilians and upholding humanitarian law, depends on not only the political will of the parties but also how inclusive the process is. In conflict resolution, women are often key actors for change at the grassroots level. However, they have limited access to official peace talks. For peace processes to be sustainable, women need to be meaningfully included in both formal and informal negotiations, including in processes dealing with SSG/R. In post conflict situations, women have specific security needs that must be taken into account at the negotiation table already. This requires women to belong to negotiation and dialogue processes in a meaningful way. Investments should also be made in unofficial dialogue and conflict resolution activities, as well as in grassroots activities, such as partnerships between civil society and the security sector.

4.4.3   Tertiary prevention: Post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding

Tertiary prevention aims to avoid the recurrence of violent conflict. This involves the effective implementation of peace agreements, efforts at reconciliation, and activities that foster peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as help address old or new root causes and drivers of conflict, including CBMs. SSG/R programming can significantly contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation and sustainable peacebuilding, as security sector institutions are once more among the key actors at this stage of the conflict cycle.

In the immediate post-conflict period, international assistance might be primarily focused on military assistance, training and equipment ("hard security") to avoid an immediate relapse into violence. However, to build sustainable peace, such activities need to be coupled with much more comprehensive and long-term efforts that address more subtle and systematic conflict drivers. In this context, SSG/R programmes and projects can play essential roles – for example, by promoting human rights compliance, transitional justice and reconciliation, governance-driven approaches for effective service delivery and DDR processes that are well con-

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26   For example, specific provisions with regard to the formation of the Constitutional Court in the Ohrid Agreement are explicitly conflict sensitive and institutionalize conflict prevention. As part of legislative modernization measures, specific police reform parameters are listed. The section concerning the cessation of military hostility refers to the disbandment of paramilitary armed regiments and adoption of the NATO rules and conditions.

nected to overall reform processes. Illustrative examples of CBMs used in tertiary prevention are trust building efforts with regard to police redeployment in former areas in South Eastern Europe or the Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan.[27]

SSG/R processes in areas that have experienced violent conflict must be comprehensive and take into account the complexity of post-conflict situations, such as the proliferation of SALW and the breakdown of public services, including in the security sector. In such contexts, all parts of the population, in particular the most vulnerable ones and those most heavily affected by the previous period of violence, need to experience that their security needs are effectively addressed. The existence of strong democratic institutions is central in this regard and forms a key component of sustainable peace. SSG/R work on strengthening democratic oversight, accountability, inclusivity and responsiveness of security sector can thus be an essential contribution to such efforts.

It must be kept in mind that changes in security sector management and long-term capacity and institution building require time. Therefore, SSG/R approaches that contribute to post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding need to be implemented with a long-term perspective and in the framework of overarching strategies.

4.5 SSG/R's Contribution to the UN Sustainable Development Goals

SSG/R plays an important role in sustainable peace and security and is essential for **sustainable development**. A key element of sustainable development is stability, which is increased by a well-functioning security sector. In the 2019 Ministerial Council statement on the OSCE's role in SSG/R, 44 participating States recognized that "an inclusive, accountable and democratically controlled security sector with full respect for human rights and the rule of law can promote confidence and trust between society and state and stability in the entire OSCE region". [28]

Thus, good SSG directly supports the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) – in particular, SDG 5 on Gender Equality and SDG 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. The OSCE's co-operation on SSG/R with other multilateral organizations – in particular the UN and the EU – also supports SDG 17 on Partnership for the Goals.

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27   For more details on these examples, please see OSCE, *OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)* (Vienna, 2013).

28   OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R, *Statement on the OSCE's role in supporting security sector governance and reform as part of the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security* (Bratislava, 2019), MC.DEL/63/19.

Info Box 3

UN Sustainable Development Goals Most Relevant to SSG/R

SDG 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.

‣ Target 5.5: Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life.
‣ Target 5c: Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels.

SDG 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

‣ Target 16.3: Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all.
‣ Target 16.4: By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.
‣ Target 16.5: Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms.
‣ Target 16.6: Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels.
‣ Target 16.7: Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.
‣ Target 16a: Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.

5. **SSG/R in the Multilateral Context**

Many international, regional and national organizations play an active role in SSG/R. They provide expertise and advice, raise awareness, and develop national capacities for good SSG, including democratic oversight, human rights and the rule of law. International and regional organizations also play a central role in establishing policies, in setting norms and standards, in ensuring accountability and in promoting the rule of law.[29]

United Nations: At the policy level, the UN Security Council has adopted two landmark resolutions on SSR (in 2008 and 2013), and the UN Secretary-General has published two reports on the subject in 2008 and 2013 respectively. At the operational level, the UN has dedicated sector-wide SSR structures in many of its field offices. The SSR Unit, located in the Office of Rule of Law & Security Institutions in the Department of Peace Operations, serves as the focal point and technical resource capacity on SSR for the UN system, as well as national and international partners. It also serves as the Secretariat for the UN SSR Inter-Agency Task Force, a co-ordination mechanism for the delivery of coherent SSR support, which currently consists of 14 UN entities.[30] A first volume of the UN integrated technical-guidance notes on SSR was published in 2012, another one in 2016, with a third volume forthcoming.

While a number of UN entities work on SSG/R-related issues, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has been particularly active in this field. It has developed a variety of publications and tools on SSG/R-related topics, such as crime prevention, criminal justice, police reform and prison reform. It works with security sector actors across the globe and is a strategic partner of the OSCE, with which it has been collaborating on the basis of joint action plans since 2011.

The World Bank emphasizes the key role that SSG can play in understanding and preventing violent conflict. In a 2018 report, published jointly with the UN, the World Bank acknowledges that SSR can play a key role in building the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of a society. In its *Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025* the World Bank includes engagement with the security sector as one of its six priority areas for preventing and mitigating fragility, conflict and violence challenges.

Another key multilateral actor is the European Union (EU). Since the early 2000s, EU institutions have been gradually increasing their support to SSR-related activities through both financial and non-financial instruments. These primarily include development programmes, peace

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29   All publications mentioned in the following paragraphs are summarized in Info Box 4.

30   For more, see United Nations Group of Friend of Security Sector Reform, *Report of the High-Level Panel and Discussion on the United Nations and Security Sector Reform: Between Policy and Practice* (2020).

and stability instruments,[31] and the activities of CSDP missions deployed in non-EU countries. An EU-wide strategic framework on SSR was developed in 2016. This led to increased support of SSR by all the EU actors and to the establishment of the EU SSG facility that serves as a technical standing capacity to better support the SSG/R initiatives of partner countries.

Other regional organizations that have adopted policy documents in the area of SSG/R include the **African Union**, ECOWAS, and the **OECD**, which in 2007 was among first to develop comprehensive guidance outlining the key concepts, norms and principles of SSG/R.

There are also several nationally-based organizations focusing on SSG/R that operate globally, such as the **Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)** and the Swedish **Folke Bernadotte Academy**. Both are the OSCE's strategic partners that have contributed to developing both these internal set of Guidelines and various OSCE capacity-building activities on SSG/R.

Info Box 4

Key Multilateral Documents in the Field of SSG/R

- Council of the EU: Concept for ESDP support to SSR (2005)
- EU Commission: Concept for European Community Support for SSR (2006)
- UN Security Council Presidential Statement (2007)
- OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (2007)
- First UN Secretary-General Report (2008)
- UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on SSR (2012)
- African Union Policy Framework on SSR (2013)
- Second United Nations Secretary-General Report (2013)
- UN Security Council Resolution 2151 (2014)
- EU-wide strategic framework to support SSR (2016)
- UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Transnational Organized Crime and SSR (2016)
- ECOWAS Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform and Governance (2018)
- UN and World Bank Report "Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict" (2018)
- UN Security Council Resolution 2553 (2020)
- World Bank Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict, and Violence 2020–2025 (2020)

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31   E.g., the EU Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, or The African Peace Facility.

6. **Resources**

‣ African Union, *Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform* (Addis Ababa, 2013).
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‣ Commission of the European Communities, *A Concept for European Community Support for SSR* (Brussels, 2006),
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Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R

Executive Summary

SSG/R support should always take a cross-dimensional approach, based on the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security, in order to take account of the holistic nature of national SSG/R processes. This chapter is intended to provide OSCE staff with advice on how to support cross-dimensional approaches to security sector governance and reform (SSG/R). The purpose of such approaches is to promote a shift from fragmented support that may have limited effects on establishing cross-dimensional synergies, both on the strategic and operational levels. The chapter encompasses guidance on the intrinsic value of a cross-dimensional approach (section 1), potential synergies for SSG/R support in the three OSCE dimensions (section 2) and on the practical implementation of a cross-dimensional approach (section 3). Finally, a practical checklist is provided to help staff in the process (section 4).

Key points from the chapter:

- **Comprehensive, cross-dimensional approaches are necessary to address the holistic nature of SSG/R:** One of the key aspects of SSG/R is its holistic nature, which recognizes the inter-linkages between the various components and actors of the security sector. Reforms in one part of the security sector may not be successful if they do not take into account effects on or the need for reforms in other parts of the security sector. Implementing such reforms and working towards SSG therefore requires effective co-ordination among security sector actors. To build on the holistic understanding of SSG/R processes, the OSCE must take full advantage of its cross-dimensional approach to security, including by strengthening internal co-ordination.

- **Identifying common SSG/R objectives and addressing them in a cross-dimensional manner:** There is a risk that "adding up" whatever SSG/R-related assistance is conducted within each of the three dimensions may be considered to amount to a cross-dimensional approach. In contrast, an integrated approach is required to enhance the impact of OSCE SSG/R support. Through such an integrated approach, OSCE actors in all three dimensions contribute to a common objective. A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support does not deliberately create additional tasks for their own sake but rather ensures synergies in the support provided by various OSCE actors, especially if these are located in different dimensions. It is about recognizing that support in one area of the security sector may affect another and, thus, that support is most effective when provided in a complementary manner that takes advantage of synergies across the dimensions.

- **Support cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R through planning and implementation:** To ensure an effective cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R, common long-term programmatic objectives must first be identified, as well as the areas of potential synergies favourable to these objectives. Such synergies can be identified through needs assessments, and thematic entry points could be linking police and justice reforms, fostering democratic oversight, strengthening integrity, mainstreaming and promoting gender equality and human rights and engaging with civil society. Where activities cut across the three OSCE dimensions of security, roles and responsibilities must be clearly defined to ensure a clear understanding of the organizational lead. The agreed set-up will also need to be reflected in any project proposal. Incentive mechanisms could be put into place to encourage cross-dimensional co-operation already at the project development phase. Existing co-ordination mechanisms can be used to this end or new ones developed to support internal co-ordination to make sure implementation is on track and actors from different units/departments/Executive Structures can inform each about progress and contribute respectively in line with what was agreed.

1. Rationale

A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R is important to implement the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security, in line with OSCE commitments, and to provide effective assistance to advance good SSG.

1.1 The Spirit of Helsinki: Addressing Security Comprehensively and Cross-Dimensionally

The OSCE's work as a regional organization is founded on a broad understanding of security. Already in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, participating States acknowledged the importance of addressing security holistically, through three indivisible dimensions: the politico-military (first) dimension, the economic and environmental (second) dimension, and the human (third) dimension. Security was no longer seen narrowly as the result of preventing conflicts between states or through the use of advanced intelligence and defence systems, but rather as a matter of concern of all institutions – from legislative bodies to the justice systems – and of all citizens, individually and as members of civil society.[1] In this respect, the OSCE's approach to security is in itself cross-dimensional.

In the OSCE context, the working definition of SSG/R defines it as a political and technical process through which a country seeks to enhance the good governance of its security sector.[2] To effectively support participating States in ensuring good governance of the security sector, Executive Structures and its departments and units in three dimensions need to contribute and have the expertise to do so.

The need for a cross-dimensional approach is acknowledged in numerous OSCE commitments, which are of direct relevance to SSG/R and highlight its importance. For example, the 2012 OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism states that the Organization "promotes a comprehensive approach to security, linking the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions, thereby providing a framework for coherent and sustained actions in preventing and combating terrorism."[3]

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1   Helsinki Final Act set out three baskets of security that have since become known as dimensions. CSCE, *Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (Helsinki, 1975).

2   For additional information, see the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context."

3   OSCE, *OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism* (Vienna, 2012), PC.DEC/1063, p. 3.

Several Ministerial Council decisions recognize that gender equality, human rights protection and non-discrimination all require mainstreaming across all three dimensions, which naturally involves judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement actors within the security sector.[4]

A cross-dimensional approach therefore integrates the work of the various actors and components of the security sector across all three dimensions, thereby implementing the OSCE comprehensive concept of security.

1.2 Providing Effective Programmatic Support to Advance Good Governance in the Security Sector

For the OSCE to implement a cross-dimensional approach in the field of SSG/R and to effectively support national reform processes in a comprehensive manner, joint efforts by actors in all three dimensions are needed and should be pro-actively sought in all related activities, irrespective of whether the activities "institutionally" fall under one dimension or another.

In some areas, such as in work to counter terrorism or organized crime, this is already the case. However, there is a risk that the cross-dimensional approach may be understood in terms of actors from each dimension providing support in their own area of SSG/R without seeking to understand or contribute collectively to a common objective or to build on related synergies. It is thus necessary to move beyond a "one-dimensional" approach to ensure that appropriate links between the dimensions are identified and supported. In a country-specific context, a cross-dimensional approach requires that common goals be set, to which actors in all dimensions contribute in order to maximize the overall impact. Support from senior management to establish strategic frameworks will be necessary to implement such an approach, starting from the programmatic planning stage.[5]

Ultimately, the purpose of supporting cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R is to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and impact of OSCE support. Furthermore, cross-dimensional approaches provide legitimacy to the OSCE when raising awareness among national actors about the need to adopt a comprehensive national approach to SSG/R.

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4   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women* (Ljubljana, 2005), MC.DEC/15/05; OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-conflict Rehabilitation* (Ljubljana, 2005), MC.DEC/14/05.

5   See the chapter "Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R" and section 4 below.

While many OSCE commitments call for a cross-dimensional approach, cross-dimensionality may not always be achieved in practice. Many SSG/R activities might be treated under the first dimension, thereby neglecting pertinent contributions from the human dimension. However, activities in all three OSCE dimensions can contribute to enhancing SSG/R. For example, activities to increase compliance with human rights by the police or armed forces would normally be led by the third dimension, possibly in co-operation with the first dimension. A first dimension activity, such as providing crowd-control equipment (e.g., riot gear) to the police, needs to be complemented by human rights training and protocols, led by third dimension experts.[6] Activities that support the good governance and integrity of security sector institutions are usually led by actors in the second dimension.

Additionally, some activities are not always institutionally led by one dimension but cut across several dimensions, known as cross-cutting activities. This is the case, for instance, with OSCE activities to combat human trafficking, to counter terrorism or to promote gender equality and human rights in the security sector, all of which require expertise from all three dimensions. While some of these cross-cutting issues, like gender or human rights, are addressed in first dimension activities, they are at times simply tacked on at the end of a process, rather than being mainstreamed throughout it, starting from the planning stage. Likewise, opportunities to strengthen good governance of the security sector have sometimes also been missed because the issue is seen as only relevant to the second dimension.[7]

The following table illustrates how SSG/R activities fit into the OSCE's cross-dimensional framework.[8]

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6   For additional information, see, for example, OSCE/ODIHR, *Guide on Law Enforcement Equipment Most Commonly Used for Policing Assemblies* (Warsaw, 2021).

7   For specific guidance on how to address this challenge, see sections 2 and 3 below.

8   This figure illustrates where different elements of SSG/R may fit into the three dimensions. It is not intended to be exhaustive. Activities that have linkages to SSG/R but are not considered SSG/R activities are not included. For instance, while it is recognized that support to democratic elections is a key pillar of long-term security and stability and may, in some contexts, provide an entry point for SSG/R efforts, it is not an SSG/R activity.

Figure 1: SSG/R-related activities in the three OSCE Dimensions

POLITICO-MILITARY DIMENSION (PMD)	ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL DIMENSION (EED)	HUMAN DIMENSION (HD)

Cross-cutting issues: gender, youth, human rights, combatting trafficking in human beings

PMD
- Tactical training for the police
- Strengthening capacities to reduce the accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons

EED
- Strengthening internal oversight in the public sector
- Promoting anti-corruption in the public sector
- Support to anti-money laundering state capacities

HD
- Strengthening national capacities of state institutions to comply with human rights, abide by the rule of law and promote human rights awareness
- Strengthening the participation of women in public-sector decision making
- Trial monitoring and compliance with fair trial standards

PMD & EED & HD:
- Supporting revisions to the human resource management system of border management agencies, the police, etc., with focus on promoting gender equality and an adequate internal disciplinary system
- Developing a comprehensive new police training curriculum
- Supporting customs services in conducting human-rights compliant customs checks
- Building youth networks to engage in community security initiatives

PMD & EED:
- Enhancing internal oversight capacities of the police
- Strengthening parliamentary financial oversight of the security sector
- Building the integrity of the armed forces, the police, etc.
- Building the capacity of security sector institutions to deal with disasters, such as natural hazards and pandemics
- Strengthening the capacities of security sector institutions to counter money laundering

EED & HD:
- Building a civil society coalition on anti-corruption, including in the security sector
- Trial monitoring of corruption cases
- Confiscation and asset recovery following corruption verdicts

PMD & HD:
- Strengthening human-rights and rule-of-law based approaches by the police or armed forces or in penitentiary institutions
- Building the capacities of the criminal justice system to address gender-based violence
- Strengthening the role of women in security sector institutions
- Supporting human rights and gender-sensitive monitoring in places of deprivation of liberty in criminal justice facilities
- Supporting national human rights institutions, parliaments and civil society in overseeing human rights-compliant security sector institutions

2. **Identifying Cross-Dimensional Synergies**

Promoting effective SSG/R requires contributions from programming in all three dimensions towards a security sector that upholds human rights and the rule of law, ensures gender equality, and adheres to the principles of accountability and transparency, effectiveness and efficiency, participation and inclusivity, and responsiveness.

One of the first steps is to identify the potential synergies to be promoted. While the following list is not exhaustive, it does provide some entry points that can be used in OSCE programmatic support to promote the implementation of good SSG principles.[9] To do so in practice, complementary support will be required in all three dimensions. Some principles, for example, gender and human rights, will always need to be taken into consideration when leveraging synergies.[10]

A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support is not intended to create additional tasks for their own sake, nor does it imply that every project must include activities in all dimensions. Its purpose is to identify and leverage synergies in programmatic activities, which can contribute to achieving higher-level OSCE strategic objectives in a given context.

2.1 **Linking Police and Judicial Reform**

The importance of supporting linkages between police and judicial reform is recognized in a number of OSCE documents, notably the 2012 OSCE Strategic Framework on Police-Related Activities.[11] The success of police reform is highly dependent on parallel progress of the judicial system. Supporting such linkages in a comprehensive manner requires a cross-dimensional approach. For instance, capacity-building for the police in forensics should be accompanied by an assessment of whether the courts have the capacity and the legal foundations to admit forensic evidence in proceedings. Enhancing the capacity of the police to make arrests also requires consideration as to whether there are a sufficient number of adequately trained defence lawyers. Furthermore, to ensure effective processing of criminal cases, it is important to support co-ordination between the police and judicial actors. Failure to recognize synergies between police and judicial reform can lead to dysfunctional responses to dealing with crime, resulting in frustration among the population and a lack of trust in these institutions.

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9   For additional information, see section 2.2 in the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context."

10   See also section 2.7 below.

11   OSCE, *OSCE Strategic Framework on Police-Related Activities* (Vienna, 2012), PC.DEC/1049.

Entry points to strengthen cross-dimensional co-operation across the security and justice sector could include:

- Improving co-ordination between the police, prosecutors and judges – for example, to support the development of multi-agency risk assessments and risk management plans;
- Strengthening co-operation between the police and prosecution services in contexts where prosecutor-led investigation systems exist;
- Enhancing mechanisms for storing and exchanging information, where relevant, including the development of memoranda of understanding related to information management.

For detailed guidance on supporting linkages between police and judicial reform, see:

‣ OSCE (2013), *Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform*

Capacity-Building for Police and Prosecutors on Joint Crime Scene Investigation in Serbia

In 2011, the new Criminal Procedure Code introduced the concept of prosecution-led investigation in Serbia, granting prosecutors the power to conduct investigations and to take the primary evidentiary initiative. This development brought significant changes in the roles of various criminal procedure actors, such as public prosecutors, judges, defence lawyers and the police. It also required a new role for the court in establishing facts, as well as the abolishment of the inquisitorial system. The new code called for improvements in strengthening the capacity of the prosecutors' office, especially during investigations, and by ensuring effective co-operation between prosecutors and the police.

In co-operation with the Ministry of Interior's National Forensic Centre and the Judicial Academy, the OSCE Mission to Serbia developed and implemented a training programme to enhance the skills of prosecutors and forensic technicians in collecting evidence at the crime scene. The programme teaches the proper and lawful collection and handling of evidence in order to reduce the dismissal of cases owing to contaminated or compromised evidence.

The training programme also facilitated an exchange of best practices, methodologies and techniques among prosecutors and the police on lines of communication, chains of command, forensic techniques, investigation tactics and expert witness reports. To support the programme, the Mission published the Manual on Crime Scene Inspection, which is divided into five thematic sections dedicated to different legal and practical aspects of conducting the crime scene inspection as rather complex evidentiary action. The Manual was authored by prosecutors, experts from the Institute of Forensic Medicine, and expert witnesses, who are also police officers, from the National Forensic Centre under the Ministry of Interior. In addition, the experts from the National Forensic Centre created a compilation of worksheets for forensic officers, published with the Mission's support. The Mission in co-operation with the National Forensic Centre and the Judicial Academy also developed advanced interactive training modules for forensic technicians and prosecutors, focusing on the practical application of criminalistic techniques through simulation of crime scene inspection. Since 2019, the skills of more than 300 officials, including forensic technicians and prosecutors in charge of investigations, have been developed through the training programme.

Lessons learned:
- ‣ Conducting trainings for only one professional group makes it difficult to address important aspects of jointly working with other relevant actors as part of the criminal justice chain.
- ‣ Joint training and exchanges on practical problems can make a valuable contribution to strengthening co-operation between the police and prosecutors, as well as to the legality of their work.
- ‣ Highly interactive training sessions based on the simulation of crime scene inspection conducted jointly by prosecutors and forensic technicians proved to be highly effective and praised by the trainees as excellent learning methodology, which addresses challenges that actually may occur in practice.

2.2 **Fostering Democratic Oversight**

Like any other public sector, the security sector must be subject to democratic oversight. This principle is a cornerstone of effective SSG and has been affirmed by the OSCE in various documents, notably the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.[12] Democratic oversight may be carried out by parliaments, the judiciary or independent bodies, such as national human rights institutions. Effective support to oversight, as a means of contributing to good SSG, requires expertise from different dimensions. Within the OSCE, various kinds of assistance are provided to foster oversight of the security sector. Some OSCE Executive Structures have a successful track record in specific areas, such as support to the establishment of a legal basis for increased oversight or to the establishment of parliamentary committees on security and defence. In other areas, such as intelligence oversight, support has been limited due to political sensitivities. Common challenges to the OSCE's support include perceptions that democratic oversight of the security sector is too sensitive in a given context, or a lack of clear institutional lead within the OSCE dimensions and hence a lack of adequate planning to establish the specific roles and responsibilities of OSCE actors.

Entry points to cross-dimensionally strengthen democratic oversight of the security sector could include:

- Due consideration by the OSCE of the need to combine support to external oversight with efforts that strengthen the internal oversight mechanisms of security sector institutions, because external oversight depends on effective internal control mechanisms;
- Raising the awareness of national actors – for example, through (regional) workshops about the importance of independent oversight, based on the commitments enshrined in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;[13]
- Promoting a legal framework for independent oversight bodies that provides an adequate mandate for them to perform their duties, accompanied by capacity-building to this end;
- Raising the awareness of civil society and the media on the role of independent oversight bodies and on how to access them.

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12   The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has also recognized the importance of democratic oversight of the security sector. See OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, "Resolution on the Democratic Control of the Private and Public Security Sectors" in *Baku Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the 23rd Annual Session* (Baku, 2014), pp.58–62.

13   For additional information, see the chapter "Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R."

Raising Awareness on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Uzbekistan

In 2020, the CPC, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and ODIHR offered an introductory seminar on SSG and parliamentary oversight of the security sector for newly elected members from both chambers of the of the Uzbek Parliament. During the seminar, relevant OSCE Executive Structures presented their work on the subject, including on human rights oversight and the importance of gender equality. Practical examples of parliamentary oversight, including on inquiry commissions, were provided by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. In response to Uzbekistan's request for further assistance, a technical seminar on parliamentary financial oversight of the security sector was provided in 2021. The seminar series will be expanded and continued in 2022.

Lessons learned:
- The contribution of different Executive Structures helped to provide a comprehensive "whole-of-OSCE" approach and allowed to cover the same subject from different angles, making it more interesting for participants.
- Engaging a trainer with in-depth knowledge of the local context allowed for Uzbekistan's priorities to be addressed. So too did dedicated interactive exercises and group discussions that were tailored to the local context.

For more guidance on support initiatives in this area, see:
- UN SSR Taskforce (2012), *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (section 7.3 on strengthening independent oversight institutions and mechanisms)

For more detail on parliamentary oversight, see:
- DCAF (2003), *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector*

For more information on ombuds institutions for the armed forces, see:
- DCAF (2012), *Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces: A Handbook*

For more information on how to integrate gender as a cross-cutting topic in independent oversight, see:
- OSCE/ODIHR, DCAF (2014), *Integrating Gender into Internal Police Oversight*
- OSCE/ODIHR, DCAF (2014), *Integrating a Gender Perspective into Internal Oversight within Armed Forces*
- OSCE/ODIHR, DCAF (2014), *Integrating Gender into Oversight of the Security Sector by Ombuds Institutions & National Human Rights Institutions*
- DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women (2019), *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender*

2.3 **Strengthening Integrity and Anti-Corruption**

Like in any other public sector, accountability, transparency and effectiveness are essential principles of good SSG. Therefore, SSG/R support also should include efforts to build integrity and counter corruption. The OSCE recognizes that a public sector "based on integrity, openness, transparency, accountability and rule of law" is "a major factor of sustainable economic growth [...] and contributes to fostering citizens' trust in public institutions and government."[14] Moreover, a number of OSCE commitments call for the effective management of public resources through strong and well-functioning institutions and recognize the role of the security sector in fighting corruption.

Good SSG requires that national executive structures possess well established, sound and functional internal control mechanisms and management practices, including human, financial and information resource management, as well as procurement regulations. Within the OSCE, programmes in the second dimension often lead efforts to strengthen financial resource management. However, this support often focusses broadly on strengthening budgetary management, with no specific focus on the security sector. As improving internal accountability and management mechanisms is essential to increase the effectiveness of the security sector, joint and complementary contributions from OSCE Executive Structures in the different dimensions could be of benefit to this end.[15]

Entry points to cross-dimensionally build integrity and counter corruption could include:

- Supporting the adoption and enforcement of laws, policies, strategies, action plans and other measures to counter corruption and to safeguard the judiciary's independence in this regard;
- Supporting measures to enhance the management of the security sector, including by promoting the review or development of institutional rules and procedures for human resource management (e.g., recruitment, promotion, retention and disciplinary procedures) to bring them in line with international standards and good practices;
- Supporting the establishment of internal control mechanisms, including the development of and adherence to codes of conduct that define ethical standards for public officials;
- Identifying existing incentives for malpractice and supporting their elimination – for example, numbers of closed cases may not be the best indicator of police performance, as pressure on police officers to solve cases may result in misconduct, such as the use of ill-treatment or torture to extract confessions;

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14   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism* (Dublin, 2012), MC.DOC/2/12, p. 2.

15   For additional information, see the chapter "Supporting Governance-Driven Approaches to Building Integrity in the Security Sector."

- Sharing experiences and best practices of good governance on a regional level in order to find ways of discussing an area of reform that might in some contexts be considered sensitive.[16]

Case Study 3

Joint Planning and Implementation of Integrity-Building Activities in Turkmenistan

In July 2018, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat hosted a national seminar on professional integrity and ethical standards in law enforcement for 25 state officials. The participants included representatives of the ministries for national security, the interior, justice and defence, the Supreme Court, the State Service to Combat Economic Crimes, and other law enforcement bodies of Turkmenistan. The two-day seminar focused on international standards and initiatives to combat and prevent corruption, codes of conduct, gender mainstreaming for law enforcement structures, identification of fraud and corruption in law enforcement, and conflicts of interest in government structures. The seminar was delivered by OSCE anti-corruption and gender experts from the OCEEA and the Gender Section. Additionally, an expert from OSCE Mission to Serbia presented Serbia's experience in applying both preventive and repressive measures in fighting corruption. All experts contributed to developing the seminar and meaningfully elaborated important topics.

Lessons learned:
‣ Collaboration across OSCE Executive Structures, especially with other field operations, allowed identifying suitable experts, who presented the topic of integrity from various angles, and for exchange of good practices in SSG/R.

For more detailed guidance, see:
‣ UN SSR Taskforce (2012), *Security Sector Reform Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (section 7.5 on strengthening the management system and internal oversight)

On the issues of police corruption, police ethics, police accountability and control, see:
‣ OSCE (2008), *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (2nd edition)
‣ OSCE (2012), *Best Practices in Combating Corruption* (2nd edition)

On supporting States in their response to the threat of terrorism, see:
‣ OSCE (2012), *OSCE Handbook on Data Collection in Support of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing National Risk Assessments*

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16   For additional information, see the chapter "Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R."

2.4 **Engaging with Civil Society**

The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security acknowledges the role of civil society in democratic oversight of the security sector.[17] In addition, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has recognized civil society's role in "providing assistance to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law."[18] The Ministerial Council Decision 3/11 on the Elements of the Conflict Cycle equally recognizes the role of civil society in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building.[19] Civil society can have multiple important roles in SSG/R, specifically in relation to accountability, transparency, human rights, participation, inclusivity and responsiveness, which are important to consider in all OSCE dimensions.

For example, in relation to a people-centred approach to security, civil society organizations (CSOs) will usually possess important knowledge on the security needs of women, men, boys and girls or knowledge on specific local or regional issues that affect the security sector. Women's CSOs are particularly well placed to share insights on the specific security needs of women and girls. As civil society can play an important role in communicating the security needs of the population to policymakers, they should be included in dialogue on reform priorities.

Civil society can also be a key source of information when conducting needs assessments and, thus, can contribute to OSCE programming. They should therefore be consulted in such processes. Civil society can also play an informal oversight role by holding authorities accountable for their actions through lobbying and advocacy campaigns. Academia and think tanks also have a role to play by providing research and analysis that can contribute to advocacy campaigns related to respective reform processes. The media, as a part of civil society, can ensure public access to information and provide a platform to voice concerns. Protecting media freedom is vital in democratic societies, and thus, it has become an integral part of the OSCE's work – in particular, through the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

Co-operation between national authorities, the police and civil society is essential on issues such as monitoring hate crimes, countering human trafficking, preventing and combating transnational threats (such as terrorism), monitoring peaceful assemblies, and building mutual

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17   OSCE, *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* (Budapest, 1994), DOC.FSC/1/95, p. 3.

18   OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, "Resolution on Strengthening Civil Society Institutions in the OSCE Region" in *Istanbul Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the 22nd Annual Session* (Istanbul, 2013), pp. 60–61.

19   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE's Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post Conflict Rehabilitation* (Vilnius, 2011), MC.DEC/3/11.

understanding and trust between the police, minorities and marginalized communities.[20] For example, when civil society is not duly involved in state efforts to combat human trafficking, fewer victims are identified and assisted, which impairs the ability of criminal justice actors to acquire information or evidence, to prosecute criminal networks, to trace and freeze assets and to compensate victims. Without a comprehensive approach that includes civil society, it is therefore not possible to succeed in addressing essential aspects of SSG/R.

Entry points to cross-dimensionally strengthen participation, inclusivity, accountability and transparency in SSG/R by involving civil society could include:

- Engaging with civil society to obtain information on the perceptions of beneficiaries to ensure that the SSG/R support provided by the OSCE is grounded in the real needs of the population. Information can be obtained during needs assessments but also on a more regular basis – for example, during programmatic planning cycles.
- Building the capacity of CSOs, including those that represent marginalized groups and minorities, through training or mentoring.
- Engaging with think tanks and research associations to compile analyses that can be used for law and policy development.
- Engaging security sector officials and civil society actors, including the media, in joint discussions – for example, on SSG/R-related laws and policies.
- Consulting CSOs that represent women, minorities and youth to ensure they are informed and their views are included, prior to the adoption of policies and laws related to SSG/R.
- Building the capacities of media to report on the security sector, for example, through workshops or trainings on investigative journalism related to corruption. Or raising awareness on freedom of information laws and bringing together journalists and press officers from security institutions in joint events to learn about each other's roles, build up trust and thereby set the ground for a productive co-operation.
- Engaging with non-governmental organizations dealing with human rights to obtain a complementary and, thus more comprehensive, overview of the work of security sector institutions in the area of SSG/R, including compliance with human rights standards.
- Engaging with youth networks – for example, on the local level – to make sure young voices contribute to community security initiatives, as well as on the national level, to take into consideration youth perspectives for law and policy development.

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20   For example, in April 2014, the ODIHR organized the expert meeting 'Police and Roma and Sinti – Current Challenges and Good Practices in Building Trust and Understanding.' The event brought together police officials and Roma and Sinti civil society activists to discuss co-operation on civil society monitoring of the work of law enforcement institutions. For additional information, see OSCE/ODIHR, *Summary Report of the Expert Meeting: Police and Roma and Sinti - Current Challenges and Good Practices in Building Trust and Understanding* (Warsaw, 2014).

Case Study 4

Supporting Civil Society Engagement in SSG/R in Serbia

The OSCE Mission to Serbia took an innovative approach to supporting civil society engagement in SSG/R. Since 2010, it has been publishing annual calls for proposals from CSOs for small-scale projects in this area. Seventy projects have been implemented to date on topics such as gender and security; emergency management; data protection; safety and security of groups in a situation of vulnerability, including persons with disabilities; shaping a sustainable security culture for youth; and combatting violence against women. Through research, analysis, social mobilization and advocacy, the CSOs supported by the Mission were able to raise awareness about previously overlooked security issues.

Through targeted mentoring and only little funding by the Mission, the projects made a difference at the local level. For example, a project in the locality of Tutin led to the adoption of a municipal protocol on multi-sector co-operation to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence. A CSO from Pozarevac helped to establish a sustainable social protection service for youth in conflict with the law and to shape a security culture for youth at the local level. This project was replicated in Novi Pazar, by creating networks of professionals from the centres for social welfare in Pozarevac and Novi Pazar.

The National Organization of Persons with Disabilities of Serbia implemented a project to raise awareness about the specific needs of persons with disabilities during emergencies and to create improvements in this area. The project included the production of a short video for the general population, a panel discussion aimed at identifying improvements and the publication of a guide on emergency preparedness and response, in both Braille and audio formats.

The Mission also supported the development of a national CSO network on UNSCR 1325, which provides opportunities for CSOs to help implement and monitor the implementation of the WPS. The network includes some 20 CSOs, many of which the Mission supported in conducting advocacy and research. In 2021, one member of the network analysed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women, peace and security at the local level, providing recommendations on how to better incorporate women's perspectives in local emergency management policies.

Lessons learned:
- Supporting CSOs to be active participants in SSG/R produced multiple outcomes, including increased co-operation between CSOs and local authorities, which in turn resulted in a number of tangible results.
- The grant projects were well distributed across Serbia, which was also valuable in terms of visibility of the OSCE Mission to Serbia, as well as in strengthening the credibility of its work outside of Belgrade.
- The grant projects also created positive effects on increasing operational and financial capacities, as well as networking abilities of CSOs that are active in the security sector. This support is among a few interventions (if not the only one) that focuses on financial support for CSOs in the security sector, which is very important in terms of sustainability of civil society's participation in SSG/R.

For information on integrating civil society, see:

‣ OSCE (2008), *Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships*

For guidance on media and SSG/R, including guidance for journalists on reporting on the security sector, see:

‣ DCAF (2021), *Toolkit for Security Sector Reporting – Media, Journalism and Security Sector Reform*

For guidance developed specifically for CSOs on the role they can play in democratic security sector oversight, see:

‣ DCAF, UNDP (2008), *Public Oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations*

2.5 Mainstreaming and Promoting Gender Equality

Gender equality, women's rights and women's empowerment are essential elements of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. OSCE standards on gender equality are included in the 1990 Copenhagen Document[21] and the 1991 Moscow Document,[22] both of which commit participating States to promoting equality between women and men. For example, the Moscow Document recognizes that "full and true equality between men and women is a fundamental aspect of a just and democratic society based on the rule of law." In the field of SSG/R, OSCE commitments set out the need to "create equal opportunities within the security services, including the armed forces, where relevant, to allow for balanced recruitment, retention and promotion of men and women."[23] The need to promote the engagement of women in judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement institutions is also recognized,[24] as is the need to promote women in parliamentary oversight of the security sector.[25] The OSCE has also called for efforts to support the police in dealing with sexual

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21   CSCE/OSCE, *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Copenhagen, 1990).

22   CSCE/OSCE, *Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Moscow, 1991).

23   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Women's Participation in Political and Public Life* (Athens, 2009), MC.DEC/7/09.

24   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women* (Ljubljana, 2005), MC.DEC/15/05.

25   For example, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, "Resolution on the Democratic Control of the Private and Public Security Sectors" in *Baku Declaration and Resolutions Adopted by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly at the 23rd Annual Session* (Baku, 2014), pp.58–62.

and gender-based violance[26] , and recognized the important role of women in conflict prevention and peace-building.[27]

To meet these commitments, especially a better understanding is required of gender dynamics in issues addressed by security sector institutions, such as preventing and countering terrorism, or about how exclusion of women in security sector institutions hampers their effective functioning. Integrating gender perspective in every stage of programmatic work and respective project design – including development, implementation and monitoring – could help to increase the understanding of prevailing gender dynamics.

Entry points to cross-dimensionally strengthen gender equality in SSG/R could include:

- Conducting gender-sensitive needs assessments to get a better understanding of the needs and priorities of different groups of women, men, girls and boys;
- Identifying obstacles that hinder women, including women in minority groups, from working in the security sector and providing legal and policy advice to relevant national institutions on how to overcome these obstacles;
- Supporting oversight mechanisms, such as internal control units or advisers on independent oversight and gender, to help address gender-based discrimination and inequality and to foster accountability by security sector institutions related to gender equality;
- Supporting participating States in developing and/or implementing national action plans on UNSCR 1325;
- Raising awareness and building the capacities of security sector personnel to address sexual and gender-based violence, including in security provision and within the security sector, as well as to protect and support victims;
- Empowering women's associations and forums in the security and judicial/prosecutorial sector by supporting their establishment, functionality and work;
- Ensuring that legislation and procedures related to search, arrest, detention, investigations and court proceedings are gender-sensitive, thereby helping to prevent sexual and gender-based violence in the criminal justice system;
- Supporting the police and other actors in the criminal justice system in collecting sex-disaggregated data on criminal cases;
- Providing grants to CSOs working on gender issues in the security sector – for example, to conduct research on women's participation in the security sector or to provide training in dealing with victims of sexual or gender-based violence;

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26   OSCE, *2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality* (Sofia, 2004), MC.DEC/14/04.

27   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-conflict Rehabilitation* (Ljubljana, 2005), MC.DEC/14/05; OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision on Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE's Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post Conflict Rehabilitation* (Vilnius, 2011), MC.DEC/3/11.

- Facilitating regional exchanges of lessons and best practices in relation to promoting gender equality and prevention of sexual or gender-based violence.

> **For detailed guidance on gender and SSG/R, see:**
> ‣ DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN WOMEN (2019), *Gender & Security Toolkit*
>
> **For detailed guidance on the OSCE's promotion of gender equality, see:**
> ‣ OSCE (2004), *Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality*

2.6 Mainstreaming and Promoting Human Rights

The promotion of human rights is a fundamental OSCE principle. The Copenhagen Document of 1990 recognizes that "all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law."[28] In the context of the security sector, this principle requires both that the security sector respects, protects and fulfils human rights[29] and that the human rights of security sector personnel are respected.[30]

Cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R require that the promotion of respect and the protection and fulfilment of human rights be mainstreamed into OSCE activities with the security sector. Doing so may involve preventive measures, such as support on legislation, preventive visits to places of deprivation of liberty or capacity-building for security sector institutions or oversight bodies. Mainstreaming human rights may also include reactive measures, such as advocacy for the investigation of torture allegations.

Entry points to cross-dimensionally strengthen human rights in SSG/R could include:

- Promoting a human rights-compliant and gender-sensitive legal framework. Such work could include providing the modalities for responding to complaints on alleged human rights violations (including discrimination, harassment and sexual harassment) or to abuse of power by police officers, not only against members of the public but also within the police. It could also include support to legal provisions that provide for a victim-centred approach in all stages of police intervention, investigation, prosecution and judicial proceedings.
- Engaging national human rights institutions and civil society in dialogue on reforms.
- Enhancing the capacities of duty-bearers (i.e., the security sector) to fulfil their obligations and of rights-holders (i.e., the general population, including those belonging to marginalized groups) to ensure their rights are upheld.

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28   CSCE/OSCE, *Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE* (Copenhagen, 1990).

29   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Declaration on Criminal Justice Systems* (Brussels, 2006), MC.DOC/4/06.

30   OSCE, *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* (Budapest, 1994), DOC.FSC/1/95, pp. 4–5.

Case Study 5

Promoting Gender Equality in the Ukrainian Armed Forces

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine is implementing a project with the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine on strengthening democratic control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which became a useful entry point to promote gender equality in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Within the project in 2020, the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine conducted a training of trainers on equal rights and opportunities for women and men in the armed forces, during which 28 representatives (15 men and 13 women) were trained from of the Ministry of Defence, the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the National Defence University and civil society. As a result, 92 per cent of participants increased their knowledge of gender equality in the armed forces. As a follow up, a team of 10 trained trainers (4 men and 6 women) supported by 3 national experts (2 men and 1 woman) conducted eight regional workshops on equal rights and opportunities for women and men in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Consequently, 154 military officers (78 men and 76 women) in the regions increased their awareness of gender equality in the armed forces by 80 per cent. The training was complemented by the development of two guidebooks, one of which was on gender integration in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as by an updated training course for the National Defence University.

Resistance to work on the subject was overcome by demonstrating that gender equality includes the rights of and opportunities for both women and men in the armed forces and that eliminating gender discrimination in the armed forces benefits both male and female military servicepersons. Using an interactive methodology, including role-plays, group exercises and group presentations, further increased the openness and acceptance of workshop participants. Another good practice was having not only women military officers but also male military officers delivering presentations and interactive sessions on gender topics in the capacity of trainers. It goes without saying that conducting the workshops successfully in this manner required careful preparation and implementation, as well as close guidance and monitoring.

Lessons learned:
‣ When promoting gender equality, the benefits for both women and men should be demonstrated.
‣ An interactive methodology helps participants to change their mind-sets and overcome their resistance through their active involvement in the training.
‣ Topics that face resistance should ideally be addressed through in-person events, rather than online.
‣ Both women and men should be included as participants and speakers, ideally in a gender-balanced manner.
‣ Conducting the workshops with trained trainers from different institutions in the defence sector, such as the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the National Defence University of Ukraine, contributed to constructive discussion on the topic and to overcoming resistance among workshop participants by enriching the atmosphere with different experiences in and approaches to gender equality.

- Training security sector institutions on human rights, including on the practical relevance for their every-day jobs, as well as how to respond to human rights violations. Topics could include international standards and good practices in policing assemblies or human-rights-based law enforcement practices in countering trafficking in human beings.
- Providing training on enhancing trust and understanding between police and communities in a situation of vulnerability, such as Roma and Sinti.
- Facilitating co-operation between security sector officials and CSOs (e.g., human rights defenders) to monitor the human rights compliance of security sector policies and practices or to conduct joint work on SSG/R and oversight or non-discrimination by the holding of joint meetings, establishment of spaces for dialogue, and so on.
- Supporting the monitoring of places of deprivation of liberty and reports on the findings of conducted monitoring visits.

Case Study 6

Simulation Exercise as a Tool to Teach Human-Rights-Based Approaches to Combating Trafficking in Human Beings

In 2016, the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings launched the project "Combating Human Trafficking along Migration Routes," followed by the project "Combating Human Trafficking along Mediterranean Migration Routes." Both projects sought to promote multi-agency collaboration and the implementation of victim-centred and human rights-based approaches during the investigation and prosecution of human trafficking cases, as well as to enhance the identification and protection of victims, particularly among migrants and refugees along migratory routes. To achieve these goals, simulation-based training exercises were conducted for multi-disciplinary teams, covering the full life cycle of a trafficking case.

To create a multi-disciplinary team, practitioners were gathered from multiple sectors, including law enforcement, prosecutors, social service providers and asylum agencies. The simulations covered the identification of and first contact with victims, the arrest and prosecution of traffickers, and the provision of victim support services.

These live action trainings taught participants how to handle the complexities involved in identifying human trafficking cases in mixed migration flows, in implementing victimless prosecution strategies, in setting up joint investigations for cross-border trafficking cases and in responding to technology-facilitated trafficking. In doing so, the trainings improved the skills and competencies of practitioners to work in multi-disciplinary teams. They also changed individual attitudes and beliefs, including stereotypes, cultural norms and values regarding other professional groups and (presumed) victims of trafficking, thus focusing on protecting and restoring the human rights of trafficking victims.

For guidance on addressing human rights issues in/by the security sector, see:

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2012), *Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Law Enforcement Officials*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2016), *Preventing and Addressing Sexual and Gender Based Violence in Places of Deprivation of Liberty: Standards, Approaches and Examples from the OSCE Region*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR, DCAF (2021), *Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel: Compendium of Standards, Good Practices and Recommendations*

On human rights and policing assemblies, see:

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2010), *Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly* (2nd edition)

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2016), *Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2021) *Guide on Law Enforcement Equipment Most Commonly Used in the Policing of Assemblies*

Further information on minority rights and criminal justice can be found in:

‣ OSCE/HCNM (2006), *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2010), *Police and Roma and Sinti: Good Practices in Building Trust and Understanding*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2016), *Effective and Human Rights-Compliant Policing in Roma and Sinti Communities: OSCE/ODIHR Training for Law Enforcement Officers*

‣ OSCE/HCNM (2017), *The Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities & Explanatory Note*

For guidance on addressing hate crimes, see:

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2012), *Training Against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE): Programme Description*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2014), *Prosecuting Hate Crimes: A Practical Guide* and *Hate Crime Data Collection and Monitoring: A Practical Guide*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2019), *Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crimes: A Resource Toolkit*

For guidance on compliance with human rights in countering terrorism, see:

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2007), *Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A Manual*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2013), *Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations. A Practical Manual for Law Enforcement Officers*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2014), *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2018), *Guidelines for Addressing the Threats and Challenges of "Foreign Terrorist Fighters" within a Human Rights Framework*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2021), *Protecting Human Rights in Prisons while Preventing Radicalization Leading to Terrorism or Violence: A Guide for Detention Monitors*

For human rights approaches in the investigation of THB cases, see:

‣ OSCE (2013), *Resource Police Training Guide: Trafficking in Human Beings*

2.7 Taking Advantage of Synergies: A Cross-Dimensional Approach to SSG/R Support

Linking police and judicial reform, fostering independent oversight, strengthening integrity and anti-corruption and engaging with civil society, as well as mainstreaming and promoting gender equality and human rights, are all areas of support that, in practice, are mutually complementary and can often not be clearly delineated from each other. For example, when strengthening gender equality and accountability of the security sector, civil society can play an important role in providing external oversight. Also, the external oversight role of civil society can make an important contribution to both police and justice sector reform.

Key entry points of general relevance to cross-dimensionally supporting SSG/R could include:

- Using the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security to engage OSCE participating States in activities that strengthen democratic oversight of the security sector or that can be used to address other key SSG/R principles, such as accountability, gender equality, human rights or participation.
- Ensuring that needs assessments are co-ordinated across the three OSCE dimensions and include other relevant thematic sectors in order to take advantage of the synergies between them.[31]
- Recognizing that broad governance projects for the public sector, for example, on financial or human resource management, should also include the security sector. Broad-ranging projects of this kind may offer an important entry point to engage in SSG/R.
- Recognizing that broad memoranda of understanding between the OSCE and (a component of) the security sector may provide an umbrella for working with security sector institutions on gender and human rights. Staff working on SSG/R and other relevant project staff should, therefore, engage with each other regarding joint initiatives.
- Recognizing that in some contexts efforts to strengthen gender equality and to address gender-based violence may provide entry points to initiate dialogue on SSG/R. This may be the case when States have committed to strengthening gender equality across the public sector – for example, through the adoption of a national action plan on UNSCR 1325.
- Promoting regional approaches, for example, related to independent oversight, gender or human rights, through regional awareness-raising workshops on the importance of the issue at hand and to exchange experiences on how such issues are addressed in other states, including in cases where there might be a lack of understanding and initiative among national stakeholders.[32]

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31   For additional information, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R."

32   For additional information, see the chapter "Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R."

Case Study 7

Building Civil Society Capacities and Fostering Co-operation on WPS, Gender-Based Violence and Oversight of the Security Sector in Kyrgyzstan

In 2018 and 2019, ODIHR's initiatives in Kyrgyzstan focused on (1) building capacities for the oversight of the security sector in implementing the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325, (2) supporting CSOs engaged in implementing the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and (3) conducting a gender-sensitive analysis of the conflict cycle and decision-making processes related to security.

Following a consultation process with CSOs, as well as with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, two sets of activities concerning security sector governance and WPS were devised:

The first was a training event implemented in Bishkek and Osh, with the participation of CSOs from all regions. The event aimed to strengthen civil society's footprint in the implementation of the country's National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325. In particular, it stimulated the engagement of human rights organizations in SSG linked to the WPS Agenda.

The second focused on building bridges between CSOs and the Ombuds institution as well as with the public councils within security sector agencies, which are tasked with internal oversight. To that end, ODIHR implemented a two-day workshop for national human rights institutions and civil society on integrating a gender perspective into the oversight of the security sector. Representatives participated from the Ombuds institution and civil society as well as from the public councils of the Ministry of Interior, the Defence Committee, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and the Penitentiary Service.

The objective of the workshop was to engage security-sector-oversight bodies and civil society in the implementation of the country's National Action Plan, while promoting concrete inter-sectoral co-operation among key agencies and civil society. The second part of the event focused on developing a practical roadmap for the implementation of the National Action Plan. Through it, oversight mechanisms can play a key role by providing expertise and support to the state agencies in charge of its implementation, while tracking their effectiveness in complying with the provisions of the National Action Plan.

Lessons learned:
- The events provided opportunities for actors not traditionally working on WPS to engage and reflect on their potential to oversee the work of the security sector, using the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 as a framework.
- Participants learned about not only the National Action Plan but also mechanisms of co-operation between national human rights institutions, public councils and civil society. They also improved their knowledge about ways to enhance the oversight of the security sector through thematic monitoring, as well as how to integrate a gender perspective into security sector oversight.

3. Practically Applying a Cross-Dimensional Approach to SSG/R Programming

When planning SSG/R support, cross-dimensional issues are often rarely considered in full. The reasons for this could include a lack of strategic approach, cross-dimensional expertise, co-ordination or resources, bureaucratic hurdles or, simply, competition. To overcome such challenges, incentive structures should be developed that encourage cross-dimensional co-ordination from the start of programmatic planning. Some steps to put incentive structures in place are outlined in this section. For all of them, the support of senior management is essential to ensure that cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R are recognized and encouraged as a core element of OSCE support.

Ideally, senior management and supervisors could also consider using the staff performance-evaluation process to encourage cross-dimensional co-operation, both for staff with programming and administrative roles.

3.1 Promoting a Strategic Vision of Cross-Dimensional OSCE Support to SSG/R

A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support requires a strategic vision of the support to be provided by the OSCE (and other international actors) in a given context. The development of a strategic vision for support should ideally be based on a needs assessment that determines the national needs and priorities for SSG/R support.[33] The strategic vision should consist of specific goals, to which programmes in all OSCE dimensions will jointly contribute. In OSCE field operations, the Head of Mission, senior management as well as the policy and planning and/or programme co-ordination and support units will play an important role in encouraging a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R.

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33   For additional information, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R."

The OSCE Centre in Bishkek's Approach to Cross-Dimensional Co-ordination

In 2013, the Head of the then OSCE Centre in Bishkek pursued an innovative approach to encouraging cross-dimensional planning. The approach consisted of identifying five strategic hubs that were considered mission-wide priorities: gender mainstreaming, good governance, rule of law, inter-communal relations and transnational threats. The strategic hubs were closely related to several SSG/R priorities. Then, each department was tasked to create a matrix, which outlined how they would contribute to each strategic area, and to co-ordinate with other departments to achieve specific goals.

Lessons learned:
▸ Considering SSG/R-related issues in the strategic hubs encouraged co-operation in this area. This initiative could be replicated by other field operations to enhance coherence and co-ordination between activities in different dimensions.

3.2 Using a Cross-Dimensional Approach to Engage National Actors on the Importance of a Holistic Approach to SSG/R

A key challenge in SSG/R processes is to ensure a holistic approach to reform that takes into account linkages between the various actors and components of the security sector. Such an approach recognizes that reforms in one part of the security sector may not be successful if their effects on the rest of the security sector are not properly considered. Thus, OSCE efforts to ensure a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R provide an opportunity to engage national stakeholders on the importance of holistic reforms.

Co-operating with multiple actors in the security sector is therefore key, but in itself does not ensure that the approach is cross-dimensional. The OSCE might be better placed to provide credible advice in this area if it is also seen as promoting a comprehensive, cross-dimensional approach internally. OSCE staff should therefore communicate with national stakeholders about the OSCE's own internal cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support. Doing so can provide entry points to raise awareness among national actors on the importance of a comprehensive approach to SSG/R. It may even pave the way to conduct a comprehensive SSG/R needs assessment in a given state. While the main purpose of such an assessment could be to inform the OSCE's own cross-dimensional support, the findings may also be useful to national stakeholders.[34]

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34   For additional information, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R."

3.3 **Defining Roles and Responsibilities**

Roles and responsibilities tend to become blurred when several Executive Structures and/or departments within them are working on a topic that cuts across all dimensions, but the lead actor is not clearly defined. Once SSG/R priorities have been identified, the Executive Structure/department that will lead the provision of support should be clearly identified. The lead actor should then determine how support can be provided by other units/departments in other dimensions in a complementary manner, including in the allocation of budget. This is particularly important to avoid gaps in priority areas, owing to a lack of clarity about which project or programme in the three dimensions should be taking the lead. Defining roles and responsibilities from the start of programmatic planning is also closely linked with internal co-ordination in the subsequent implementation phase.[35] Senior management plays an important role in encouraging such cross-dimensional co-operation and in setting up incentive structures for this purpose.

3.4 **Encouraging a Cross-Dimensional Approach to SSG/R Support in Project Development**

Once strategic priorities and common goals have been set and the roles and responsibilities clarified, these should be considered and reflected accordingly when drafting project proposals. The process of drafting project proposals can also be used to actively promote cross-dimensionality for SSG/R support. Some field operations have updated their Unified Budget (UB) project proposal templates for this purpose.

In some field operations, project co-ordination units have been established in the Office of the Head of Mission to encourage cross-departmental consultations on all project planning. Such units can play an important role in encouraging a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support. Efforts should also be made at the departmental level to identify the extent to which cross-dimensional SSG/R linkages have been appropriately considered when developing relevant projects.

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35   See also section 3.5 below.

Standardizing Approaches to Cross-Dimensional SSG/R Support in the UB Project Proposals of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

When drafting UB projects in the Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, project managers are encouraged to consider the SSG/R aspects of project activities, including the potential for cross-departmental co-operation across all three dimensions.

The Mission updated its template for UB project proposals to standardize consideration of thematic areas, including gender, youth, SSG/R, civil society and partnerships. To this end, the template has a section on mainstreaming that includes SSG/R, gender and youth.

The template also includes a list of the Mission's departments and units, to standardize the areas in which cross-dimensional co-operation should be considered.

Such departments and units include: Deputy Head of Mission, which is responsible for 2nd dimension issues in the Mission; the Department of Security Co-operation projects on anti-terrorism, arms control, and security governance; the Human Dimension Department's sections on democratic governance, education, human rights, rule of law; as well as Press and Public Information, the Policy and Planning Section's Gender and Youth unit and the Policy and Planning Section.

☐ Gender ☐ Youth ☐ SSG/R ☐ Civil society ☐ Partnership

Potential for cross-departmental cooperation with:
☐ DHoM ☐ DSC-AC ☐ DSC-AT ☐ DSC-SGC ☐ HDD-DGS ☐ HDD-EDS ☐ HDD-HRS ☐ HDD-RoL ☐ PPI ☐ PPS-GYU ☐ PPS

With regard to SSG/R mainstreaming, the project template further explains to project developers that activities should "contribute to the process of improving security provision, management and/or oversight (i.e., governance of the security sector), in accordance with the principles of good governance (i.e., democratic oversight, rule of law, human rights, transparency, accountability, integrity, etc.). In the context of the Mission, these efforts would ideally be synergized among programmatic departments, so as to ensure coherence across the three OSCE dimensions of security."

The template subsequently requests that project developers "summarize how the project design contributes to improving governance of the security sector [and] outline if and how the plans are synergized with complementary efforts of other Mission projects."

In support of these efforts, the SSG/R focal point reviews all UB project proposals and provides feedback and advice in addition to the Mission's Planning and Co-ordination Unit.

Once roles and responsibilities are clarified on who is to lead the project and how responsibilities regarding implementation are distributed, these roles and responsibilities will also need to be reflected in the project-set up. A cross-dimensional project set-up can take different forms, also depending on whether funds are UB or extra-budgetary (EXB).

Case Study 10

Practical Examples of Co-operation among Executive Structures in the Three Dimensions

Co-operation between two Executive Structures, which provide expertise from different dimensions: The EXB project "Strengthening security sector governance in the Republic of Armenia" promotes inclusive policy dialogue, strengthening of awareness and capacity development in the field of security sector governance. The Secretariat's SSG/R team in the CPC's Operations Service leads the management and co-ordination of the overall project. In the framework of this project, the task to strengthen the national human rights institution is led and implemented by ODIHR, which provides human dimension expertise. ODIHR leads communication with the national human rights institution and plans programmatic work in close co-ordination with the project lead in CPC. The task is also formally assigned to ODIHR in IRMA

Co-operation between two departments in one Executive Structure in joint project implementation: The cross-dimensional EXB project "Strengthening the fight against transnational organized crime in South-Eastern Europe through improved regional co operation in asset seizure, confiscation, management and re-use" is jointly managed by two Secretariat departments: the Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) and the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA). The project aims to improve effectiveness in the fight against transnational organized crime by enhancing regional co-operation and the national capacities of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project is implemented in close co-operation with the field operations in South-Eastern Europe.

The project management role in IRMA is formally assigned to the assigned to TNTD. However, the cross-dimensional co-operation is outlined as part of the joint project proposal. In reality, therefore, all decisions related to programmatic planning and implementation are taken jointly. The cross-dimensional approach enables the project managers to better identify national and regional shortcomings and to offer tailored solutions.

3.5 **Supporting Internal Co-ordination**

Establishing or making full use of internal co-ordination mechanisms is key to supporting cross-dimensional approaches. One such mechanism includes regular exchanges between heads of programmes or relevant project managers. Others include the development of matrices on common priorities or exchanges of information on the issues in the different dimensions that are regularly addressed with national stakeholders. Senior management has a key role to play in promoting internal co-ordination.

SSG/R focal points also have a crucial role to play in co-ordinating cross-dimensional SSG/R issues. Focal points in related areas can also contribute to mainstreaming SSG/R in their areas of work. For example, gender focal points in Executive Structures promote gender mainstreaming throughout the OSCE's work, including in the area of SSG/R. Similarly, focal points on combatting human trafficking or on Roma and Sinti can all create synergies between their work and SSG/R efforts. That being said, focal points require adequate time and resources to be successful in co-ordinating efforts, as focal point roles are fulfilled in addition to the regular tasks and duties of OSCE officials. Also of importance is that the co-ordination efforts of focal points be made in a way that fully respects the mandates of their Executive Structures.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo's Internal Mechanisms to Enhance Cross-Dimensional Co-ordination

Recognizing that different departments may engage with the same local stakeholders in parallel, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo introduced cross-dimensional co-ordination mechanisms to leverage synergies and avoid duplication. These mechanisms help to ensure common Mission messaging with counterparts, thus supporting coherence of efforts and avoiding overburdening local actors, for example, by inviting them to participate in too many parallel workshops and trainings.

In practice, the Mission ensures co-ordination by storing all relevant information in shared folders on topics that cut across the dimensions, such as on countering violent extremism leading to terrorism, domestic violence and hate crimes, as well as information on youth inclusion and gender mainstreaming. The jointly stored documents include internal and external reports and research papers, project documents, donor mapping matrices, activities and action plans, among others. The shared folders are complemented by joint email addresses used by thematic focal points and working groups. The working groups are used to co-ordinate efforts and avoid overlaps on the planned and implemented activities of sections working in the different dimensions. They have clear terms of reference, meet regularly, and are usually chaired by senior management at the level of Head or Deputy Head of the Mission.

Lessons learned:
- ‣ The use of matrices that map the main counterparts of each department is a good practice – for example, by allowing to track the events to be attended by specific counterparts. The regular sharing of such matrices among departments and keeping them updated provides a practical tool to manage engagement with local stakeholders in a structured manner. Such matrices may also be useful in identifying entry points for additional cross-dimensional co-operation.

4. **Checklist**

The following checklist is intended to help programme/project management staff in:
- Identifying cross-dimensional synergies in SSG/R programming;
- Practically applying a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R programming.

The purpose is not to "check" every item, but to provide an aide-memoire to consider key aspects and suggestions that might be relevant for your daily work.

Identifying Cross-Dimensional Synergies in SSG/R Programming

Linking police and judicial reform

☐ Have efforts been made to strengthen co-ordination between different actors of the security sector (e.g., between the police, prosecutors and judges)?

☐ Have efforts been made to enhance mechanisms for storing and exchanging information?

Fostering democratic oversight

☐ Has due consideration been given to the need to combine efforts to strengthen external oversight with internal oversight mechanisms?

☐ Has awareness been raised among national actors about the importance of independent oversight?

☐ Have efforts been made to support the promotion of a legal framework which provides security institutions, as well as independent oversight bodies, with the necessary mandate to perform their duties?

☐ Has awareness of civil society and media been raised on the role of independent oversight bodies and how to access them?

Strengthening integrity and anti-corruption

☐ Have efforts been made to support the adoption and enforcement of laws, policies, strategies, action plans and other measures to counter corruption and safeguard the judiciary's independence?

☐ Have measures been undertaken to enhance the management of the security sector, including the review or development of institutional rules and procedures (e.g., on human resource management)?

☐ Has support to the establishment of internal control mechanisms (e.g., codes of conduct that define ethical standards for public officials) been considered?

☐ Have existing incentives for malpractice and supporting their elimination been considered?

Engaging with civil society

☐ Has civil society been consulted about the perceptions of beneficiaries to ensure that the SSG/R support provided by the OSCE is grounded in real needs?

☐ Have efforts been made to enhance the capacities of rights-holders (i.e., the general population, including those belonging to marginalized groups) to ensure their rights are upheld?

☐ Have efforts been made to build the capacities of CSOs?

☐ Has engagement with think tanks and research associations been considered to compile analysis that might be useful for law and policy development?

☐ Have joint discussions between security sector officials and CSO representatives, including media, been considered – for example, on SSG/R related laws and policies?

☐ Has special consideration been given to CSOs that represent women, minorities or other marginalized groups?

☐ Has consideration been given to building the capacities of media to report on the security sector?

☐ Have youth networks been consulted for relevant SSG/R-related planning processes to make sure youth perspectives are adequately considered?

Mainstreaming and promoting gender equality and human rights

☐ Have gender-sensitive needs assessments been conducted, including on obstacles that hinder women from working in the security sector?

☐ Has assistance been provided on promoting a human-rights compliant and gender-sensitive legal framework?

☐ Have participating States been supported in developing and implementing national action plans –for example, on UNSCR 1325?

☐ Has support to internal control units or advisers on gender been considered to help address gender-based discrimination and inequality?

☐ Have women's associations in the security sector been supported?

☐ Have efforts been made to enhance the capacities of duty-bearers (i.e., the security sector) to fulfil their obligations – for example, how to respond to human rights violations?

☐ Has awareness been raised and capacities of security sector personnel been built to address sexual and gender-based violence?

☐ Has support been considered in collecting sex-disaggregated data in relation to the security sector?

☐ Have grants been provided to CSOs to conduct research on gender issues or to provide training, for example, on accurate treatment of victims?

☐ Have national human rights institutions and civil society been engaged in dialogue on reforms?

☐ Have there been efforts to build trust and understanding between security sector personnel, such as police and marginalized communities?

☐ Has co-operation between security sector officials and CSOs, as well as national human rights institutions, been built to monitor human rights compliance?

☐ Has the gender-sensitive monitoring of places of deprivation of liberty and the reports on findings of such visits been supported?

Taking advantage of synergies

☐ Has the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security been considered as an entry point to address key principles of SSG/R, such as accountability, gender equality, human rights, participation?

☐ Has it been ensured that needs assessments are co-ordinated across the three OSCE dimensions and include other relevant thematic sectors?

☐ Has it been considered that broad governance projects for the public sector should also include the security sector and could constitute a good entry point?

☐ Have broad memoranda of understanding been considered to engage with security sector institutions on SSG/R?

☐ Have regional approaches been considered to facilitate exchange of lessons learned and good practices?

Practically Applying a Cross-Dimensional Approach to SSG/R Programming

Promoting a strategic vision of OSCE support in a given state

☐ Is there a strategic vision of SSG/R support from the OSCE (and other international actors)?

☐ Is the strategic vision based on a (comprehensive) needs assessment, including the national priorities for SSG/R support?

☐ Does the strategic vision in relation to SSG/R support consist of specific goals, requiring contributions from all OSCE dimensions?

☐ Is a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R encouraged by senior management? If not, how can senior management support be generated?

Using a cross-dimensional approach to engage national actors on the importance of a holistic approach to SSG/R

☐ Has the OSCE's cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R been communicated to the host country to raise the awareness of national actors about the importance of a holistic approach to their own SSG/R efforts?

Defining roles and responsibilities

☐ Which Executive Structure/programme/unit will lead the provision of SSG/R support, in particular, when the support to be provided is cross-dimensional?

☐ Has the allocation of budget for joint activities by different Executive Structures/ programmes/units been agreed?

Encouraging a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support in project development

☐ Is cross-dimensional co-operation built in to OSCE projects and programmes?

☐ Have standardized approaches been considered to facilitate cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R support?

Supporting internal co-ordination

☐ Is the project co-ordination unit aware of the need to integrate a cross-dimensional approach?

☐ Are there internal co-ordination mechanisms in place to support cross-dimensional approaches (e.g., regular information exchanges, matrices of common priorities, focal point networks, etc.)?

☐ Are there other mechanisms that could be established to support internal co-ordination?

☐ Do co-operation mechanisms ensure full respect for the mandates of OSCE Executive Structures?

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Guidelines for OSCE Staff

Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R

Executive Summary

This chapter discusses the rationale for pursuing a regional approach to SSG/R (section 1), identifies potential ways to strengthen regional co-operation on SSG/R (section 2), and provides guidance on applying a regional approach to SSG/R (section 3). Finally, a practical checklist is provided to help staff in the process (section 4).

Key points from the chapter:

- **Capitalize on potential benefits of a regional approach to SSG/R:** While SSG/R processes are primarily national in their scope and focus due to the country-specific institutional set-up of a security sector, a regional approach can bring many benefits that can make the OSCE support more effective and efficient. For instance, a regional approach can provide new entry points for SSG/R support at the national level, as it can bring new dynamics into reform processes and desensitize issues that may be difficult to address in the framework of a national context alone. Regional initiatives may also contribute to security sector institutions' ability to effectively address security challenges, especially those requiring transnational collaboration, and can provide a platform to facilitate the sharing of good practices and lessons learned among countries. Moreover, regional approaches may at times be a prerequisite for other activities. For instance, broad confidence-building among security sector institutions through regional events may be necessary for the success of subsequent efforts to strengthen operational co-operation across borders. Finally, regional approaches can strengthen the contribution of SSG/R to wider conflict prevention. At the same time, OSCE's efforts to support regional co-operation on SSG/R should not be conducted as ad hoc activities but should be designed to support broader national priorities and objectives for SSG/R in a given State.

- **Identify entry points for strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R:** There are several possible entry points for OSCE programmatic activities in the field of SSG/R that can benefit from a regional approach. These include advancing development and implementation of relevant international norms and standards for the security sector, delivering capacity-building (e.g., through joint training and simulation exercises), facilitating operational co-operation and information exchanges (e.g., through study visits, joint events or development of joint action plans and strategies), supporting relevant co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms, as well as professional networks and associations, and, last but not least, conducting research and data collection. When appropriate, encouraging and facilitating the participation of a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society organizations and private sector, in regional activities can contribute to confidence-building among the actors involved.

- **Support the effective application of regional approaches to SSG/R efforts:** Effective implementation starts with the appropriate consideration of regional approaches during the planning stage. In particular, when conducting a needs assessment, the regional dimension and the potential value of regional co-operation should be considered. If regional approaches are important in a given context, there is a need to assess the extent to which national actors have an interest in participating in such endeavours. The OSCE should ensure that it facilitates but does not lead regional initiatives. In case there is a lack of interest, the OSCE may consider taking an incremental approach towards building interest in regional co-operation through such measures as supporting the participation of experts in regional events or promoting bilateral sharing of information and experiences. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that regional approaches might not be relevant in every context and have their limitations.

1. **Rationale**

The latest UN Security Council resolution on Security Sector Reform acknowledges the important role of regional and sub-regional organizations in assisting UN Member States in undertaking reforms of their security sectors.[1] It also underlines the importance of partnerships and co-operation with regional and sub-regional organizations.

As the world's largest regional security organization that operates under the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the OSCE has an important role to play. Thanks to its geographical scope, the network of field operations and long track record as a platform for inclusive security dialogue and co-operation, the OSCE is well positioned to support regional approaches to SSG/R. This comparative advantage gives the OSCE a key added value. As noted in the 2019 report by the OSCE Secretary General, "Regional expertise acquired over the years and the OSCE's extensive network of field operations put the Organization in a position to make valuable contributions to global efforts to sustain peace and security, and thus to strengthen its role as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. By leveraging partnerships, we can optimize these advantages."[2]

Several OSCE commitments, particularly in the area of transnational threats, recognize the importance of strengthening regional security co-operation. The mandates of certain OSCE field operations also highlight the need to support regional initiatives. Although each security sector is country-specific and SSG/R is primarily a national process, there are several reasons why a regional approach to SSG/R support may be beneficial:

- **Regional approaches may provide entry points for SSG/R support at the national level:** Some SSG/R issues may be perceived as too sensitive to be discussed at the national level (e.g., sexual harassment or corruption in the security sector). Discussions at the regional level can desensitize and raise awareness on such issues, bringing a new dynamic into reform processes and opening doors for further progress. Moreover, supporting the development or implementation of regional commitments may make it easier to advocate for certain issues to be addressed at the national level. Providing a regional platform also makes it possible to bring together a variety of actors who may not be able or willing to meet at the national level. This can contribute to confidence-building among different stakeholder groups.

- **Regional approaches are necessary for addressing transnational challenges:** Many of today's security threats and risks (e.g., organized crime, trafficking in human beings, terrorism, cybercrime) are of a transnational nature. Addressing them effectively, therefore,

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1   United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2553 (2020)* (New York, 2020), S/RES/2553.

2   OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019), SEC.GAL/42/19, p. 12.

requires regional co-operation, as recognized in several OSCE commitments. Supporting regional exchanges among national security sector institutions is also important in order to promote confidence-building as a prerequisite for collaboration on addressing transnational challenges.

- **Regional approaches facilitate exchanges of good practices and lessons learned from reform processes:** SSG/R processes can be challenging in any country. Participating States can therefore greatly benefit from sharing experiences – whether positive or negative – from implementation of reforms in their security sectors. Regional events and activities can facilitate identification and sharing of such experiences. For example, the OSCE assists participating States in initiating or strengthening national action plans developed in the context of UNSCRs 1325 and 1540. Regional exchanges on good practices and lessons learned from implementation of such plans can contribute to strengthening commitment in some countries and can support ongoing reform efforts at the national level.

- **Regional approaches can strengthen the contribution of SSG/R to wider conflict prevention:** Supporting SSG/R initiatives at the regional level can provide a platform for facilitating dialogue and transnational co-operation. This can in turn contribute to confidence-building and to broader conflict prevention among States.

Info Box 1

Examples of OSCE Commitments Providing the Basis for Supporting Regional Co-operation among Security Sector Institutions

- **Politico-military co-operation:** "Reaffirming their respect for each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, the participating States will base their mutual security relations upon a co-operative approach. [...] They will continue to develop complementary and mutually reinforcing institutions that include European and transatlantic organizations, multilateral and bilateral undertakings and various forms of regional and subregional co-operation."[3]
- **Police co-operation:** One of the guiding principles for the OSCE in this area is "enhanced co-operation among participating States and international and regional organizations." Accordingly, the OSCE "supports subregional co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms."[4]
- **Organized crime:** The OSCE "enhances the institutional capacity of the relevant stakeholders and strengthens law enforcement co-operation at the international, regional and national levels."[5]
- **Cybercrime:** The OSCE "facilitates, at the regional and national levels, capacity-building and the exchange of information and best practices in investigating cybercrime and dealing with cyber evidence."[6]
- **Border security management:** The OSCE "can offer its organizational framework for interaction on border-related issues with international regional and subregional organizations" [...] "increased co-ordination on border security and management at the subregional level may constitute a stepping stone towards the OSCE-wide establishment of open and secure borders."[7]
- **Terrorism:** The OSCE's comprehensive approach is "well suited to address at the regional level challenges posed by terrorism, to ensure respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms; to identify and address the factors conducive to terrorism; and to explore synergies in addressing new and emerging transnational threats and challenges to security and stability"; the OSCE will "pursue its activities to enhance co-operation and build capacity at the national, regional and subregional levels to prevent and combat terrorism [...] within a framework based on the rule of law and respect for human rights."[8]

3   OSCE, *OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* (Vienna, 1994), DOC.FSC/1/95, p. 3.

4   OSCE, *OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities* (Vienna, 2012), PC.DEC/1049, pp. 3, 7.

5   Ibid, p. 5.

6   Ibid, p. 7.

7   OSCE, *OSCE Border Management and Security Concept* (Ljubljana, 2005), MC.DOC/2/05, p. 4.

8   OSCE, *OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism* (Vienna, 2012), PC.DEC/1063, pp. 3, 4.

‣ **Trafficking in human beings:** The SR/CTHB "will further promote and facilitate, within existing resources, all forms of co-operation among OSCE participating States, including at the bilateral and regional level, where appropriate, and collaboration with major international bodies and entities engaged in combating trafficking in human beings, as well as relevant NGOs."[9]

‣ **Anti-corruption:** The Ministerial Council encourages participating States "to facilitate the recovery of stolen assets as part of national measures as well as in the framework of international and, where appropriate, regional co-operation and ensure beneficial ownership transparency" and "tasks the OCEEA to explore […] the opportunities for co-operation with national, regional and international initiatives, promoting the principles of transparency, citizen participation and accountability."[10] The OSCE participating States recognize "the need to prevent and combat corruption at international and national levels in a comprehensive way, including by addressing the links between corruption and money laundering, and through the effective implementation of asset recovery measures and improved international and regional co-operation."[11]

‣ **Money-laundering:** The OSCE participating States "welcome that the OSCE […] continues to assist participating States, at their request, with developing and/or harmonizing their national anti-corruption legislation, in line with their international commitments, with ensuring practical implementation and effective enforcement through exchanges of experience and good practices at the regional, sub-regional and national levels" and "express support to the work of […] regional bodies and […] to ratifying or acceding to and fully implementing relevant regional and international instruments to counter money-laundering and the financing of terrorism […]"[12]

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9   OSCE, *Decision No. 1107 Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings: One Decade Later (Vienna, 2013)*, PC.DEC/1107/Corr.1, p. 8.

10   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/14 on the Prevention of Corruption* (Basel, 2014), MC.DEC/5/14, pp. 3, 4.

11   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision No.6/20 on Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency* (Tirana, 2020), MC.DEC/6/20, p. 1.

12   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism* (Dublin, 2012), MC.DOC/2/12, pp. 3, 4.

2. Identifying Entry Points for Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R

Figure 1: Entry points for strengthening regional co-operation

2.1 Development and Implementation of International Norms and Standards

International norms and standards developed for security sector institutions at the regional or global (UN) level can provide important entry points for SSG/R programmatic activities. Promoting and reviewing implementation of such norms and standards at the regional level ensures that States are not left in isolation but are part of a wider multilateral process. It can also help to build further commitment through, for example, one or several peer States encouraging one or several fellow States to move forward with implementation. Furthermore, ratification of the same norms and standards by several OSCE participating States can provide the basis for regional capacity-building support to implementation of the commitments made. Examples of international norms and standards in the field of SSG/R include the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), UNSCR 1540 (2004) and the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

When supporting the development and implementation of SSG/R-related international norms and standards at the regional level, the following entry points could be considered:

- Mapping existing international commitments relevant for the security sector that States are yet to ratify or implement in order to identify possibilities for programmatic support;
- Identifying opportunities for developing new international norms and standards for the security sector at the regional level;
- Raising awareness on the importance of adhering to SSG/R-related international norms and standards, and offering support for their national implementation;
- Supporting regional capacity-building initiatives and development of regional strategies and action plans on how to implement SSG/R-related elements in international commitments made by States;
- Organizing regional workshops, seminars and study trips to discuss progress and to exchange experiences in implementation of relevant commitments.

Case Study 1

Regional Seminars on OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is a cornerstone document for the principle of democratic governance of the security sector. Since 2008, regional seminars on the Code of Conduct have taken place annually across the OSCE area (e.g., Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Black Sea region, the Baltic Sea region, the Mediterranean region, and North America). The seminars have aimed at explaining how the Code of Conduct is relevant for all participating States, which has helped to put politically sensitive commitments into perspective and has ensured that no State is excluded from the process. The seminars have also enabled other participating States with comparable contexts and backgrounds to exchange experiences and lessons learned. In addition to six official OSCE languages, the Code has been translated into several other languages to facilitate regional discussions and support outreach and awareness-raising both within and beyond the OSCE area.

On the 25th Anniversary of the Code in 2019, the participating States reaffirmed their strong commitment to the Code by adopting a Ministerial Commemorative Declaration.[13] The States reconfirmed that the knowledge, skills and experience of both women and men are essential to efforts aimed at furthering peace, security and stability in the OSCE region, including the implementation of the Code of Conduct, and committed to ensuring and promoting their equal opportunities and full and meaningful participation in that process. They also welcomed the continuation of outreach efforts on the Code of Conduct for the benefit of the OSCE Partners for Co-operation.

2.2 Regional Capacity-Building

Capacity-building at the regional level is often pursued by bringing together national stakeholders from different States at workshops, seminars or training events. Sharing experiences in implementing reforms among States facing similar challenges can contribute to confidence-building. Moreover, capacity-building at the regional level can enhance learning through "peer-to-peer" exchange and encourage the collective identification of issues and lessons learned. It can also contribute to harmonizing processes and practices of security sector professionals across a given region. For instance, the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe offers opportunities for both enhancing knowledge and building contacts among senior border security officials from across the OSCE, which contributes to mutual trust necessary for future collaboration. At the same time, it needs to be recognized that capacities and approaches may vary across a given region; consequently, regional capacity-building initiatives have to be adjusted accordingly.

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13   OSCE, *Commemorative Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security* (Bratislava, 2019), MC.DOC/1/19.

When supporting regional capacity-building, the following entry points could be considered:

- Identifying challenges which are shared by participating States in a given region, and determining whether the States could benefit from regional capacity-building;
- Supporting capacity-building through regional training, simulation exercises, workshops and "peer-to-peer" seminars;
- Considering how capacity-building support delivered at the regional level can be tailored to different national contexts and needs;
- Incorporating sharing of national experiences, good practices and lessons learned as part of a regional capacity-building and allowing enough time to exchange and discuss these in smaller formats (e.g., working groups);
- Ensuring that, where appropriate, a broad range of state and non-state actors, including from civil society and the private sector, are invited to participate in regional capacity-building events to promote confidence-building and facilitate co-operation among all relevant stakeholders.

Case Study 2

Regional Capacity-Building on Combating Cybercrime

In 2017–2019, the OSCE Secretariat's Transnational Threats Department (TNTD), in close co-operation with the OSCE Field Operations in South-Eastern Europe, piloted a regional capacity-building project on combating cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime. The project aimed to enhance police training capacities on this topic through a series of thematic training courses, complemented by a training-of-trainers programme. Each beneficiary country nominated two practitioners as future "national trainers" who, alongside other criminal justice professionals, completed six regional training courses. In the project's second phase, the national trainers developed and organized their own courses in national languages, tailored to the needs and realities of each beneficiary country, monitored and supported by the OSCE. After the first round of national training courses, a regional workshop was organized for the trainers to exchange experiences, good practices and lessons learned. This was followed by a second round of national training courses, complemented by curriculum development for police academies. The project concluded with a regional conference. Based on the results and lessons learned, TNTD launched a similarly designed capacity-building project in Central Asia in 2021.

2.3 Operational Co-operation and Information Exchange

Many security-related challenges require concerted action and information sharing among security sector institutions across borders – for instance, transnational organized crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings and illicit goods, migration, or cybersecurity. Thanks to its geographical scope and wide network of field presences and institutions, the OSCE can effectively support efforts to enhance operational co-operation and information exchange at the regional level. For instance, joint simulation training exercises, which bring together agencies from different States, can promote better co-operation and build trust and confidence. Such transnational co-operation can also advance mutual understanding of legislation and procedures applicable in different States, which can improve ability of security sector institutions in the region to address common security challenges. Through cross-border co-operation and information exchange, security sector institutions, including those responsible for management and oversight, can also benefit from experiences and know-how of their counterparts in other countries when enhancing their own operational capacities. All of this is important for a well-functioning security sector, as it can increase its effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness.

Support for operational co-operation and information exchange at the regional level may at times need to start with smaller steps, particularly in cases where regional co-ordination mechanisms are missing or there is an absence of political will for closer cross-border collaboration. Such steps may include supporting interested States in participating in relevant events in their region, which may contribute to broader confidence-building or awareness-raising about SSG/R-related issues that are gaining prominence in neighbouring countries. Another such small step may be supporting bilateral exchanges between two States. Strengthening bilateral co-operation between two States that either face similar challenges or share cultural similarities can be an effective strategy for enhancing wider regional co-operation in the future.

When supporting operational co-operation and information exchange at the regional level, the following entry points could be considered:

- Identifying security challenges that require operational co-operation and information exchange at the regional level;
- Facilitating networking between the security sector institutions of neighbouring States through joint activities (e.g., through joint events such as conferences, workshops, seminars or simulation exercises);
- Promoting the benefits of regional operational co-operation and information exchange (e.g., through sharing of best practices on study visits);
- Supporting the harmonization of standards and practices at the regional level (e.g., through development of a regional manual);
- Supporting the development of regional strategies and action plans to address common challenges;

- Organizing study visits of security sector representatives to other States of the region, which have undergone similar reforms;
- Facilitating participation of security sector officials in relevant regional events, which are likely to promote confidence-building or to raise awareness about SSG/R.

Case Study 3

Bilateral Co-operation between Ukraine and Lithuania on Countering Terrorism

In 2018–2019, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine facilitated bilateral co-operation on countering terrorism between the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGSU) and the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service (LSBGS). In 2018, Lithuanian officials conducted a training on terrorism and cross-border crime risk profiling for 25 Ukrainian colleagues in Odessa. Since Lithuania had already introduced an automated risk profiling system at its borders, LSBGS representatives also participated in a working group developing the terms of reference for an automated risk profiling system for Ukraine. In 2019, representatives of SBGSU conducted a study visit to Lithuania, where together with LSBGS they developed IT solutions for the automated risk profiling system for Ukraine as well as three e-profiles for the system focused identification of terrorism threats, trafficking in human beings, and smuggling of weapons, ammunition and explosives. Thanks to its experience with automated profiling systems, Lithuania provided guidance, expertise and advice for introducing a similar system in Ukraine.

2.4 Co-ordination and Information-Sharing Mechanisms

In some regions, operational co-operation and information exchange among security sector institutions, including those responsible for management and oversight, from different countries is already institutionalized through specifically dedicated co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms. There include, for instance, the Regional Cooperation Council's Integrative Security Sector Governance (RCC/ISSG), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), including SEESAC's Regional Security Sector Reform Platform, the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, Police Co-operation Convention for Southeast Europe, the Central Asian Border Management Initiative 2020 (CABMI) or the Association of European Police Colleges (AEPC). Such mechanisms can provide entry points for various SSG/R programmatic activities. Rather than duplicating the efforts of such structures, the OSCE can generate added value by providing the necessary expertise and support to their activities that are in line with the OSCE's programmatic priorities. Occasionally, the OSCE may support establishment of new regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms among security sector institutions from different States to respond to a new emerging need.

When supporting co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms at the regional level, the following entry points could be considered:

- Mapping existing regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms in the field of security sector and identifying opportunities for engagement with them. This can be included in a broader SSG/R needs assessment;
- Raising awareness among national security sector institutions and professionals about existing regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms, including at relevant national and regional events;
- Providing support to relevant co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms through technical support and capacity-building;
- Supporting the establishment of new regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms between security sector institutions to respond to new emerging needs if there is serious interest and commitment on behalf of the States concerned.

Case Study 4

Hot Pursuit Protocols in South-Eastern Europe

The OSCE Presence in Albania, in close co-operation with other OSCE field operations in the region, supported the conclusion of Hot Pursuit Protocols (HPP) between Albania, Kosovo,[14] North Macedonia and Montenegro. The Presence facilitated the establishment of an expert working group tasked with drafting and negotiating HPP and organized simulation exercises on their operationalization on the ground. The Protocols were the first of their kind in the region and significantly contributed to increasing co-operation and trust between the Albanian border police and their counterparts in the region. They not only intensify and improve cross-border information exchange and co-operation, but also increase effectiveness of the fight against organized crime and illicit trafficking as they allow police agencies to pursue and apprehend criminals beyond their administrative borders, without the need to request a prior authorization. The involvement of the OSCE as an impartial facilitator helped build mutual confidence and trust among all stakeholders from the region, which was essential when introducing such a novel instrument.

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14   All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population in this text, should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.

Regional Platform for the Exchange of Good Practices

The Regional Anti-Corruption Platform for Internal Control Departments of border and law enforcement agencies of the OSCE participating States of South-Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and Moldova was launched in September 2019.[15] It was established within a joint project of the the OSCE Secretariat's TNTD and OCEEA. With the broader objective to continue strengthening good governance of the security sector, this interactive regional platform has facilitated the exchange of anti-corruption practices and further strengthened the implementation of effective anti-corruption policies and measures at the national and regional level.

2.5   Professional Networks and Associations

Promoting and supporting regional networks and associations of experts can also be an effective means of advancing the sustainability of regional co-operation. Professional networks and associations can contribute to sharing of experiences, facilitating collaboration, and harmonizing practices and processes. There are a number of regional professional networks relevant for SSG/R within the OSCE area (e.g., European Network of National Human Rights Institutions, Balkan Asset Management Interagency Network). Some of the professional networks were established by the OSCE – for instance, the OSCE Border Security and Management National Focal Points Network, the OSCE Counter-Terrorism Network or the OSCE Police Academies Network.

When promoting and supporting regional professional networks and associations, the following entry points could be considered:

- Mapping existing regional professional networks and associations in the field of security sector and identifying opportunities for engagement with them (this can be done through an actor mapping exercise, ideally integrated in a broader SSG/R needs assessment);
- Raising awareness among national security sector institutions and professionals about relevant regional professional networks and associations that they may wish to join;
- Providing support to regional professional networks and associations for security sector in the form of technical assistance and capacity-building;
- Involving regional professional networks and associations when implementing SSG/R programmatic activities, including as in-kind contributors or implementing partners;
- Supporting the establishment of new regional professional networks and associations for security sector actors.

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15   OSCE, *Regional OSCE-supported Anti-Corruption Platform for South-Eastern Europe, Ukraine and Moldova launched in Vienna* (23 Sep 2019).

Regional Network of Organized Crime Prosecutors

The Permanent Conference of Organized Crime Prosecutors (PCOCP) is a network of prosecutors that connects 13 organized crime prosecution offices from the Western Balkans region and the EU (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia). The Network was established with the support of the OSCE Mission to Serbia in 2016 with the aim to improve regional co-operation and information sharing and, as such, increase the efficiency of transnational organized crime investigations. The Network was launched at the international conference on complex organized crime and corruption investigations organized by the OSCE Mission to Serbia in May 2016 where prosecutors from the region and several EU countries signed a joint Declaration of Intent. In November 2016, the second meeting concluded with the transformation of the initiative into a Permanent Conference of Organized Crime Prosecutors. In October 2017, the third meeting of the PCOCP, in co-operation with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, institutionalized the Permanent Conference and created a Secretariat on a rotational basis. The first Chairmanship of the Secretariat for the following four years was granted to Serbia as the initiator of the initiative with the OSCE Mission's support. An Executive Board to manage the work of the PCOCP was also established and currently consists of Serbia, Romania, North Macedonia and Montenegro. The Board engages in annual meetings to exchange information, improve capacities and share best practices. The Network continues to grow: Greece joined in June 2019 while Austria accepted the invitation to join the Network and sign the Declaration in 2021.

2.6 Research and Data Collection

Conducting research and collecting data is part of the OSCE's work in many thematic areas, including SSG/R. The OSCE often also develops research-based knowledge products for the security sector in the form of guidelines and handbooks to raise awareness on certain topics or support national actors in implementing certain reforms.

Conducting research and collecting data on the security sector at the regional level has several benefits. It can help to measure and compare progress in national implementation of security sector reforms across several States, which can contribute to strengthening commitment and determination of those States that may be lagging behind. Furthermore, comparing experiences of different countries may help to identify common gaps and challenges, which can provide a basis for future capacity-building on either the national or regional level. It can also contribute to identifying good practices and lessons learned that can be factored in future SSG/R programmatic activities, making the OSCE's support more effective and efficient. Last but not least, outcomes and findings from such comparative research can facilitate regional co-ordination

and co-operation on SSG/R processes among States, contributing to mutual understanding and confidence-building.

When conducting research and collecting data at the regional level, the following entry points could be considered:

- Identifying common governance- and reform-related topics and issues that are addressed by security sector institutions from several OSCE participating States and may benefit from comparative research;
- Designing research in a way that its findings and conclusions can serve as a basis for future SSG/R programmatic support, be it at national or regional level;
- Engaging national security sector actors, including those for management, internal and external oversight, and relevant professional networks and associations (both national and regional) when planning, designing and conducting research;
- Presenting and disseminating findings and outcomes from research to security sector institutions from the States concerned at relevant national and international events.

Case Study 7

Implementing the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in the OSCE Region

In 2020, the OSCE Secretariat's Gender Section, with the support of external researchers, conducted a study on National Action Plans (NAP) on the implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). The study builds on similar research done in 2014 and provides research-based evidence on the implementation of the WPS agenda across the OSCE region. It combines a desk-based analysis of NAP from 36 OSCE participating States and a more detailed field research-based assessment of five NAP from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine. The analysis shows that the range of issues the NAP cover is growing, although attention is still paid to the traditional "pillars" of WPS activity, notably participation and prevention. There has been an increased focus on prevention since 2014 and NAP have begun to feature emerging WPS issues, such as disasters and violent extremism. Much room for improvement remains in the sphere of budgeting and the specification of financial arrangements, as most NAP do not feature even a "broadly defined" budget, let alone specific allocations to defined agencies or initiatives. Various good practices emerged from both desk-based and field research, which informed the study's recommendations in the following areas: (1) framing and developing NAP, (2) NAP implementation, (3) NAP monitoring and evaluation and (4) support of the OSCE and other international organizations in NAP development and implementation.

3. Applying Regional Approaches to SSG/R

This section highlights some of the main factors that should be taken into consideration in applying a regional approach to broader SSG/R programmatic activities.

3.1 Ensuring That Regional Co-operation on SSG/R Takes Place within a Broader Framework of Support

Support for regional co-operation on SSG/R needs to take place within a framework of broader support for SSG/R in a given State. Strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R should therefore not be pursued in the form of ad hoc activities. It needs to be clearly linked to national priorities on SSG/R and the overarching objectives of SSG/R support by the OSCE in a given State.[16]

For instance, strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R may be identified as a priority for OSCE support if a national priority is to enhance the fight against transnational organized crime. Careful consideration is also needed on how to enhance the sustainability of regional support, with particular reflection on building the capacity of national actors to lead such co-operation, ensuring that follow-up to regional initiatives is planned from the outset, and placing such support within a broader framework of SSG/R engagement. For instance, in the context of accession to the EU, a tool often used for supporting bilateral co-operation is "twinning projects," in which one EU Member State offers its expertise and experience on the implementation of EU legislation to another State.[17] While this does not apply directly to the OSCE, the approach of twinning may be a useful strategy for embedding study visits in a framework of a more long-term co-operation and experience-sharing in order to support participating States in the implementation of OSCE norms and principles.

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16   For more, see the chapter "Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R."

17   See European Commission (no date), *Twinning* [accessed 28 October 2021].

3.2 Including a Regional Dimension in Planning and Implementing SSG/R Activities

OSCE staff engaged in implementing SSG/R activities should ensure that the challenges and opportunities of applying a regional approach are considered already at a planning stage. SSG/R needs assessments should thus include analysis of the regional dimension in order to identify potential benefits and feasibility of a regional approach, which should subsequently inform project development and design. Among other things, this involves understanding the regional political dynamics and assessing common SSG/R-related challenges in a given region. Assessments should also consider existing regional initiatives and commitments, which may provide entry points for SSG/R activities at the national level and map existing regional bodies (networks, associations, etc.) that work with security sector institutions. Finally, assessments should also take into account lessons learned from the experiences of other States in the region in implementing similar reforms.[18]

In considering opportunities and challenges for applying a regional approach to SSG/R activities during the planning phase, OSCE staff should take advantage of experiences and knowledge of their colleagues from other OSCE Executive Structures, especially those operating in a given region. Regular planning and co-ordination meetings between different Executive Structures (e.g., regional meetings of heads of departments or heads of missions), as well as various focal points networks, can be used for this purpose. Focal points can, among other things, support efforts to identify common regional needs, share expert advice, find opportunities for pooling resources and create informal networks. Different focal point networks across Executive Structures offer an opportunity to share experiences and knowledge resources with neighbouring field operations. In less formal settings, ad hoc consultations with colleagues working on the same thematic issues in neighbouring countries can provide invaluable input to planning and designing SSG/R activities.

These colleagues can be instrumental also during the implementation phase. They can share experiences, good practices and lessons learned from their SSG/R programmatic activities. Consultations with colleagues can also help identify opportunities for pooling resources or developing new joint regional initiatives across different OSCE Executive Structures.

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18   For more, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R."

3.3 Promoting the Understanding that Regional Co-operation on SSG/R Can Be Cost-Effective

Investing in enhancing regional co-operation on SSG/R between participating States may have a long-term impact that will offset potential initial costs in terms of resources or time necessary to build mutual trust. It is important to recognize that regional co-operation on SSG/R can be cost-effective despite a certain initial investment required at the beginning. It can therefore be beneficial for the OSCE to work with existing structures and mechanisms facilitating regional co-operation in order to strengthen their capacities and thus increase the long-term sustainability of support for reform efforts in the region. Moreover, in some cases there may be cost benefits if expenses or resources for implementing SSG/R activities are pooled. Finally, the OSCE should raise awareness of the fact that, from a national perspective, it may be often more cost-effective to tackle common challenges, such as transnational organized crime or trafficking in human beings through regional co-operation.

3.4 Capitalizing on Existing Regional Knowledge Resources, Co-ordination and Information-Sharing Mechanisms

For supporting regional initiatives and ensuring co-operation across OSCE Executive Structures engaged in a given region, capitalizing on existing knowledge resources and information-sharing mechanisms can be useful in order to identify opportunities, common challenges, best practices and lessons learned. Online information-sharing tools can also provide an important platform for enhancing regional co-operation and collaboration among OSCE staff, as well as serving as useful resources for security sector professionals and civil society.

OSCE Online Tools for Co-ordination and Information-Sharing

‣ <u>POLIS Knowledge and Learning Platform:</u> A comprehensive knowledge management platform for information related to transnational threats and security developed by the OSCE Secretariat's TNTD. It consists of a Digital Library, an Events Calendar, and Country Profiles. In order to access most materials, registration is mandatory. Moreover, some materials are restricted to law enforcement only.

‣ <u>Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System (TANDIS):</u> A platform developed by the ODIHR's Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department to share and promote practical initiatives and to provide information on issues related to tolerance and non-discrimination across the OSCE region. It includes information received from the OSCE participating States, specialized institutions and other relevant organizations; country pages providing information on national initiatives, legislation, specialized bodies, statistics, etc.; thematic pages with information related to different key issues, such as racism and hate crime; international standards and instruments; and information from intergovernmental organizations, including country reports and annual reports. The system is available in English and Russian, but materials in the collection are also available in other languages.

‣ <u>Legislationline:</u> A free-of-charge online legislative database created by ODIHR's Legislative Support Unit to assist OSCE participating States in bringing their legislation into line with relevant international human-rights standards. It provides direct access to international norms and standards related to specific human dimension issues and to domestic legislation and other documents of relevance to these issues. The database is available in English and Russian.

‣ <u>OSCE E-learning Platform:</u> A learning platform for online courses developed by the OSCE. Some courses are open to public while others are restricted only to selected participants. To enrol in a course, prior registration is mandatory.

‣ <u>OSCE Communities:</u> An online solution that provides a virtual team workspace for remote collaboration and co-ordination on OSCE projects. This can be a useful tool particularly for projects that are implemented jointly by OSCE staff from more than one unit, department or Executive Structure, or in co-operation with external partners. It not only enables easy and secure sharing of all necessary materials in one place but also enables joint editing of documents, co-ordination through shared calendar(s) and timeline(s), and collaboration on creating different types of content. Each working space is accessible only to the users specifically assigned to it.

3.5 Following a Step-By-Step Approach

National ownership is a key prerequisite for the OSCE's support to SSG/R. As mentioned above, strengthening regional co-operation on certain SSG/R-related issues needs to be in line with national priorities. If the will necessary to engage in regional initiatives is lacking in a given State, the OSCE should recognize it. In order to support the development of interest in regional initiatives, taking an incremental, step-by-step approach could still be considered. Such approach could, for example, initially only aim to support regional co-operation on a technical level by, for instance, supporting the participation of national experts in regional training courses. This may contribute to both building confidence between participating States and highlighting the benefits of a regional approach, thus paving the way for a more comprehensive form of regional co-operation in the future.

3.6 Recognizing That Regional Approaches Have Their Limitations

Although States in a given region may share similar challenges, specific national requirements must not be overlooked. Regional priorities should thus always be carefully examined against national priorities to ensure that there is complementarity and, hence, a rationale for the OSCE to support them within a given State.

In some circumstances, regional approaches may also not be beneficial: for example, when States are at different stages of implementation of a certain reform process or when a participating State does not share (or does not perceive itself as sharing) similar challenges with neighbouring States. Moreover, sometimes the mandates of OSCE field operations in a given region vary too much to allow for a coherent regional approach. Certain field operations do not have mandates for regional programmatic activities and require assistance from one of the OSCE Institutions or the OSCE Secretariat if they are to give effective support to such initiatives. Appropriate assessments, including timely communication with host authorities, and exploring of possibilities with other OSCE Executive Structures, are thus essential to ensure that the benefits and challenges of a regional approach are well understood.

4. **Checklist**

The following checklist is intended to help programme/project management staff in:

- Identifying opportunities and entry points in different types of OSCE programmatic activities that can benefit from a regional approach;
- Applying a regional approach to planning and implementing SSG/R activities.

The purpose is not to "check" every item, but to provide an aide-memoire to consider key aspects and suggestions that might be relevant for your daily work.

Identifying Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R

Development and implementation of international norms and standards

☐ Map existing international norms and standards relevant for the security sector, which States are yet to ratify or implement, in order to identify possibilities for programmatic support;

☐ Raise awareness on the importance of adhering to SSG/R-related international norms and standards;

☐ Support national implementation of SSG/R-related international norms and standards through capacity-building;

☐ Support regional capacity-building initiatives and development of regional strategies and action plans on how to implement SSG/R-related elements in international commitments made by States;

☐ Organize regional workshops, seminars, and study trips to discuss progress and to exchange experiences in implementation of relevant norms and standards;

☐ Identify opportunities for developing new international norms and standards for the security sector at the regional level.

Regional capacity-building

☐ Identify challenges which are shared by participating States in a given region, and determine whether the States could benefit from a regional capacity-building;

☐ Support capacity-building through regional training, simulation exercises, workshops and "peer-to-peer" seminars;

☐ Consider how capacity-building support delivered at the regional level can be tailored to different national contexts and needs;

☐ Incorporate sharing of national experiences, good practices and lessons learned as part of a regional capacity-building, and allow enough time to exchange and discuss these in smaller formats (e.g., working groups);

☐ Ensure that, where appropriate, a broad range of state and non-state actors, including civil society and private sector, are invited to participate in regional capacity-building events to promote confidence-building and facilitate co-operation among all relevant stakeholders.

Operational co-operation and information exchange

☐ Identify security challenges that require operational co-operation and information exchange at the regional level;

☐ Facilitate networking between the security sector institutions of neighbouring States through joint activities (e.g., through joint events such as conferences, workshops, seminars or simulation exercises);

☐ Promote the benefits of regional operational co-operation and information exchange (e.g., through sharing of best practices on study visits);

☐ Support the harmonization of standards and practices at the regional level (e.g., through development of a regional manual);

☐ Support the development of regional strategies and action plans to address common challenges;

☐ Organize study visits of security sector representatives to other States of the region, which have undergone similar security sector reforms;

☐ Facilitate participation of security sector officials in relevant regional events, which are likely to promote confidence-building or to raise awareness about SSG/R.

Co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms

☐ Map existing regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms in the field of security sector, and identify opportunities for engagement with them;

☐ Raise awareness among national security sector institutions and professionals about existing regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms, including at relevant national and regional events;

☐ Provide support to relevant co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms through technical support and capacity-building;

☐ Support the establishment of new regional co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms between security sector institutions to respond to new emerging needs if there is serious interest and commitment on behalf of the States concerned.

Professional networks and associations

☐ Map existing regional professional networks and associations in the field of security sector, and identify opportunities for engagement with them;

☐ Raise awareness among national security sector institutions and professionals about relevant regional professional networks and associations that they may wish to join;

☐ Provide support to professional networks and associations for security sector in the form of technical assistance and capacity-building;

☐ Involve regional professional networks and associations when implementing SSG/R programmatic activities, including as in-kind contributors or implementing partners;

☐ Support the establishment of new regional professional networks and associations for security sector actors.

Research and data collection

☐ Identify common governance- and reform-related topics and issues that are addressed by security sector institutions from several OSCE participating States and may thus benefit from comparative research;

☐ Design research in a way that its findings and conclusions can serve as a basis for future SSG/R programmatic support, be it at the national or regional level;

☐ Engage national security sector actors, as well as relevant professional networks and associations (both national and regional), when planning, designing and conducting research;

☐ Present and disseminate findings and outcomes from research to security sector institutions from the States concerned at relevant national and international events.

Applying Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R

Ensuring that regional co-operation to SSG/R takes place within a broader framework of support

☐ Is strengthening co-operation among security sector institutions in a region part of national priorities for security sector reform in a given State?

☐ Does the national security strategy include the objective of strengthening translational co-operation with other countries?

☐ Do national actors have capacities to engage in regional co-operation on common security threats and risks?

Including a regional dimension in planning and implementing SSG/R activities

☐ Have challenges and opportunities of regional approaches been considered during the project/programme development phase? Has a regional dimension been included in the project's/programme's needs assessment?

☐ Have existing regional initiatives and commitments, which may provide entry points for reform efforts at the national level, been considered when planning SSG/R-related programmatic activities?

☐ Have lessons learned from the experiences of other States in the region in implementing similar reform efforts been taken into account when planning SSG/R support in a given State?

☐ What regular OSCE meetings and focal points networks can be used to plan and co-ordinate SSG/R activities at the regional level?

☐ Have colleagues from other OSCE Executive Structures working in a given region been consulted?

Promoting the understanding that regional co-operation on SSG/R can be cost-effective

☐ Has awareness been raised on the fact that the long-term benefits of regional co-operation are likely to outweigh initial costs?

☐ Are there regional structures that the OSCE could collaborate with or support, including through pooling resources?

☐ Has awareness been raised on the fact that it is often more cost-effective to tackle common challenges through regional co-operation?

Capitalizing on existing regional knowledge resources, co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms

☐ What existing OSCE co-ordination and information-sharing tools can be used to support regional initiatives?

Following a step-by-step approach

☐ Where national will for regional SSG/R approaches is weak or missing, has an incremental, step-by-step approach been considered?

☐ Are there opportunities to support regional co-operation on the technical level (e.g., by supporting participation of experts from a given State in relevant regional events), which are likely to promote confidence-building or awareness-raising about norms and standards related to SSG/R?

☐ Are there opportunities to organize a study visit for security sector officials from a given State to a fellow State in the region that has undergone similar security sector reforms?

Recognize that regional approaches have their limitations

☐ Are regional priorities in the field of SSG/R in line with national priorities in a given State and, hence, provide a rationale for support by the OSCE?

☐ Has an appropriate assessment on the benefits and challenges of a regional approach to SSG/R support been made?

☐ Have potential benefits of a regional approach to SSG/R activities been communicated to host authorities?

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- United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2553 (2020)* (New York, 2014), S/RES/2553.
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Websites

- Twinning: *https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/funding-and-technical-assistance/twinning_en*

- POLIS Knowledge and Learning Platform: *https://polis.osce.org/*

- Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System (TANDIS): *https://tandis.odihr.pl/*

- Legislationline: *https://www.legislationline.org/*

- OSCE E-learning Platform: *https://elearning.osce.org/*

- OSCE Communities: *https://confluence.osce.org/*

Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R

Executive Summary

The chapter provides an overview on the rationale, typology, functions and added value of needs assessments (section 1); outlines and describes main steps in the planning (section 2) and conducting needs assessments (section 3); and discusses the follow-up process to needs assessments (section 4). Finally, a practical checklist is provided to help staff in the process (section 5).

Key points from the chapter:

- **Apply a comprehensive approach in all SSG/R-related needs assessments:** Any needs assessment conducted in the area of SSG/R must be guided by a comprehensive approach, even if the assessment only focuses on one security sector institution or one thematic area (e.g., policing, anti-corruption, etc.). A comprehensive approach in this regard includes examining the extent to which the security sector is effective, accountable, inclusive and responsive; evaluating how much it operates within the framework of democratic governance and human rights; identifying the synergies between related subsectors; and collecting the perceptions of beneficiaries. Inclusivity is also required by involving a diverse set of stakeholders, including representatives of relevant security institutions, oversight actors, civil society, international actors and OSCE staff (as applicable) in all three dimensions of security.

- **Ensure national ownership:** National ownership requires engagement with national stakeholders from the very outset on the assessment's objectives, its scope, the implementation process and the subsequent handling of findings.

- **Mainstream gender and human rights:** Gender and human rights need to be effectively mainstreamed throughout the assessment by ensuring that the assessment team is not only gender-balanced but also that it possesses gender and human rights expertise, and the assessment contains a gender analysis. Moreover, the data collected must be disaggregated by sex, age and population groups (e.g., minorities), and efforts must be made to understand the differing circumstances, needs and perceptions of women, men, boys and girls. More broadly, the assessment should examine the roles of both duty-bearers (the security sector) and rights-holders (the beneficiaries).

- **Maximize the effectiveness of the needs assessment:** Adequate planning and implementation are essential to success. With regard to needs assessments, this includes clarifying the methodology, the roles and responsibilities of the assessment team and the co-ordination mechanism across all three OSCE dimensions. To maximize effectiveness, assessment teams must define the methods of data collection, recognize related challenges and manage expectations. Moreover, the assessment should be based on a situation, stakeholder and problem analysis that draws both on desk research and in-country data collection and interviews. The findings of the assessment should also be validated with national counterparts and adequately fed into OSCE project and programme planning.

Figure 1: The needs assessment process

STEPS OF THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT PROCESS

Planning for needs assessment: setting out the terms of reference

- Defining the objectives and scope
- Defining methodology
- Defining methods of and recognizing the challenges in data collection
- Identifying relevant benchmarks and key guiding questions
- Setting out roles and responsibilities
- Engaging national stakeholders from the outset
- Managing expectations
- Integrating gender aspects

Conducting the needs assessment

Preparatory analysis
- Designing assessment questions
- Reviewing relevant sources of information
- Reflecting on the regional dimension
- Conducting a stakeholder mapping
- Identifying priorities for the in-country assessment

In-country assessment
- Following an inclusive approach in organizing meetings
- Collecting primary data

Analysing and validating the results

Following up on the needs assessment

- Presenting the findings and recommendations
- Feeding the findings into planning, monitoring and evaluation

1. Rationale

A comprehensive needs assessment is of critical importance and essential added value for programmatic engagement and project activities by the OSCE and must be part of strategic planning. Therefore, this chapter provides practical guidance on how to conduct needs assessments in the field of SSG/R as part of project design, building on the OSCE Project Management Manual.[1]

Needs assessments are part of the strategic planning, which is used to determine priorities, to strengthen programme and project design, to improve decision-making and subsequently to enhance monitoring and evaluation. They are an integral element of the identification phase of the project cycle.

Figure 2: Five phases of the OSCE project cycle[2]

Project Self-evaluation

Unified Budget Process

FIVE PHASES OF THE OSCE PROJECT CYCLE

Project Implementation, Monitoring and Controlling

Project Identification

Project Development

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
1   OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010).

2   Ibid., p. 7.

Needs assessments help OSCE programme/project managers to understand a variety of factors – notably, the national priorities of reform processes, the context in which the programme/project will take place; the different stakeholders; their interests, expectations and challenges; and the strategic options to address challenges. A thorough assessment of these elements will facilitate sustainable and results-oriented approaches to SSG/R support.[3]

Figure 3: Types of SSG/R needs assessments

WHO

OSCE-driven assessments
- ‣ guide internal programming
- ‣ draw not only on the review of documents but also on consultations with national stakeholders and other external actors
- ‣ are renewed regularly (at least every three years)

Beneficiary-driven assessments
- ‣ are supported by the OSCE upon request
- ‣ may be initiated to inform national-level SSG/R planning or to acquire a better understanding of needs
- ‣ could be initiated by government or civil society

Joint assessments
- ‣ are initiated by the OSCE and other international partners
- ‣ increase coherence and the co-ordination of international support
- ‣ help clarify ways of co-ordination and divisions of labour among international actors in discussion with national stakeholders

SCOPE

- ‣ cover the entire security sector
- ‣ less rarely conducted by the OSCE as part of the OSCE project cycle but advisable over medium term

Sector-wide assessments

- ‣ focus on a specific subsector or area of SSG/R (e.g., police reform, prison reform)
- ‣ are more frequently conducted by the OSCE

Component-specific assessments

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3   See the chapter "Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R".

Needs assessments have different functions and provide important added value to different processes:

- Supporting national reform processes:
  Needs assessments provide empirical evidence of gaps, thereby justifying the establishment of priorities. They enable the OSCE to deliver tailor-made advice to national stakeholders on reform priorities. At the same time, national authorities may directly use the results of the needs assessment by feeding them into their own decision-making processes, especially when such a needs assessment is commissioned or supported by national stakeholders.

- Facilitating more effective OSCE programming by contributing to:

  - *Stronger engagement with national stakeholders.* Strong engagement with national stakeholders, including civil society, facilitates sustainable and results-oriented programming that is grounded in national needs.

  - *The identification of entry points for relevant support.* Needs assessments identify gaps that should be filled and thus ensure that the support provided is demand-driven as opposed to supply-driven. Regular monitoring of ongoing engagement can feed into needs assessments and also informal needs assessments can help to ensure that OSCE support is routinely adapted to changing circumstances and requirements, thereby maintaining the relevance of OSCE support.

  - *The identification of cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R.* By examining the relationship and interlinkages between different components of the security sector, needs assessments help to plan comprehensive and holistic support.[4]

  - *The early identification of risks and challenges.* Misconceived assumptions, unexpected resistance to reform processes, capacity limitations and other challenges might negatively affect the results expected. They may even contribute to an increase in existing tensions, despite the OSCE's good intentions. Needs assessments help to identify and mitigate such risks at an early stage.

  - *Stronger co-operation with other international actors.* Included in needs assessments are consultations with other key international actors, who are engaged in supporting the security sector, in order to identify gaps, ensure co-ordination and avoid duplication of efforts. Early engagement with international actors helps to identify potential areas for co-operation in a timely manner.

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4   See the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R".

- Providing baseline data for subsequent planning, monitoring and evaluation efforts:
  A common challenge in the area of SSG/R is the lack of baseline data for outputs and outcomes, against which to measure progress and the achievement of targets. Baseline data is necessary to measure the result and impact of the support provided and it is also a requirement of OSCE project proposals. Needs assessments help to collect and analyse relevant data and to provide the necessary information to establish baselines. This information can therefore be used to support the development of results frameworks. Data may be obtained from relevant analytical studies, research, national policy documents, statistics, interviews, surveys or relevant civil society sources. This data can subsequently inform both national and international monitoring and evaluation (M&E) efforts.[5]

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5   See also the section 4.2 below.

2. Planning the Needs Assessment: Defining the Terms of Reference

The planning process should start by defining the methodology to be used and determining the general framework and objectives of the needs assessment. It is important to engage with national stakeholders during the planning phase in order to ensure that they can help in shaping the assessment to their needs. Engaging national stakeholders in this phase also increases their commitment to implement the recommendations arising from the assessment. A key output of the planning phase is the development of **terms of reference** and agreement on them with national stakeholders.

Info Box 1

Terms of reference should summarize the following:

- ‣ Objectives and the scope of the assessment
- ‣ Methodology
- ‣ Key benchmarks and guiding questions for the assessment
- ‣ Roles, responsibilities and composition of the assessment team
- ‣ Co-ordination mechanism for the team throughout the process
- ‣ Data sources and data collection methods
- ‣ Deliverables and indicative timelines
- ‣ Reporting modalities to disseminate the findings
- ‣ Budget (if applicable)

It is good practice to highlight in the terms of reference the need for a comprehensive, inclusive, gender-sensitive (incl. gender analysis) and people-centred approach to the conduct of the assessment, which will consider the needs of different groups of women, men, girls and boys. In the area of SSG/R, such an approach includes, for example, tailoring the methodology to include consultations not only with formal (state) security sector institutions but also with representatives of civil society and non-state security actors.[6]

For additional guidance and tips on planning an SSG/R needs assessment, see:
- ‣ DCAF/ISSAT (2010), *Operational Guidance Note: Planning a Security & Justice Assessment*
- ‣ FBA (2005), *SSR Assessment Framework*, Chapter 2 (Considerations at the Planning Stage), pp. 9–15

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6   For more details, see the section 3.2.1 below.

2.1 Defining the Objectives and Scope of the Assessment

OSCE staff should start by defining the overall objectives and scope of the assessment, as this will directly affect the timeline and the resources needed. Decisions are required as to whether the assessment will be broad (i.e., sector-wide) or limited to one or multiple subsectors. The objectives should be clear to all stakeholders involved.

In the context of SSG/R, one of the key purposes of a needs assessment is to take full account of the links between the various dimensions of security. In an ideal context, the OSCE would provide support based on a needs assessment of the entire security sector. In most cases, however, due to targeted intervention, limited time and resources, assessments will only focus on a subsector of the security sector, such as police services or the judicial system. In such cases, it is nevertheless important to reflect on elements of the broader security sector, which may need to be included in the assessment to obtain a complete picture of needs and priorities.[7]

Case Study

SSG/R Needs Assessment for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (I)

From October 2020 to February 2021, the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre supported the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the conduct of a component-specific needs assessment, which focused on three thematic areas (**scope**): (1) integrity and anti-corruption in the security sector, (2) community security and community policing and (3) integrated border management. The assessment followed up on the mapping study "*OSCE Internal Mapping on Support Provided in the Area of SSG/R in Bosnia and Herzegovina*" published in 2019.

The **main objectives** of the assessment were to:
- Assess, in co-operation with the relevant authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the capacities, needs and priorities for national reform efforts in order to strengthen governance of the security sector in three selected priority areas;
- Inform future OSCE support on the basis of recommendations for whole-of-mission programmatic engagement (especially for UB and EXB programming from 2022 onward).

The **sub-objectives** of the needs assessment were to:
- Identify or assess potential entry points for the Mission (and other interested partners) to engage in more holistic support to national and local SSG/R process;
- Identify potential gaps and emerging needs in the SSG/R processes where there is an opportunity to provide support;
- Promote more holistic, whole-of-mission and cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R.

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7   For more examples, see the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R".

2.2 Defining the Methodology

Different methodologies are used to conduct needs assessments in the field of SSG/R. The choice of methodology will depend on the purpose, the financial and human resources available and the access to data. Some examples include:

- **The capacity, integrity and sustainability framework (institution-centred):** This framework identifies the capacity (effectiveness), integrity (accountability) and sustainability gaps of security sector institutions at the individual, organizational and external levels. This methodology helps to achieve a detailed understanding of the needs and opportunities of security institutions and to break them down into layers that allow targeted programming support. While institution-centred assessments help in understanding how to do things effectively and efficiently, they do not indicate whether these are the right things to do. Thus, the findings do not respond to key questions like: *Do the security services provided respond to the real security needs of the population?*

Figure 4: Capacity, integrity and sustainability framework[8]

	CAPACITY/ EFFECTIVENESS	INTEGRITY/ ACCOUNABILITY	SUSTAINABILITY
INDIVIDUAL	Education Experience Aptitude	Human Rights Conduct Affiliation	Handover Performance Mentoring Ongoing Training
ORGANISATIONAL	Structures Resources Rules/Mandate	Representation Discipline Transperancy	Maintenance Budget Auditing
EXTERNAL	National Strategies Management Bodies Cooperation	Formal Oversight Informal Oversight Independence	

8   DCAF/ISSAT, *Top 10 Programming Tools for Security and Justice Reform* (Geneva, 2015), p. 12.

• **The community-based approach (user-centred):** This type of assessment enables a better understanding of the security needs of the end-users, who are the people and communities in a given country. It also identifies the security institutions that should but do not respond to these needs. While this methodology enables the development of solutions that keep people at the centre of project/programme design, it may not always provide enough detailed information on the reasons behind the action (or inaction) of the security sector and, therefore, may overlook issues related to the sustainability of reforms.[9]

Figure 5: Five stages of the community-based (user-centred) approach

5 STAGES OF THE COMMUNITY-BASED (USER-CENTRED) APPROACH

Identigying security needs of "users".

⬇

Assessing the extent to which the security sector is addressing the identified needs.

⬇

Mapping international support for the security sector to meet the identified needs.

⬇

Identifying the gaps between 2 & 3 versus 1.

⬇

Formulatting policy recommendations and validating them with "users".

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
9   DCAF/ISSAT, *The Community-Based Approach to Criminal Justice Assessments* (Geneva, 2014).

Ideally, a mixed methodology should be applied, even if there are often time constraints and insufficient financial and human resources that hinder the assessment of all aspects. However, even when compromises need to be found, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the challenges and opportunities offered by the methodology selected.

For a detailed guidance on how to apply these two approaches, see:
‣ DCAF/ISSAT (2014), *A Community-Based Approach to Criminal Justice Assessments*
‣ DCAF/ISSAT (2015), *Using the Capacity, Integrity and Sustainability Framework*

Case Study

SSG/R Needs Assessment for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (II)

This needs assessment followed a user-centred approach, which focused on the security-related needs, problems, issues and experiences of the end-users – individuals and communities. At the core of the assessment, were the following questions:

‣ *What are the security needs of the population in relation to the three thematic areas outlined above?*
‣ *What are the specific needs of women, men, boys and girls in this regard?*
‣ *How effectively are the country's security sector institutions addressing these needs?*
‣ *What type of international support is already provided to security sector institutions to address the identified needs?*
‣ *What gaps exist between the security needs identified and the capacities of security sector institutions to address these needs? What gaps exist in the international support provided?*
‣ *How can the OSCE comprehensively support Bosnia and Herzegovina's security sector institutions to address the gaps identified in a sustainable fashion?*

When examining the institutional capacity to address the needs of individuals and communities, a particular emphasis was placed on accountability, oversight, gender equality and human rights. The methodology used reflected the OSCE's approach to SSG/R in that the security sector should be responsive to the security needs of all people and that SSG/R support should reflect needs of all segments of society, while integrating gender equality and human rights.

2.3 Defining the Methods and Recognizing Challenges in Data Collection

The terms of reference should set out the initial sources and methods for data collection, ideally consisting of a combination of public and internal data sources, qualitative and quantitative data collection methods and analysis methods relevant to the sector. Statistics and information collected about the sector and on perceptions of security among the population should always be disaggregated by sex and population groups (e.g., minorities).

Figure 6: Data collection methods

	QUALITATIVE METHODS — A lot of data about a limited number of subjects:	QUANTITATIVE METHODS — Limited data about a lot of subjects:
	(-) limited generalization (low reliability) (+) understanding an issue in detail (high validity)	(-) Limited understanding of an issue in detail (low validity) (+) Generalization of results (high reliability)
PRIMARY SOURCES (sources containing original data that have not been interpreted)	• **One-on-one** (semi-structured) **interviews** • **Focus groups** (semi-structured) • **Observations** • **Case studies**	• **Expert surveys** • **Public surveys** • **Official statistics** • **Structured observation**
SECONDARY SOURCES (interpret, discuss or analyse original – primary – data)	• **Documents analyses** (records, reports, articles, books, etc.)	• **Structured content analysis** of documents (records, reports, articles, books, etc.)

Data collection, whether desk-based or field research, can be challenging, mainly because of the **accessibility and reliability of data**. Information related to the security sector is often considered sensitive, either because of national security concerns or because it is highly personal – for example, information on gender-based violence. Therefore, it is important to collect relevant publicly available data before requesting internal information. To build trust with respondents, clear assurances are required on how information will be stored and about how the findings of the needs assessment will be disseminated. When collecting data on sensitive issues, face-to-face interviews are often more appropriate than written questionnaires.

Empirical obstacles related to the reliability and accurate interpretation of quantitative data (e.g., crime statistics) also need to be recognized. To increase the reliability and effectiveness of the needs assessment, data sources need to be triangulated through both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. To increase the credibility of findings, challenges or short-comings in collecting data must be included in the final assessment report so that the methodo-logical limitations are made clear.

> **For an overview of data collection methods in project self-evaluation, see:**
> ‣ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers,* section 12.8 on "Data Collection, Analysis and Interpretation"

Case Study

SSG/R Needs Assessment for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (III)

This assessment employed three main methods of data collection:

1. During the preparatory desk research, the assessment teams used **documents analysis** to search for relevant primary and secondary data. This data came from the Mission's programmatic documents (UB and EXB project proposals and evaluation/self-evaluation reports), relevant OSCE reports and publications, relevant reports by governmental and non-governmental bodies, relevant laws, national strategies and policy documents, as well as reports produced by civil society, academia and other international actors.

2. Document analysis was complemented by **focus group discussions** with relevant com-munities and **informal interviews** with relevant OSCE staff from both the Mission and the Secretariat.

3. During the in-country assessment, primary data and information was collected through **semi-structured interviews** with representatives of relevant national security sector insti-tutions, academia and civil society, as well as with the international community. In total, almost 180 individuals were interviewed. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews were conducted by video-conference or by phone.

2.4 **Setting Benchmarks and Developing Guiding Questions**

Benchmarks can be used to identify the priorities to be examined during a needs assessment. While there is no consistent set of internationally recognized benchmarks for SSG/R, there is general agreement that the security sector should be both effective and accountable.[10] Therefore, some of the key SSG/R benchmarks are related to effectiveness (e.g., adequate service delivery) and accountability (e.g., internal accountability and external oversight, respect for human rights and gender equality, etc.). Other benchmarks may, for example, relate to the capacity development needs of relevant institutions.

In some areas of SSG/R, specific international standards may exist that can be used to set benchmarks – for example, the UN's Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the UN's Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women or the UN's Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice. Key international and national commitments may also be used as benchmarks, such as levels of implementation of the UN SDGs or OSCE principles and commitments (e.g., derived from the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security), as well as evaluations and recommendations by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) or opinions of the Venice Commission. Other relevant national policy/action plans, such as for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, may also be of use.

To complement the benchmarks set and to specify in greater detail the issues that the assessment will focus on, the terms of reference should always include (preliminary) guiding questions for the assessment. The guiding questions need to be derived from the assessment's scope. They can be formulated generically but should be specific enough to articulate what should be examined. They can be understood as "research questions" that will guide the work of the assessment team. When formulating the guiding questions, it may also be useful to consider the structure of the final report. In practice, the guiding questions may need to be refined during the assessment, once the first findings begin to emerge; however, they should not be changed fundamentally.

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10   For more, see section 2.2 in the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context".

2.5 **Establishing Roles and Responsibilities**

Clear roles and responsibilities need to be assigned, not only when the needs assessment is jointly conducted with other international actors or beneficiary-driven but also when the OSCE is in the lead. Roles and responsibilities should be assigned in four areas: (1) leading the assessment, (2) contributing to the assessment (human and financial resources), (3) collecting data and analysing it and (4) disseminating the results of the assessment.

In leading the assessment, this role could be filled internally within the OSCE or externally by a national or international expert. Regardless of who leads it, the assessment will likely require expert contributions from a number of OSCE Executive Structures and national stakeholders. Within the OSCE, roles and responsibilities may become blurred as expertise is often required in two or all three OSCE dimensions. Therefore, clarity is required on the institutional lead, who will co-ordinate expertise within the OSCE. A cross-dimensional perspective can be ensured by including representatives from the different OSCE dimensions in the assessment team by consulting them during the assessment process.[11]

The type of expertise required in the assessment team should be clarified during the planning phase and reflected in the terms of reference. There is a particular need to identify the areas for which external experts will need to be hired to complement internal expertise. In the field of SSG/R, expertise may be required to analyse the political context of SSG/R, understand the holistic nature of SSG/R, provide component-specific knowledge (e.g., on policing or border management), review other related reform process that affect SSG/R or conduct a gender or conflict analysis for the sector. The assessment team should also be gender-balanced and include experts who speak the national language. If an external consultant is hired to lead and/ or support the assessment, the appropriate amount of lead time must be factored in to identify and contract the expert in accordance with OSCE regulations.

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11   For more, see the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R".

SSG/R Needs Assessment for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (IV)

This needs assessment was:

- **Co-ordinated and managed** by the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, in close co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- **Conducted** by six external international and local consultants, in three teams of two people each, with one international and one local consultant for each thematic area;
- **Supported** by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance's International Security Sector Advisory Team (DCAF/ISSAT) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), which provided methodological advice and external quality review;
- **Supported** by a group of focal points for each thematic area from all dimensions within the Mission, as well as relevant staff from the OSCE Secretariat, who provided input to the consultants and reviewed their outputs.

Lessons learned:

- Defining a **clear division of labour from the outset** contributed to effective management and co-ordination of the process, which involved a wide range of internal and external actors.
- Appointing **focal points from all dimensions within the Mission** helped the consultants to gain a comprehensive overview of the Mission's work and the general situation with regard to security needs and the security sector of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was instrumental in validating the findings and recommendations.
- Having a **team of both national and international consultants** helped to combine international best practices with a thorough understanding of the local context. The national consultants also helped to facilitate more effective interviews with national interlocutors, which was essential at a time when in-person meetings were restricted due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Holding **regular co-ordination meetings** helped to ensure effective monitoring in line with the **milestones** and **timeline** established for the process.
- Having each chapter of the final report written by a different team required **additional time and resources** to ensure consistency and quality throughout the text. When multiple experts are involved in the assessment, having one person lead in drafting the report may help to reduce resource burdens.
- **Delays can be caused by external factors** (e.g., recruitment and availability of experts, official approvals for interviews with state officials, etc.). Therefore, the timeline should include a buffer to provide for such contingencies.

2.6 Engaging with National Stakeholders from the Outset

When planning a needs assessment, defining co-ordination modalities among the different partners is key. Even when an assessment is OSCE-driven, efforts should be made to involve national authorities and non-governmental actors, including civil society, in order to support national ownership. In OSCE-driven assessments, it is thus important to explain and consult regarding the purpose of the assessment with national stakeholders, to request their practical support and to keep them informed of the results. The OSCE should also discuss with national representatives the findings of the assessment prior to their publication and agree an appropriate format to disseminate them. Whether the assessment is OSCE- or beneficiary-driven, the selection of national stakeholders to engage in the process should be carefully planned.[12]

2.7 Managing Expectations

As SSG/R can be a sensitive topic for individuals and institutions, some national stakeholders may object to the assessment and not wish to provide information. A number of approaches can be used to mitigate this challenge. First, OSCE staff should take the time to explain the purpose of the needs assessment, also highlighting the benefits that national stakeholders may derive from it. Second, OSCE staff should determine the modalities for disseminating and following up on the results of the assessment; it may be necessary to agree with national stakeholders whether the results will be made public or remain internal or to confirm that they will not be publicly released without prior approval. Alternatively, agreement might be sought on developing a short version for the public and a longer internal version that contains more sensitive information. However, OSCE staff should take care not to raise expectations, including hopes among national stakeholders that the assessment will result in immediate funding for reforms. Therefore, careful consideration must be given to the messages that will be communicated in preparing for the assessment and after it has been concluded.

2.8 Integrating Gender into SSG/R Needs Assessments

Gender is an important factor in any needs assessment and should, therefore, be mainstreamed throughout the entire process. Gender mainstreaming is much more than mere consultations with women's groups; it involves understanding gender as an integral part of the assessment, rather than an external factor. Gender aspects should be included within the scope of the assessment, either as a separate objective (e.g., to assess the extent to which an institution upholds gender equality internally and in its operations or services) or as a key aspect of other set objectives (e.g., as fundamental to understanding the effectiveness and accountability of a security institution).

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12   For further details, see the section 3.2.1 below.

Gender is also important in the selection of the assessment team and involves not only selecting women and men as experts but also ensuring that all team members have the skills to integrate gender perspectives or at least understand the importance of doing so. Other important factors include the need to consult women, LGBTIQ and other groups during the assessment, as well as the benefits of disaggregating data by sex and age when collecting data, including interviews and public surveys.

For further information on gender and needs assessments in the field of SSG/R, see:
- DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW (2008), *Security Sector Reform Assessment, Monitoring & Evaluation and Gender* (Gender and Security Sector Reform Toolkit);
- DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women (2019), *Integrating Gender in Project Design and Monitoring for the Security and Justice Sector* (Gender and Security Toolkit).

3. Conducting the Needs Assessment

3.1 Preparatory Analysis (Desk Research)

The preparatory analysis for a needs assessment is conducted through desk research to systematically gather available primary and secondary data. The analysis maps the broad political, economic, security, institutional and legal context in which the security sector operates. It is also used to identify gaps in data and the questions that will need to be answered during the in-country assessment in order to fill those gaps. A comprehensive preparatory analysis thus helps to plan a purposeful in-country assessment and will consequently reduce the amount of resources required.

> **For additional guidance and tips on conducting an SSG/R needs assessment, see:**
> ‣ DCAF/ISSAT (2010), *Operational Guidance Note: Conducting a Security & Justice Assessment*
> ‣ FBA (2005), *SSR Assessment Framework*, Chapter 3 (Background Analysis), pp. 16–21

While some of the methods for the preparatory analysis may have already been defined in the planning phase (e.g., methods of data collection), the following additional aspects should be considered during the preparatory analysis.

3.1.1 Designing the assessment questions

Based on the guiding questions specified in the terms of reference, the assessment team will develop more detailed questions to help in collecting and analysing data. These assessment questions should be used during both the desk-research analysis of data and the in-country collection of data (e.g., through semi-structured interviews or focus groups). The following box provides a non-exhaustive list of sample questions for comprehensive SSG/R needs assessments. For further material, see the list of resources at the end of this section.

Indicative Guiding Questions for Needs Assessments

Mapping the context:

▸ What is the political, economic and security situation of the country and what are the implications for the security sector?
▸ What are the regional dynamics that could have an impact on SSG/R efforts?
▸ Who are the relevant stakeholders and what are the power dynamics between them? How could these support or hinder the reform of the security sector?
▸ What are the roles and relations between women, men, girls and boys in the given country? What are the implications of such gender dynamics on the security sector?

Mapping the potential for national ownership of reforms:[13]

National security vision:
▸ Is there a national security policy or strategy in place that defines a national vision?
▸ Does the national security policy/strategy provide clear priorities that may enable the SSG/R process to realize this vision?
▸ Was the national vision developed in a consultative manner and does it reflect the priorities of all national stakeholders (including civil society, minority groups, etc.)?
▸ Is there an evident political commitment to reform this area?
▸ Are there any political obstacles to further reform?

National capacity to co-ordinate and implement the SSG/R process:
▸ Does the government possess the capacity to co-ordinate and implement the SSG/R process?
▸ Is there a donor co-ordination mechanism in place led by national stakeholders?
▸ Are the financial and human resources of the security sector sufficient to implement the SSG/R process?
▸ Are there ongoing reforms or budgetary commitments, which demonstrate that the national government is able or willing to undergo further reforms?

National financial responsibility:
▸ Does the reform process fully depend on external funding or will the government allocate funds for reform efforts?
▸ Are national funding decisions related to the security sector in line with the national vision for SSG/R?

National capacities for monitoring and evaluation:
▸ Is there a national M&E mechanism in place for SSG/R implementation?
▸ Is the government ready to implement the recommendations derived from M&E?

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13   These categories of national ownership are adapted from United Nations SSR Task Force, *UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform* (New York, 2012).

Mapping the perceptions of the population:

- What are people's security needs?
- What do boys, girls, women and men perceive as major security risks?
- Do boys, girls, women and men trust security sector institutions and feel that their security needs are addressed effectively?
- What are the security perceptions and needs of minority communities (if applicable)?
- What are the perceptions of women, men, boys and girls regarding efforts to prevent sexual and gender-based violence?

Mapping the effectiveness of the formal (state) and informal (non-state) security sector:

Roles and responsibilities:
- Are there clear provisions in the legal and constitutional framework that set out the mandates, roles and responsibilities of the security sector?
- Are there any overlapping roles and responsibilities?
- Do the provisions of the legal framework correspond to the reality on the ground?
- To what extent are security sector institutions effectively managed at the strategic level, in particular with regard to strategic communication, strategic planning, budget development, reporting and analysis, and internal regulations?

Human resources:
- What are the numbers of personnel and their ranks/positions (disaggregated by sex)?
- Are women equally represented in the security sector?
- Are minority groups (such as Roma and Sinti) proportionally represented in the security sector?
- What are the obstacles to the recruitment, retention and advancement of women and/or minority groups?
- Is the education/training provided to staff helping to enhance the professionalism of the respective institution?
- What are the critical training needs (or training deficits)?

Performance:
- Do current security sector reform priorities effectively reflect the needs of girls, boys, women and men?
- What are the existing and emerging operational capability/capacity gaps?
- Does the security sector have the human, financial and material resources needed to fulfil its mandate?
- To what extent does the institution use its resources efficiently?
- Does the institution have adequate management practices in place to perform effectively?
- How is the security sector implementing its mandate in practice?
- What gaps need to be filled?
- Is sexual and gender-based violence reported, effectively responded to and prosecuted?
- How does the criminal justice system respond when a crime is committed?

Co-ordination and partnerships:
‣ What is the relationship between security sector institutions generally?
‣ What is the relationship between the police and prosecutors?
‣ What is the relationship between the security providers and those responsible for security management and oversight?
‣ Are there functioning co-ordination mechanisms in place between related institutions, including non-state security and justice providers?
‣ What is the relationship between civil society and security sector institutions?

Mapping the accountability of the security sector:

Internal accountability of the security sector:
‣ Are there mechanisms for internal controls (e.g., codes of conduct or disciplinary mechanisms)?
‣ Are the mechanisms being used?
‣ Do investigations of misconduct result in appropriate action?
‣ Is there evidence of corruption?
‣ Does the security sector respect human rights?

External oversight:
‣ Are there clear provisions in the legal and constitutional framework to enable oversight bodies to play their roles effectively?
‣ Are there legal ambiguities or deficits that influence the effectiveness and accountability of the institutions?
‣ Are there appropriate mechanisms for external oversight (e.g., parliament, ombuds institutions)?
‣ Are these mechanisms performing their oversight role? If not, why not?
‣ What civil society organizations are active in the area of SSG/R? Do civil society and the media contribute to monitoring the security sector, including non-state security and justice providers?
‣ Is the security sector subject to the same public financial management as other public sector institutions?
‣ Does civil society participate in parliamentary hearings? Does it have the capacity to provide expertise?

For more examples of illustrative questions to guide SSG/R assessments, see:
‣ OECD (2008), *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (pp. 52–56)
‣ FBA, *Assessment Framework Insert – Sectorial Questions*

For additional guidance on assessing the criminal justice system, including specific questions to assess different parts of the security sector, see:
‣ UNODC (2006), *Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit*

For additional guidance on assessing defence, see:

▸ RAND (2010), *Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool*

For assessment questions that examine the interaction between the different criminal justice sector institutions, other governmental agencies and non-state actors, see:

▸ OSCE (2013), *Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform*

For examples of questions to assess the capacity of parliaments to conduct security sector oversight, see:

▸ Fuior, T. (2011), *Parliamentary Powers in Security Sector Governance*, pp. 35–59 (Toolkit for Parliamentary Self-Assessment).

3.1.2   Reviewing relevant sources of information

Information from multiple sources and institutions (see info box 3) should be reviewed to ensure a broad understanding of the political context, the legal framework, previously identified gaps and challenges, evaluation findings and lessons learned, and the roles and responsibilities of security institutions. Gender-related aspects must also be considered, such as the security risks and needs of women, men, boys and girls and their access to security services, as well as what hinders gender equality in the security sector. A specific gender analysis of the security sector, including on the representation of women in senior positions and their roles in decision-making, can help to identify gender-related gaps and needs.

3.1.3   Reflecting on the regional dimension

During the desk research, appropriate consideration also needs to be given to the regional dimension, as it is an important element of situation analysis. The regional dimension may include regional conflict dynamics, sources of cross-border tensions (e.g., organized crime or drug trafficking) and regional co-operation dynamics (e.g., regional networks or platforms). Regional challenges may require specific actions in SSG/R, such as strengthening international co-operation. Desk research should therefore seek to answer the following questions:

- Are there ongoing initiatives or existing commitments at the regional or international level that may provide entry points for national reform efforts?
- Have other states in the region recently undergone similar reform processes from which lessons may be learned?
- Would a regional approach to SSG/R support be valuable?[14]

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14   For more, see the chapter "Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R".

Info Box 3

Relevant Sources of Information

National and international strategic and legal documents	OSCE documents
▸ Peace agreement(s) (if relevant) ▸ National security strategy, policy documents and action plans related to the security sector (rule of law, justice reform, prison reform, etc.) ▸ Strategic documents related to horizontal governance (public administration reform, Parliament, oversight reform, etc.) ▸ National laws pertinent to SSG/R ▸ International conventions ratified by the host government ▸ Other regional and international political and policy commitments (e.g., SDGs)	▸ Mandates of OSCE field operations ▸ Previous needs assessments ▸ OSCE questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, including state responses ▸ Past activities of OSCE institutions and field operations, including former project evaluations and self-evaluations ▸ Political and monitoring reports (e.g., by ODIHR, HCNM, RFoM) and review of legal framework by ODIHR ▸ Thematic annual reports (e.g., on police-related activities, gender) and assessments (e.g., ODIHR field assessment visit reports on Roma and Sinti issues) ▸ Former MoUs with host governments ▸ Opinions by ODIHR on legislation related to the security sector ▸ Election assessment and observation reports by ODIHR
Other national documents	**Documents produced by other actors**
▸ Sectoral strategies (e.g., police reform strategy) ▸ Operational policy (e.g., human resources management policy, code of ethics) ▸ National action plans (e.g., on gender, anti-trafficking, Roma and Sinti) ▸ Crime statistics, victimization studies, public surveys, statistics on the ethnicities of arrested persons	▸ Civil society assessments ▸ Studies and reports by academia/think tanks ▸ Media reports ▸ Reports by Transparency International, Freedom House, International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, European Roma Rights Centre, etc. ▸ Former assessments, evaluations and progress reports by international actors (e.g., Council of Europe, European Commission, donors)

3.1.4 Stakeholder mapping and identifying priorities for the in-country assessment

Data collected during the preparatory phase should be analysed to identify priorities for the subsequent in-country assessment. Priorities may be identified on the basis of:

- **Gaps in information:** The desk-based research may highlight areas where information is lacking. Such areas should be given special attention during the in-country assessment so that interviews can help to complete the picture.
- **Potential priorities for reform:** Potential gaps and priority needs for SSG/R may be identified during the research. Assumptions about needs should be tested through interviews during the in-country assessment to ensure they hold true.

On the basis of the preliminary gaps and priorities identified during the desk-based preparatory analysis, the key stakeholders can be mapped. Based on the stakeholder mapping, decisions can be taken on specific stakeholders who should be interviewed in order to fill specific gaps, in addition to interviewing a broad representative sample of interlocutors.

> **For possible tools that can be used for stakeholder mapping, see:**
> ‣ DCAF/ISSAT, *Stakeholder Analysis Tool*
> ‣ FBA (2005), *SSR Assessment Framework*, Annex B
>   (Example of Stakeholder Analysis Matrix), pp. 35

3.2 In-Country Assessment

The next step of the assessment process is to collect primary data in the country in question. The in-country assessment will be based on the preparatory analysis and tailored to fill the information gaps identified and/or to test the validity of the assumptions made about priority needs. The in-country assessment should include meetings with national and international stakeholders, who represent a variety of areas relevant to the assessment, including national authorities (beneficiaries), civil society organizations and other non-state actors (academia, think tanks, research groups), and international actors active in the sector. In the OSCE context, the most common methods of primary data collection in the area of SSG/R include semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Occasionally, processes and procedures may also be observed.

> **For additional guidance and tips on in-country assessment, see:**
> ‣ FBA (2005), *SSR Assessment Framework*, Chapter 4
>   (In-country Assessment Phase), pp. 16–21

3.2.1   Inclusive approach to stakeholder engagement and interviews

Assessments in the area of SSG/R must be inclusive when selecting interlocutors and should seek to engage both those providing SSG/R assistance and those benefiting from such support. As the perceptions and security needs within and outside the capital may differ significantly, efforts should also be made to meet with relevant representatives from regional and rural areas.

When organizing meetings, representatives of the following categories of interlocutors should be included:

- **Security sector officials:** If the assessment is intended to be comprehensive, meetings will need to be held with a broad selection of security sector actors.[15] If the assessment is intended to focus on a specific area of the security sector, for example, defence or criminal justice, meetings should still be held with representatives of closely related areas as they can provide external perspectives and additional information (e.g., with regard to co-ordination and co-operation, effectiveness, etc.).

- **Civil society and other non-state actors:** In needs assessments, representatives of civil society and other non-state actors are often overlooked but essential interlocutors. They often possess knowledge about particular security challenges faced by the general population or by certain groups, such as women or minorities. Thus, they may have insight on specific priorities that should be addressed through reform efforts and knowledge of ongoing relevant projects. Consultations with civil society and other non-state actors should include women and minority organizations and/or human rights groups, independent think tanks, academia, research institutes or even chambers of commerce.

- **Oversight actors:** In order to assess the accountability of the security sector, consultations should be held with representatives of parliament, the judiciary and other relevant national oversight bodies, such as ombuds institutions, commissioners or anti-corruption agencies.

- **International actors:** To help identify lessons learned from previous international interventions as well as current gaps, it is important to map past, current and planned international support and relevant lessons learned. International actors too may be able to provide a different perspective on the reform process as well as donor co-ordination efforts.

- **OSCE field staff:** OSCE field operations are one of the OSCE's significant comparative advantages. Therefore, if present in the country under assessment, OSCE field staff should be consulted about the work of the security sector, the population's perception of it, past experiences and lessons learned and any specific challenges on the ground. The field offices of

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15   See Figure 2 in the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context".

OSCE field operations have at times experienced difficulties in feeding information into policy processes at the capital level. Therefore, needs assessments provide an ideal opportunity to ensure that localized information is captured and shared with appropriate stakeholders.

3.2.2   Primary data collection

Primary data should be collected on the basis of the questions developed during the preparatory phase. The purpose is to collect data that is not available in the secondary and primary sources collected through the desk research. In the OSCE context, this will be usually done through semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups. Several important points should be kept in mind when using these methods:

First, the same set of questions need to be asked of all respondents representing the same groups (e.g., civil society, security providers) so that the data collected can be compared and triangulated. While each interview/focus group will have its own pace and direction, a certain degree of standardization is required.

Second, to capture all information, thorough notes are required. Respondents should always be made aware that all information they provide will be treated as confidential and anonymous. If possible, the interviewer should be accompanied by a dedicated note taker. Interviews can also be recorded, but this may not be feasible in some contexts. Even if a respondent agrees to be recorded, their readiness to speak openly may be indirectly influenced. If an interview will be recorded, informed consent must be sought from the respondent, regardless of whether the recording is only for internal purposes.

Finally, when conducting interviews with persons in vulnerable situations, the do-no-harm principle (DNH) must always be strictly followed. The DNH principle recognizes the potential negative effects of interventions and the need to take them into consideration beforehand. In the context of needs assessments, DNH means that consideration is given to risks that persons in vulnerable situations who participate in the assessment may face by being involved in the process itself, and that adequate mitigation measures are taken to provide additional safeguards for their engagement in order to avoid causing any harm.

For additional guidance on DNH, see:
‣ CDA (2004), *The Do No Harm Handbook*

3.3 **Analysing and Validating the Results**

Once sufficient information has been gathered by the assessment team, it must be compiled and analysed to identify key findings and recommendations. The guiding questions developed at the start of the exercise (section 3.1.1) can be used to structure the analysis and the options for the way forward. Following that structure, the data can be analysed as follows:

- **Understanding the context:** The context should include a **situation analysis** and a **stakeholder analysis**. Key questions include: How is the general political and economic situation in the state concerned expected to affect the performance of security sector institutions and opportunities for SSG/R? What is the general situation with regard to security sector institutions' service delivery – what works well, what are challenges? What is the situation within the security sector with regard to human rights and gender equality? What are the security needs and the security perceptions of women, men, boys and girls? How do such gender relations interact with power dynamics in the given context? Are there important national processes and regional dynamics that need to be considered? To what extent will the situation and the power dynamics affect the potential for reform efforts? Which other actors (host government, civil society, donors, international organizations) play a role in the sector and its governance? What are the power dynamics between the main stakeholders? Which parties are likely to positively and negatively react to the SSG/R process?

- **Considering the potential for national ownership of reforms:** What is the national vision of security? Are national authorities ready to engage in reforms? Would any groups (e.g., women, youth, minorities or other) be in a particularly vulnerable situation in the process? What are the national financial and human capacities to design, implement and monitor the reform process? How much reliance will there be on external support? In which areas will there likely be more political will to engage (e.g., because the area is perceived as a priority or is less sensitive than other areas)? Is there a willingness to strengthen both the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector?

- **Understanding which security needs of the population are being met and which are not and why (including both effectiveness and accountability gaps):** This is the core of the assessment and the **problem analysis**. Key questions include: What are the key security problems and needs of women, men, boys and girls? What hinders security sector institutions from addressing these problems and needs? Are hindrances linked to political will, institutional capacities or legislative gaps? What legal and policy gaps have been identified? What are the institutional capacity and capacity development gaps? Are there geographical differences in service delivery between local governments? What are the preconditions for sustainability of institutional support actions? What is the role (if any) of the actors involved in the external oversight of the security sector in front of these challenges? What are the weaknesses and strengths of existing internal accountability systems?

Political Economy Analysis

The findings from analysing the situation, the problem, the stakeholders, national owner-ship and national capacity, etc. can help in developing a political economy analysis. Political economy analysis can be defined as "the interaction of political and economic processes in a society, the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time."[16] Thus, a political economy analysis will help to provide a comprehensive picture of the context in which security sector institutions operate and to identify the best options for the way forward. It aims to increase understanding about the interaction between institutions and stakeholders, through a political and economic lens, and to explain why institutions per-form in one way and not another. With this knowledge, the right incentives and constraints can be identified that enable or challenge behavioural change (and its sustainability over time) in the security sector. This knowledge can help in developing programmatic support and the design of context-specific reforms towards sustainable progress.

For additional guidance on political economy analysis, see:
- OECD (2015), *A Governance Practitioner's Notebook*
  (chapter "Putting political economy to use in aid policies")
- Oversees Development Institute (2016), *Using political economy analysis in conflict security and justice programmes*
- GSDRC (2014), *Political Economy Analysis: Topic Guide*

- **Identifying options for the way forward:** Which areas of reform should be prioritized? Is it necessary to pursue quick wins in order to build confidence or support for more compre-hensive reforms? Do the priority areas identified for support match the OSCE's mandates, areas of expertise and capacities? If not, can the OSCE share the findings with other actors who are better able to provide support? Are there issues on which close collaboration with other international actors would be beneficial?

After analysing the results, they should be **validated**. The purpose of validation is to categorize the preliminary findings and recommendations so that they can be presented to the benefi-ciaries and partners for feedback and confirmation. Feedback can be sought in various ways, including validation workshops, focus group discussions, follow-up interviews with selected respondents from the in-country assessment, or written questionnaires. If the needs assessment is meant to provide recommendations for OSCE programmatic activities, OSCE staff should be involved in the validation exercise. Feedback from the validation exercise should be incorporat-ed into the final needs assessment report and recommendations.

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16   Department for International Development, *Political Economy Analysis – How To Note* (2009).

SSG/R Needs Assessment for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (V)

This needs assessment was conducted in five stages:

1. **Methodology workshops:** The process started with a series of workshops conducted by DCAF/ISSAT to ensure that all three teams of international and local consultants applied a consistent methodology. The workshops were also used to identify the users (individuals and communities) in each of the three thematic areas: (1) integrity and anti-corruption, (2) community security and policing and (3) integrated border management. The Mission's focal points for each thematic area also participated in the workshops.

2. **Preparatory analysis:** The workshops were followed by desk research conducted by each team to map the security needs of users and to identify the relevant national security sector actors and international donors. The teams complemented the desk research in consultation with civil society representatives of specific groups of users and the Mission's programmatic staff. Some teams also held focus group discussions with relevant groups. The outcomes of this stage included a short situational analysis, a stakeholder mapping and questionnaires for semi-structured interviews with different groups of respondents (security sector representatives, international community, civil society).

3. **In-country assessment:** In the next stage, the assessment teams conducted semi-structured interviews with representatives from relevant national security sector institutions, academia, civil society and the international community. In total, almost 180 individuals were interviewed. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, most interviews were conducted by video-conference or by phone. Some interviews took place in person with strict adherence to safety measures.

4. **Analysis:** In the fourth stage, the assessment teams analysed the data collected to identify gaps between users' needs, the capacities of the security sector and the support provided by the international community. Based on the analysis, the assessment teams formulated recommendations for the Mission's future programmatic support to the security sector in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. **Validation:** To validate the results, the interim recommendations were presented to relevant staff from the Mission and the Secretariat in December 2020. After that, the draft report was shared for written comments with staff from the Mission and the Secretariat, DCAF/ISSAT and the FBA. Three validation workshops were then held with Secretariat and Mission staff in February 2021. Based on workshops and the written feedback received, additional findings and recommendations were elaborated and refined in March–April 2021. The report was finalized in May 2021.

For more information on how to conduct a situation analysis, stakeholder analysis or problem analysis, see:

‣ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (sections 5.5–5.9)

For a list of practical tools that can be used for analysis, see:

‣ FBA (2005), *SSR Assessment Framework*, Annex C: Matrix of Analytical Tools

‣ DCAF/ISSAT (2015), *Top 10 Programming Tools for Security and Justice Reform*

For conflict analysis and power relations, see:

‣ Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2005), *Conflict Analysis Tools*

‣ The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (2006), *Power Analysis*

4. **Following Up on the Needs Assessment**

The last phase of the needs assessment is to follow up on the results by disseminating the findings and ensuring they are put to good use.

4.1 **Disseminating the Findings and Recommendations**

With whom the findings should be shared and how they will be disseminated should have been determined during the planning phase. This planning should also have included how feedback will be incorporated and who will be responsible for implementing the recommendations. In most cases, the findings will be delivered in written form as a report to the main stakeholders (both the OSCE and national partners). If the results are to be shared more widely, the findings should first be shared with the stakeholders involved to obtain their feedback and to agree on how to address the recommendations made.

4.2 **Feeding the Findings into Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation**

The results of the needs assessment should be analysed and fed into OSCE project and programme planning. In particular, the findings should inform the development of projects and programmes that the OSCE will prioritize for support, as well as the short-, mid- and long-term results, to which OSCE activities should contribute. In addition to the analysis of the data and the main problems identified, these findings should contribute to an understanding of relevant cause-and-effect relationships – for example, by means of a Theory of Change – and identify how the activities and outputs of the projects will lead to addressing the core problem identified or what results would be required towards the mid-term outcome and objective.[17]

When developing UB and EXB projects and programmes that address the findings of the needs assessment, some of the data gathered should be included in the UB programme document and project logframe and the M&E frameworks: (1) to identify and measure project indicators for objectives, outcomes and outputs, (2) to identify risks and assumptions and (3) to generate baselines against which to measure progress and possible targets. Moreover, if findings from the needs assessment are relevant to other OSCE dimensions, and these were not involved from the outset, staff should ensure that these are appropriately shared with their colleagues so that they can also feed into their project and programme planning.

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17   For more, see the chapter "Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R".

Case Study

SSG/R Needs Assessment for the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (VI)

The outcomes of the assessment were presented to the OSCE Group of Friends of SSG/R in Vienna and to the international community in Sarajevo. The programmatic recommendations from the assessment were also discussed with OSCE senior management in three sessions, one dedicated to each thematic area. The outcomes of the discussions were then fed into the Mission's internal planning process for 2022 and beyond.

For additional guidance and tips on following up on an SSG/R needs assessment, see:

▸ DCAF/ISSAT (2010), *Operational Guidance Note: Following on from a Security & Justice Assessment*

5. **Checklist**

The following checklist is intended to help programme/project management staff to:
- Implement a comprehensive approach in conducting SSG/R related needs assessments;
- Promote national ownership of SSG/R processes;
- Mainstream gender equality and human rights principles throughout the assessment;
- Maximize the effectiveness of needs assessments.

The purpose is not to "check" every item, but to provide an aide-memoire to consider key aspects and suggestions that might be relevant for your daily work.

Planning the Needs Assessment: Defining the Terms of Reference

Defining the objectives and scope of the assessment

☐ Are specific objectives agreed, taking into account all three OSCE dimensions?

☐ Are the objectives clear and understood by all stakeholders involved?

☐ Will the assessment be broad (i.e., sector-wide) or specific (i.e., assessing one or two security subsectors, while still supporting a comprehensive approach)?

☐ Are the scope and limitations of the assessment clear?

☐ What resources are required and available (time, personnel, funding, etc.)?

Defining the methodology

☐ Which methodology will be applied?

☐ What are the opportunities and challenges of the methodology selected?

Defining the methods and recognizing challenges in data collection

☐ What methods will be used to collect both primary and secondary data?

☐ Have both qualitative and quantitative methods been considered?

☐ What main sources of primary and secondary data are available?

☐   What are the potential challenges related to data collection that might need
to be mitigated and/or acknowledged in the report, especially with regard to
availability and reliability?

Setting benchmarks and developing guiding questions

☐   What benchmarks can be set related to the effectiveness, accountability, inclusivity,
responsiveness, human-rights compliance and gender equality in the security sector?

☐   Are there specific international standards, OSCE principles and commitments,
as well as national commitments and policies that can be used to set benchmarks?

☐   What are the key questions that the assessment aims to address?

Establishing roles and responsibilities

☐   Have clear roles and responsibilities been assigned for the institutional lead
of the assessment (OSCE internal or external) and to co-ordinate across the
three OSCE dimensions?

☐   What kind of expertise is required to conduct the assessment?

☐   Which external actors will be involved? Which parts of the assessment will
they contribute to? Which institution(s) will contribute funding and/or expertise?

☐   Is the team gender-balanced? Does the team possess gender expertise?

☐   Are representatives of each OSCE dimension included in the team?

Engaging with national stakeholders from the outset

☐   How does the assessment promote national and local ownership?

☐   Which national partners, institutions and agencies will be involved in the assessment?

☐   Will all actors who play a significant role in the reform process be consulted
(security sector officials, parliamentarians, etc.)?

☐   Are non-state actors, including civil society, academia, and media,
included in the assessment?

Managing expectations

☐ Have the purpose and benefits of the needs assessment been consulted with and/or explained to all relevant national stakeholders?

☐ Has agreement with relevant national stakeholders been reached on how to disseminate the results?

Integrating gender into SSG/R needs assessments

☐ Will a gender analysis be conducted as part of the assessment? Has assessment of gender equality been included as a separate objective?

☐ If gender equality is not included as a separate objective, how is gender mainstreamed in the assessment's objectives/sub-objectives (e.g., to understand the effectiveness and accountability of a security institution)?

☐ Has gender been taken into account in selecting the assessment team?

☐ Are women and LGBTIQ groups planned to be consulted during the assessment?

Conducting the Needs Assessment: Preparatory Analysis

Designing the assessment questions

☐ Do the assessment questions adequately consider the need to map the potential for national ownership and the perceptions of different groups of the population, including women and youth?

☐ Do the assessment questions adequately examine the security needs of the population?

☐ Do the assessment questions adequately examine the extent to which the security sector is effective, accountable, inclusive, and responsive, while operating within the framework of democratic governance and human rights?

☐ Do the questions ensure that the needs assessment will be comprehensive, regardless of whether it will assess the entire sector or only one or two components?

☐ Are the assessment questions for respondents from the same groups (e.g., security sector professionals, civil society, international actors, etc.) standardized to allow comparison and triangulation of the information collected?

Reviewing relevant sources of information

☐ Has information from multiple sources and institutions been reviewed, including gender-related data and information from local civil society organizations?

☐ Has the reliability of the data been verified?

☐ Is the data disaggregated by sex and population groups (e.g., minorities)?

☐ What are the gaps in the analysed data that will need to be filled in during the in-country assessment?

Reflecting on the regional dimension

☐ Has appropriate consideration been given to the regional dimension (e.g., regional conflict co-operation dynamics or sources of cross-border tensions)?

☐ Are there ongoing regional initiatives or existing commitments that may provide entry points for reform efforts at the national level?

☐ Have other states in the region recently undergone similar reform processes from which lessons may be learned?

☐ Would a regional approach to SSG/R support be valuable?

Stakeholder mapping and identifying priorities for the in-country assessment

☐ Have all relevant stakeholders been identified?

☐ What emerging gaps and priorities for SSG/R has the preparatory research identified?

☐ What additional data is required from whom to answer the assessment questions?

Conducting the Needs Assessment: In-country Assessment

Inclusive approach to stakeholder engagement and interviews

☐ Have meetings been arranged with a broad selection of representatives from security sector institutions, management and oversight actors, civil society, academia, media, international actors and OSCE staff?

☐ Have meetings been arranged with respondents from different parts/regions of the country?

Primary data collection

☐ How will the data from interviews/focus groups be collected? Have respondents agreed with the way their replies will be recorded ("informed consent")?

☐ How will the collected data be stored?

☐ How is confidentiality and anonymity ensured?

☐ Has the "do-no-harm" principle been considered when selecting and engaging with respondents?

Analysing and validating the results

☐ What strategic recommendations can be drawn from the assessment?

☐ How will the general political situation (based on the information collected in the needs assessment) affect SSG/R efforts?

☐ Is there a political willingness and adequate resources for national actors willing to engage in SSG/R?

☐ What are the key security needs of women, men, boys and girls?

☐ What are the challenges for the security sector in addressing the key security needs?

☐ What strategic options have been identified for the OSCE's support to SSG/R?

☐ Have the preliminary findings (and their possible interpretations) been validated by the beneficiaries and other relevant partners?

☐ Are data collection challenges or shortcomings recognized in the assessment report?

Following Up on the Needs Assessment

Disseminating the findings and recommendations

☐ How will the findings be disseminated and with whom will they be shared?

☐ How will the findings be shared with colleagues from other OSCE Dimensions and Executive Structures?

☐ What is the follow-up with relevant national stakeholders on how to address the findings and recommendations from the assessment?

Feeding the findings into planning, monitoring and evaluation

☐ How will the findings feed back into planning mechanisms and inform the development of OSCE projects and programmes?

☐ How will the assessment be integrated in the monitoring and evaluation frameworks of UB and EXB projects?

6. **Resources**

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
Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R

Executive Summary

This chapter discusses the rationale for results-oriented programming in the field of SSG/R (section 1), explains the results-based management framework (section 2), describes how to programme for long-term results (section 3) and how to mainstream results-oriented approaches into different types of OSCE programmatic support (section 4). Finally, a practical checklist is provided to help staff in the process (section 5).

Key points from the chapter:

- **Programme for mid- to long-term results:** In line with OSCE mandates and taking into account national priorities for reform, it is important to identify the long-term programme objectives to which OSCE support intends to contribute. OSCE support has at times focused on activities and short-term results (outputs) rather than on planning for and measuring their contributions to the mid- (outcomes) to long-term (objectives) results required for sustainable change. In the field of SSG/R, long-term results should contribute to positive change for the beneficiaries and their wider environment, for example, increasing the security of marginalized groups or creating more inclusive and accountable security sectors. These aspects shall be taken into account and reflected during the Unified Budget (UB) Proposal so the formulation of outcomes and objectives is adjusted in case needed.

  Once the programme objectives have been identified, a theory of change should be developed to identify the sequence of results at different levels that are needed to contribute to the objective and to identify the assumptions underpinning each causal link. Once a programme strategy is in place, projects can be developed that feed into the broader UB programme objective. Among other things, national ownership is essential to the sustainability of long-term results, as is ensuring that national strategies and frameworks are adequately supported and reflected throughout the planning and implementation process.

- **Ensure that activities are implemented with the mid- to long-term results in mind:** OSCE staff should reflect on how to implement SSG/R-related activities in ways that support a results-oriented approach, notably by ensuring that activities are conducted as a means to achieve broader objectives and not as ends in themselves. Doing so requires that all types of activities (e.g., workshops, training and courses) are connected to the formulation of outputs (the products and services that will result in an increase in skills and awareness of security sector representatives). Outputs should then lead to achieving outcomes (changes in the behaviour and institutional capacity of security sector institutions) and subsequently contribute to achieving objectives (changes in condition for effective security sector governance).

- **Consider the building blocks for sustainability of SSG/R support:** Sustainability can be safeguarded, for example, by strengthening national capacities to gradually take over some of the support provided by the OSCE (e.g., the organization of workshops), by ensuring that the financial implications of reform efforts are understood and assumed by national actors over time, or by embedding individual capacity-building or legislative reform initiatives in long-term institutional reform strategies and the curricula of national training institutions. Situational analysis and needs assessments are important tools to map actors and areas that have potential for contributing to sustainable change.

- **Monitor and evaluate progress towards achieving mid- to long-term results:** Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is essential to ensure that OSCE support leads to mid-term results (outcomes) and contributes to long-term results (objectives). While short-term progress needs to be monitored, it does not shed light on whether OSCE support is contributing to sustainable mid- to long-term results, such as changes in institutional behaviour or performance and in conditions. M&E needs to start at the planning stage, by clearly setting out the mid- to long-term results the OSCE seeks to contribute to and by establishing baselines, against which progress can be measured. Indicators need to be developed for each level of the results chain as well as the means of verifying them through qualitative and quantitative data. M&E should capture each level of the results chain to establish whether OSCE support is contributing to mid- and long-term results. In the SSG/R field, M&E should also reflect on the extent to which the support provided is in line with SSG/R principles.

1. **Rationale**

This chapter provides OSCE staff with advice on how to support the delivery of sustainable reform with a focus on long-term positive change. The text complements OSCE's Performance-Based Programme Budgeting approach and the OSCE Project Management Manual,[1] including OSCE project proposal templates.

In recent years, the need to ensure that international support contributes to positive and sustainable long-term change has been increasingly recognized. For instance, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation underlined that "having a sustainable impact should be the driving force" behind international support.[2]

In practice, international support has often focused on activities and short-term results, rather than on planning for and measuring contributions to mid- to long-term results required for sustainable change. This challenge is compounded in the field of SSG/R, where the sensitivity of some reform efforts at times results in missed opportunities to link activities to long-term objectives and broader strategies for long-term institutional change.

A results-based approach is based on planning for long-term results that lead to a change in conditions, as well as on identifying the mid- and short-term results needed to achieve them. Long-term results should be derived from and aligned to national priorities and national strategy implementation processes. Aligning to national strategies will help to ensure that support is not supply-driven (i.e., based on the available expertise of international actors) but is instead grounded in national priorities and policies that are set by states themselves.

The OSCE's approach to results-based management (RBM), known as Performance-Based Programme Budgeting (PBPB), is the OSCE's Unified Budget (UB) management tool. It defines the intended *objectives* (long-term results), *outcomes* (mid-term results), and *outputs* (short-term or annual results) at the programme level while ensuring that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the key elements. PBPB promotes the development of a coherent theory of change, which identifies the results the OSCE seeks to contribute to across the results chain at the

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1   OSCE, *Performance Based Programme Budgeting Orientation Guide* (Vienna, 2007); OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010).

2   OECD, *The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Paris, 2012).

programme and project levels.[3] It foresees that all actors will contribute directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results and ensures that their processes, products and services (as outputs) will contribute to the achievement of the desired mid- to long-term outcome and objective.

At the programme level, planning, monitoring and evaluating the OSCE's contribution to long-term results are thus at the core of OSCE strategic management and are integral parts of the PBPB approach. However, it can often be challenging to set objectives that are strategic enough with the aim towards long-term effects. It can be also challenging to design projects in such a way that they contribute to programme objectives. For this reason, this chapter highlights the need to plan for long-term change on the level of programme *objectives.* During their implementation, project activities must be connected to overarching objectives and be conducted in a manner that enhances the sustainability of reform efforts.

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3   The OSCE Executive Structures translate their respective mandates and the political guidance received from the participating States into programmes through the UB process. A UB Programme is a level higher than a project. In the OSCE it involves not only managing multiple ongoing projects but also carrying out traditional diplomatic work and political monitoring and reporting. A programme is a complex, continuous and long-term effort. A project is a temporary initiative with limited resources, clear start and end dates, consisting of a series of activities aimed at producing results and achieving a specific objective. Within the OSCE, a project may be funded from the Unified Budget (UB) or extra-budgetary (EXB) contributions. OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010), pp. 7, 21.

2. **The RBM Framework in the OSCE Context**

2.1 **The Results Chain of an Intervention**

In OSCE programme management terms, an *objective* is at the highest level of the results chain. It is the intended end result, which the programme aims to support the beneficiary/host country in achieving over several years in line with the mandate and OSCE commitments. As such, objectives should reflect results that contribute to a "change in condition for the beneficiaries and their wider environment."[4] These results are outside the OSCE's control, as the OSCE can only seek to *contribute* to the achievement of objectives, alongside other national and international actors who also contribute to the same nationally owned long-term results. For that reason, the OSCE formulates objectives at the programme level in terms, such as *to advise*, *to assist* or *to support* host country authorities. While the OSCE does not have full control over the achievement of the objective, it does have some level of influence. Setting out a clear M&E framework to track the extent to which support has been successful to contribute to a planned objective is therefore important.

One common challenge during the planning phase is ensuring that objectives are identified at the right level of the results chain. For instance, the objectives of programmes in the field of SSG/R are at times formulated as, *"to foster dialogue between civil society and security institutions"* or *"to enhance awareness among the police."* However, these examples are not objectives. *Fostering dialogue* is an activity and *enhancing awareness* is an output. As such they should not be confused with objectives. In the SSG/R field, a long-term objective is the end result we want to achieve, such as enhancing the security of the population, which is frequently accomplished through reform activities that aim to increase the effectiveness and the accountability of the security sector. An example of a genuine OSCE programme objective might be *"to assist the host government in increasing the inclusivity of security sector governance."*

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4   Ibid, p. 98.

The second highest level of result after the objective is the *outcome*, which is a mid-term result generated by outputs. Although the achievement of outcomes may be affected by outside factors and not within the direct control of the OSCE, they should be within the reasonable influence of the OSCE.[5] Outcomes often reflect behavioural or institutional change.[6] One example of a change in behaviour might be that parliamentary security committees begin to play an active role in overseeing the security sector for the first time. An institutional change, on the other hand, might be an institution using new structures and processes to deliver services in a more accountable and effective manner.

Figure 1: Different levels of results in a programme[7]

5   Ibid, p. 22.

6   Outcomes could be further differentiated from immediate, short-term and mid-term outcomes (e.g., application of enhanced knowledge and skills leading to the change of policies, practices and then institutional behavior and performance).

7   Adapted from: Ibid, p. 23.

The level at which to place an outcome is contextual and depends on the cause-and-effect relationship of the different programme elements (i.e., activity, output, outcome, and objective). For instance, the same programmatic result *"establishment of a human resource management system"* may be put on a different level of the result chain depending on the logical framework matrix.[8] If in one context, the OSCE has directly financed the establishment of a human resources management system for the police, this would be considered an *output*, as it does not reflect behavioural change but the goods delivered by the OSCE. This output, however, has the potential to lead to an *outcome*, if, for example, the police begin to use the human resource management system to enhance institutional efficiency and the internal accountability of its staff.

In a different context, however, the police may itself decide to introduce a human resources management system, as a result of OSCE policy advice or support provided through a feasibility study. In this case, the OSCE contributed to significant behavioural change and the same programmatic result (*"establishment of a human resource management system"*) can be thus considered an *outcome*. In most cases, a combination of several *outputs* is required to achieve one *outcome*. For example, as an outcome, the police introducing a human resource management system may require the following outputs: (1) increased awareness by the police of the importance for introducing a human resources management system and (2) increased skills among the police to facilitate the revision of internal processes necessary to support the new human resources management system.

The lowest level of results are **outputs**. They are specific products or services resulting from one or several OSCE activities.[9] They are direct results of a combination of these activities, leading to immediate changes in knowledge, skills, awareness or processes. One example of an output of a training or workshop might be *"increased awareness of Ministry of Interior staff about the need for and benefits of a human resource management system."*

Finally, there are **activities**. These are not results in themselves. Activities are required to transform inputs (time, resources) into outputs (i.e., products and services). An example of activity can be training, workshop, seminar, assessment, etc.

To demonstrate the formulation of SSG/R-related results at different levels, an example of an existing OSCE UB programme and two fictional examples of the logical frameworks (logframe)

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8   The Logical Framework Matrix (logframe) is a visual project planning and management tool. It allows the main components of the project (programme objective, project objective, results and activities) to be organized and analyzed in a structured way. Logframe complements the Project Cycle Management method to form the methodological basis of project management in the OSCE. OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010), p. 6.

9   Ibid, p. 22.

from EXB projects are provided below.[10] The EXB examples have been simplified for illustrative purposes; in practice, several activities may be needed to achieve an output, and several outputs are typically required to achieve each outcome.

For additional information, see:
‣ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (chapter 4)

Case Study 1

Programme of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (UB Proposal 2021)

‣ Objective: To support BiH in developing a better-governed security sector capable of effectively responding to contemporary and emerging threats and challenges to national and human security in accordance with OSCE commitments, norms, and principles.

‣ Outcome 1: Security sector actors design, lead and sustain effective governance and reform of the security sector.

- ‣ Output 1: The capacity of BiH to comply with and report on politico-military and security commitments is supported, including through improved parliamentary and democratic oversight of security and defence.
- ‣ Output 2: Governance and reform of the security sector are improved through support to enhanced inter-institutional co-operation and increased engagement of civil society, women and youth.
- ‣ Output 3: The capacity of BiH to manage borders, respond to natural and human-made disasters, and address cross-border crime and threats emanating from cyberspace is increased.

‣ Outcome 2: Decision-makers and civil society use whole-of-government, whole-of-society, and human-rights-compliant approaches in addressing the threats of terrorism and violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (VERLT).

- ‣ Output 1: Strategic policy frameworks, mechanisms and programmes for preventing and countering terrorism and VERLT and for mitigating the risk of CBRN threats are improved.
- ‣ Output 2: The capacity of security sector actors to effectively address the threat of terrorism in accordance with rule of law and human rights standards is increased.
- ‣ Output 3: The capacity of authorities and civil society to effectively address VERLT by applying inclusive, co-operative and human rights compliant approaches is increased.

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10 The presented log-frame matrix differs from the currently used OSCE's EXB project proposal template in differentiating between output and outcome results of a project. The OSCE project proposal template is currently being revised with the aim to include these new levels in results chain, aligning the terminology used in the OSCE with the international project management practices.

Logical Framework Matrix

Project Strategy						
UB Programme Objective	To assist host country authorities in providing responsive and inclusive security to all citizens, while fully meeting its international security commitments					
	Narrative Summary/Project Description/Result's Chain Narrative	**SMART Indicators**	**Baseline**	**Planned Target**	**Means of Verification (MoV)**	**Assumptions**
Project objective	To strengthen a more inclusive and respectful working environment towards women in the Police.	1. Percentage of women in the police force 2. Percentage of women working in the police force who consider their working environment good 3. Percentage of women in senior management positions 4. Number of complaints received from women about their working environment	1. 8% (2020 data) 2. 25% (2020 survey) 3. 10% (2020) 4. 100 (2020)	1. ≥13% by 2025 2. ≥ 65% by 2025 3. 25% (by 2025) 4. 50 (by 2025)	1. Police force statistics on recruitment 2. Surveys among selected police staff 3. Police records 4. Police records	*Other security sector institutions in the host country support a more inclusive security sector governance.*
Project outcome result 1	Inclusivity and respect are reflected as key values in the police's internal corporate culture.	1. Number of internal communication tools aiming at the promotion of *inclusivity* and *respect* within the working environment 2. Number of internal policies which promote *inclusivity* and *respect* within the working environment	1. 0 2. 0	**1.** ≥ 5 **2.** ≥ 5	Police codes of conduct, newsletters, staff instructions and guidelines, standard operating procedures, other internal communication products	*Police staff are responsive to the values promoted by the corporate culture.*
Project output result 1 *(+ additional outputs)*	Senior police managers are aware how to promote an inclusive and respectful working environment for women.	Percentage of senior police managers who correctly answer at least 80 per cent of the questions related to promoting an inclusive and respectful working environment for women	0	At least 70%	Pre- and post-training questionnaire	*Senior police managers apply the knowledge gained.*
Activity 1 *(+ additional activities)*	Training for senior police managers on promoting inclusive and respectful working environment for women.	Percentage of senior police managers who complete the training on inclusive and respectful working environment for women	N/A	At least 70% by 2025	Agenda and list of participants from a training, photo documentation	*Senior police managers are available and interested in being trained.*

Project outcome result 2	Gender parity in the police is strengthened.	Percentage of police recruits that are female	25% (in 2020)	50% (by 2025)	Police force recruitment statistics	*Women are interested in making a career in the police force.*
Project output result 2 *(+ additional outputs)*	Awareness of women about employment in the police force increased.	Number of women that are reached by the recruitment campaign	0	≥ 2 million in total (Facebook, LinkedIn, Instagram)	Metrics of the campaign reach on social media platforms	*Women are interested in applying for to work in the police force.*
Activity 2 *(+ additional activities)*	**1.** Development of a campaign communication strategy **2.** Production of campaign materials	**1.** Existence of a campaign communication strategy **2.** Existence of campaign materials	N/A	**1.** Yes (by 2022) **2.** Yes (by 2022)	Communication strategy, campaign materials	*Police actively support and contribute to the campaign.*
Project outcome result 3	Equal opportunities for female officers within the Police are promoted.	Existence of direct or indirect gender-based discrimination within the HR policies on promotion	Yes	No (by 2025)	Report/assessment by an external oversight actor(s)	*Women police officers apply for higher positions within the police force.*
Project output result 3 *(+ additional outputs)*	HR policies on promotion are updated to remove any direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of gender.	Percentage of recommendations adopted from expert assessment	0	At least 80% (by 2024)	Updated HR policies on promotion	*The updated HR policies are implemented in practice.*
Activity 3 *(+ additional activities)*	Elaboration of an expert assessment of existing HR policies on promotion.	Number of policy recommendations issued	N/A	At least 10	Expert assessment reports	*Police leadership is willing to implement the expert recommendations.*
Preconditions	Willingness of police leadership to become more inclusive.					

Logical Framework Matrix

Project Strategy						
UB Programme Objective	To support the host country authorities in enhancing accountability of the security sector.					
	Narrative Summary/Project Description/Result's Chain Narrative	**SMART Indicators**	**Baseline**	**Planned Target**	**Means of Verification (MoV)**	**Assumptions**
Project objective	To enhance independent oversight of the security sector.	**1.** The public voices confidence in the functioning of the independent oversight of the security sector **2.** Senior representatives of relevant state and non-state institutions consider that independent oversight of security sector is effective	**1.** 28% (2019 survey) **2.** Low confidence (2020 needs assessment study)	**1.** ≥ 50 % **2.** High confidence	1. Public perception survey 2. Semi-structured interviews with senior representatives of the Parliament, CSOs, academia, media	*Increased oversight leads to more accountability in the security sector institutions.*
Project outcome result 1	Parliament oversight of the security sector is increased.	Percentage of Parliamentary activities (hearings, monitoring visits) related to the security sector oversight	10% (in 2020)	20% (by 2025)	Schedule of the Parliament's activities, reports from Parliamentary meetings	*Political parties are willing to hold security sector institutions accountable for their actions.*
Project output result 1 *(+ additional outputs)*	Understanding of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff about security sector oversight is increased.	Percentage of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff trained that demonstrate enhanced skills and knowledge on parliamentary oversight of the security sector	None	At least 70%	Pre- and post-training questionnaire	*Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff apply the knowledge gained.*
Activity 1 *(+ additional activities)*	Delivering a training on parliamentary oversight of the security sector.	**1.** Percentage of parliamentarians who complete the training **2.** Percentage of parliamentary staff who complete the training	N/A	**1.** ≥ 60% (by 2025) **2.** ≥ 80% (by 2025)	Agenda and list of participants from a training	*Parliamentarians and parliamentary staff are interested and available to attend the training.*

Project outcome result 2	Capacities of independent oversight institutions to investigate human rights violations by security sector institutions are enhanced.	The percentage of investigations completed by the national human rights institution (NHRI) that involve security sector institutions	20% per year (in 2020)	40% per year (by 2025)	Statistics of NHRI	*Criminal justice system follows up on investigations by the NHRI.*
Project output result 2 *(+ additional outputs)*	Procedures to investigate cases of human rights violations by members of the security sector are updated.	NHRI endorses and adopts procedures to investigate human rights violations by security sector actors	None	Yes (by 2023)	Written decision/internal memo/policy guidance	*Public reports human rights violations by security sector actors.*
Activity 2 *(+ additional activities)*	Developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) on investigating human rights violations in the security sector.	Existence of SOPs in line with international best practices	N/A	Yes (by 2022)	SOPs	*Staff of the national human rights institution use SOPs in their work.*
Project outcome result 3	Civil society actors, the media and academia more actively engage in oversight of the security sector.	1. Number of publications/reports on the security sector published by national CSOs/academia increases 2. Number of media articles related to security sector increases	1. 3 reports in the period 2015–2020 2. ~20 (in 2015–2020)	1. ≥ 6 reports in the period 2021–2026 2. ~40 (in 2021–2026)	1. Reports published by CSOs and academia 2. Articles published by national media in print and/or online	*Political actors and security sector recognize the role of CSOs, media and academia as external oversight actors.*
Project output result 3 *(+ additional outputs)*	Awareness about the importance of security sector oversight among CSOs, media and academia is enhanced.	Percentage of participants who correctly answer at least 80 per cent of the questions related to the importance of external security sector oversight	Not known	At least 70%	Post-workshop test	*CSOs, media and academia are interested to research/write about security sector issues.*
Activity 3 *(+ additional activities)*	Four workshops with relevant CSOs, media and academia about security sector oversight.	1. Number of participants from relevant CSOs (disaggregated by sex) 2. Number of participants from media (disaggregated by sex) 3. Number of participants from academia (disaggregated by sex)	N/A	1. ≥ 30 (≥40% being female) 2. ≥ 30 (≥40% being female) 3. ≥ 30 (≥40% being female)	Agenda and list of participants from the workshops	*Representatives of CSOs, media and academia are interested and available to attend the workshops.*
Preconditions	The political will of key stakeholders to strengthen independent oversight of the security sector.					

2.2 The Theory of Change and Underlying Assumptions

A theory of change is a statement that explains why we think certain actions will produce outputs leading to the desired change in a given context. It outlines all the cause-and-effect relationships between the elements in the result chain and provides the narrative that explains the logic of the intervention applied.

A theory of change takes the logframe matrix one step further in that it offers a representation of the results chain, accompanied by a narrative to map and explain the various connections between each level of results. It acknowledges the non-linear nature of a results chain and the fact that there may be multiple strands that lead to a single result.[11] As such, a theory of change is particularly useful in maintaining the focus on long-term results and the changes required to achieve them. Moreover, it can help in understanding the complexity of SSG/R interventions, where multiple projects may be required to contribute to a single programme objective. A theory of change is also particularly useful in identifying ways that activities in different OSCE dimensions can contribute to a common overarching objective. Description of theories of changes should be as comprehensive as possible and gender-sensitive.

To develop a theory of change, OSCE staff should plan towards the intended objective and identify the kind of change needed for it to be realized. They should then plan for OSCE support by moving backwards along the results chain, determining the changes that need to be made for each result level to be attained. They should also reflect on the underlying assumptions of the theory of change; for each result, they should ask what assumptions need to be fulfilled for the next result to be achieved.

The theory of change for a project can be as simple as "if we conduct activity A to produce output B in setting C, the result will be outcome D, which will ultimately contribute to objective E." For example, a simplified version of the theory of change for a project with the objective to reduce gender-based violence through increasing accessibility of police services for women and girls might be: *"If we provide funding, training and technical assistance to the national police in three rural districts (activities) to establish specialized gender desks in twelve police stations (outputs), we will increase the ability of women and girls to safely access justice in the areas served by these stations (outcome) and ultimately contribute to a reduction in gender-based violence (objective)."*[12]

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11   Isabel Vogel, *Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development* (UK Department of International Development, London, 2012).

12   This example was taken from Parsons, J., Gokey, C. and Thornton, M., *Indicators of Activities, Outputs, Outcomes and Impacts in Security and Justice Programming* (UK Department of International Development, London, 2013), p. 9.

Figure 2: A simplified example of a theory of change in an SSG/R project

If we provide funding, training and technical assistance to the national police in three rural districts...

...we will increase the ability of women and girls to safely access justice in the areas served by these stations...

Output

Objective

Activities

Outcome

...to establish specialized gender desks in twelve police stations...

...and reduce the overall threat of gender-based violence.

In the field of SSG/R, as well as other fields, one challenge is the identification and description of assumptions about which activities will lead to positive short-, mid- and long-term change. However, as such assumptions are rarely tested during the planning phase and the situation in the course of implementation can change, certain activities and short-term results may not lead to the intended mid- and long-term changes. To mitigate this risk, OSCE staff can develop a theory of change to identify the sequence of results at different levels and the assumptions underpinning each causal link. The continuing validity of the assumptions established at the planning phase and risks identified for the theory of change should be regularly updated while implementing the programme and adjust the implementation.

Projects may operate on more than one theory of change. One theory might address the approach taken (methodology), while another addresses the choice of project participants or the timing of activities. Multiple theories of change can also be combined into a single statement: *"If we work with groups A, B and C and apply approach/methodology D at time E, we will achieve results F, G and H."*

Developing a theory of change consists of three main steps: (1) Identifying the expected or desired change/changes, (2) articulating how the changes will be made as a result of programming efforts, and (3) developing one or more *"If X then Y because..."* statements.

>> **For additional practical guidance on developing theories of change and examples:**

▸ Woodrow, P. and Oatley, N. (2013), *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security & Justice Programmes: Part I: What are they, different types, how to develop and use them*

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation Framework

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is essential not only to promote accountability towards donors and beneficiaries but also to demonstrate how support leads to long-term results.[13] Evaluations are important mechanisms for examining how outcomes (e.g., behavioural and institutional change) affect the end recipients of the services (e.g., the general public). The complexity of M&E requires appropriate planning and budgeting from the outset. An M&E framework should be thus established during the planning phase of a project or programme and be implemented throughout and after the implementation of activities. For M&E to be effective, sufficient financial and human resources need to be allocated.

An M&E framework builds on two key elements: the indicators, and the respective baseline and target. *Indicators* are quantitative or qualitative references that provide a simple and reliable means to measure progress and achievements.[14] Indicators should be SMART (i.e., specific, measurable, available, realistic and time-specific) and be set for all levels of the logframe or results chain. Where applicable, indicators should be disaggregated by sex and other intersecting factors such as age. The aim of the indicators is to demonstrate that the project has completed its activities, delivered its intended outputs and outcomes and achieved its objective. The *baseline* provides a snapshot of the situation before the project is implemented and can be defined during a needs assessment.[15] Baseline information is necessary not only to justify the relevance of a project but also to measure progress against the indicators and towards the set target. *Targets* may come from national strategies, policy documents, or negotiations with stakeholders. By the same token, monitoring is not just to measure progress against targets but to discover whether remedial actions need to be implemented when progress is behind schedule.

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13   Monitoring is the "rapid, ongoing, continuous analysis of project progress towards achieving results with the purpose of improving management decision-making"; and evaluation is the "in depth analysis and assessment of overall performance of the project including the project's relevance to the problems, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and in particular its contribution to a specific (…) objective." OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010), p. 85.

14   Ibid, p. 40.

15   For more, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R," including the section 4.2.

> **For additional practical guidance on developing indicators, see:**
> ‣ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers*, pp. 40–44
> ‣ DCAF (2010), *Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators*
> ‣ Parsons, J., Gokey, C. and Thornton, M. (2013), *Indicators of Activities, Outputs, Outcomes and Impacts in Security and Justice Programming*

For M&E purposes, **means of verification** are important. They include *what* data is collected to measure progress on each indicator and against the baseline, as well as *how* and *when* the data is collected. Identifying appropriate means of verification and collecting necessary data can often be challenging, particularly in the field of SSG/R, because SSG/R interventions are often qualitative (e.g., increasing the population's confidence in the police) rather than quantitative or because data is not publicly available. Moreover, some key data (e.g., numbers of victims of sexual and gender-based violence, levels of military expenditure or corruption) may not be accessible because they are considered too sensitive to share. Such challenges can impede both the establishment of baselines and the collection of the data required to measure progress against the indicators. Wide sources of data identified during needs assessments shall serve the basis for indicator setting and means of verification.[16]

> **For more information on how to collect and analyse data and how to carry out monitoring and self-evaluations, see:**
> ‣ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (chapters 11 and 12)
>
> **For guidance on M&E in the area of SSG/R, see:**
> ‣ Corlazzoli, V., and White, J. (2013), *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation*
> ‣ UNDP (2014), *Why, What and How to Measure? A User's Guide to Measuring Rule of Law, Justice and Security Programmes*

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16   For more information on addressing these challenges, see the subsection 3.8 below.

3. Programming and Monitoring for Results-Oriented Support

A number of elements need to be taken into account to successfully provide results-oriented support.

3.1 Identifying National Priorities through Needs Assessments

The mandates of the OSCE Executive Structures are set by the Permanent Council and are often broad. They are then translated through the application of PBPB methodology into concrete programmatic results – objectives, outcomes and outputs – which are defined in the UB Proposal. National priorities often inform the overall objectives of Executive Structures, in particular OSCE field operations. By aligning support to national priorities in the field of SSG/R, the OSCE can better provide demand-driven support that matches the real and evolving needs of the security sector and the wider population. National priorities should thus feed into the development of the OSCE's long-term objectives in the field of SSG/R.

An important tool to map national priorities in the field of SSG/R is the needs assessment process. Without a comprehensive needs assessment, it is impossible to understand and target the needs of the security sector and to ensure a sustainable long-term approach to SSG/R assistance. At the very least, national documents – such as national action plans and security policies – should be examined to determine whether clear priorities have been established. Needs can also be identified through consultations with national stakeholders, including the intended beneficiaries. In the SSG/R field, consultations require an inclusive approach that includes relevant ministries, oversight bodies, relevant security institutions, civil society organizations, women's and youth groups and other relevant actors involved in the reform process.[17]

On the basis of the needs assessment and the identified national priorities, concrete programme objectives should be defined that are in line with OSCE commitments and the specific mandates of Executive Structures. In cases where projects and programmes are ongoing, (self-) evaluations should be carried out and national priorities and needs periodically reassessed to avoid that support becomes path-dependent; for example, a similar type of support, such as training, may be continually provided because it provides visibility. Or the same group of stakeholders may be repeatedly engaged for years because they are willing to attend workshops. The OSCE

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17   For more information, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R."

should also assess broader contextual changes and evolving needs, which it reflects in revised programming. Moreover, the OSCE should continue to hold regular consultations with national stakeholders, as a prerequisite for successful programming and implementation and, ultimately, towards sustainable long-term results.

3.2 Designing Interventions with a Focus on Long-Term Results

In line with the mandates of Executive Structures and national priorities, OSCE interventions should be designed in a way that they achieve different levels of results, which ultimately contribute to long-term sustainable change. The results chain of the intervention should be developed in accordance with the theory of change established by the Executive Structure and, when relevant, any theories of change defined for the UB Programme.[18]

OSCE programmes are thus implemented through *activities*, such as training or the provision of technical support, which produce specific *outputs*, such as increased awareness or enhanced capacities. These *outputs* will directly contribute to the specific *outcomes*, such as the use by national actors of the knowledge acquired through OSCE activities, for example, in developing new policies. Outcomes should contribute to achieving the overarching *objectives* set by the Executive Structure in a given context, such as increasing the accountability of security sector actors.[19]

To ensure that activities contribute to long-term results, OSCE staff should also identify the underlying assumptions of the intervention logic and, when possible, challenge them from the outset. Moreover, to prevent undesired negative effects, in the planning phase OSCE staff should identify how to manage risks that may arise during the implementation phase (e.g., if an underlying assumption proved to be wrong) and that could have unexpected effects on the results chain. Thus, to the extent possible, OSCE staff should challenge assumptions, monitor risks and develop risk-mitigation strategies. Finally, in line with the *2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality*, OSCE staff needs to ensure that gender perspective is integrated into OSCE activities, programmes and projects, including those related to SSG/R.

For integrating gender perspective in a project design, see:
‣ DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women (2019), *"Integrating Gender in Project Design and Monitoring for the Security and Justice Sector" (Gender and Security Toolkit)*

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18 For more details, see the section 2.2 above.

19 For more details, see the section 2.1 above.

3.3 Connecting Projects to Longer-Term Programme Strategies

OSCE uses the PBPB approach to plan, develop and manage its UB Programmes. UB Proposal organizes the work of OSCE Executive Structures into a number of UB Programmes that describe achieving short-term results (outputs), contributing to mid-term (outcomes) and long-term results (objectives). UB and EXB projects contribute to the achievement of the objectives of a UB Programme and, ultimately, to the political commitments of the Organization.[20]

At the project level, planning often focuses on immediate or short-term results on the level of annual outputs – for example, activities like workshops and training. OSCE project design should move beyond short-term results, building on the fact that UB Programmes are planned with mid-term outcomes and long-term objectives in mind. As mandates and funding commitments are usually extended, it is necessary to plan for mid- to long-term results, even if they may take several years to materialize. To that end, when feasible, OSCE staff should develop multi-year programmes, which can be implemented through a series of annual plans, projects and activities.

At the project level, both UB and EXB, the logframe is used to map the main components of the project: UB Programme objective targeted, project objective, outcome, outputs and activities.[21] These components can be complemented with a project-level theory of change that sets out how the project will contribute to the broader programme strategy. It may also be useful to test the related assumptions to ensure the feasibility of the project's contribution to the programme strategy.[22]

To further strengthen the connection between projects and the UB Programme objectives, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) can be developed with national authorities to set out the mutually agreed long-term objectives of the OSCE's support. However, it needs to be recognized that the OSCE's contribution to achieving long-term objectives will also depend on the OSCE's continued presence in a host country and/or the availability of funds. EXB projects can cover multi-year engagements that contribute to long-term results. In contrast to UB projects that are funded annually, EXB projects can run for several years, making them well-suited to the development of mid- to long-term support strategies in the field of SSG/R. Although subject to different mechanisms than UB projects, EXB projects must still seek to contribute to the OSCE's overall objectives and can be integrated into an OSCE programme.

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20   See more in OSCE, *Performance Based Programme Budgeting Orientation Guide* (Vienna, 2007); and OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010).

21   Any UB or EXB project has to contribute to a UB Programme objective.

22   See the sub-section 2.2 on the theory of change.

For information on the OSCE approach to project identification and project development, see:

▸ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (chapters 5 and 6)

3.4 Engaging with Other International Actors in Support of Shared Objectives

Ideally, all international actors engaged in SSG/R work in a country should work in concert towards achieving the same mid- to long-term results, in line with national priorities. To that end, the OSCE should advocate for national actors to define long-term reform priorities and strategies for different parts of the security sector. The OSCE should also encourage national actors to take the lead in co-ordinating the implementation of national reforms, including donor co-ordination mechanisms. If no nationally-led donor co-ordination mechanisms are in place, the OSCE should encourage co-operation with other international actors to identify ways to contribute collectively to the achievement of national goals.

The OSCE can engage with relevant international actors (international organizations and agencies, embassies, etc.) through regular meetings or by organizing donor co-ordination mechanisms. Co-ordination is essential to eliminate gaps in support, to avoid duplicating efforts and to ensure joint messaging among international partners. Co-ordination is particularly important in the field of SSG/R due to the political nature of some SSG/R reforms. Therefore, strong co-ordinated messages from the international community are required, in particular, on the importance of national reform priorities that may be considered sensitive.

3.5 Supporting Cross-Dimensional Collaboration within the OSCE

OSCE support will be more comprehensive and results-oriented when OSCE actors collaborate across all three dimensions of security. Cross-dimensional collaboration facilitates a move away from fragmented support (which may have limited results) towards the achievement of long-term results, which can be coherently supported from different dimensional perspectives. All OSCE Executive Structures should ensure that strategic objectives are identified in all three dimensions of security in order to provide support that achieves the greatest impact. Cross-dimensional needs assessments are useful tools to ensure that needs can be identified and addressed in all three OSCE dimensions.[23]

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23   For more, see the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R."

3.6 **Supporting the Sustainability of SSG/R through National Ownership**

Change is closely related to sustainability; if reform efforts are not sustained over a time, the results achieved will be lost and little change will be made. Sustainability can only be ensured if national actors have the willingness and capacity to keep up reform efforts. National ownership implies that national actors lead the reform process, which they must have the capacity to steer, co-ordinate, monitor and finance. According to the UN, national ownership rests upon four main pillars: a common national vision to guide the reform process, the capacity to implement and co-ordinate the reform process, financial responsibility of the reform process, and nationally-led monitoring and evaluation of the reform process.[24] The role of the OSCE and other international organizations is to support such nationally-led reforms.

For more detail on how to support national ownership of SSR, see:
‣ UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force (2012), *UN SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (pp. 13–34)

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
24   UN Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, *UN SSR Integrated Technical Guidance Notes* (New York, 2012), p. 18.

Info Box 1

Approaches to Supporting National Ownership

Ensuring that OSCE support flows from national priorities: An important element of national ownership is a national vision of the security sector from which OSCE objectives can be identified. Needs assessments are important tools to identify priorities on the basis of national visions. Needs must also be re-assessed to identify changing priorities and to flexibly re-direct resources to areas where there is interest on the side of beneficiaries and thus the potential for impact.

Assessing national will to lead reform efforts: When engaging with national stakeholders and to build meaningful partnerships, it is important to make adequate assessments of national interests. Priority should be given to engaging with national stakeholders who can contribute to institutional change and who have a clear interest in reform. Such "champions of change" may play an important role in advocating for reform among other actors and in other parts of the security sector.

Supporting national capacities to lead reform efforts: In addition to identifying champions of change, it is also necessary to map national capacities to lead reform efforts. National actors should be encouraged to take the lead on various matters, notably on identifying national priorities for reforms, implementing reforms, establishing national and international co-ordination mechanisms on SSG/R, and monitoring progress in national reform implementation. It is important to ensure the sustainability of support for capacity-building by anchoring it in broader national institutional capacity-building strategies and incorporating it into the work of national training and capacity-building institutions.

Engaging national stakeholders in dialogue on OSCE support: National stakeholders must be engaged throughout the programme cycle, from needs assessments through to implementation and evaluation. Holding annual consultation meetings is a good practice, which will allow priorities to be jointly re-assessed against the evolving political and security environment. Other good practices include steering committee meetings with key partners and periodic presentations of results to national stakeholders. An inclusive approach requires the engagement of all relevant national stakeholders, including representatives of civil society, women's groups, national minorities, and other relevant actors.

Supporting the engagement of civil society: A key principle of national ownership is inclusion, which means that the perceptions and needs of the general population are addressed, rather than only the needs of national authorities. This includes addressing the needs and priorities of different groups of women, men, boys and girls. In the long run, reform efforts that do not meet the real needs of all national beneficiaries are unlikely to be sustainable. To ensure inclusivity, dialogue between national authorities and civil society must be supported.

3.7 Complementing Long-Term Strategies with Quick-Impact Initiatives

While the OSCE should strive to ensure its support has a long-term impact and is sustainable, it may at times be necessary to invest in quick-impact initiatives that build confidence or prepare the ground for longer-term engagement. Such engagements are generally small scale, of immediate benefit to the population or key stakeholders and meet a targeted need. From an OSCE perspective, they may help to strengthen interaction with key stakeholders during design phase of a further project, thus building confidence for co-operation on future projects that may be more sensitive.

Case Study 2

Quick-Impact Projects as Part of the Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan

Following violent inter-ethnic clashes in the southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010, the government of Kyrgyzstan requested the OSCE's support to help the police working in a multi-ethnic environment in protecting human rights and improving community-police relations. To respond to the crisis, the then OSCE Centre in Bishkek established the Community Security Initiative (CSI), which aimed to build confidence between law enforcement agencies and communities.[25] As part of the CSI, the OSCE sent unarmed international police officers to act as advisors in district police stations.

During the initial stages of the CSI, small-scale community initiatives were used to build confidence between the police and the community. For example, the OSCE helped to re-establish a police presence in remote areas by deploying mobile police receptions – customized minivans containing the basic equipment for a functioning mobile police station. After their introduction, police and community leaders increasingly used them as places to raise and discuss problems. Small-scale community initiatives, such as sports events, police open days and cultural celebrations, were used to re-build the bridges between communities and the police.

The support provided under the CSI was small-scale but matched local needs, as it was based on a thorough understanding of the specific challenges facing each community. This support also helped to build confidence between OSCE police advisors and their Kyrgyz colleagues, as well as constituents in their districts, thus strengthening their credibility and in turn facilitating a more effective provision of advice. The successes of these quick-impact initiatives also helped expand the CSI to other districts.

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25   OSCE, *"The Community Security Initiative,"* 2012.

Quick-impact initiatives should be designed in consultation with the beneficiaries to ensure they have the intended effects. Needs assessments are important in identifying areas where such initiatives may be of value or where they may generate further engagement or change. As quick-impact initiatives should prepare the ground for longer-term sustainable engagement, they should be developed together with long-term strategies for support rather than in isolation. Adequate attention must also be paid to ensuring that short-term responses do not hamper long-term initiatives.

3.8 Monitoring and Evaluation for SSG/R Support

Effective M&E is essential to ensure that progress is regularly recorded and on track, risks are assessed and mitigated, the project is adjusted if needed and its contribution to achieving long-term results can be evaluated. To ensure that M&E supports the OSCE's contribution to long-term results, it must go beyond the level of outputs and focus on outcomes.

M&E should start at the planning stage along with the development of the logframe matrix and the theory of change. The theory of change and the design of the logframe matrix require the selection of a strategic objective (or intended change), and a process of working backwards to identify the results needed to reach established goals. Once the results have been identified, indicators need to be identified or developed that demonstrate the results to be achieved through the means of verifying them through qualitative and quantitative data. Potential assumptions and risks also need to be identified. At the OSCE UB Programme level, indicators are assigned to measure outcomes, which are used as internal planning and monitoring tools. At the project level, indicators should be assigned at all levels of the results chain. To maintain a focus on long-term results during project planning, it is useful to look at UB Programme-level outcomes and indicators and to consider how the project result will contribute to UB Programme outcomes and objectives.[26]

Proper M&E can be challenging, for example, due to lack of resources to carry out monitoring and to identify and introduce remedial actions as and when needed. To ensure sufficient financial and human resources for M&E, it must be properly planned and budgeted for, and awareness raised about its importance. It can also be difficult to measure change because of the qualitative nature SSG/R effects – for example, the population's increased confidence in the police. Moreover, relevant data – for example, on numbers of victims of sexual and gender-based violence, levels of corruption or military expenditure – may not be available because they are considered too sensitive to share. Furthermore, data may not be capturing all information needed for proper M&E (e.g., disaggregated by sex, age, ethnicity, etc.). The lack of readily

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26   OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010), p. 40.

available data may hamper the development of baselines and impede the collection of the data required to measure progress. The following section offers guidance for planning M&E and mitigating some of the challenges mentioned.

- **Developing a baseline against which progress can be measured:** The baseline is the reference point against which progress can be measured. Ideally, such data should be identified prior to the start of a project, mainly, through needs assessments process using a wide range of sources. In some more complex cases, a project can include an early activity at the start of its implementation to carry out a baseline study, which will provide the baseline data against which the target can be set. In such cases, the project proposal document (logframe and M&E plan) should be updated with the newly acquired baseline data as soon as it is available.

- **Identifying sources of data to develop a baseline and to measure progress:** Data to be used in establishing baselines and in measuring progress against them can be gathered, for example, from national reports (e.g., a strategy implementation report) and statistics, international standards, and research papers. OSCE can also collect primary data through interviews, focus groups or public surveys. It can reconstruct broad baseline information from secondary data, such as civil society reports, assessments and reports by international actors or relevant national statistics. To enhance its credibility, any secondary data used should be assessed based on the period it covers as well as for accuracy and potential bias. Data can also be collected through observation, for example, by examining how parliamentary security committee hearings take place or how well minorities are integrated into the police services. To ensure that data is credible, it must be verified against multiple different data sources and data collection methods.

> **For more guidance about data collection, analysis and interpretation, see:**
> ‣ OSCE (2010), *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (sub-chapter 12.8)

- **Monitoring beyond outputs:** Monitoring at the project level shall track progress in conducting not only activities and the achievement of outputs as results but also the project's outcomes and objectives, including the project's contribution to the broader UB Programme strategy. At the UB Programme level, progress is generally monitored at the level of outputs, outcomes and objectives. At this level, monitoring outcomes is particularly important and requires an analysis of whether the outputs produced and provided have contributed to improved knowledge and skills leading to behavioural or institutional performance change. Additionally, monitoring should seek to assess to the extent possible whether outcomes are contributing to long-term results (objectives) that affect positive change for beneficiaries.

- **Clarifying the difference between activity indicators and output indicators:** Output indicators can easily be confused with activity indicators. Activity indicators merely show that activities have taken place, such as the number of people who attended a training on combatting hate crimes. Such indicators do not show whether the activity contributed to achieving a short-term result (output). Instead, the indicator should reflect changes in capacity, knowledge or processes – for example, the percentage of people who felt the training they received increased their ability to combat hate crimes.

- **Clarifying the difference between output indicators and outcome indicators:** While the level of results may depend on the context, a common problem occurs when output indicators are used to measure outcomes. For example, the skills acquired through training (output) may be used as an indicator of outcome, even if acquiring such skills has not contributed to broader behavioural or institutional change (outcome). To monitor the change from such an output, it would be necessary to examine whether the skills acquired have been applied more broadly and have resulted in improved practices and/or working methods. For example, for an output indicator such as *increased knowledge of international good practice among parliamentary security committee staff*, a corresponding outcome indicator might be *the extent to which parliamentary security committees have adapted their working methods in line with international good practice.*

- **Managing expectations about indicators:** While indicators are important in tracking progress, they are not able to explain why progress has occurred. They also require data collection and, therefore, have resource implications. For that reason, the number of indicators selected should be limited and include those that provide the best means to measure progress. To that end, indicators should be SMART (i.e., specific, measurable, available, realistic and time-specific). However, it may not always be possible to collect data that correlates directly to a specific indicator, in particular, at the objective level. In such cases, the use of indirect or *proxy indicators* may be required. For example, it may not be possible to directly measure the increase in security for marginalized groups. Instead, this might be indirectly measured through proxy indicators that combine the level of hate crimes against marginalized groups and their own perceptions of security. As proxy indicators may not fully capture the intended change, the data such indicators are based on and their limitations must be borne in mind.

Figure 3: Examples of possible SSG/R-related proxy indicators

PRINCIPLES OF GOOD SSG	POSSIBLE PROXY INDICATOR
Accountability and Transparency	‣ Accountability Index (Varieties of Democracy) ‣ Strategic Corruption and Governance Index ‣ Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International) ‣ Control of Corruption Index (World Bank) ‣ State Legitimacy Scale (Fragile State Index)
Effectiveness and Efficiency	‣ Number of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants (UNODC – Crime Trends Survey, Interpol, National Security Reports) ‣ Monopoly on the Use of Force (Bertelsmann Transformation Index) ‣ Government Effectiveness Index (World Bank)
Rule of Law	‣ Rule of Law Index (Varieties of Democracy) ‣ Rule of Law Index (World Bank) ‣ Political Terror Scale
Gender Equality	‣ Gender Inequality Index (UNDP) ‣ Women Peace and Security Index (Georgetown Institute for WPS and the PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security) ‣ SHEcurity Index
Participation and Inclusivity	‣ Political Rights and Civil Liberties Ranking (Freedom House) ‣ Equal Protection Index (Varieties of Democracy) ‣ Voice and Accountability Index (World Bank) ‣ Civil Society Participation Index (Varieties of Democracy)
Responsiveness	‣ Security Apparatus Scale (Fragile States Index)

- **Developing quantitative and qualitative indicators:** With regard to SSG/R outcomes, qualitative indicators are sometimes better suited to capturing behaviour and institutional change than quantitative indicators. Unfortunately, quantitative indicators are often preferred because they are easier to measure or collect (e.g., from official statistics, external sources or measurement). While OSCE staff is most often advised to use a combination of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the choice of indicator should be influenced by the validity of indicator (i.e., it measures the underlying concepts as closely as possible), and data availability. For example, for measuring the improvement in investigation of hate crimes by applying international good practice, the quantity of hate crimes investigated by the police itself will not indicate whether the change in investigation practices occurred to be more in line with international standards and had a positive effect. Adding a qualitative indicator based on observation or interviews or survey can help to measure the feedback on the extent to which the investigations were now conducted in line with international good practice. The indicator should also be as specific as possible, hence formulation with reference to international good practices is too wide to use.

- **Incorporating the views of national stakeholders and beneficiaries in M&E plans:** For support to remain relevant, monitoring should incorporate the views of different national stakeholders and beneficiaries, for example, by engaging national actors in establishing indicators, on deciding what to monitor, in conducting focus groups with beneficiaries and in using national expertise to collect baseline data. Including gender perspective into monitoring can help reveal gender-related gaps and challenges, which can be then addressed by adjusting a project as needed. Consequently, the OSCE should promote continuous joint monitoring of progress. Joint monitoring mechanisms are also important in ensuring mutual accountability. To that end, project staff should organize regular co-ordination or steering committee meetings with beneficiaries and key donors to exchange information on progress and make any necessary adjustments to project implementation. Involving national parliaments in establishing benchmarks against which the achievement of SSG/R objectives can be measured is also good practice, in which the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly can play a facilitating role.

- **Integrating M&E into decision-making:** It is important to ensure that SSG/R support is in line with national priorities and is likely to contribute to long-term results. Doing so requires the ability to adjust OSCE support to changing circumstances and lessons identified. M&E provides important input into decision-making about implementation of reforms as it enables regular monitoring and the re-adjustment of projects and programmes in line with progress and lessons learned. Recommendations emerging from M&E may also feed into decisions about the development of new projects.

The OSCE Mission to Serbia's Annual Implementation Review Meetings

In order to strengthen its dialogue with national stakeholders, in the framework of the multi-year Sweden-funded EXB project, the OSCE Mission to Serbia and its Democratization Department organize annual implementation review meetings to discuss the support provided over the past year and the lessons identified. The meetings gather together all project partners, including donor, state institutions, NGOs and academia. In addition to providing a formal mechanism for jointly discussing the type of support provided by the OSCE, the meetings also made it possible for the lessons identified to be fed into the project's further implementation, self-evaluation and future project design.

- **Evaluating SSG/R support:** Evaluations use not only the M&E data collected during project implementation and reporting but also information beyond that in order feed into the assessment, recommendations and lessons learned to be considered for future programme and project design. The OSCE defines four types of evaluation: *ex-ante evaluation*, *progress evaluation*, *final evaluation* and *impact evaluation* (see Figure 4). For all types of evaluation, the contribution of short-term results should be tested against the achievement of mid- and long-term goals. Evaluations at the OSCE can be conducted by externally hired experts (decentralized/commissioned evaluation) or by OSCE Secretariat's Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) following standard evaluation methodology.

- Evaluations in the OSCE adhere to the OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria of *relevance*, *effectiveness*, *efficiency*, *sustainability*, *impact* and *coherence*. When conducting an evaluation in the field of SSG/R, the criterion *relevance* can examine, for example, the principle of national ownership and ask, *"To what extent has OSCE assistance been provided in a way that supports national ownership and that is complementary to and co-ordinated with the implementation of national strategies?"* National ownership can also be explored from the perspective of *coherence* or *sustainability*.

Depending on the objectives of a specific evaluation, other criteria can also be applied, such as the *OSCE's added value/comparative advantage* or *gender mainstreaming*. Not all criteria need to be used in every evaluation. The choice depends on various factors, including the purpose and objectives of the evaluation, available resources, and methodological considerations. In the SSG/R field, additional criteria for an evaluation may relate to, for instance, the extent to which the OSCE support was provided in line with the principles of good security sector governance.[27] These can include, for example:

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27   For more information, see section 2.2 in the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context."

- *Gender equality:* To what extent have the different security needs of women, men, boys and girls been reflected in the OSCE's SSG/R support? Have men, women, girls and boys benefited from long-term results? M&E data need to be disaggregated by sex to facilitate the analysis of different results for women, girls, men and boys.
- *Human rights:* To what extent have the perceptions of both duty-bearers and rights-holders been collected? M&E should thus include the perceptions of minorities.

In addition to any evaluation that may take place (be it a commissioned, external evaluation or one that is internally conducted by OIO), a Project Manager is required to prepare as a minimum, a **final project self-evaluation** as a final narrative report for each project, reflecting the complete set of M&E data, outlining how well the project achieved its planned mid- to long-term results and what lessons have been learned. Self-evaluation is different in nature from an evaluation as it is an internal reflective process, but it should aim to be as objective as possible.

Figure 4: Different types of evaluation

TYPES OF EVALUATION

EX-ANTE EVALUATION
- ‣ Prior to project implementation
- ‣ Important to assess the strength of project design
- ‣ Assesses whether planned support may plausibly contribute to the intended long-term results

PROGRESS EVALUATION
- ‣ During project implementation
- ‣ Facilitates the re-adjustment of projects and programmes on the basis of changing needs
- ‣ Ensures that results will likely continue to contribute to intended outcomes and objectives

FINAL EVALUATION
- ‣ Contributes to internal learning and self-reflection
- ‣ Offers opportunities to feed lessons learned into subsequent projects and programmes
- ‣ Contributes to understanding whether the assumptions identified in the theory of change were correct

IMPACT EVALUATION
- ‣ Takes place between one and five years after an intervention
- ‣ Examines whether the expected long-term impact has occurred and, if so, whether it is sustainable
- ‣ Examines whether support has contributed to positive (or negative) change for beneficiaries
- ‣ Generally conducted by external evaluators (commissioned evaluation)

3.9 Overcoming Challenges towards Results-Oriented Approaches to SSG/R

In supporting results-oriented approaches to SSG/R, potential challenges include the following:

- **Lack of political support for results-oriented reforms:** SSG/R is a political process that can create changes in power balances. For this reason, political support may not always be available for the kinds of long-term reforms that will likely result in sustainable change. Instead, support may be limited to ad hoc activities, such as training and workshops. OSCE staff should identify opportunities to raise political support for long-term reforms. This may be done by using existing OSCE commitments as entry points (e.g., the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security), by supporting regional workshops where it may be possible to address an issue that is too sensitive to discuss at the national level or by making use of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to provide political support.

- **Balancing national ownership with results-oriented approaches:** Even when political support is sufficient, a clear and necessary national vision for long-term reform may not exist. In such cases, the OSCE may be called upon to contribute to various different national reform efforts that do not necessarily contribute to an overarching long-term national goal. In such cases, the OSCE must strike a balance between promoting national ownership and supporting sustainable results-oriented reforms. While support should work towards long-term change, the responsibility to prioritize reform efforts lies with national actors. Sometimes small steps are needed to build confidence and raise awareness about the importance of long-term reform before more strategic issues can be discussed. Nonetheless, such steps should be framed within a longer-term OSCE strategy and should be reassessed if no progress is made towards long-term nationally driven reform.

- **Dealing with context-specific change:** Long-term change can take on different meanings in different contexts. Therefore, the same benchmarks cannot be transferred from one context to another. For example, drafting a national security policy may be considered a significant step forward in the reform process of one State. However, in another, the implementation of the national security policy would be a significant advancement. Similarly, the timeline needed for change may vary widely from State to State and from region to region. For this reason, contextual information needs to be included in relevant project documents to explain which reforms constitute progress and to provide the necessary baselines against which to measure change.

- **Dealing with unforeseen challenges:** Occasionally, new and sudden security challenges may emerge (e.g., a pandemic) that might slow down on-going reform processes or lead to reconsideration of reform priorities by national authorities. While OSCE's support to SSG/R should

be systematic and focused on long-term change, it should also be flexible to provide assistance to new emerging security needs on short notice, if needed. Although it is difficult to plan for such unforeseen situations, it is important to ensure that any OSCE assistance to the security sector considers how good governance principles can be promoted and mainstreamed.

• **Capacity of the beneficiary to deliver reforms:** If the beneficiaries of OSCE support lack the financial, human or technical capacities to deliver reforms, the achievement and sustainability of results can be hindered. While beneficiary capacities may be outside the OSCE's control – for example, because of staff rotation, remuneration or public budgets – some aspects may be mitigated if addressed in the project development phase. Needs assessments and long-term engagement with project counterparts are useful ways to identify and address capacity issues among project beneficiaries.

4. Results-Oriented Approaches in Different Types of Support

This section offers concrete suggestions and food for thought on how to implement results-oriented approaches to SSG/R support in the areas most commonly addressed in OSCE programming. Programmatic activities should thus be conducted in ways that maximize the potential to achieve long-term and sustainable results. Results can be best achieved when all types of support are connected to the overarching programme objective and when due consideration is given to enhancing the sustainability of results.

4.1 Developing Knowledge Products

The OSCE often develops and publishes knowledge products, such as guidelines and handbooks, which may be used to raise awareness or to support national actors in implementing reform efforts. The OSCE also supports the conduct of targeted mapping exercises and the development of assessments and monitoring reports for specific countries, when requested.

The impact of knowledge products can be increased by:

• **Ensuring that knowledge products have a clear objective:** Knowledge products that provide recommendations for national stakeholders on the basis of research and empirical evidence may help to increase the credibility of OSCE policy advice. They can also provide a good basis for capacity-building efforts. The development of such products should not be

done in isolation from other projects but, rather, as part of a broader contribution to an overarching objective.

- **Ensuring that knowledge products are relevant to needs:** When planning development of knowledge products, OSCE staff should ensure that national actors are interested in receiving such products and that there will be opportunities to apply the findings.

- **Involving practitioners in conceptualizing and reviewing knowledge products:** Knowledge products are often developed with the support of external experts, but engaging additional practitioners with relevant SSG/R expertise (e.g., police reform, border management, anti-corruption) from participating States or international organizations in the conceptualization and review phases can help to ensure the quality of the publication. As many knowledge products are developed by the OSCE Secretariat or Institutions, it is important to ensure involvement of OSCE field staff working in a given thematic area, especially if the product is being developed for a specific participating State or a sub-region (e.g., Eastern Europe, Central Asia, etc.).

- **Raising awareness of knowledge products, both within the OSCE and beyond:** While much effort is often invested in developing knowledge products, insufficient attention can be paid to raising awareness among the target group(s) of the products and how to use them. Therefore, planning for the development of knowledge products should also include which target group(s) should receive them, how awareness will be raised about the products, the languages they may need to be translated into and whether training will be necessary to support their use. These aspects should be included in the budget for knowledge-product development from the outset.

- **Monitoring and evaluating the use of knowledge products developed:** Efforts should be made to evaluate whether the products developed are being used by the intended audience and that their use is contributing to positive change. Monitoring can be done through questionnaires that request information from the target audience on the use of the knowledge product or by observing whether the recommendations made within them are being applied.

Case Study 4

OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing

The OSCE Guidebook on Intelligence-Led Policing was developed by the OSCE Secretariat's Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) between December 2016 and July 2017. Some 35 law enforcement experts nominated by OSCE participating States provided in-kind support, as did experts from the TNTD's main partner organizations, Interpol, Europol and UNODC.

The experts took part in a two-day workshop where they discussed conceptual issues related to the intelligence-led policing model and agreed an outline for the guidebook. After the workshop, the experts continued to support the drafting process during three dedicated working groups by reviewing drafts and providing subject matter expertise on specific chapters.

The drafting process was preceded by a thorough desk research of existing materials, which was crucial in conceptualizing the guidebook. While involving experts from participating States and partner organizations posed some logistical challenges, their input was invaluable in ensuring the high quality and relevance of the publication. Their involvement also contributed significantly to the wide acceptance and endorsement of the guidebook, which was essential in ensuring its practical use by national authorities.

Given the OSCE's geographical diversity, a key challenge was to identify a common terminology, as some terms and concepts related to intelligence-led policing have different meanings in different cultural contexts or do not exist at all. To this end, agreeing on a common approach to conceptualizing the OSCE-recommended intelligence-led policing model before starting the drafting process was essential.

Since its publication, the guidebook has been translated into ten languages. It has provided a basis for TNTD's national and regional workshops across the OSCE area and has been used by law enforcement agencies, police training institutions and other international and regional organizations.

4.2 **Promoting Norms and Good Practices**

The OSCE often supports workshops, seminars, conferences and study visits to raise awareness of OSCE commitments, as well as other international norms and good practices relevant to the security sector.

Impact in promoting norms and good practices can be increased by:

- **Ensuring that events and study visits are a means for contributing to broader objectives:** At times, various types of events and visits are supported as if they themselves were the objective, when they are rather a means of contributing to achieving a change. Therefore, events and study visits should not be conducted in isolation but should take into account the theory of change and the overall aim of the programme/project concerned, complementing other activities that contribute to the programme/project objective. This may require, for example, that a follow-up action to events/visits should be planned for and budgeted. Thought also needs to be given to how to support in-depth discussions during events/visits about reform needs, which are in line with OSCE commitments or other international norms and good practices.

  Concrete recommendations and agreements reached at events/visits on how to move forward are key outputs (goods and services delivered directly by the OSCE). Each event or visit is a project activity, which requires to be a building block of the theory of change, with well formulated expected results. These elements could be captured in terms of reference and asked to be tracked. In particular for study visits, the positions of participants must be relevant to the visit's purpose; participants should have decision-making authority or be drivers of change and they should be encouraged to report back in a formal manner to disseminate the knowledge acquired and follow up on any next steps. The OSCE should actively encourage nomination of qualified women participants.

- **Considering how to engage national stakeholders in the organization of events:** National stakeholders may have the capacity and desire to (co-)organize events. To increase sustainability and to strengthen national ownership, the OSCE should support the organization of events by national stakeholders rather than taking the lead. Civil society organizations may also have the capacity and interest to engage in the organization of such workshops, although in some cases the context may be too sensitive for them to take the lead.

- **Tailoring the content to practical needs:** Events that promote norms should be as practically oriented as possible. Accordingly, good practices include engaging practitioners from other participating States, showcasing concrete case studies and highlighting operationalization of norms and principles. Allowing adequate time for participants to discuss issues of concern and share their own experiences is also a useful way to ensure that practical issues are raised, addressed and followed up on.

- **Considering the regional dimension:** Adding a regional dimension to events can have advantages in enabling discussions on issues that are broader than the national context. They can also facilitate the exchange of experiences, good practices and lessons from the reform processes within a given region and encourage similar processes among neighbouring countries.[28]

- **Monitoring and evaluating the support provided:** Events and visits supported by the OSCE should be monitored as to whether or not they have generated concrete recommendations or agreements, and the degree to which these are being followed-up. Activities that do not lead to changes in practices should not be repeated without considering how to increase their impact.

4.3 Providing Advice for Legislative Reform Processes

The OSCE may be requested to review the law-making process in a participating State, to comment on a particular law related to the security sector or to support the subsequent implementation of laws. The OSCE's recommendations assist participating States in ensuring their laws comply with OSCE commitments and other international standards. Such recommendations are often provided by OSCE field operations or by ODIHR, often jointly with the Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).

The impact of advice for legislative reform processes can be increased by:

- **Providing comprehensive support:** Planning support for a full legal cycle can help to increase impact. Such support may include performing legal reviews, providing direct support to the drafting body, supporting peer-to-peer communication to exchange lessons on implementing the law, providing capacity-building for relevant stakeholders to implement the law, and monitoring the implementation of the law after it has been passed by parliament.

- **Engaging directly with legislators:** Experience shows that the OSCE's advice for legislative changes has a greater impact when the OSCE directly advises law drafters and legislators, as appropriate, or participates in the working groups or commissions responsible for drafting laws. Direct interaction with those drafting the legislation can help to ensure that the legal advice is well received and that local realities are adequately reflected in the advice provided.

- **Promoting assessments of the potential social and financial impact of legislation:** The OSCE should promote and support impact assessments of potential legislative amendments. Assessments of the potential social and financial impacts of a law should be undertaken at

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28   For more details, see the chapter "Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R."

an early stage of the drafting process so that legislators can consider whether the legislative amendments are feasible in practice and if they are sustainable. Accordingly, it is helpful to identify at an early stage the financing and capacity-building required to implement the law.

- **Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the advice provided:** The OSCE should monitor the extent to which its advice has been taken on board by national actors. Monitoring should consider not only the support provided in the legislative drafting process (e.g., whether the OSCE's support was considered relevant and led to legislative amendments) but also the implementation of new or amended legislation (e.g., if the OSCE's support led to a positive change or in case there are any unintended side effects). If a country is lagging behind in implementing legal amendments, the OSCE may consider supporting follow-up activities that will assist the responsible authorities with implementation in a sustainable way over time.

> **For advice on how to request legislative assistance from ODIHR, see:**
> ‣ OSCE/ODIHR (2018), *Requesting Legislative Assistance from ODIHR*

4.4 **Providing Policy Advice**

Providing policy advice to a participating State is an effective way to support its reform efforts. Policy advice can take many forms, including advice on the possible options for reform, on the review of national plans or on strategy development.

The impact of policy advice can be increased by:

- **Mapping the national context:** Policy advice needs to be specific to the national context. A better understanding of local specificities can be gained by mapping the national context through situation analyses and needs assessments.[29]

- **Engaging with other international actors:** Policy advice has a stronger impact if it is agreed and harmonized by all or the main international actors present in a country/ active in that policy field. OSCE staff should co-ordinate with relevant international actors to communicate policy priorities and to ensure consistency in messaging.

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29   Needs assessment is the process of identifying the needs of a community, institution, region or country, analyzing the causes and effects of their problems and evaluating strategic solutions to address them. Situation analysis is one of the steps of needs assessment. It is review of the political, social, cultural, historical, institutional and legal context that will affect the project. Situation analysis identifies the key factors affecting the project, including risks and opportunities. Situation analysis thus feeds into stakeholder and risk analyses. OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010), pp. 28–29.

Case Study 5

Increasing the Representation of Women at All Levels of Policing in Montenegro

In 2020, the OSCE Secretariat's Transnational Threats Department (TNTD) in close co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Montenegro assisted the Montenegrin Police in conducting an in-depth analysis to better understand the opportunities and challenges associated with women's meaningful participation at all levels of policing. The analysis drew from national legal and policy frameworks, previous research, interviews/key-person meetings and focus groups with employees of the Police and relevant stakeholders. A summary document included a set of concrete recommendations on how to increase the number of women at all levels of policing and enhance their meaningful participation.[30]

Particular attention was paid to securing the commitment of beneficiaries from the beginning of the process, by consulting them on the methodology and during the drafting of the recommendations. As a result, they confirmed that the proposed measures cover all aspects raised during the assessment and are relevant, feasible and actionable.

One of the challenges was ensuring that the beneficiaries will implement the proposed recommendations. In this sense, the involvement of the Mission during the assessment was crucial, as they will work closely with the beneficiaries on the implementation of the measures proposed in the final document. For example, one of the recommendations was to conduct a public awareness campaign on the role of women in the police, to encourage them to pursue a career in this field. The Police Directorate and the Police Academy, with the Mission's support, launched a campaign in spring 2021 in connection with a call for enrolment of new police cadets. The set of materials included a brochure and a poster with information about employment opportunities for police officers, and six 30-second videos showcasing how a police career can be an attractive employment opportunity for women.

- In 2021, TNTD in co-operation with the CPC and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan will implement a similar project for the Uzbek Police. **Encouraging an inclusive approach to policy making:** The implementation of policy changes will likely affect a wide range of stakeholders in different ways, due to intersecting factors such as age, sex, social class and ethnicity. Therefore, it is essential to encourage an inclusive approach to policy making among all relevant national stakeholders, such as representatives of civil society, women's groups, national minorities and others. To ensure sustainability, dialogue on policy making should be extended beyond the capital to the regions, as there are often vast differences in the challenges faced by citizens in urban and rural areas.

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30   For more, see OSCE, *Increasing and Supporting the Participation of Women at all Levels in the Montenegrin Police: Key Findings and Recommendations* (Vienna, 2021).

- **Advocating for adequate budgeting and monitoring:** When providing policy advice, the OSCE should ensure that national actors are aware of the financial implications of the reform activities planned. For example, the OSCE can advocate for the development of an implementation plan (incl. budget) that will accompany the development of new laws or policies. Moreover, the OSCE can advocate for the development of a national monitoring framework to track the implementation of new policies and plans.

- **Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the policy advice provided:** In evaluating the policy advice provided by the OSCE, an important element is how far it has contributed to national policies in line with OSCE commitments. For example, the OSCE can evaluate the extent to which national policy documents correspond with the norms and good practices that the OSCE promotes. The implementation of national policies should also be monitored, so as to identify areas that may require further capacity-building or advocacy efforts.

4.5 **Capacity-Building**

Strengthening national capacities is crucial in supporting long-term and sustainable reform led by national actors. Capacity-building may include the development of individual skills – for example, through training – or support to broader institution building, such as the establishment of structures and processes.

The impact of capacity-building can be increased by:

- **Embedding capacity-building initiatives in long-term institutional reform strategies:** Capacity-building should not only aim to improve individual performance but also be integrated into a long-term reform framework at the institutional/organizational level. It is thus necessary to consider how capacity-building will be connected to broader structural changes. In the case of training, there should be an agreement with beneficiaries on how to institutionalize it and make sure it is not a one-time activity – for example, through training of trainers or by incorporating training content into the curricula of national training institutions.

- **Increasing the impact of training:** Every training should have clearly defined SMART learning objectives as well as learning outcomes for each individual module/session. The training methodology needs to be based on adult learning theory, including participatory training, in which trainees are actively engaged in the learning process. A good training package should consist not only of presentations but also of a training manual, a trainer's guide and practical handouts. A preparatory e-learning course or pre-reading material that covers theoretical aspects should be also included, as these allow more time to be dedicated to practical exercises and discussions during the training sessions.

To determine the training's immediate impact, pre- and post-training evaluations need to be conducted to measure participants' knowledge and skills, both prior to and after the training. Pre- and post-training evaluations need to be designed with similar scope or format for results to be comparable. To increase participant responses, such tests should be anonymized, for example, by using nicknames or numbers on answer sheets.

When applicable, a training-of-trainers approach should be considered to build a pool of competent instructors who can then teach the material to a wider audience. A good practice in this regard is to involve relevant national training institutions (e.g., police or judicial academies) in security sector training, even if they are involved only in a supporting or observing role. Finally, the impact of training can be increased by complementing it with additional support, in particular, mentoring or the establishment of an informal network of training participants.

- **Managing turnover in trained experts through candidate selection:** One common challenge is turnover in trained staff, which limits their ability to transfer newly acquired skills within the structure originally targeted for capacity-building. One way to mitigate this risk is to require a commitment from national stakeholders that the staff to be trained will continue in their current positions for a certain period of time so that they can apply and transfer the skills acquired. A clear selection method and terms of reference should be developed to ensure that the participants nominated have the relevant experience and interest to strengthen their skills and that they will have the opportunity to apply them. The establishment of alumni networks of experts and officials engaged in SSG/R could also contribute to sustainability in this area.

- **Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the capacity-building provided:** All capacity-building support should be regularly monitored and evaluated. Unsuccessful capacity-building activities should be thoroughly redesigned, involving all relevant stakeholders and focusing on all stages of the capacity-building process. With regard to training courses, their evaluation is often limited to the number of participants, but they should instead focus on whether the knowledge and skills of participants have increased and are being applied. Time-delayed surveys (e.g., six months following the training) are a good practice in obtaining such information. Questionnaires for the supervisors of participants about the changes they have observed in their trained staff are also useful in evaluating impact. In addition, such questionnaires can help to increase awareness among supervisors of the staff that received training and the potential they might have to contribute to broader institutional reform. When evaluating training, the extent to which individual training has contributed to broader institutional reform processes should be also assessed.

For guidance on the role of capacity-building in police reform, see:

‣ Harris, F. (2005), *The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform*

Case Study 6

Evaluating Capacity-Building in the OSCE

In 2018, OIO carried out a cross-organizational thematic evaluation of capacity development and learning activities delivered by the OSCE. The following key lessons were identified, which can guide future learning and capacity development activities:

‣ Interactive and experiential forms of learning are optimal for knowledge gains and skill-building when they are used in combination with formal learning. When the balance is tipped too far in favour of social and experiential learning, effectiveness and efficiency of knowledge transfer seems to decrease.

‣ Social and experiential learning methods might be more effective in fostering changes of beliefs and attitudes among learners and in challenging deep-seated stereotypes.

‣ Decisions to use highly interactive methods within larger projects should be carefully weighed against issues of sustainability, efficiency and the potential to achieve the same results using other methods.

‣ Short-term outcomes (changes in knowledge and attitude) often lead to changes in practice (mid-term outcomes), but the kinds of capacity development projects implemented by the OSCE often lack clarity about how to achieve longer-term results that lead to institutional change and impact.

‣ Project designs often lack plans for how participants will become leaders in their own institutions and transfer the acquired knowledge, skills and attitudes to others.

‣ Capacity development projects would be better served if they set fewer and more concrete training objectives and were more strategic in meeting them.

‣ Formal training should complement (not replace) social and experiential learning. The OSCE needs to better support counterparts in establishing comprehensive learning mechanisms.[31]

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31   For additional details, see OSCE, *2019 Synthesis Report on the Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning* (Vienna, 2019).

5. **Checklist**

The following checklist is intended to help programme/project management staff to:
- Plan for results-oriented programming, monitoring and evaluation of SSG/R support;
- Implement results-oriented approaches in different types of SSG/R support.

The purpose is not to "check" every item, but to provide an aide-memoire to consider key aspects and suggestions that might be relevant for your daily work.

Planning for results-oriented programming, monitoring an evaluation

Identify national priorities in the field of SSG/R

☐ Have national priorities been identified and used to inform the development of long-term OSCE objectives for SSG/R support?

☐ Has a comprehensive needs assessment been conducted?

☐ Have relevant national documents (e.g., national strategies and action plans) been examined?

☐ Have all relevant national stakeholders, including intended beneficiaries, been consulted in an inclusive manner?

Design interventions with a focus on long-term results

☐ Have objectives, outcomes and outputs been set at the right level of the results chain?

☐ Have relevant SMART indicators been identified for each level of the results chain?

☐ Have baseline and targets been set for all indicators?

☐ Have adequate and available means of verification been identified for each indicator?

☐ Has a theory of change been developed to highlight the sequence of results and the assumptions underpinning each causal link?

Connect projects to longer-term programme strategies

☐ Have the long-term results (objectives) for SSG/R support been set?

☐ How are different OSCE projects in the field of SSG/R contributing to the long-term results?

Engage with other international actors in support of shared objectives

☐ Is international support co-ordinated and contributing to the achievement of the same national long-term SSG/R priorities?

☐ Are any nationally led co-ordination mechanisms in place to support such priorities?

☐ Has consideration been given to engaging with other international actors to co-ordinate messages and to ensure policy advice is harmonized?

Support cross-dimensional collaboration within the OSCE

☐ Are projects/programmes contributing to overall objectives that are supported in and by all three dimensions of security?

☐ Has a cross-dimensional needs assessment in the field of SSG/R been considered?

Ensure the sustainability of SSG/R support through national ownership

☐ Have the objectives of OSCE's SSG/R support been mutually agreed with national authorities (e.g., through a MoU)?

☐ Have relevant national stakeholders, including civil society, been engaged in a dialogue on the OSCE's SSG/R support throughout programme/project cycle?

☐ Are national actors willing to sustain reform efforts and do they have the capacities to do so?

☐ Have national stakeholders, who can contribute to institutional change and have interest in the reform process, been engaged?

☐ Has any support to enhance national capacities to lead reform efforts been provided?

☐ Are projects/programmes readjusted in reaction to monitoring and evaluation results?

Recognize the need to complement long-term strategies with quick-impact initiatives

☐ Have short-term or quick-impact initiatives to build confidence and lay the foundation for a longer-term sustainable engagement been considered?

Plan to monitor and evaluate SSG/R support

☐ Has M&E been planned from the outset?

☐ Has a baseline for each SMART indicator been developed against which progress can be realistically measured?

☐ Have both quantitative and qualitative SMART indicators been considered?

☐ Have adequate and available sources of data been identified for M&E purposes?

☐ Is progress monitored beyond outputs and focuses also on outcomes?

☐ Have national stakeholders been involved in M&E?

☐ Have mechanisms been set to ensure ongoing M&E efforts feed into decision-making?

☐ Has an independent evaluation of SSG/R support been planned and budgeted for?

Implementing results-oriented approaches in different types support

Developing knowledge products

☐ Ensuring that knowledge products have a clear objective;

☐ Ensuring that knowledge products are relevant to needs of security sector institutions;

☐ Facilitating the involvement of practitioners in conceptualizing and reviewing the products;

☐ Raising awareness of the products, both within the OSCE and beyond;

☐ Monitoring and evaluating the use of knowledge products developed.

Promoting norms and good practices

- ☐ Ensuring that events (e.g., workshops, study visits, conferences) are perceived as a means to achieving broader objectives;

- ☐ Predefining (possibly in terms of reference or a concept note) the purpose, the targeted audience and the follow-up for events;

- ☐ Engaging national stakeholders in organizing events;

- ☐ Tailoring the content of events to practical needs;

- ☐ Considering the regional dimension when organizing events;

- ☐ Monitoring and evaluating any follow-up to events.

Providing advice for legislative reform processes

- ☐ Providing comprehensive support by planning the support for a full legal cycle (i.e., drafting, implementation, capacity-building);

- ☐ Engaging directly with legislators as appropriate;

- ☐ Promoting and supporting assessments of the social and financial impacts of new legislation;

- ☐ Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the advice provided.

Providing policy advice

- ☐ Mapping the national context through situational analyses and needs assessments;

- ☐ Engaging with other international actors;

- ☐ Encouraging an inclusive approach to policy making;

- ☐ Advocating for adequate budgeting and monitoring;

- ☐ Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the policy advice provided.

Capacity-Building

☐ Embedding capacity-building initiatives in long-term institutional reforms strategies;

☐ Defining clear objectives and using adult learning theory and participatory learning methodology;

☐ Managing turnover in trained experts through candidate selection;

☐ Monitoring and evaluating the impact of the capacity-building provided.

6. **Resources**

‣ Corlazzoli, V., and White, J., *Practical Approaches to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security and Justice Programmes: Part II: Using Theories of Change in Monitoring and Evaluation* (London: Department for International Development, 2013). Available at: *https://issat.dcaf.ch/ara/download/38924/579718/CCVRI-DFID-Practical-approaches-to-theories-of-change.pdf.*

‣ DCAF, *Measuring Security Sector Governance: A Guide to Relevant Indicators* (Geneva, 2010). Available at: *https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/OP_20_SCHROEDER_FORM.pdf.*

‣ DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN Women, "Integrating Gender in Project Design and Monitoring for the Security and Justice Sector" in *Gender and Security Toolkit* (Geneva, 2019). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/odihr/447067.*

‣ Harris, F., *The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform* (Pristina: OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2005). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/f/19789.pdf.*

‣ OECD, *The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation* (Paris, 2012). Available at: *https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/Busan%20partnership.pdf.*

‣ OSCE, *2019 Synthesis Report on the Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning* (Vienna, 2019). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/oio/486463.*

‣ OSCE, *Increasing and Supporting the Participation of Women at all Levels in the Montenegrin Police: Key Findings and Recommendations* (Vienna, 2021). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/secretariat/480853.*

‣ OSCE, *Performance Based Programme Budgeting Orientation Guide* (Vienna, 2007). Note: internal OSCE source, not publicly available.

‣ OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (Vienna, 2010). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693.*

‣ OSCE, *The Community Security Initiative* (12 April 2012). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/bishkek/106312.*

‣ OSCE/ODIHR, *Requesting Legislative Assistance from ODIHR* (Warsaw, 2018). Available at: *https://www.osce.org/odihr/407447.*

‣ Parsons, J., Gokey, C. and Thornton, M., *Indicators of Activities, Outputs, Outcomes and Impacts in Security and Justice Programming* (London: Department for International Development, 2013). Available at: *https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/304626/Indicators.pdf.*

‣ UNDP, *Why, What and How to Measure? A User's Guide to Measuring Rule of Law, Justice and Security Programmes* (New York, 2014). Available at: *https://www.undp.org/publications/why-what-and-how-measure-users-guide-measuring-rule-law-justice-and-security#modal-publication-download.*

‣ Vogel, I., *Review of the use of 'Theory of Change' in international development* (London: Department for International Development, 2012). Available at: *https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08a5ded915d3cfd00071a/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf.*

▸   Woodrow, P. and Oatley, N., *Practical Approaches
    to Theories of Change in Conflict, Security &
    Justice Programmes: Part I: What are they,
    different types, how to develop and use
    them* (London: Department for International
    Development, 2013).
    Available at: *https://gsdrc.org/document-library/
    practical-approaches-to-theories-of-changein-
    conflict-security-justiceprogrammes-part-i-
    what-are-they-different-types-how-to-develop-
   and-use-them/.*

Guidelines for OSCE Staff

Supporting Governance-Driven Approaches to Building Integrity in the Security Sector

Executive Summary

This chapter provides OSCE staff with advice on how to promote governance-driven and cross-dimensional support to building integrity within the security sector, as a key component of good governance. The chapter explains the rationale behind the need to uphold the security sector to high standards of ethical values (section 1); underlines the importance of strengthening cross-dimensional aspects of integrity-building efforts (section 2); outlines the main guiding approaches to ensure that support in this area remains governance-driven (section 3); and identifies key entry points for programmatic support (section 4). Finally, a practical checklist is provided to help staff in the process (section 5).

Key points from the chapter:

- **The security sector must uphold the same high standards of ethical values in the pursuit of their mandate as any other public sector:** The promotion of integrity is particularly important within the security sector, as the only component of the public sector that embodies the legitimate use of force and limitation of civil liberties.

- **Integrity-building projects and programmes should be governance-driven:** A strong culture of integrity supports security institutions in (a) effectively delivering security to all the population, (b) building a trust-relationship with its citizens and (c) promoting accountability to shared ethical values and principles, including the respect for human rights and gender equality. To achieve this effect, however, it is not sufficient to focus on narrow aspects of capacity-building. While this may be important, a culture of integrity requires governance-driven approaches that can support the integration of shared ethical values into the foundations of the institution. Such approaches may include fostering inclusivity, prioritizing support through an institutional-building lens, and promoting a focus on both internal accountability and external oversight.

- **Support to building integrity requires co-ordinated and coherent support across all OSCE dimensions:** While activities aimed at building the integrity of public institutions are mainly in the remit of the OSCE's second dimension, support to strengthening the good governance of security sector institutions has traditionally been led by the first dimension. At the same time, the third dimension also plays a key role in strengthening external oversight of the security sector, and mainstreaming human rights and gender approaches. These are all key building blocks for promoting integrity. The lack of clarity on which dimension should lead on integrity-building efforts in the security sector has meant that support in this area has sometimes fallen through the cracks. Efforts should be made to identify synergies and build on the extensive experience that all three OSCE dimensions have acquired in this field.

- **To plan for comprehensive support to integrity building, entry points should be considered at multiple levels:** OSCE support should always be grounded in an assessment of integrity-building needs prior to planning and designing specific projects. While the scope of the project will largely depend on the mandate and the available human and financial resources, efforts should be made to seek entry points at different levels. This may include strengthening legal and policy frameworks, promoting integrity at the institutional and individual levels, and/or supporting external oversight. For instance, while policy frameworks are key to ensure national commitment to integrity, they will only be an asset if they are effectively implemented. Similarly, while building individual capacity to integrity is fundamental, it will not produce long-term results without the necessary accompanying institutional reforms aiming at establishing clear and transparent human and financial management processes.

1. **Rationale**

Integrity provides an important barrier to corruption and lack of good governance, both recognized by the OSCE Ministerial Council as *"potential sources of political tension that undermine the stability and security of participating States."*[1] Institutions, which are not perceived to uphold high standards of integrity and professionalism, are not only more likely to lose public trust but also to be ineffective in the delivery of services. Integrity building is therefore key to strengthening democratic institutions that uphold the rule of law and respect human rights and gender equality, and can contribute to preventing conflict and fostering security and development.[2]

Integrity is of particular importance to security sector governance and reform (SSG/R) as the security sector is the only public sector holding the legitimate authority to use violence. As security sector institutions also may limit civil liberties (e.g., when making arrests), it is paramount to demonstrate their commitment to the delivery of security for all people.

The **integrity of the security sector**, just as in any other public sector, refers to "*the consistent alignment of, and adherence to, shared ethical values, principles and norms for upholding and prioritizing the public interest over private interests in the sector.*"[3]

The most common integrity violations are abuse of power and corruption (e.g., bribery, illicit enrichment, abuse of functions), as well as *policy capture*, whereby policies are repeatedly directed away from the public interest through legitimate means but towards a specific interest, exacerbating inequalities and undermining democratic values.[4] Similarly, the cases of highly politized security sectors, which are often at the service and protection of certain political elites, are also a consequence of low levels of integrity.

Therefore, while the security sector needs to be able to investigate and fight corruption, building integrity is much broader than tackling corruption. While the ethical values to be promoted are likely to depend on local standards and wider political realities, a common trend is the

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1   See for instance, OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/16 on Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity* (Hamburg, 2016), MC.DEC/4/16.

2   For instance, OSCE, *Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism* (Dublin, 2012), MC.DOC/2/12, recognizes that a public sector that is "based on integrity," among others, is "a major factor of sustainable economic growth and contributes to fostering citizen's trust in public institutions and government."

3   OECD, *OECD Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity* (Paris, 2017), p. 7.

4   For more information see OECD, *Preventing Policy Capture: Integrity in Public Decision Making* (Paris, 2017).

need to ensure that integrity transpires at both the individual and institutional levels and is reinforced by strong mechanisms for internal accountability and external oversight. As such, efforts to build integrity should be underpinned by the same principles of good governance that are applied to the public sector.[5]

Integrity building in the security sector is not new and is key to supporting nationally-driven SSG/R processes. The OSCE has successfully been providing assistance in this area to its partici-pating States in the form of, among others, tailor-made seminars and conferences, trainings, and technical advice to support the enactment of laws and regulations foreseeing punitive measures for those who engage in corrupt activities. To effectively prevent illicit practices, a long-term and governance-driven approach that promotes an institutional culture of integrity across the security apparatus is needed. Building integrity should thus become a vital component of cross-dimensional and good-governance initiatives and be at the heart of any SSG/R approach.

Several tools within and beyond the OSCE have been developed to provide practical guidelines to support integrity building in the public sector, often in the framework of anti-corruption efforts.[6] However, when it comes to the security sector, guidance is often limited only to a spe-cific component of the sector (e.g., police). Moreover, there is no guidance on cross-dimensional and governance-driven approaches to addressing integrity building in the security sector that is in line with the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security.

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5   See the section 2.2 in the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context".

6   E.g., OSCE, *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (Vienna, 2016).

Figure 1: OSCE commitments underlining the importance of promoting integrity in the public sector

Charter for **European Security** — 1999

Declaration on **Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism** (Dublin) — 2012

2014 — Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/14 on the **Prevention of Corruption** (Basel)

Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/16 on **Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity** (Hamburg) — 2016

2020 — Ministerial Council Decision No. 6/20 on **Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency**

2. Strengthening Cross-Dimensional Approaches to Integrity Building in the Security Sector

While integrity building in the security sector is recognized to be of vital importance to broader SSG/R efforts, OSCE support to this area has sometimes fallen through the cracks. Part of the challenge relates to the lack of a clear institutional anchor for this portfolio: the security sector is not considered at the core of the second dimension's mandate, and integrity building is not perceived as the primary domain of the first dimension. To ensure effective OSCE support, there is a need for stronger cross-dimensional approaches to identifying integrity-building needs and to acting on these. Such cross-dimensional approaches can build on the comparative advantages of each OSCE dimension, which can bring different expertise to the table. For instance:

- Under the **first dimension**, several field operations have sought to engage in integrity building, with a particular focus on policing and border management (e.g., training activities for border and customs officials and regional conferences to share experiences and lessons learned on building police integrity and accountability). Occasionally, the OSCE has supported programmes aimed at building accountability of specific security institutions in a comprehensive manner (including areas such as parliamentary oversight, external and internal oversight mechanisms, training, community consultations, and media support), which set the foundations for building integrity. However, the first dimension's efforts to date have often been focused on specific parts of the security sector, driven by the perception that integrity building within the security sector as a whole is a matter for the second dimension, just like for the other parts of the public sector.

- The **second dimension** has developed significant experience in supporting the development of anti-corruption strategies, sound and transparent public procurement processes, and regulations on whistle-blower protection, as well as in promoting integrity in the public sector. However, except for very few exceptions (see case study 1), the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) has not been involved in activities related to integrity building in the security sector per se. It has, however, engaged in building the capacity of the security sector, and in particular, investigators and prosecutors in investigating corruption and money laundering. Efforts have also been made to support the adoption and implementation of existing instruments, standards and norms (e.g., the World Customs Organization's Revised Arusha Declaration on Good Governance and Integrity in Customs Services).

Strengthening Integrity through Assistance to Anti-corruption Institution Building in Armenia

In 2018, based on the request of the Ministry of Justice of Armenia, the OCEEA launched the extra-budgetary project *"Strengthening anti-corruption reform in Armenia"* aimed at establishing and reinforcing national anti-corruption institutions with adequate human and technical resources to foster the country's good governance reforms, including in the security sector.

The project was the outcome of negotiations among different stakeholders, including the law enforcement institutions which were initially reluctant to engage. At the end, it was decided to create two institutions: I) a Corruption Prevention Commission (established in 2019) to prevent corruption through seeking compliance with ethical requirements, conflicts of interest and other restrictions for public officials and civil servants, implementation of asset and income declaration systems, and raising public awareness; and II) an Anti-Corruption Committee (established in 2021) to combat bribery and other corrupt practices in law-enforcement agencies. The project was jointly drafted by both the OSCE and the Ministry and focused on targeted policy, expert, advocacy, and capacity-building assistance in establishing the aforementioned anti-corruption institutions. For the first time, the OCEEA prominently engaged in the institutional development of specific anti-corruption institutions, from the development of organigrams and jobs descriptions to the design of recruitment processes for leadership positions and the provision of training to new staff. Moreover, in parallel, the OCEEA was also involved in drafting the Anti-Corruption Strategy and its Action Plan for 2019–2022, which was adopted by the Government in October 2019.

- The **third dimension** has also made an important contribution to building a culture of integrity within the security sector, working mainly on building external accountability (e.g., through supporting ombuds institutions and other independent oversight bodies, building civil society's oversight capacities, as well as strengthening security sector institutions' compliance with the rule of law and mainstreaming human rights and gender equality).[7] Support has also been provided to enhance judicial integrity and to develop effective and transparent mechanisms to prosecute corruption. Ultimately, integrity is a cornerstone for the promotion of democratic and accountable institutions, which is at the core of the third dimension's mandate.

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7   OSCE, *The OSCE Approach to Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R): Report by the Secretary General of the OSCE* (Vienna, 2019), SEC.GAL/42/19.

Case Study 2

A Cross-dimensional Working Group on Anti-corruption and Integrity Building in North Macedonia

In 2017, the OSCE Mission to Skopje established a cross-dimensional working group to co-ordinate the Mission's anti-corruption activities. The working group has allowed for exchange of information and a more co-ordinated and coherent support to national security and public sector actors: police, public prosecutor's office, State Commission for Prevention of Corruption, local self-government units, etc. As part of this support, the Mission has so far contributed to the development of a new Integrity Policy Declaration for local self-government units and trained the newly appointed integrity officers in 27 municipalities in 2021. In addition, the Mission supported the establishment of the anti-corruption legal clinic at the Faculty of Law in Skopje; assisted the Academy of Judges and Public Prosecutors in the development of judicial and prosecutorial ethics and ethical behaviour; provided advanced training in financial investigations, anti-corruption and assets recovery for the police; and supported the enhancement of anti-corruption capabilities for fighting border-related crimes. The Mission also continuously monitors the court proceedings of high-profile corruption cases.

All dimensions thus have extensive experience and interest in building integrity in different parts of the security sector and from different perspectives. Bearing this in mind, more efforts should be made to identify synergies across all three dimensions to promote organization-wide coherent approaches to integrity building. For example, it is undesirable to advance in strengthening the integrity of the public sector without including the security sector. Similarly, it is not sustainable to strengthen individual integrity through training offered by the first dimension if there are no parallel efforts to strengthen external accountability, which is an area often supported by the third dimension. Cross-dimensional approaches are therefore necessary and can be fostered by, among others, recognizing that broad governance projects for the public sector that focus on integrity building should also be rolled out to the security sector. Alternatively, smaller projects on human resource management or financial management in the security sector may offer an important entry point for engaging in SSG/R through an integrity building lens.[8]

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8   For more examples on cross-dimensional co-operation, see the chapter "Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R".

3. Guiding Approaches for Governance-Driven Support to Integrity Building in the Security Sector

The OSCE has acquired significant experience in providing training, developing codes of conduct, enacting laws and policies, and supporting investigative measures, all key anti-corruption initiatives. However, when it comes to building a culture of integrity, a shared understanding of the purpose and values guiding the institution, as well as conditions necessary to create commitment to those values, should be built. To that end, governance-driven approaches are important (i.e., the application of a good governance lens to any of the work provided by the OSCE in this field).[9] When it comes specifically to developing integrity-building programmes, those should be guided, to the extent possible, by the following approaches:

- **Foster inclusive processes when developing, implementing and overseeing integrity-building programmes:** As in all efforts to support the consolidation of democratic institutions, integrity-building programmes or programmes with an integrity component should look beyond the government and be developed in consultation with not only the security sector institution concerned but also civil society (including women's groups and the youth), relevant parliamentary groups and other relevant actors. Taking an inclusive approach will not only foster a common understanding of the challenges and possible solutions, and ensure that programmes are fit-for-purpose, but it will also improve the public perception and increase citizens' trust in the security sector.[10] Therefore, these actors should be involved at all stages of the project cycle to the extent possible. Opportunities should be created for relevant actors to provide input during the design of integrity-building programmes, as well as when overseeing its implementation, conducting monitoring or doing evaluation.

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9   See the section 2.2 in the chapter "Understanding SSG/R in the OSCE Context".

10   A substantial body of evidence demonstrates that there is a significant negative correlation between integrity and, more specifically, corruption, as well as the levels of confidence in public institutions. See e.g., Anderson, C. J. & Tverdova, Y.V., "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(1), 2003, pp. 91–109; or Clausen, B., Kraay, A., & Nyiri, Z., "Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey," *The World Bank Economic Review*, 25(2), 2011, pp. 212–249.

Case Study 3

Inclusive Approaches to the Drafting of Regulation in Kosovo[11]

In 2020, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo was invited to provide expert support through its Department for Security and Public Safety to a working group consisting of representatives of Kosovo Police, Police Inspectorate of Kosovo, and relevant civil society organizations established to review a draft regulation on integrity for police. The Mission's role was, *inter alia*, to ensure that the regulation reflects best international practices in the area of police integrity and is compatible with human rights principles. From March to November 2020, a series of working group meetings were organized to discuss, co-ordinate and compile suggestions and recommendations in the area of police integrity and conflict of interest by all representatives involved in the process. The diversity of opinions and substantive and technical expertise within the working group ensured a holistic approach to reviewing the document and contributed to its consistency and comprehensiveness. The Mission also provided also provided a range of international perspectives on police integrity and prevention of the conflict of interest that were fed into the process.

• **Prioritize support through an institution-building lens:** Without establishing or changing necessary institutional processes and mechanisms, training individuals will not suffice, despite the fact that it is vital to foster change in knowledge and mindset. Integrity should thus be tackled from an institutional perspective and aim at decreasing incentives and opportunities for engaging in corruption and other undesirable practices. This should focus on organizational integrity by establishing clear and transparent human resources and financial management processes and creating decent working conditions for the police, military and other security actors with respect for gender equality and human rights. For institutional approaches to succeed, enough time should be planned to enable changes in behavior of staff that, in turn, will impact institutional practices and processes. Despite the OSCE's annual budget cycle and rotation of international staff, which may both challenge long-term commitment, multi-year programmes can be planned for. Such programmes could be designed and broken down into individual one-year projects that are grounded in long-term strategic plans aiming at producing outcomes and objectives.

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11   All references to Kosovo – whether to the territory, institutions or population in this text – should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.

- Promote a focus on both internal accountability and external oversight: Integrity-building programmes in the security sector should strive to meet the same ethical standards of integrity as any other public institution. These values should be upheld through mechanisms of internal accountability which outline clearly what behavior is expected and how inappropriate behaviors sanctioned. At the same time, external oversight mechanisms are fundamental to ensure accountability at all levels of the security sector, including at the management level. External oversight mechanisms include state and non-state actors and institutions engaged in the democratic governance of the security sector (e.g., parliamentary committees, judicial services, anti-corruption agencies, independent complaint authorities, civil society, the media, etc.).

Info Box 1

Challenges in Implementing Governance-Driven Approaches to Integrity Building

Challenge	Entry points for action
Long-term national commitment might be lacking. Given the inherent sensitivities surrounding the fight against corruption and, more broadly, any integrity-building efforts, long-term national ownership and leadership is a necessary condition for success.	Long-term commitment can be promoted and planned for: ▸ Strong national leadership should be sought from the beginning.[12] ▸ Codes of conduct and other existing tools can be used as entry points to start the conversation. ▸ It is encouraged to sign MoUs with national counterparts. ▸ Key political momentums (e.g., post-elections) can be used to promote change.
The highest political structures might not comply with minimum standards of integrity. In many contexts, those same actors who are expected to introduce anti-corruption and integrity policies fail to operate in accordance with minimum standards of integrity.	Integrity-building efforts should go hand-in-hand with initiatives aiming at promoting minimum standards of integrity at the highest levels of the government: ▸ Relevant OSCE Decisions[13] can be used as entry points for engaging in broader discussions with national counterparts on integrity building in the public sector.
Resistance might be faced within security sector institutions. Strengthening the integrity of any part of the public sector, especially the security sector, means reducing or re-balancing the influence of certain power groups over the sector. Those who stand to gain from corruption will lose when the possibilities for corruption are reduced.	The resistance that integrity reforms and initiatives might face should be identified as early as possible: ▸ When designing and planning for this kind of work, the political economy[14] of the specific context should be assessed, and power dynamics need to be taken into account.

12   See the section 3.6 in the chapter "Results-Oriented Programming in the Field of SSG/R".

13   See the Figure 1 above.

14   See the section 3.3 in the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R".

4. Key Entry Points for Supporting Integrity Building in the Security Sector

To put the aforementioned governance-driven approaches into practice, this section provides examples of the most common entry points to support participating States in building integrity within security institutions.

Figure 2: Entry points for integrity building in the security sector

4.1 **Assessing Integrity-Building Needs**

Tailor-made integrity-building initiatives should take into account the specific challenges, risks, needs and opportunities in building the integrity of the security sector in a given context. The cultural and political context in which these institutions operate should be taken into considerations for all programmatic interventions. To ensure this is the case, when planning for support to integrity building, OSCE staff could:

• **Introduce integrity aspects in (broader) SSG/R needs assessments:** If SSG/R assessments are intended to examine the extent to which security sector institutions function in accordance with democratic norms and good governance principles, then assessing the status of integrity of the institutions can provide an important contribution to the overall exercise. These broader assessments should serve to identify whether integrity building is a key issue that requires programmatic support or not.[15]

• **Conduct an in-depth assessment of integrity building as a basis for developing a project:** If integrity building has been identified as a key area for action, an in-depth assessment should be supported to identify specific needs and entry points. This requires gathering information on the applicable international and regional minimum standards, as well as on what constitutes low and high-levels of corruption in a given country and what are the perceptions by the local population.[16] Periodic surveys of public opinion, which can inform assessments, may shed light on perceptions of corruption. Similarly, some local and international NGOs regularly gather and publish data and statistics relevant for integrity (e.g., the Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International). However, it should be recognised that access to data (or simply, availability of data) may be very limited due to the sensitivities on this issue. For this reason, it is vital to have the support of national counterparts in the conduct of such assessments, or ideally, to support them in conducting a self-assessment.

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15   For further information, see the chapter "Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R".

16   United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).

Info Box 2

Relevant Counterparts for Assessing Integrity Needs in the Security Sector

The specific stakeholders to be engaged will depend on the context, the scope and the objective of the programme. However, there are a number of actors, beyond the traditional security sector-related structures, which should be considered.

labor unions for **security sector staff**

ombuds institutions, human rights commissions, and other **independent complaint authorities**

the media

audit offices

civil society

anti-corruption agencies and **commissions**

judicial services and **law commissions**

parliamentarians and relevant **parliamentary committees**, and **political parties**

Case Study 4

Public Perception Surveys on Attitudes towards Police in Montenegro

In 2020, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro conducted a public perception survey on the attitudes of Montenegrin citizens towards the work of the Police Directorate. The survey focused on the citizens' views on the main threats to their security and safety and on their perception of the police as an institution and the overall police reform process. A report with the results of the survey was made publicly available for the information and benefit of national stakeholders and other organizations. The report included findings specifically on issues related to integrity of the police.[17] The data was later used by the Mission to identify priority areas for project planning and for better shaping future actions. It is intended to conduct such perception surveys annually so that they can serve as a tool for both national stakeholders and the Mission to regularly measure progress in police reforms in Montenegro.

- **Support an integrity-building self-assessment of the security sector:** If there is sufficient interest from national stakeholders, the assessment by the OSCE could be combined with support to national stakeholders in undertaking a self-assessment. This can help promote ownership of identified programmatic areas for support and at the same time build capacity to address this issue and factor it into future risk analysis and risk management.

There are a number of tools for supporting self-assessments, for example:
- ‣ NATO (2009), *Building Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and Peer Review Process*
- ‣ DCAF (2019), *Toolkit on Police Integrity* (chapter 9, section 3.1)

On the basis of the assessments, there are likely to be entry points for support spanning across areas such as the development of legal and policy frameworks, the promotion of integrity at the institutional level, developing knowledge tools and capacity-building support for security sector personnel, and the support to external oversight. The subsequent sections of the chapter encompass an overview of relevant examples under these categories.[18]

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17   For additional details, see OSCE Mission to Montenegro, *Perception of the police in Montenegro: Results of a quantitative survey* (Podgorica, 2020).

18   Given that it is not possible to provide in-depth guidance on each area, the text rather highlights where detailed guidance exists to support the development of assistance in these areas.

What Should Be Examined in Integrity-Building Assessments?

The scope of the assessment needs to be defined according to the specific context and the mandate received for the exercise. Through a combination of methodologies (e.g., desk research, stakeholder mapping, semi-structured interviews, surveys), assessments could aim, among others, at:

‣ Mapping applicable international and regional minimum standards on integrity. *Has the Government committed to any international or regional standards?*

‣ Mapping all relevant legislation and national and local policy frameworks covering integrity-related issues. *Are there laws setting minimum integrity standards for the public sector (or specifically for the security sector) at national and/or local levels? Are there national and/or local anti-corruption strategies and actions plans in place?*

‣ Identifying types and frequency of corruption and other undesirable practices being perpetrated by the security sector and its components (e.g., customs, traffic police). *Is there grand corruption (i.e., abuse of high-level power)? Is there petty corruption (i.e., everyday abuse of power by public officials in their interaction with citizens)? Is there a tendency to deviate the work of security sector institutions towards the interest of the few and away from the public interest (including by legitimate means)? If yes, what are existing practices?*

‣ Assessing the political economy and other informal institutional practices and networks which might impact the outcome of integrity-building efforts. *What are the power and economic relations within the security sector and between the sector and the structures overseeing it? Do these relations determine the type and the way corruptive practices are perpetrated?*

‣ Mapping causes for engaging in corruptive practices. *What are the incentives for the unethical behavior of security sector personnel (e.g., poor working conditions and salaries, lack of career perspectives)? Do security sector institutions have sufficient capacity and resources, human and financial, to successfully carry out their mandate? Is the structure of the institution found suitable to support a culture of integrity? Do security sector personnel have a good knowledge on the values and conduct expected within their tasks?*

‣ Assessing the strengths and weaknesses of existing internal accountability and external oversight mechanisms. *Have the security sector institutions developed codes of conduct or similar tools? Are those accessible to all staff? What are the sanctions in case of inappropriate behavior? Are internal and external accountability mechanisms in place and functional? Which are the institutions tasked with overseeing the level of (or lack of) integrity in the security sector? What is their mandate? Are those independent? How are they financed? How are their members elected?*

‣ Understanding local standards and assessing the level of awareness of the wider population. *What is the population's perception of the security sector's integrity? What are the needs? What are the opportunities to further strengthen security sector institutions' integrity? What are the values that citizens want security sector institutions and its personnel to observe in their conduct?*

4.2 **Supporting Legal and Policy Frameworks**

International, regional, national, local legal and policy frameworks provide entry points for building integrity in the security sector, especially by means of policies and regulations within security sector institutions. Support in this area can involve mapping legislative gaps, supporting legal and policy framework development in line with international standards, and supporting the practical application of these frameworks. While legal and policy frameworks related to integrity will differ from context to context, the following are some broad examples:

- **International conventions and other tools and commitments (including OSCE commitments) made by Governments** that include references to integrity and democratic governance of the public sector, and in particular, of the security sector. Some examples are the OSCE Decisions listed in the Figure 1, the UN Convention against Corruption, the World Customs Organization's Revised Arusha Declaration on Good Governance and Integrity in Customs Services, and the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions' declarations and guidelines on international professional standards for public sector auditing.[19]

- **National legislation** that builds on applicable international standards and sets a clear context-specific framework to support integrity building in the security sector (e.g., laws on civil service, anti-corruption laws, surveillance laws).

- **National strategies** include anti-corruption strategies and national security strategies, which are the two most relevant and common strategies in the area of integrity. Anti-corruption strategies should not only set minimum standards to be observed in the public sector but also explicitly mention the importance of these for the security sector. National security strategies should also explicitly mention integrity building as a prominent issue that affects the effective delivery of security.

- **National action plans** seeking the implementation of the commitments made in the aforementioned instruments. Enough human and financial resources should be allocated to that end, and accountability for their implementation should be sought, including by establishing clear M&E mechanisms.

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19   For other intentional guidelines and standards, see DCAF's *website*.

Info Box 5

Examples of Key Issues to Be Covered in National Normative Frameworks[20]

‣ Reference to international and regional instruments and already agreed standards. These could include anti-corruption conventions that have taken a broader approach to address prevention of corruption at the global level.

‣ Reflect human rights and gender-equality as key cross-cutting issues, which are fundamental to support integrity.

‣ Provide broad directions on the ways and means to achieve these standards, by encouraging, among others, the development of preventive measures, codes of conduct, provisions on conflict of interest, adequate capacity building, etc.

‣ Encourage setting up clear rules and secure procedures to empower and protect whistleblowers reporting suspected cases of misconduct.

‣ Call for the establishment of adequate accountability and oversight mechanisms and appropriate procedures and sanctions to deal with misconduct.

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20   List adapted from DCAF's websites on international standards and legal frameworks, and security sector legislation.

4.3 **Promoting Integrity at the Institutional Level**

Building integrity is not only about creating a framework but also about creating the right conditions at the institutional level. If staff are expected to be accountable to the institutions they represent, then these institutions should provide for clear and transparent processes to decision-making and management, including on recruitment. The institutions need to ensure decent working conditions for their staff, offer adequate remuneration, provide a safe working environment and manage risks.

All these processes are part of the internal accountability system that make the institutions more effective in delivering on their tasks. In these processes, it is encouraged to further explore and utilize digital tools to support strengthening integrity and internal accountability as appropriate.[21] In this regard, OSCE staff could:

- **Develop risk analysis and risk management systems:** A system could be developed to systematically map sensitive processes (e.g., procurement, promotion of staff, inspection), sensitive functions (typically, staff with relevant decision-making powers related to finances, procurement, human resources, etc.) and identify vulnerabilities and risks to integrity violations. Control mechanisms (i.e., internal accountability systems) with investigation capacity to respond to suspicions of violations should also be put in place. Similarly, public surveys and other tools for the systematic collection of data on the population's perception regarding the level of integrity of the security sector could be developed. To support these types of early prevention efforts, the use of digital tools can become a great support, as they process and compare data more easily. Finally, to support increased transparency, the OSCE could encourage security institutions to make this data available to the public when appropriate.

> **For further information on risk assessments and management, see:**
> ‣ OECD (2017), *Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity*
> ‣ INTOSAI (2019), *Guidelines for Internal Control in the Public Sector*
> ‣ DCAF (2019), *Toolkit on Police Integrity* (chapter 3, section 3.5)

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21   OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision N.6/20 on Decision on Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency* (Tirana, 2020).

Case Study 5

Supporting Risks Analysis on Corruption in Serbia

In 2019, the OSCE Mission to Serbia supported the Sector for Internal Control (SIC) of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (MoI) to develop the Guidelines for Corruption Risk Analysis. The Guidelines were endorsed by the MoI as a part of the in-service training curriculum to be used by trainers from SIC and other organizational units of the MoI. In the course of 2020, the MoI appointed a number of working groups for each branch of the General Police Directorate (e.g., the SIC, traffic police, border police, specialized units, etc.) to conduct a corruption risk assessment for different types of posts within the police. In 2021, the Mission, together with DCAF's Police Programme, supported the MoI in training the working groups members on conducting such assessments. The training was delivered by experts from the National Anti-Corruption Agency of Serbia, Romanian Anticorruption General Directorate and the SIC. As the working groups are being established for different lines of work and there is rotation of the staff, there is a need for constant training on the subject.

- **Strengthen human resources management:** There is a need to ensure that the management of the security sector institutions' staff meets relevant international standards, such as clear and transparent assignment of authority and responsibility, appropriate lines of reporting, fair and transparent recruitment policies (including for the higher rank positions), merit-based systems to promotions, regular performance reviews, gender-equality policies, and the planning for post-service employment services. Cronyism and nepotism must be safeguarded against, and illicit practices (e.g., illicit enrichment) has to be prevented.[22] Efforts should be made to meet international good practices in the development of professional standards through the consultation of staff. Labor unions should also play a role in ensuring respectable social and working conditions which are necessary preconditions for integrity.

For further information, see:

‣ DCAF (2019), *Toolkit on Police Integrity*, which includes useful insights on human resources and recruitment and which can serve as food for thought for other components of the security sector.

‣ DCAF (2015), *Training Manual on Police Integrity*, (chapters 2 and 3 on Human Resources Management and Integrity Planning)

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22   In line with Art.20 of the UN Convention Against Corruption, applicable to all public officials and judicial office holders.

Case Study 6

Development of Human Resources Strategies for Increased Police Integrity in North Macedonia

In 2018, the Police Development Unit of the OSCE Mission to Skopje together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) established joint working groups on human resources management and on disciplinary procedures. In 2019, the working groups produced a *Human Resources Management Strategy* (2020-2022) and a report on revised disciplinary procedures, respectively, with recommendations to be implemented in the upcoming three years. The working group on disciplinary procedures identified that many corruption cases were the result of poor recruitment practices and selection of individuals with low personal integrity. Furthermore, the ongoing practice of providing ethics training and traditional reactive investigations as a response to the complaints for police misconduct were found not to be sufficient to build a culture of integrity across the entire institution. In order to change this practice, more proactive investigations were recommended in addition to the provision of comprehensive ethics training.

Against this background, the working group outlined the following recommendations to strengthen police integrity:

- ‣ Introducing a disciplinary measure for not reporting peer misconduct;
- ‣ Establishing an early intervention (early prevention) system for employees with poor conduct;
- ‣ Establishing an automated case management system for recording disciplinary violations and disciplinary cases;
- ‣ Introducing a disciplinary matrix to specify the range of possible penalties and available aggravating and mitigating factors for each type of categorized misconduct;
- ‣ Providing more robust training for everyone involved in the entire disciplinary process (disciplinary commissions, internal control officers, etc.);
- ‣ Developing specific activities aimed at depoliticizing the members of the police forces and MoIA staff in order to ensure professional integrity and political neutrality;
- ‣ Developing a strong concept of professional integrity and policies in MoIA; and
- ‣ Assessing the risk of corruption and conflicts of interest.

In addition, the establishment of a sound mechanism for informing the public about issues concerning police competence and accountability was also foreseen. This was meant to send a clear and firm message to the public that cases of abuse of police power, as well as the inappropriate behavior and treatment by members of the MoIA, are to be resolved quickly and in full compliance with the relevant legal regulations.

- **Map and promote good practices in addressing incentives for misconduct and creating opportunities for strengthened integrity:** Salaries should be adequate and paid on time to avoid the need to look for other sources of income.[23] Implications for family members of security sector personnel should also be taken into consideration when deciding about the appropriateness of benefits, such as housing, schooling, medical care, etc. If the workplace provides for welfare, then it reduces the need for staff to engage in corrupt behaviors and provides incentives for them to perform their work competently, honestly and completely, according with the institution's ethical values.[24] Similarly, efforts should be made to identify existing vulnerabilities and incentives for malpractice and to support their elimination. For example, the number of resolved cases is not necessarily a good indicator of police officers' performance, as pressure to solve cases may, for instance, lead to the use of torture or ill-treatment to extract confessions. While issues like the height of salaries can usually not be influenced by the OSCE, efforts can be made to support national institutions to map opportunities for integrity, provide advice and facilitate the exchange of good practices. In identifying context-specific positive and negative incentives, relevant and adequately strong labor unions in the security sector are a key counterpart.

- **Strengthen financial management:** Non-transparent financial management in security sector institutions, lack of control over expenditures and the disconnection between policymaking, planning and budgeting are powerful enablers of corrupt practices, providing incentives to personnel not to perform their duties in accordance with the rules, guidelines and ethical values set by their institution.[25] Moreover, in the security sector, corruption can often occur in contracting and procurement, as relevant information is often confidential due to security reasons and may involve security restrictions on competition in tenders or limitations on subsequent audit and investigation. Thus, more attention should be paid to support participating States in establishing or enhancing appropriate financial management within security institutions, including by setting effective inspection and audit systems, clear and transparent procurement processes and appropriate mechanisms for income and asset declarations of public officials. All these processes can greatly benefit from digitalization.[26]

For further information, refer to tools such as:
- ‣ OSCE (2016), *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (in particular chapters 7 and 8)
- ‣ World Bank (2017), *Securing Development: Public Finance and the Security Sector*

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23   To further explore the opportunities and limitations for economic incentives, consultations with the Ministry of Finances should be considered as appropriate.

24   United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).

25   See also DCAF's website on *building integrity* and *resource management*.

26   In line with OSCE, *Ministerial Council Decision N.6/20 on Decision on Preventing and Combating Corruption through Digitalization and Increased Transparency* (Tirana, 2020).

- **Promote institutional culture of integrity:** Efforts to build integrity at the institutional level should not be limited only to improving management practices and processes. The culture of an institution and overall working environment are equally important for any reform to succeed. The way how integrity-building efforts are framed and perceived within the institution concerned will influence attitudes of staff whose behavior and conduct are essential for achieving a long-term change. Promoting an institutional culture that endorses integrity as a key value can thus significantly contribute to the success of reform efforts in any other area, be it human resources, financial management, risk management or preventing misconduct.

4.4 **Promoting Integrity at the Individual Level**

To promote integrity within the security sector, personnel need to be provided with easily accessible tools that clearly define the shared ethical values that are expected from the institution they represent. Moreover, if staff is to be internally accountable for their actions, they should be capacitated with the ways and means to perform their duties in accordance with the set standards. To support efforts in this area, the OSCE staff could:

- **Support the development and review of codes of conduct (or similar tools) and provide regular training on such tools:** Codes of conduct offer important tools to guide the behavior of staff by setting expectations and requirements of professional conduct. They can cover areas such as conflicts of interest, declaration of offers/gifts, disclosure of assets, handling confidential information, abuse of office, etc. The codes should be easily accessible for all security personnel, firmly rooted in ethics and values, and appealing to read, with a simple layout, graphics and accessible (non-legalistic) text.[27] Nonetheless, while the formulation of their content is fundamental, they should also foresee mechanisms of implementation (e.g., provision of regular training, appointment of points of contact to provide further information when needed), sanctions for non-compliance and oversight arrangements.

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27   Transparency International, *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms* (London, 2011), p. 35.

Case Study 7

Building Integrity Training Capacity in Montenegro

At the request of the Ministry of Interior, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro has been co-supporting integrity-building initiatives for the police in partnership with DCAF's Police Integrity Building Programme since 2014. The first joint event organized was the Police Academy's "Strategic Planning Workshop on Police Integrity" conducted in late 2014. The event was followed by a seminar of national stakeholders, organized by DCAF in partnership with the Mission, to discuss the training required by the Ministry of Interior and an assessment of the Academy's priorities for external assistance. Participants were senior and mid-level staff members of the Police Academy, Ministry of Interior, Police Directorate, Police Internal Control Department and Legal and Human Resources Directorate, as well as representatives of the media and civil society.

Particular emphasis has been put on building in-service training capacity on integrity. In 2015, training was organized for police integrity facilitators and police gender facilitators. The aim was to create a small pool of trainers to strengthen police internal resources to independently conduct in-service training on gender and integrity for police officers. In 2017, similar training was again provided as a refresher component for those who were already trained in 2015. Later, the Mission conducted monitoring activities on the police in-service training conducted by the trained facilitators in different parts of the country. The feedback has been used to improve the training curricula for police officers and to develop more targeted training. Efforts were also made to combine in-person training with e-learning courses and to create an online learning platform. Additionally, to build support among police management on integrity, including the importance of the in-service training capacity, the Mission and DCAF conducted a workshop on integrity management and strategic planning for police managers in 2017.

Lessons learned:
- Building police capacity to provide in-service training in different parts of the country, and implementing parallel efforts to seek senior management support, was a successful strategy to ensure the sustainability and to promote national and local ownership.
- Carefully planning the selection of facilitators was very important as it helped identifying police officers with a certain level of authority and good reputation. These facilitators, who participated on a voluntary basis, upheld high levels of legitimacy when providing training to their colleagues.
- Creating a pool of trainers allowed the Police Directorate to provide training on integrity and gender in different parts of the country upon request.
- Planning for monitoring and evaluation activities to track progress and results of the in-service training provided by the trained facilitators enabled to improve and better target the Mission's efforts according to needs.

Info Box 6

Online Training Modules

‣ **OSCE course on Good Governance and Anti-Corruption:** In 2018, the OCEEA launched a number of online training modules (in English and Russian) on prevention and combating corruption for government officials, representatives of law enforcement, private sector and civil society on the <u>OSCE e-learning platform</u>. The curricula of the modules, which include a specific module on integrity, is based on the <u>OSCE Handbook on Combating Corruption</u> and provides basic information on available tools and instruments to prevent and combat corruption. Although the modules aim at a wider audience, they can also be used as a part of anti-corruption awareness-raising activities within the security sector.

‣ **DCAF courses on Police Integrity:** These courses have been developed by DCAF under the framework of the Police Integrity Building Programme. They provide a clear understanding of police integrity, the factors that affect it and the key actors that can contribute to building and sustaining it (level 1 course). The courses also outline the opportunities to acquire knowledge around building, sustaining and strengthening organizational integrity (level 2 course). Both courses, as well as a facilitators' course, are available at <u>DCAF website</u>.

• **Raise knowledge among staff on their rights and duties through the provision of training and development of awareness material:** It is important that security sector personnel are familiar with relevant legal norms and operational guidelines and understand the consequences for breaking the rules.[28] The provision of training and training-of-trainers programmes, as well as the development of promotional materials (brochures, leaflets, videos, etc.), can support raising the level of awareness of the staff of polices, laws, codes of conducts and any other regulatory frameworks on integrity. Awareness raising on integrity can be also integrated in the curricula of military, police and judicial academies, as well as online training modules. It is equally important to promote understanding of the opportunities and challenges in building integrity within the security sector among the leadership of the security sector institutions and policy makers. A more self-aware leadership can better support effective policy and integrity-building measures and be credible in convincing others about the reforms needed.[29]

For further information, see:

‣ Transparency International (2016), *Building integrity and countering corruption in defence and security: 20 practical reforms (2nd edition)*

‣ OSCE (2016), *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (in particular chapters 5 and 6)

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28 United States Institute of Peace, *Fighting Corruption in Security Sector Reform* (Washington, D.C., 2010).

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Case Study 8

Promoting Gender Equality and Human Rights of Security Personnel in Kyrgyzstan

The Republican Committee of Soldiers' Mothers in Kyrgyzstan focuses on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms of active-service personnel in military or para-military structures. This extends to issues such as combating ill- or degrading treatment; protecting personal and constitutional rights, including electoral rights; monitoring issues of nourishment and health; and providing psychological assistance. The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek is working with the Committee to raise awareness on these issues among those in active duty, as well as increasing the knowledge of active service personnel on their human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Similarly, in 2017, the OSCE supported the establishment of the Kyrgyz Association of Women in the Security Sector at a conference organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek in co-operation with the Kyrgyz Association of Women Police, Presidential Administration, Parliament, Defense Council, Supreme Court, Government, Prime Minister's Office, Ministry of Interior and all state security-providing structures. The association represents women who serve in the state's security sector and seeks to contribute to the common cause of promoting gender equality in the security sector of the country. Supporting gender equality, as well as promoting non-discrimination policies, have thus become strong entry points for the OSCE to build on key integrity values.

4.5 **Strengthening External Oversight**

External oversight mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure integrity frameworks are applied and to seek redress and compensation when those are violated. OSCE staff could:

- **Support strengthening state mechanisms:** State mechanisms depend on each particular context, but typically consist of anti-corruption agencies, ombuds institutions, parliamentarians and parliamentary committees, audit offices, the judiciary, the prosecutor's office, and other similar entities. Efforts should be made to develop strong, independent oversight mandates and capacities for these actors to enable the effective oversight of security sector institutions, including breaches of codes of conduct and other integrity frameworks. Support can be provided through assistance to establishing adequate mandates, including encouraging setting the conditions for financial independence, functional institutional processes, such as transparent recruitment processes and training on integrity-related issues. Finally, to support formal mechanisms for accountability, appropriate measures should be established to ensure that easily accessible complaints procedures and safe reporting channels are available to victims of misconduct by security personnel, whistleblowers, and other individuals with a legitimate interest in reporting the lack of integrity in the security sector. Efforts should be also made to raise awareness on existing complaint mechanisms among both citizens and security personnel (e.g., organizing information sessions, printing leaflets, disseminating further information on the internet and through other channels with the support of the media).

- **Support non-state oversight mechanisms:** Non-state actors include the civil society organizations, academic institutions, independent think tanks and the media. OSCE could strengthen the role and capacities of these actors to oversee security sector institutions, with a particular focus on civil society. Additionally, the OSCE could support the establishment of strong, independent, well-mandated, and respected labor unions for security sector staff as a key actor vis-à-vis the oversight of the human and financial management of security institutions. The OSCE could also organize joint workshops for journalists and press officers from the security sector institutions on media reporting on the security sector (e.g., on topics such as investigative journalism in the area of corruption, awareness-raising on freedom of information law or the freedom of assembly).

> **For further information on strengthening state and non-state external oversight mechanisms, see:**
> ‣ OSCE (2016), *Handbook on Combating Corruption* (sections 12–15)
> ‣ DCAF (2021), *Toolkit for Security Sector Reporting: Media, Journalism and Security Sector Reform*

- **Support strengthening co-operation and co-ordination between anti-corruption agencies and other oversight bodies:** While a diverse set of oversight actors already exist in most OSCE participating States, specialized corruption prevention agencies and other oversight bodies are often scattered throughout all levels of government, and the overall system remains deeply fragmented and inefficient, sometimes resulting in conflicts over mandates and responsibilities. To strengthen a governance-driven approach, efforts could focus on promoting co-operation and co-ordination among anti-corruption agencies and oversight bodies, as well as between these and the security sector institutions themselves to support a coherent and effective accountability system.

> **For further information, see**
> ‣ WFD (2020), *Combatting corruption capably: an assessment framework on parliament's interaction with anti-corruption agencies*

- **Support awareness-raising activities aimed at stimulating public debate on integrity-related issues within the security sector, and support sharing experiences and best practices at the regional level:** Considering that integrity is dependent on local, national and regional standards and political realities, and that political will is the driving vehicle for sustainable reforms, stimulating public debate and creating space for dialogue are key entry points for integrity-building programmes. For example, national and regional roundtables can provide a platform for stakeholders to reach a common understanding of the scope and importance of the security sector's integrity, including, when possible, reaching a consensus on the most significant priorities and challenges for strengthening integrity in the specific context.

5. **Checklist**

The following checklist is intended to help programme/project management staff to:
- Mainstream cross-dimensional approaches to integrity building in the security sector;
- Implement governance-driven support to integrity-building efforts;
- Facilitate the identification of entry points for programmatic support.

The purpose is not to "check" every item, but to provide an aide-memoire to consider key aspects and suggestions that might be relevant for your daily work.

Mainstreaming cross-dimensional approaches

To ensure programmatic support to integrity building, and benefit from the experience and expertise of the OSCE's three dimensions of security, the following considerations are encouraged:

Identify aspects of your integrity-building programme/project which might be of relevance to the other dimensions:

☐ If the programme/project aims at improving the integrity of the public sector, has the security sector been considered as a key part of the public sector?

☐ If the programme/project targets specifically security sector institutions, are there inputs and lessons learned by the second dimension that should be taken into account?

☐ Have elements of the rule of law, human rights and gender equality been fully integrated and mainstreamed?

Consider establishing mechanisms to support co-ordination of and co-operation on ongoing support:

☐ Would it be possible to set up a cross-dimensional working group to support information sharing and co-ordination on ongoing support to integrity-building efforts in the security sector?

☐ Alternatively, could integrity-building support be integrated into existing working groups focused on related or broader thematic areas?

If relevant, consider jointly planning a programme/project with other dimensions:

☐ Is there an opportunity to jointly plan a programme/project with other dimensions?

☐ Could other dimensions be considered a key partner for the implementation phase? For instance, other dimensions might have key expertise to be featured in trainings, conferences, technical meetings, etc.

At the very least, consider consulting with colleagues from other dimensions:

☐ When planning and developing a programme/project aiming at building integrity in the security sector, consult with other colleagues across the OSCE to identify synergies with other ongoing projects, and brainstorm on lessons learned and concerns that might be of relevance for the project design and implementation.

> ### Providing governance-driven support to integrity building in the security sector

When planning and implementing projects/programmes related to integrity building in the security sector, beyond applying the good governance principles, the following three aspects should be considered:

Foster inclusive approaches when developing, implementing and overseeing integrity-building activities:

☐ Have all actors with a legitimate interest been identified and consulted (security sector institutions, audit offices, labor unions, parliamentary groups, civil society, other oversight institutions, etc.)?

☐ Have their considerations been properly featured into the project design?

☐ Will all relevant counterparts be engaged during the implementation phase? In what way?

☐ Have the concerns of and consequences for each gender been taken into consideration?

Prioritize support through an institution-building lens:

☐ Has the programme/project only considered enhancing individual capacity on integrity or is it also aiming at establishing the necessary institutional processes and mechanisms to promote change in management?

☐ If it is mainly focused on building individual capacities, are there opportunities to build synergies with other projects focused on institutional reform?

☐ If it is focused on building institutional capacities, has the time required for achieving sustainable change been factored in the programme/project design?

☐ Is the programme/project going beyond establishing a punitive framework and looking at building opportunities for integrity?

Promote a focus on both internal accountability and external oversight:

☐ How is internal accountability being addressed?

☐ Is accountability being sought at all levels of the security sector or are existing mechanisms only targeting the lower ranks?

☐ Is the project considering both state and non-state oversight mechanisms? Do these mechanisms possess strong mandates for overseeing the integrity of security sector institutions?

☐ Do state and non-state oversight mechanisms have the necessary capacities for the successful implementation of their mandates?

☐ Even when a programme/project does not specifically focus on building internal accountability and/or external oversight for integrity, has the programme/project identified entry points for these areas?

Identifying key entry points for programmatic support

If there is the interest to further support building the integrity of security sector institutions, the following entry points for programmatic support can be considered by OSCE staff:

Assessing integrity-building needs

To identify priority areas for support and develop tailor-made integrity building initiatives that take into account the specific challenges, risks, needs and opportunities in building the integrity of security sector institutions, OSCE staff could:

- ☐ Introduce integrity aspects in broader SSG/R needs assessments;

- ☐ Conduct in-depth assessments of integrity building as a basis for developing a programme/project;

- ☐ Support an integrity-building self-assessment of security sector institutions.

When conducting needs assessments or supporting self-assessments, the following questions should be explored:

- ☐ What are the applicable international standards, legal and policy frameworks?

- ☐ What kind of corruptive activities are most commonly identified in the security sector?

- ☐ What accountability mechanisms are in place?

- ☐ What is the perception of the population?

- ☐ What are the needs in terms of integrity of the concerned security institutions?

- ☐ Why have these needs not been met to date?

- ☐ Have all relevant stakeholders been consulted?

- ☐ What are the risks and opportunities for integrity building in the security sector?

- ☐ What are the priorities for reform? At what level (institutional, individual, etc.)?

Supporting legal and policy frameworks

To support the development and review of legal and policy frameworks, assistance can be provided through the implementation of awareness-raising activities, and/or the provision of technical advice and support (e.g., on mapping legislative gaps, legal and policy framework development and practical application of these frameworks). In particular, OSCE staff could target the following levels:

- National legislation

- National and local anti-corruption, security and integrity strategies and policies

- National action plans

When supporting these frameworks, among other considerations, the following should be made:

- Are there references to international and regional instruments and other relevant standards?

- Is there a reference to human rights and gender equality as key elements of integrity?

- Are there clear directions on the ways and means to achieve integrity-building goals?

- Are there clear rules and procedures to empower and protect whistleblowers?

- Is there a clear mandate to establish adequate accountability and oversight mechanisms?

Promoting integrity at the institutional level

Clear and transparent processes to decision-making and management in security sector institutions should be established. To that end, OSCE staff could consider:

- Supporting the development of risks analysis and risk management systems;

- Providing technical advice to strengthen the human resources management;

- Mapping and promoting good practices in addressing incentives for misconduct and creating opportunities for strengthened integrity;

☐ Supporting an institutional culture and working environment that endorses integrity as a key value;

☐ Providing technical advice to strengthen the financial management.

Promoting integrity at the individual level

Security personnel need to be provided with the tools and capacities to perform their duties in accordance with the integrity standards set by the security institution they represent. To that end, OSCE staff could consider:

☐ Supporting the development and review of codes of conduct and similar tools;

☐ Raising knowledge among security sector staff on their rights and duties through training and development of awareness material;

☐ Promoting values and attitudes that contribute to building integrity.

Strengthening external oversight

External oversight mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure integrity frameworks are being applied and to seek redress and compensation when those are violated. To that end, the OSCE staff could support:

☐ Strengthening state oversight mechanisms through assistance to establishing strong and independent mandates, capacity-building, training;

☐ Enhancing capacities of non-state oversight mechanisms through capacity-building, training, etc.;

☐ Strengthening co-operation and co-ordination between anti-corruption agencies and between those and other oversight bodies;

☐ Awareness-raising activities to stimulate public debate on integrity-related issues within the security sector, and to support sharing experiences and best practices at regional level.

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