Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 4 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it observed construction works. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

The Mission resumed full operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, following earlier limited operations due to security considerations after an explosion in Donetsk city centre on 31 August.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions).

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Midna Ruda (government-controlled, 69km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions 5km south-east, assessed as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 3-4km south-west and west-south-west, and about 210 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-3km south, the latter assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone.[2]

Positioned on the eastern edge of Vidrodzhennia (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5km south-east, assessed as part of a live-fire training exercise in the security zone.[3]

Positioned in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 200-250m east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (12 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions).

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions, assessed as 120mm mortar rounds, 10-15km east.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[4] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 4 September, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded a large fire moving east-south-east of the camera. A representative of the Forestry Department told the SMM that there was a wildfire burning in the area of Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk), in an area up to 3km north of the Siverskyi Donets River.

On 3 September, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) about 400m north of the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

During the day on 4 September, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces walking inside the Zolote disengagement area in a north-eastern direction.  

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard about 80 shots of small-arms fire 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and noted that 39 towed howitzers (13 2A36 and 26 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that one tank (T-64) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[5] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 3 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on trucks near residential houses east of Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 September, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna, an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and an IFV (BTR-4) in Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the same UAV spotted eight armoured personnel carriers (MT-LB) and two IFVs (MT-LB MB) near Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

The SMM monitored the situation at entry-exit checkpoints. The Mission saw that the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The SMM saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. It saw a crane, excavator, truck and a bulldozer involved in ongoing construction of shelters and road repairs, and three workers dismantling a bus station roof near the entry-exit checkpoint. The previous day, the SMM saw members of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service dismantling the entry-exit checkpoint and its defensive walls, as well as a shelter in the parking area of the entry-exit checkpoint. The SMM also noted that shelters about 1km north of the bridge had been completely dismantled.

The Mission observed that entry-exit checkpoints near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk)  and Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk), as well as checkpoints near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) were open (see SMM Daily Report 4 September 2018).

The SMM saw new checkpoints, including two in Horlivka, one near Styla (non-government-controlled 34km south of Donetsk), one near Dokuchaievsk, and one on the northern outskirts of Yenakiieve (non-government-controlled, 41km north-east of Donetsk).  

The SMM observed two mine hazard signs for the first time (one red sign with white lettering indicating “mines” and one sign with red handwritten letters on wood indicating the same message, both in Russian) placed next to concrete barriers and piles of soil blocking a road leading from road H20 to the eastern part of Novotroitske.

The SMM observed that a previously reported anti-tank mine (TM-62) near the southern edge of a road leading from the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) to a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) had been removed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations nearby, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below).

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water systems near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[6]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM were allowed to proceed only after an armed member of the armed formations inspected the SMM vehicle.

Other impediments:

• Staff at a school in Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that it could not visit the school without prior written approval from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] In violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the TCG of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

[3] In violation of the ceasefire and the decision of the TCG of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.