Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 August 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and it was also restricted in Styla, Staromykhailivka and again in Zaichenko, as well as near Novoazovsk, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure in Luhansk region on both sides of the contact line. It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions).

On the evening and night of 21-22 August, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded nine undetermined explosions, 56 projectiles in flight, 32 airbursts and an illumination flare, all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south-south-west. During the same evening and night, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk recorded two undetermined explosions and 39 projectiles in flight, all 2-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east.

On the evening and night of 21-22 August, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three explosions (one assessed as an impact of a mortar round and two undetermined) and about 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-south-east.

On the same evening and night, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion, 11 projectiles in flight, two muzzle flashes and an illumination flare, all 0.5-2km south and south-south-west.

During the day on 22 August, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and about 25 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-3km south-west and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (33 explosions).

During the day on 22 August, positioned in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 explosions of artillery rounds 10-20km north-east.

Positioned in Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard 22 explosions (some of which were assessed as outgoing artillery rounds and some others as impacts of artillery rounds) 8-15km north-west.

Positioned near Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 10km north-east and 25 undetermined explosions 8-10km south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

During the day on 22 August, the SMM saw a man assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel armed with a machine gun standing near the bridge and another man assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel walking north from Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), both inside the disengagement area. On the same day, the SMM saw a different man assessed as Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel driving a car with black licence plates into and exiting the disengagement area multiple times.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. The SMM was unable to monitor the situation through patrolling near the Petrivske disengagement area.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 19 August of 21 tanks (type undetermined) and 25 pieces of towed artillery near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (in the same area, aerial imagery available to the SMM also revealed the presence of 82 armoured combat vehicles). On 21 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three tanks (probable T-72) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). On 22 August, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) in a training area near Myrne.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines and noted that a tank (T-64) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), and an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk). On 22 August, the SMM saw seven armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2): five near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk) and two near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

On 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV and an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an IFV (BMP-1) north-west of Shumy (41km north-east of Donetsk); the same SMM long-range UAV spotted an additional armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in the same area.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and a new mine hazard sign. On 22 August, in the eastern outskirts of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a tailfin, assessed as part of a mortar (120mm) round, protruding from the tarmac. On the side of the same road, a few metres away from the aforementioned tailfin, the SMM saw for the first time a red square-shaped sign with “Mines” written on it in Russian language.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the station, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, a water pipe in Zolote and a water channel junction in Stanytsia Luhanska, as well as to enable the installation of a new segment of the water pipeline near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to residential houses in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, saying that it was unsafe for the SMM to proceed.
• While an SMM patrol was driving towards the Petrivske disengagement area, at a checkpoint near Styla (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), six armed members of the armed formations denied it passage, saying that “an operation was ongoing in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, saying that “an operation was ongoing in the area”.
• At a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, saying that it was unsafe for the SMM to proceed due to “frequent shelling in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.