Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 23 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw damage to a farm near Novoluhanske.
• On 23 August, it saw members of the armed formations taking down a wall at their former forward position and personnel from the State Emergency Services of Ukraine cutting trees and branches inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM spotted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Raihorodka and non-government-controlled Ternove.
• It saw new anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia.
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a cargo train heading south-west as well as a cargo train probably loaded with coal in Kumshatske.
• The long-range UAV spotted vehicles and people in a field west of the border with the Russian Federation in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske, in Sosnivske and Naberezhne, and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (46), compared with the previous reporting period (69 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly directions of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Damage to a farm near Novoluhanske

The SMM saw damage to two buildings at the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). At the administration building, the Mission saw a hole in an east-north-east-facing ground floor window but could not assess the cause of damage. At a pig barn about 150m south-east of the administration building, the SMM saw about 15-20 holes in a south-facing outer wall, a hole in a south-facing window, assessed as fresh, and a hole in another south-facing window along with a corresponding hole on a south-facing wall inside of the barn, both assessed as caused by small-arms fire. An employee at the farm (a woman in her forties) told the SMM that she had been in the barn with other employees on the morning of 18 August when she had heard shooting and took shelter in a corridor. Shortly thereafter, she said she heard a bullet impact the window (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM saw at least 21 personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as four vehicles (including a white armoured vehicle), entering the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk). On the same day, inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw eight Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, six members of the SES cutting trees and branches in fields west of the road and north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), as well as a bulldozer, a dump truck, and a crane parked near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The SMM also saw that a shuttle bus and golf cart continued to operate between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the broken section of the bridge and back. On two occasions, at the EECP north of the bridge, the SMM saw 500-800 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and 150-400 queuing to enter. Throughout the day, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of pedestrians.

At the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, as well as five members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres from a wall of the position to a location about 10m south. [2] On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw six contractors constructing a shelter of a humanitarian organization.       

On 24 August (outside of the reporting period), the SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel removing sand-filled tyres from the walls and roof of their former forward position north of the broken section of bridge. The SMM also saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel using a crane to remove nine large concrete slabs from an area south of the former forward position. At the same time, the SMM saw members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres from the walls of their former forward position immediately south of the broken section of bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned in the central part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), while conducting a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight over the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 shots and five burst of small-arms fire about 1-2km west (unable to assess as inside or outside of the disengagement area), assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2km west. Shortly thereafter, while returning the UAV, the SMM heard three additional shots of small-arms fire about 1-1.5km north-north-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery), assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.3km north-north-west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and heard an additional two shots of small-arms fire at a distance of about 1.5km north-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery) before it left the area.*

While positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small arms fire at a distance of about 1km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the same day, the SMM accessed its camera site in Petrivske for the second time since June 2018 and conducted maintenance.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

21 August

An SMM UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a compound near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 22 August 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) in a military compound on the eastern edge of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted nineteen tanks (eight T-64 and 11 undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

23 August

The SMM noted that six MLRS (BM-21), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 11 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm), and a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk

23 August

The SMM noted that 93 tanks (26 T-64, 36 T-64-B, 30 T-72, and a T-80), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm), nine towed mortars (six 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38) and four mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a school building in Raihorodka and
• five APCs (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

22 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near residential houses in Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske; and
• four IFVs (a BMP-2 and three BMP variants) near Orikhove (57km west of Luhansk).

23 August

The SMM saw:

• three APCs (a BTR-80, a BTR variant and a type undetermined) in Stanytsia Luhanska and
• an APC (BTR-70) and a heavy-machine-gun (DShK, 12.7mm) north-east of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

On 23 August, near a checkpoint of the armed formations on road C-051532 between Styla (34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission again saw four members of the armed formations digging inside deep trenches.

Anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia

The SMM saw 12 new anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in the western lane of the road H-21 south of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), as well as 15 previously observed anti-tank mines laid across the entire road further south.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Trains near Kumshatske

On the night of 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable fuel cargo train (with 20 wagons) moving south through the train station in Kumshatske (non-government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) towards Sofiivka (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), as well as a stationary train (with at least 50 wagons), assessed as probably carrying coal, at the same train station.

Vehicles spotted in a non-government-controlled area near Manych

On the night of 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable cargo truck and two cars stationary in a field, about 3.5km north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk), in an area adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation where there are no official border crossing points, as well as a cargo truck stationary at a junction about 2.5km south-west of Manych. About ten minutes later, in the same area, it spotted another truck driving west on a dirt road about 400m west of the border. After about 30 minutes, the UAV spotted around six people walking west in a field between the border and the aforementioned truck and two cars. About five minutes later, it spotted two cars (probably the aforementioned ones) driving west towards Manych, as well as an additional third car, also moving west towards Manych.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 22 cars (four with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 24 cars (five with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, one bus with “DPR” plates, and two pedestrians (women in their thirties and fifties) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians (males) entering Ukraine and 13 pedestrians (eight females and five males) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car with Russian Federation licence plates, two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and 25 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw seven cars (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, and one with German licence plates), five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates as well as two with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), and 11 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, once citing an “ongoing operation in the area” and once citing the SMM’s refusal to show its patrol plan.
• At the eastern entrance to Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing orders from superiors.
• While at a shop in Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations approached the SMM and asked to see its patrol plan, then told the Mission to leave the village, citing orders from superiors.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM was allowed to proceed only after 18 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 22-23 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Yurivka (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) and between Bulavyne (non-government-controlled, 54km north-east of Donetsk) and Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Yurivka and Bulavyne.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two storage sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.