


Daily Report 215/2020

9 September 2020¹

Summary

- The SMM recorded one ceasefire violation in Donetsk region and none in Luhansk region. In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and 50 in Luhansk region.
- The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. During evening and night hours, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted people inside the latter two areas.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
- The Mission continued following up on the situation of civilians amid the COVID-19 outbreak, including at an entry-exit checkpoint in Luhansk region.
- The SMM's freedom of movement continued to be restricted, including near non-government-controlled Korsun, Donetsk region and at a border crossing point outside government control near Leonove, Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations²



¹ Based on information from the Monitoring Teams as of 19:30, 8 September 2020. All times are in Eastern European Summer Time.

² For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Petrivske and near Shyrokyne were not operational.

³ Including explosions.


⁴ Including from unidentified weapons.

Map of recorded ceasefire violations




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Ceasefire violations observed by the SMM 8 September 2020



Ceasefire violation concentration



- Explosion
- Settlement
- Estimated line of contact

Sources: Administrative Boundaries - OCHA; Roads, Rivers - OpenStreetMap; Sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO Sea Areas; Other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

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Created: 09/09/2020

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded one ceasefire violation – an undetermined explosion near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (see below). In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded no ceasefire violations.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. In the [previous reporting period](#), it recorded 50 ceasefire violations.

Following agreement reached at the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on 22 July regarding additional measures to strengthen the ceasefire, from 00:01 on 27 July until the end of the reporting period, the SMM has so far recorded a total of 1,001 ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (including 174 explosions, two projectiles in flight, 13 illumination flares and 812 bursts and shots).

Disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske⁵

On the morning of 8 September, inside the **disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska** (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission saw two members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) south of the new span of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

On the evening of 7 September, inside the **disengagement area near Zolote** (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three people inside former positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces – in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), about 1km east-south-east of the area’s north-western corner, one about 500m west-south-west, and one about 200m west-south-west of the area’s north-eastern corner. Also inside the disengagement area, the UAV spotted three people within a former position of the armed formations, about 1.4km north of the area’s south-eastern corner.

On the morning of 8 September, the SMM saw two unarmed members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) enter the disengagement area, walk to 350m north of its southern edge and return. Throughout the day, the SMM observed six members of the armed formations near the armed formations checkpoint south of the disengagement area.

On the same day, north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed ten workers with heavy construction equipment clearing vegetation and laying gravel on both sides along a 1km stretch of road T-1316. South of the disengagement area, the SMM observed 20 workers with heavy equipment conducting groundwork near the same road.

On the night of 7-8 September, inside the **disengagement area near Petrivske** (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted three people in a former position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 500m east-north-east of the area’s south-western corner.

⁵ Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

During the day on 8 September, while positioned near the disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. The Mission also noted that the previously reported cement blocks on the road leading from Petrivske to Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), about 90m west of the SMM camera site, were no longer present. (The Mission had first seen them on 3 August. On 11 August, it had seen that they had been removed, and then it had seen them again on 14 August. See SMM Daily Reports of [4 August 2020](#), [12 August 2020](#) and [14 August 2020](#).)

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines as well as weapons beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage areas, all in training areas in non-government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions (for further details, see the tables below).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁶

On 6 September, about 550m south-east of Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a military position, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (not visible in imagery from 21 December 2019).

On 7 September, about 2km north of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted an extension (about 3m long) of an existing trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations (not visible in imagery from 16 July 2020).

On 8 September, about 3km south-east of Raiivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission observed five members of the armed formations with shovels near one of their positions on the north-eastern side of a local road.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) traveling south-east to north-west and then turning west at a road intersection on the northern edge of Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) (for further details, see the table below).

SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of critical civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable preparations for construction work south of the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote and near Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), south of the bridge in Shchastia, where it also enabled demining activities.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable electricity service inspections near Vesela Hora and in government-controlled Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), as well as the inspection of

⁶ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

a gas pipeline between government-controlled Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Kodema (57km north-east of Donetsk).

It also facilitated and monitored adherence to localised ceasefires to enable railway maintenance in Vilkhove (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), repairs to water infrastructure near non-government-controlled Pankivka (16km north of Luhansk) and Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk), and demining activities near government-controlled areas of Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk) and Myrna Dolyna (67km north-west of Luhansk) on 8 September, as well as demining activities on agricultural land near Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk) on 7 September.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. While positioned about 500m north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the Mission recorded an undetermined explosion assessed as within a 5km radius of the station.

Measures taken at entry-exit checkpoints and corresponding checkpoints to counter COVID-19 outbreak

In Luhansk region, the SMM noted that the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Stanytsia Luhanska was operational.

While at the EECP at about 08:50, 11:20 and 14:50, the Mission observed in total 1,000 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing to enter government-controlled areas and in total 90 people (mixed genders and ages) queuing in the opposite direction. The SMM also observed a golf cart operating between the new section of the bridge and the EECP.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

***Restrictions of the SMM's freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate**

The SMM's monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM's mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM's freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine's border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM's operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following [the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#); these restrictions continued to limit the Mission's observations.

Denial

- About 1.5km north of Korsun (non-government-controlled, 31km north-east of Donetsk), on road M-04, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing exercises” near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). The road was also blocked by a military truck.

- About 4km north-north-west of the border crossing point in Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, non-government-controlled, 82km south of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing “the closure of the border crossing point”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines, UXO and other obstacles.

Delay

- Near Kruhlyk (non-government-controlled, 65km south-west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to pass only after 40 minutes of waiting, referring to a need for permission from his superiors.

Table of weapons

Weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
07/09/2020	16	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Buhaiivka (37km south-west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV
	6	Towed howitzer (D-30A <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)		
	3	Multiple launch rocket system (BM-21 <i>Grad</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk)	

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Date	No. of weapons	Type of weapons	Location	Source of observation
Non-government-controlled areas				
07/09/2020	12	Tank (five probable T-64 and seven type undetermined)	In a training area near Buhaiivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), where imagery also revealed the presence of about 55 armoured combat vehicles ⁷	Long-range UAV
	3	Probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35 <i>Strela-10</i>)		
	4	Tank (type undetermined)	In a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk)	
	3	Self-propelled howitzer (2S1 <i>Gvozdika</i> , 122mm)	In a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk)	
	3	Towed howitzer (D-30 <i>Lyagushka</i> , 122mm)		
	10	Tank (type undetermined)		

Table of military and military-type presence in the security zone⁸

Date	No.	Type	Location	Source of observation
Government-controlled areas				
06/09/2020	-	Military position (not visible in imagery from 21 December 2019)	Near Shumy (41km north of Donetsk)	Mid-range UAV
07/09/2020	3	Probable armoured combat vehicle	Near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV
	1	Probable armoured combat vehicle	Near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk)	
	2	Probable armoured combat vehicle	Near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)	
	1	Probable armoured combat vehicle	Near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	Near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk)	
	3	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant)	Near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk)	
	1	Armoured combat vehicle		
	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70)	Northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk)	Patrol

⁷ The armoured combat vehicles mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

⁸ The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.


08/09/2020	1	Armoured personnel carrier (BTR-60)	Near Karlivka (25km north-west of Donetsk)	
Non-government-controlled areas				
07/09/2020	-	Trench extension (about 3m long) (not visible in imagery from 16 July 2020)	Near Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk)	Long-range UAV

Table of ceasefire violations as of 8 September 2020⁹

SMM position	Event location	Means	No.	Observation	Description	Weapon	Date, time
About 500m NE of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km N of Donetsk)	4-5km SSW	Heard	1	Explosion	Undetermined	N/K	8-Sep, 13:42

⁹ The table only includes ceasefire violations directly observed by the SMM patrols or recorded by the SMM cameras and it may include those also assessed to be live-fire exercises, controlled detonations, etc. Details provided – in terms of distance, direction, weapons-type, etc. – are based on assessments provided by monitors on the ground and technical monitoring officers, and are not always necessarily precise. When information is not known (indicated with an “N/K”), the SMM was unable to ascertain such information due to distance, weather conditions technical limitations and/or other considerations. Ceasefire violations recorded by more than one patrol/camera and assessed to be the same are entered only once.

Map of Donetsk and Luhansk regions¹⁰



¹⁰ The SMM is deployed to ten locations throughout Ukraine – Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, Luhansk and Kyiv – as per Permanent Council Decision 1117 of 21 March 2014. This map of eastern Ukraine is meant for illustrative purposes and indicates locations mentioned in the report, as well as those where the SMM has offices (monitoring teams, patrol hubs, and forward patrol bases) in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. (In red: a forward patrol base from which SMM staff has temporarily relocated based on recommendations of security experts from participating States as well as SMM security considerations. The SMM uses the premises during daylight hours and patrols in this settlement during daylight hours, as well.)