

Daily Report 237/2021

9 October 2021¹


Summary

- In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded 47 ceasefire violations, including nine explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 96 ceasefire violations in the region.
- In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations, both explosions. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 17 ceasefire violation in the region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Petrivske.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the operation and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure, and a transfer of funds from non-government to government-controlled areas.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at seven entry-exit checkpoints and three corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at two checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region. Its unmanned aerial vehicles again experienced multiple instances of jamming.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴




¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 8 October 2021. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.


³ Including explosions.

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.


Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 8 October 2021



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 09/10/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 47 ceasefire violations, including nine explosions (two airbursts and seven undetermined). The majority of ceasefire violations occurred north-east and east of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km north-east of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 96 ceasefire violations in the region.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, both undetermined explosions south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), the SMM recorded 17 ceasefire violation in the region, thirteen of which also occurred close to the aforementioned area.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding Measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the Mission has recorded at least 62,911 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 17,218 explosions, 12,523 projectiles in flight, 278 muzzle flashes, 248 illumination flares and at least 32,644 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

On the evening of 7 October, while on the northern edge of Popasna (government-controlled 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-7km east-south-east, assessed as outside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, but within 5km of its periphery.

On 8 October, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them). The SMM again saw the seven previously observed containers located south of the disengagement area’s southern edge and inside the area, and the previously reported underground structure inside the area.

On the night of 7-8 October, an SMM camera 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-5km east-south-east and south-east, unable to be assessed as either inside or outside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).

During the day on 8 October, while positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-6km south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone

In Donetsk region, the Mission saw a combat engineering vehicle in a government-controlled area. (For further information, see the table below.)

De-mining activities near Novoluhanske, Donetsk region

About 1.5km and 2.5km north of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 13 members of an international de-mining organization (gender and age unknown) in protective gear, most of whom were using mine detectors in fields east and west of a local road. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 8 October 2021](#).)

SMM facilitation - the assessment, operation and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable repairs to the roofs of buildings at the DFS.

The Mission also monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable the assessment of an area for the installation of a gas pipeline near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), as well as the assessment and maintenance of phenol sludge reservoirs near Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), reportedly related to water payments. During the transfer, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on three occasions while flying over areas south-east of Shchastia. (See below.)*

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints

In Donetsk region, the SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open, with people queueing to travel in both directions. The SMM noted that the EECPs near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), and Hnutove (government-controlled, 90km south of Donetsk) were open, but did not observe any traffic passing through.

In Luhansk region, the SMM observed that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska was open, with people queueing to travel in both directions. About 50m and 200m south of the EECP, the Mission saw ongoing construction works. (For previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 8 October 2021](#).)

The SMM noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia were open, but that the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

Border areas outside government control

The Mission monitored areas near the border with the Russian Federation near Cheremshyne (59km south-east of Luhansk), and observed no change in the security situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- At a checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 102km south-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the Mission passage west towards Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk). While at the checkpoint, the SMM saw civilian traffic passing through.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Delays:

- At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed south towards government-controlled areas after about 20 minutes of waiting, having previously asked for all patrol vehicles' doors to be opened to check patrol members' IDs, which the patrol refused. IDs were subsequently checked through the drivers' doors only.
- At the checkpoint on the northern edge of Novoazovsk, a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage east towards a border crossing point only after about 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:⁶

- While conducting a test flight, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Varvarivka (government-controlled, 81km north-west of Donetsk) and Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and over areas near Andriivka (government-controlled, 79km north-west of Donetsk). The same UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas between Marinka and Andriivka.
- SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, during 12 flights: on three occasions while flying over areas near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), twice near Romanivka (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk), and once each near Novoselivka (government-controlled, 31km north of Donetsk), Svobodne (non-government-controlled, 73km south of Donetsk), Novoazovsk, Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), Dmytrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Luhansk), Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and Oleksandrivsk (non-government-controlled, 10km west of Luhansk).

⁶ For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of tens of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁷

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
8/10/2021	1	Combat engineering vehicle (type undetermined)	Near Novoselivka (31km north of Donetsk)	Patrol


⁷ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 8 October 2021⁸

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 2km E of Bohdaniivka (government-controlled, 41km SW of Donetsk)	2-5km SE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NW to SE (unable to be assessed as either inside or outside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	8-Oct, 00:50
	2-5km ESE	Recorded	1	Projectile	NNE to SSW (unable to be assessed whether inside or outside the disengagement area near Petrivske)	N/K	8-Oct, 00:50
SMM camera at Donetsk Filtration Station (15km N of Donetsk)	0.5-1km S	Recorded	1	Illumination flare	In vertical flight	N/K	7-Oct, 20:58
SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km NE of Donetsk)	3-5km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst	N/K	7-Oct, 20:06
	1-2km E	Recorded	1	Muzzle flash		N/K	7-Oct, 21:18
	1-2km E	Recorded	1	Projectile	WNW to ESE (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	7-Oct, 21:18
	1-3km E	Recorded	1	Explosion	Airburst (subsequent to previous event)	N/K	7-Oct, 21:18
	1-2km ENE	Recorded	4	Projectile	In vertical flight	N/K	7-Oct, 21:50
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	4	Projectile	W to E	N/K	8-Oct, 00:32
Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km SW of Donetsk)	4-5km S	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Oct, 10:14
NE part of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km NE	Heard	3	Burst		HMG	8-Oct, 10:55
	2-3km NE	Heard	3	Shot		30mm cannon	8-Oct, 11:04
	2-3km NE	Heard	3	Shot		30mm cannon	8-Oct, 11:12
About 2km ENE of Shyroka Balka (non-government-controlled, 34km NE of Donetsk)	2km E	Heard	6	Shot		30mm cannon	8-Oct, 11:28-11:38
	2km E	Heard	12	Shot		30mm cannon	8-Oct, 11:38-11:46
About 2km N of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km S of Donetsk)	4-6km SW	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as inside the disengagement area)	N/K	8-Oct, 13:02-13:20
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	5-7km E	Heard	3	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Oct, 14:09
N edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km W of Luhansk)	6-8km SE	Heard	1	Explosions	Undetermined	N/K	7-Oct, 23:18
	5-7km ESE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined (assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote)	N/K	7-Oct, 23:24

⁸ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions⁹



⁹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).