

Daily Report 257/2020

28 October 2020¹


Summary

- The SMM recorded two ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and again none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, it recorded 23 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region.
- The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a person inside the disengagement area near Petrivske.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 pandemic, including at an entry-exit checkpoint and the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations in Luhansk region.
- The SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region.
- The Mission’s freedom of movement continued to be restricted.*

Ceasefire violations²

Number of recorded ceasefire violations³

Number of recorded explosions⁴



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 27 October 2020. All times are in Eastern European Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and Berezove were not operational.

³ Including explosions


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 27 October 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 28/10/2020

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded two ceasefire violations, both undetermined explosions, in an area east-south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). In the [previous reporting period](#), the Mission recorded 23 explosions, the majority of which at northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations, as in the [previous reporting period](#). The last time it recorded ceasefire violations in the region was between the evenings of 23 and 25 October (ten) (see [SMM Daily Report 26 October 2020](#)).

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,905 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 575 explosions, 30 projectiles in flight, 16 muzzle flashes, 23 illumination flares and 1,261 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

Inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

While positioned near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it) announced to the SMM that a demining team would be conducting a controlled detonation inside the area. Subsequently, the SMM heard an explosion about 1.3km north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, close to the railway tracks inside the area, assessed as a controlled detonation. The explosion was also recorded by the SMM camera on the southern edge of the area.

Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the disengagement area, the Mission saw six members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them), two of whom walked inside the area up to about 350m north of its southern edge and then returned. Throughout the day, inside the area, about 300m north of its southern edge on the western side of road T-1316, the SMM saw about seven workers renovating a road sign with “Pervomaisk” written on it in Russian.

About 400m south of the area’s southern edge, it also saw about 43 workers with heavy equipment welding a fence and installing a roof over a metal construction, reportedly for use as a future bus stop, and paving the ground, reportedly for use as a future parking lot.

On the evening of 26 October, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a person inside a former position of the armed formations near the area’s south-eastern corner.

On 27 October, while positioned about 1.5km east of Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw seven soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

carrying rifles, walking east on road C050563 between Bohdanivka and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

On the same day, while positioned on the western edge of Petrivske, the SMM saw three visibly armed members of the armed formations walking east on road C051532. On the same day, while positioned north of Petrivske, the Mission saw a car with three men in military-type clothing driving south towards Petrivske on road C051532 between Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, the SMM observed a surface-to-air missile system in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region (for further information, see the table below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

The Mission observed armoured combat vehicles on both sides of the contact line in Donetsk region and in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region (for further information, see the table below).

Presence of mines near Petrivske and at the destroyed Donetsk international airport, Donetsk region, as well as anti-tank mines and demining activities near Vesela Hora, Luhansk region

On 23 October, about 1.7km north of Petrivske and about 170m east of road C051532, between Styla and Petrivske, an SMM mini-UAV [again](#) spotted a transparent plastic bag filled with about 20 anti-personnel mines (assessed as PMN-2 type) lying on the ground.

On 24 October, an SMM mini-UAV [again](#) spotted at least 45 anti-tank mines laid in three rows across a taxiway at the destroyed Donetsk international airport (8km north-west of Donetsk). About 160m south of these, laid in three rows across the taxiway, the same UAV [again](#) spotted at least 23 anti-tank mines. All these mines were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On 26 October, about 1.5km north-west of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) and about 30m west of road H-21, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 15 anti-tank mines laid in a single row, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The same UAV also spotted approximately two rows of 24 circular holes, with a large circular crater at the northern end of each row, assessed as caused by demining activities (for similar observations in the area, see [SMM Daily Report 21 October 2020](#)).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (see above), north of

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), and near Vesela Hora, south of the bridge in Shchastia.

At the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road H-21 north of the bridge, the Mission saw workers operating heavy equipment. Near the checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south-east of the bridge and about 100m north of the checkpoint, the Mission saw 37 workers with heavy equipment laying asphalt on road H-21 and fencing the perimeter around the checkpoint.

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway inspection, maintenance and vegetation clearance near Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk); repairs to water infrastructure near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk); maintenance of road T-1316 near Zolote – north and south of the disengagement area – and of road H-21 south of Shchastia; repairs to electrical transformer substation near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk); as well as inspection and maintenance of power lines in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter the COVID-19 pandemic

In Luhansk region, the Mission noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska remained non-operational,⁷ while the corresponding checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge was operational.

While at the checkpoint of the armed formations at around 09:00, the SMM saw four people (one man and three women in their seventies) queuing to leave government-controlled areas and no pedestrian traffic in the opposite direction. Subsequently, the SMM saw the abovementioned four people entering non-government-controlled areas.

Security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 25 October, the SMM observed a calm situation in south-east Kherson region, at checkpoints near Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Chaplynka (77 km south-east of Kherson), as well as in Skadovsk (62km south of Kherson) on 26 October.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

⁷ Notice about the EECP's temporary closure from 15 October to 31 October 2020 was published on the website of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 13 October. A representative of the SBGS reconfirmed to the SMM on 23 October that the EECP would remain closed until 31 October because of COVID-19 mitigation measures, with special exceptions.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see [SMM Daily Report 12 October 2020](#)). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians' movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Table of weapons

Weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
26/10/2020	1	Surface-to-air missile system (9K33 <i>Osa</i>)	Near Arkhanhelske (32km north of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type of weapon	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
26/10/2020	1	Armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2)	Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)	Mini-UAV
	1	Trench digger (PZM-2)		
	2	Infantry fighting vehicle (BMP variant)	Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80)		
Non-government-controlled areas				
26/10/2020	6	Armoured combat vehicle	In a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk)	Long-range UAV


⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Table of ceasefire violations as of 27 October 2020⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
SMM camera in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km N of Donetsk)	3-5km ESE	Recorded	2	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	26-Oct, 21:34

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras, and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff have temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States, as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and also patrols in this settlement during daylight hours.)