Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 November 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations compared with the previous reporting period, with most of the violations recorded around Debaltseve and in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area. In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations but fewer explosions compared with the previous day. The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and damage to civilian infrastructure on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol, in Pikuzy, in Troitske, and damage to a school in Stanytsia Luhanska. The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement process in Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and was restricted in its freedom of movement in all three areas.* The SMM monitored the withdrawal of weapons, and observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. It travelled to three border areas currently not under government control. In Kyiv the Mission monitored two public gatherings in the city centre. 

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region, including approximately 430 explosions compared with 141 in the previous reporting period. Approximately 250 of these explosions were recorded in a 30-minute time period around Debaltseve, and nearly 100 in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata-Donetsk airport area throughout the day.

While in Donetsk city centre on the evening and night of 2 November, the SMM heard 70 undetermined explosions north-west and west. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) for approximately two hours on 3 November, the SMM heard 16 explosions assessed as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher rounds 2km south.

While in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 November the SMM heard two undetermined explosions assessed as mortar rounds of unknown calibre 3-5km east. Also on 2 November, while in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 explosions assessed as outgoing 122mm artillery rounds 4-5km south-south-west. On the afternoon of 3 November, positioned at an observation point in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard approximately 250 explosions in a 30-minute period 5-9km north-west.

In the late afternoon and early evening of 2 November, the SMM camera in government-controlled Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded an exchange of fire which began with one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance north-east. In the ensuing exchange the camera recorded five explosions assessed as impacts, two rocket-assisted projectiles fired from south-west to north-east (one assessed as an anti-tank rocket), and one rocket-assisted projectile fired from north-east to south-west; all at unknown distances north-east. Positioned in government-controlled Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol) for about 40 minutes the SMM heard two explosions assessed as mortar rounds of unknown calibre and approximately 100 overlapping bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all at unknown distances south-east.

In Luhansk region the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations but fewer non-training-related ceasefire violations and fewer explosions (36 explosions in the reporting period as opposed to 40 in the previous reporting period). While in government-controlled Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 28 explosions assessed as 82mm mortar rounds of unknown calibre which it assessed as part of a live-fire exercise outside of the security zone. Positioned approximately 3km south of government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as artillery of unknown calibre 10km west-north-west (outside of the disengagement area).

The SMM followed up on reports of shelling and damage to civilian infrastructure. At the eastern outskirts of Mariupol, in government-controlled Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed six fresh impact sites, all assessed as caused by artillery rounds fired from a north-easterly direction. All of the impact sites were in close proximity to houses. The SMM observed shrapnel damage to a gas pipeline and the walls and roofs of several houses, downed electricity lines and broken windows. The SMM observed a dead dog with a large flesh wound in the garden of one home. Three residents separately told the SMM that the shelling had taken place shortly before midnight on 2 November. Two residents separately told the SMM that until 22 October Ukrainian Armed Forces had been present in a resort area at the southern edge of the settlement (about 300m from residential areas to the north) where four of the impact sites were located.

In “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed that part of the roof on the north-eastern side of a house had burned. Three residents told the SMM that there had been shooting and shelling around the village on the evening of 2 November.

In government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed a fresh impact site, about 10m from a house, which it assessed as having been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-easterly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that the round had impacted on the night of 1-2 November.

In government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk, outside of the disengagement area) a school director showed the SMM a bullet hole in the south-facing window of the third floor of a school which she said had been caused by shooting the previous night. The SMM assessed that the hole had been caused by a 12.7mm heavy machine-gun round.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas of Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three areas,* but the Mission was able to partially monitor them. The SMM observed the presence of forces, hardware and signs of shelling around Stanytsia Luhanska. It noted no demining or fencing off of mines in any of the areas.

At the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area), the SMM observed an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) covered with a camouflage net. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska (outside of the disengagement area) the SMM observed another IFV (BMP-1) covered with a camouflage net. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and a Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC and an armed “LPR” member separately informed the SMM of the presence of impact sites and damage caused by fighting around the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge on the night of 2 November. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position on the bridge (inside the disengagement area), the SMM observed three fresh impacts from rocket-propelled-grenade rounds (RPG-7) assessed as fired from a southerly direction and observed two fresh bullet impacts on the southern wall of a concrete bunker. A damaged but unexploded rocket-propelled-grenade round lay near the position, a short distance from the crossing route used by civilians.

The SMM observed eight fresh impact sites at and around the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge as well as on the bridge near the “LPR” forward position north of the Siverskyi Donets river. The SMM assessed one of the impacts as having been caused by an anti-tank projectile and two more by an unknown weapon, all fired from a north-westerly direction; four as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher rounds and one by a rocket-propelled-grenade round, all fired from a north-easterly direction. The SMM observed a ninth impact site between the broken section of the bridge and the Ukrainian Armed Force forward position, which it assessed as caused by an automatic-grenade-launcher round (AGS) fired from an easterly direction. The SMM also observed for the first time the remnants of one IFV (BMP-1) cannon round on the southern side of the bridge and an unexploded under-barrel-grenade round lying on the asphalt road between the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position and the broken section of the bridge. The unexploded ordnance (UXO), which was near the pedestrian crossing area, was marked with pieces of wood. The SMM noted that the fighting had splintered the wooden boards of both ramps over the broken section of the bridge. At the JCCC headquarters in Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Russian Federation Armed Forces representatives told the SMM that after at least nine attempts to jointly stop the fighting in the area of Stanytsia Luhanska, they were able to facilitate a ceasefire just after midnight on 3 November.

The SMM was stopped from reaching the railway bridge from the north by Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on one occasion, and from the south through “LPR”-controlled areas on two occasions, once due to the presence of a mine hazard sign and once as an armed “LPR” member could not ensure the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines. Separately, an armed “LPR” member advised the SMM not to use a side road south of the pedestrian bridge (outside of the disengagement area) due to the presence of unexploded ordnance.*

The SMM crossed the main road in the Zolote-Pervomaisk disengagement area from government-controlled to “LPR”-controlled areas. In government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC and a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM that access roads around the disengagement area had not been cleared of mines. At the disengagement area, the SMM was unable to travel on a road leading from a government-controlled part of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) to the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route, which remains closed to civilians, due to the road being blocked by concrete blocks, barbwire and mine hazard signs. At the “LPR” checkpoint on the eastern edge of the disengagement area an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that he was unable to ensure the security of the SMM in areas off roads in the disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO.*

In government-controlled Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), west of Petrivske disengagement area, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC told the SMM that the road east to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk), along the northern edge of the disengagement area, was still mined. At a “DPR” checkpoint east of the disengagement area “DPR” member was unable to ensure the security of the patrol in the disengagement area.* Positioned 1.5km east of Bohdanivka the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at an unknown distance south-east (the SMM assessed that the ceasefire violation occurred outside of the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Memorandum.

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside assigned areas in government-controlled areas the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) in Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk) and two self-propelled surface-to-air missile/anti-aircraft gun systems (2S6 Tunguska variant) near Stritenka (formerly Oktiabrske, 62km south-west of Donetsk). 

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set in the 16 October 2015 notification. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed 17 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm; four observed for the first time), 12 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm, all observed for the first time) and eight self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm; also all observed for the first time). The SMM observed as missing 38 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm; 31 were noted as missing for the first time).

The SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent storage site whose location complies with the respective withdrawal lines and noted that 45 tanks (31 T-72 and 13 T-64) and 21 mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) were missing. Four tanks (T-64) and three mortars were noted as missing for the first time.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM observed four armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-70s) near Olhynka (40km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) in Stanytsia Luhanska (one inside and one outside the disengagement area, see above). Near “DPR”-controlled Starobesheve (32km south-east of Donetsk) the SMM observed one APC (BTR-80).

The SMM monitored three border areas currently not under government control and noted a calm situation at border crossing points near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) and Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk). While at the Uspenka border crossing point for 40 minutes, the SMM observed four commercial trucks (three with Ukrainian licence plates and one with Belarusian ones) exiting Ukraine and two entering, all with their cargo areas covered. One additional commercial truck with Russian Federation licence plates and its cargo area covered arrived at the border crossing point while the SMM was present. The SMM was present at the Ulianivske border crossing point for 25 minutes and at the Marynivka one for 45 minutes.

In Kyiv the SMM monitored two public gatherings in the city centre. At the first, the SMM observed at least 1,000 demonstrators (men and women of different ages) representing labour unions from the National Academy of Science and healthcare sectors gathered in front of the Parliament. Approximately 60 law enforcement officers were positioned nearby. The demonstration remained peaceful. At the second protest, approximately 500 demonstrators (25-60 years of age, 50 per cent women) partially blocked traffic on Khreshchatyk Street along Independence Square for approximately 2.5 hours. During this time protestors lit at least seven flares and four torches. The demonstrators were calling for the dismissal of the head of the National Bank and the return of their savings which were allegedly lost through the liquidation of a bank during the last year. Up to 150 law enforcement officers attempted several times, unsuccessfully, to push the demonstrators back by forming a chain and moving slowly forward. At approximately 14:00 the protestors were pushed back from the street by the police.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to pass through a checkpoint leading to the railway bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not proceed further towards a summer cottage area (neighbouring the railway bridge south of Stanytsia Luhanska) from “LPR”-controlled areas on two occasions: once due to the presence of a mine hazard sign, and once as an “LPR” armed member could not ensure the security of the SMM due to the possible presence of mines. The SMM informed the JCCC on both occasions.
• An armed “LPR” member advised the SMM not to use a side road south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (outside of the disengagement area) due to the presence of unexploded ordnance. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM could not travel on the road from government-controlled Bohdanivka east to Viktorivka (42km south-west of Donetsk) as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the JCCC present said the road was still mined and he could not ensure security for the SMM to travel.
• At a “DPR” checkpoint east of the Petrivske disengagement area an armed “DPR” member was unable to ensure the security of the patrol in the disengagement area.
• The SMM could not proceed across the bridge south of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) from either side. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier and armed “LPR” members present at their respective checkpoints told the SMM that the bridge was still mined. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was unable to travel on a road leading from a government-controlled part of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) to the Zolote-Pervomaisk crossing route, which remains closed to civilians, due to the road being blocked by concrete blocks, barbwire and mine hazard signs. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• At the “LPR” checkpoint on the eastern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, an armed “LPR” member told the SMM that he was unable to ensure the security of the SMM in areas off of roads in the disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. The SMM informed the JCCC.
• In “LPR”-controlled Verkhnoshevyrivka (44km south-east of Luhansk), a person involved in public matters told the SMM that senior “LPR” members had not provided prior approval to meet with the SMM.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.