

# Daily Report 31/2021


9 February 2021<sup>1</sup>

## Summary


- The SMM recorded 42 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 106 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The Mission recorded five ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. In the previous 24 hours, it recorded 15 ceasefire violations in the region.
- The SMM saw fresh damage to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and again saw containers inside and near the southern edge of the area near Zolote.
- The SMM spotted for the first time anti-tank mines near Zaitseve, Donetsk region.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable operation and maintenance of critical civilian infrastructure and demining activities.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians, including at four entry-exit checkpoints and five corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at a border crossing point near and a railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk), Luhansk region.\*

## Ceasefire violations<sup>2</sup>

Number of recorded ceasefire violations<sup>3</sup>



Number of recorded explosions<sup>4</sup>



<sup>1</sup> Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 8 February 2021. All times are in Eastern European Time.

<sup>2</sup> For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

<sup>3</sup> Including explosions.


<sup>4</sup> Including from unidentified weapons.

### Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and  
Co-operation in Europe  
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

## Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 8 February 2021



#### Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- ..... Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 09/02/2021

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded 42 ceasefire violations, including seven undetermined explosions, the majority of which occurred during the day in areas south-east of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the Mission recorded 106 ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded five ceasefire violations – a burst and four projectiles in flight at easterly directions of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below). In the [previous 24 hours](#), the SMM recorded 15 ceasefire violations in the region.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July 2020 regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July 2020 until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded at least 8,508 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 3,186 explosions, 1,078 projectiles in flight, 101 muzzle flashes, 60 illumination flares and at least 4,083 bursts and shots).

### **Damage to functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, Luhansk region**

The Mission followed up on reports of recent damage to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) which allegedly occurred on the night between 7 and 8 February.

At 3 Voikova Street, while in the presence of two members of the armed formations, the SMM saw two fresh holes (about 12cm in diameter) in two north-west-facing double-pane glass windows in a stairwell on the third floor. It also saw broken glass on the windowsill below the windows and two fresh ricochet marks about 2m above the floor on two walls opposite the windows. Lying on the floor in an adjacent hallway, about 4m and 5m south-east from the entrance to the stairwell, the SMM observed two (7.62mm) bullets. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by small-arms fire.

### **Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske<sup>5</sup>**

On 8 February, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the repaired span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

During the day on 7 February, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote**, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two people near a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 200m west-south-west of the area’s north-eastern corner.

On the night between 7 and 8 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst of an undetermined weapon and four projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east and east and assessed as outside the area but within 5km of its periphery.

On 8 February, the SMM again saw five containers inside a fenced perimeter south of the area’s southern edge, on the southern edge of the road leading eastward towards Zolote-

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<sup>5</sup> Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

5/Mykhailivka. Inside the disengagement area, it again saw a container about 60-70m north of the other containers and another about 350m north of the area's southern edge, both on the western side of road T-1316. The Mission saw posts placed in the ground on both sides of the road, reportedly for use as two barriers regulating east and westbound traffic on the road between Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It also observed 16 workers with heavy equipment mixing cement, laying electrical cables, and drilling a hole in the ground in the fenced perimeter, as well as moving about 50 concrete blocks inside it.

On 8 February, while positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom walked inside the area to about 350m north of its southern edge and returned.

During the day on 6 February, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted three people and a civilian car near a former position of the armed formations about 350m north-west-north of the area's south-eastern corner.

On 8 February, while positioned near the SMM camera 2km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed a military ambulance approach a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces nearby. Near the ambulance, it saw two men (age unknown) in dark-coloured clothing, one lying on a stretcher and the other with a bandage on his right arm. The Mission saw the former man being carried into and the latter man board the ambulance, which subsequently left in the direction of Bohdanivka. An officer of the Ukrainian Armed Forces of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that warning shots and then further shots had been fired when a civilian car had entered a forbidden area.

### **Withdrawal of weapons**

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed four tanks in violation of withdrawal lines and 15 tanks beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, all in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

### **Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>6</sup>**

The Mission spotted armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, including near a residential area, and in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

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<sup>6</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

### **Presence of anti-tank mines near Zaitseve, Lozove and Zoloti Pisky, and at the destroyed Donetsk international airport, all in Donetsk region**

On 6 February, about 500m north of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 50 anti-tank mines (assessed as not recent) laid in a field and running from about 2km south-east of the settlement to about 100m south-west, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

About 1km south of these, the UAV spotted for the first time about 50 anti-tank mines (assessed as not recent) laid in a field between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the armed formations.

On the same day, in a government-controlled area of Zaitseve, the same UAV again spotted about 200 anti-tank mines laid in a field, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 27 October 2020](#)).

At the destroyed Donetsk international airport, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 85 anti-tank mines laid across two taxiways, all assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 7 July 2020](#) and [SMM Daily Report of 28 September 2020](#)).

About 3km and 4km north of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least 120 anti-tank mines laid across the highway leading to Zoloti Pisky (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report of 17 August 2020](#)).

On the north-eastern edge of Semyhiria (government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the Mission saw about 20 stationary pickups and utility trucks with logos of an international humanitarian demining organization.

### **SMM facilitation of operation, inspection and repairs of critical civilian infrastructure and of demining**

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne. While positioned at two locations near Zalizne, the Mission recorded five bursts of heavy machine-gun fire and 22 shots of small-arms fire in areas south-east of the settlement.

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to localized ceasefires to enable inspection and repairs of a power line in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as demining activities in agricultural fields near government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk).

### **Situation at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints**

In Donetsk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were operational, with civilian traffic passing through in both directions. While at the checkpoint, the SMM recorded eight bursts of heavy machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west of its position.

The Mission also noted that the checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) was closed.

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the EECP near Stanytsia Luhanska and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge were operational, with people passing through in both directions.

The SMM also noted that the EECPs near Zolote and Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were open, but no people were observed passing through, while the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations south of the disengagement area near Zolote and 3km south-east of the bridge in Shchastia were closed.

### **Border areas outside government control**

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the Mission observed nine cars (one with “LPR” plates) entering and one car exiting Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.\*

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka for about ten minutes, the SMM observed no traffic. After about ten minutes, two visibly armed members of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area.\*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

### **\*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

*The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Minsk agreements have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the government (for example, see below ). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.*

Denials:

- At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area, referring to orders from his superiors.
- At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, two visibly armed members of the armed formations told the Mission to leave the area, referring to orders from their superiors.

*Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/unexploded ordnance (UXO):*

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:<sup>7</sup>

- On 6 February, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and near Chyrylianske (formerly Oktiabrsk, non-government-controlled, 62km south-east of Donetsk).
- On 7 February, an SMM long-range UAV twice experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Illinivka (formerly Illich, government-controlled, 56km north of Donetsk) and once experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas near Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk).

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<sup>7</sup> For cases of probable jamming and jamming mentioned in this section, the interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs' positions.

## Table of weapons

### Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
7/2/2021	4	Tank (T-72)	In a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

### Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
7/2/2021	15	Tank (two T-64 and 13 T-72)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

## Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone<sup>8</sup>

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
<b>Government-controlled areas</b>				
6/2/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1)	Near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk)	
	1		Near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk)	
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	Near a residential area in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV
<b>Non-government-controlled areas</b>				
7/2/2021	1	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Novokyivka (25km east of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV

<sup>8</sup> The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.




**Table of ceasefire violations as of 8 February 2021<sup>9</sup>**

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera 1km SW of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 100km S of Donetsk)	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Feb, 23:00
	4-6km N	Recorded	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	7-Feb, 23:01
Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km SW of Donetsk)	3-4km NW	Heard	8	Burst		HMG	8-Feb, 13:43
About 4.5km SE of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km NE of Donetsk)	2-3km NW	Heard	7	Shot		Small arms	8-Feb, 12:15-12:22
	1km NNW	Heard	15	Shot		Small arms	8-Feb, 12:25-12:35
About 2km WSW of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km E	Heard	5	Burst		HMG	8-Feb, 13:20-13:25
About 2.5km SE of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 99km S of Donetsk)	3-4km NNE	Heard	5	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Feb, 12:51
SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km W of Luhansk)	2-4km ENE	Recorded	1	Burst	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	7-Feb, 23:03
	2km E	Recorded	4	Projectile	N to S (assessed as outside the disengagement area)	N/K	7-Feb, 23:18

<sup>9</sup> The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

### Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions<sup>10</sup>



<sup>10</sup> The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours).