

Combating Human Trafficking as part of Money Laundering Detection

Transactions Monitoring in Banks

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Agenda



- 1 Raiffeisen Banking Group
- 2 Transactions screening and AML monitoring
 - > Challenges
 - Examples

The Gable Cross



The Gable Cross – trademark of the Raiffeisen Banking Group



It consists of two stylized horse's heads crossed and attached to the gable of a house.

It is a symbol of protection rooted in old European traditions

A gable cross on the roof was believed to protect a house and its occupants from outside dangers and to ward off evil.

The Gable Cross is one of Austria's best-known trademarks, and it is in use around the world, particularly within the scope of RAIFFEISEN branding activity in Central and Eastern Europe.

Raiffeisen Banking Group: Three-Tier Structure



~2.200 Affiliated Branches in Austria





~530 Austrian Raiffeisen Banks

















8 Regional Banks







Network Banks in CE, SEE, Russia, CIS other **Other Foreign Branches and Offices Group Corporates incl. Austria**

The RBI Group in Europe





Financial Sanctions vs. Money Laundering



Financial Sanctions (FiSa)

Anti Money Laundering (AML)

EMBARGO measures / OFAC

- Funds come primarily from regular sources and businesses.
- Real-time screening before execution of transactions. Rule-based, automated screening of transactions, customer data base and potential customers against watch lists.
- In case of watch list matching regulatory authorities have to be informed and the **transactions have to be frozen or rejected**.

Transaction monitoring / research

- Funds out of illegal transactions (drugs, human trafficking etc.) are brought in legal payment circulation by FI.
- Ex-post analysis (sometimes long-term) of customer / account profiles of suspected or reported money laundering activities.
- Identification of suspicious cases must be reported to the state prosecutor.

Detection of Money Laundering



Customer Risk Classification

- High
- Standard
- Low



- Account Usage
- Peer Group definition and comparison
- Behavior Analysis
- Customer and Account Risk Analysis



Screening against Watchlists

- PEP
- · Risk / Offshore Destinations
- "Blacklists" / Watchlists



Financial Sanctions – True Hits

Ex-Post analysis to identify unusual behavior and suspicious transactions Detection Indicators / Detection Rules Sudden and inconsistent change of activities Distributed ATM transactions Wire transfers to offshore centers Large, round amounts Funds transferred within a short period of time Regular deposits or withdrawals of large amounts of cash or large number of low cash amounts

Monitoring Scope



Monitoring clusters

Existing Customers

Regular screening of existing customers and associated entities



Account holders

Authorized persons

Economic beneficiaries

Transactions

Realtime screening and monitoring of incoming, outgoing and routed transactions



Customer payments

Bank & Clearing payments

Documentary payments

Buyer's loans / Export loans

Securities transfers / Transactions

New & Walk-in Customers

Online screening before business execution



Account opening

Cash transactions

...

Watch lists (EU, UN, OFAC, Local,...)

Official Lists - Worldcheck (WCK)



Whole Worldcheck

- 1.500.000 entries
- 350 Sub lists
- 26 Categories

Subcategory PEP

Overall sub-list appx. 400.000 entries

Open Issues

- Missing Data, relevant for investigation & decision process (e.g. DOB, BIC Code, ISO Code)
- Not useful Alias names (e.g. Francisco)
- Delayed list updates

WCK List Entry Quality



Easy to investigate:

LAST NAME: SALAH CATEGORY(2): TERRORISM

FIRST NAME: Mohammad Abd El-Hamid SUBCATEGORY:

Khalil

OFFICIAL LIST(S): OFAC SDT USDOJ

ALIAS(ES):

AHMAD,Abu AHMED,Abu

AHMED, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil

Al-AHMAD,Abu

HAMID SALAH, Muhammad Abd

SALAH, Mohammad Abdel Hamid Halil

SALAH, Mohammed

SALAH, Mohammed Abdel-Hamid

SALAH, Mohammed Abdul Hamid Khalil

SALAH,Muhammad SALAH,Muhammad A

SALAH, Muhammad Hamid Khalil

ALTERNATIVE SPELLING:

TITLE: POSITION:

AGE: 54 DOB: 1953/05/30

PLACE OF BIRTH: DECEASED:

PASSPORT(S):

024296248 (USA)

SSN: 342-52-7612 **COUNTRY:**

USA (US)

LOCATION(S):

9229 South Thomas ~ Bridgeview, Illinois ~ USA P O Box 2578 ~ Bridgeview, Illinois ~ USA

P O Box 2578 ~ Bridgeview, Illinois ~ USA P O Box 2616 ~ Bridgeview, Illinois ~ USA

Chicago, Illinois ~ USA

ISRAEL

Difficult to investigate:

LAST NAME: AHMED CATEGORY(2): INDIVIDUAL

FIRST NAME: Adnan S Hasan SUBCATEGORY:

<u>OFFICIAL LIST(S):</u> BOE CES CSSF DBB EU EU-IRQ HKMA IOMSO IRAQ.2 JMOF LGB MFSANC MINEFI OFAC SECO-SECO-IRQ UE UN UNIR

MESANC MINEFI OFAC SECO SECO-IRQ DE UN UNIF

ALIAS(ES):

ADNAN,Ahmed S Hasan ADNAN,Hasan Ahmed S

SULTAN, Ahmed

ALTERNATIVE SPELLING:

TITLE: POSITION:

AGE: DOB:

PLACE OF BIRTH: DECEASED:

PASSPORT(S):

SSN: COUNTRY:

JORDAN (JO)

LOCATION(S):

Amman ~ JORDAN


Challenges



- List of persons / organisations reported as involved in Human Trafficking: Investors (!) - Recruiters - Transporters - Protectors - Informers – Guides and Crew Members - Enforcers - Debt Collectors (!)
- List of known suspicious addresses / areas
- Authority-Feedback on reported suspicious transactions
- Exchange of relevant experiences / information between:
 - Authorities and Banks
 - Members of the Banking Group and
 - Correspondent Banks especially in THB sensitive countries
- Monitoring of Clearing Transactions

Example: Outgoing Customer's Payment (1/2) Raiffeisen Bank International






Example: Outgoing Customer's Payment (1/3) Raiffeisen Bank International



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{4:
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:23B:CRED
:23E:PHOB/9514790432
:32A:110923EUR988
:50K:/00000888123333
MR. BIG BOY
HAUPTSTRASSE 355
AUSTRIA, VIENNA
:57A:BANKPKCC
:59:/PK1111111222233
SWEET DREAMS
HAPPY AV. 666
SIBBI 1223
PAKISTAN
:70:PAYMENT FOR NR.888
:71A:SHA
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
Example: Outgoing Customer's Payment (3/3) Raiffeisen Bank International






Example: Monitoring Scope






Example: Clearing Payment (1/2)






Example: Clearing Payment (2/2)





Clearing Payments





GOAL:

Recognise the <u>suspicious networks</u> and <u>flow of funds</u> by monitoring transactions of involved third parties !!!

Looking forward ...





FATF – Red Flags Indicators



Transaction profile

→ automated generation of ML red flags for **our customer** for further manual investigation **possible**:

- transfers of cash in small amounts with high frequency
- structuring funds below threshold
- repetitive transfers of like nature
- transfers to sensitive countries of destination
- transfers or large cash / cheque deposits followed by cash withdrawals or smaller amounts wire transfers
- cash deposited at several branches
- transfers from different regions / persons to the same beneficiary (our customer)
 transfer from one person (our customer) to different regions / persons
- the sender of cash transfers has no bank account in the sender country
- lack of references or identification
- sudden change in customer's normal business practices
- new customers from risk countries and who frequently make major transactions

FATF – Red Flags Investigation



- Transaction profile
 - → manual checks during the investigation on an red flagged customer:
 - Business accounts used as flow-through accounts
 - Incorporating illegal funds in businesses
 - Financial turnover incommensurate with the commercial turnover
 - Structuring via commercial entities and transfer of money using contract for loan
 - Fictitious loans: loan provided by a shareholder to the related legal person and subsequent transfer back
 - Company balance sheet showing assets in cash and profits with no legitimate trade justification
 - Significant share of the company's capital in no-term deposits

FATF - Manual Checks



Transaction profile

→ automated generation of ML red flags **not easy possible**

- Use of a common address (!!!)
- The transaction involves the exchange of currency to Euros, USD, CAD or pounds, for sexual purposes, money is often transferred in small amounts with high frequency from the victims to members of the organised crime group situated abroad or other places in the country (!!!)
- Companies may be connected in different ways to human trafficking and smuggling of migrants: they can be used as an additional or main means of money laundering;
- They often carry out international activity (travel agencies, tourism-related companies, money transfer agencies, etc.).

FATF - Manual Investigation



Customer profile:

- Unexplained/unjustified/unusual lifestyle
- Mismatch between amounts paid and the occupation of the person
- Unexplained/unjustified large profits for a company
- Forged documents
- Execute transactions on behalf of themselves or with use of others' IDs
- Registration of assets under different names
- Pay attention to customers accounts who have reported identity theft
- Relations with persons with suspected or known criminal history (!!!)
- A common mobile number, address and employment references used to open multiple bank accounts in different names (!!!)
- Use of MSBs by migrant workers transferring a part of their salaries to their families abroad and illegal migrants paying a debt (!!!)
- Credit card payments to online escort services for advertising (including small posting fees to companies of online classifieds as well as more expensive, higher-end advertising and website hosting companies) (!!!)