

Daily Report 258/2020

29 October 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded two ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- A man died due to the detonation of a hand grenade in Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted four people inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region and checkpoints of the armed formations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission visited two border crossing points in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
- The Mission's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including at border crossing points outside government control near Dovzhanske and Voznesenivka, Luhansk region (including at a railway station).*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 28 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational.

³ Including explosions

⁴ Including from unidentified weapons

Map of recorded ceasefire violations



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 28 October 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration

- High
-
- Low

- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 29/10/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation, an undetermined explosion, while facilitating and monitoring adherence to a localised ceasefire in Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded two ceasefire violations, both undetermined explosions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, as in the [previous reporting period](#). The last time it recorded a ceasefire violation in the region was on 25 October (see [SMM Daily Report 26 October 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,906 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 576 explosions, 30 projectiles in flight, 16 muzzle flashes, 23 illumination flares and 1,261 bursts and shots).

Man killed by detonation of a hand grenade in Sievierodonetsk, Luhansk region

The SMM followed up on reports of a 53-year-old man who died on 14 October from injuries caused by the detonation of a hand grenade in the basement of an apartment building in a residential complex near Sievierodonetsk city centre (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk).

On 27 October, a 50-year-old woman, who introduced herself as the spouse of the man, told the SMM over the phone that her husband had died on 14 October due to the explosion of a device he had been handling while in their basement.

On 20 October, a female staff member of the city morgue (in her thirties) told the Mission that an autopsy had revealed that the man had sustained injuries consistent with those caused by a hand grenade explosion on 13 October and that he had subsequently died from blood loss on 14 October.

On 19 October, a representative of the local police in Sievierodonetsk (woman, in her thirties) told the SMM that a 53-year-old man had been killed in a blast while he had been dismantling an explosive device, assessed by the police as a hand grenade, in the basement of a five-storey building in a residential complex close to Sievierodonetsk city centre.

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On 28 October, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 27 October, inside **the disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 150m south of the area’s northern edge and about 250m south-west of its north-eastern corner. The same UAV spotted three people inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s eastern edge, about 1.4km north of its south-eastern corner.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

On the morning of 28 October, the SMM camera on the area's southern edge recorded eight undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 0.5-4km north, assessed as probable controlled detonations.

On the same day, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the area's northern edge, the Mission observed two vehicles of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine, eight de-miners in protective gear with metal detectors on the western side of road T-1316, two of whom were conducting demining activities, and five workers removing concrete blocks with a crane.

Also on 28 October, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission observed five members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with "JCCC" written on them), two of whom, accompanied by three people wearing medical protective gear, walked inside the disengagement area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned.

About 200m south of the area's southern edge, the SMM also saw about 21 workers with heavy equipment welding a fence and installing a roof over a metal construction, reportedly for use as a future bus stop, as well as painting metal railings lying on the ground, reportedly for placement along a sidewalk near a future parking lot.

On 28 October, while positioned near the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1.5km north of Petrivske, the Mission saw a car with two men in military-type clothing driving south on road C051532 between Styła (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system in violation of withdrawal lines and three surface-to-air missile systems beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a compound, all in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Luhansk region and in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia.

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); maintenance of and repairs to power lines in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and near Betmanove; repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote – north and south of the disengagement area – and of road H-21 south of Shchastia; and demining activities in agricultural fields between government-controlled Hirske (63km west of Luhansk) and Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the intersection of roads H-21 and T-1309, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the northern edge of the bridge in Shchastia, the SMM observed workers operating a front loader, a dump truck and a multi-purpose truck. Near the checkpoint of the armed formations about 2.5km east of Vesela Hora and about 3km south-east of the bridge, the Mission saw around 25 workers with heavy machinery and equipment asphaltting and fixing electrical installations from poles into the ground.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 28 October, while at a railway station near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw no activity. Immediately upon arrival, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, the Mission saw five trucks (including four with “LPR” plates) and three vehicles (including two with “LPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. After about two minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point in Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the Mission observed three cars (including one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 34 trucks (including 30 with “LPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

While at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed a stationary van with Ukrainian license plates facing west. The driver (man, in his sixties) told the SMM that he had been waiting for a deceased person to be transferred from Donetsk city to Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit check point (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska remained non-operational.⁷

While at the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations between 10:00 and 12:00, the SMM observed 22 people (16 women and five men, mixed ages, and one girl, 15 years old)

⁷ Notice about the EECP’s temporary closure from 15 October to 31 October 2020 was published on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October. On 28 October, Ukrainian Armed Forces published on their official Facebook page that the temporary closure of the EECP had been extended until 15 November 2020.

queuing to exit non-government-controlled areas and a woman (in her forties) waiting to travel in the opposite direction.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [below](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial:

- At the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
- At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations asked the Mission to leave the area.
- At a border crossing point in Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations asked the Mission to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Other impediments:

- On 27 October, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between government-controlled Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) and Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk).⁸

⁸ The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV's positions.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
27/10/2020	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	Near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
27/10/2020	3	Surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)	In a compound near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁹

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
27/10/2020	16	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	In a compound near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2)	Near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk)	
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (two BMP-1 and one BMP-2)		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB)		
	3	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-variant)	In a compound near Myronivka (64km north-east of Donetsk)	
	3		Near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)	
	1		Near Viktorivka (74km west of Luhansk)	
26/10/2020	2	Armoured combat vehicle	Near Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV
28/10/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk)	Patrol
Non-government-controlled areas				
28/10/2020	2	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	Near Teplychne (8km west of Luhansk)	Patrol


⁹ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 28 October 2020¹⁰

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 1km NW of Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km NE of Donetsk)	3-4km SSE	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	28-Oct, 09:42

¹⁰ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹¹



¹¹ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours.)