

# Security Sector Governance and Reform



## Guidelines for OSCE Staff

# **Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R)**

**Guidelines for  
OSCE Staff**

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## Foreword

Although Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) is a relatively new concept, it goes hand in hand with the OSCE's comprehensive understanding of security. Indeed, through its Institutions and Field Operations, the Organization has for quite some time been providing expertise to participating States on many important aspects of SSG/R, including police reform, border management and security, counter-terrorism, anti-corruption, justice sector reform and others. The concept of SSG/R is already supported by a broad normative framework within the OSCE, with the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security as a key point of reference.



In recent years, the concept of SSG/R has been increasingly recognized by OSCE participating States and the Organization's Executive Structures as playing an essential role in conflict prevention, early warning, crisis management and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, although the OSCE is very active in the area of SSG/R, it is missing a coherent and co-ordinated approach. This was the conclusion of a mapping study conducted by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) on the role of the OSCE in SSG/R that was commissioned by Switzerland ahead of its 2014 OSCE Chairmanship. This understanding, which is shared by many participating States, has steered the Organization's work in the area of SSG/R over the past two years, including the development of this first set of OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R.

These guidelines were produced with the participation of an OSCE-wide network of focal points representing all of the OSCE Executive Structures and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. This collaborative approach allowed us to build on the wealth of knowledge and experience from across our Organization and to tailor the guidelines to the OSCE's own distinct profile and needs. The guidelines also build on the strengths and comparative advantages of the OSCE, namely its comprehensive approach to security and the inclusive and co-operative nature of its work, its Institutions and network of field presences, its Parliamentary Assembly, as well as the Organization's ability to provide context-specific approaches. Based on numerous existing norm-setting documents and commitments, these guidelines also fully respect the prerogatives and mandates of the different constituent parts of the OSCE. In developing them, we once again relied on the excellent and dedicated assistance of DCAF, for which we are very grateful.

Given the increasingly complex security challenges we face today, I am convinced that applying the concept of SSG/R can be highly beneficial to our work in the OSCE region and beyond. This first set of guidelines will provide OSCE staff with a practical tool to



guide them in their daily work. This will ultimately help us to pursue a more coherent and co-ordinated approach to supporting nationally led SSG/R processes, and thus to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our work. I trust that OSCE staff will find the present guidelines useful and will provide us with constructive feedback, so that we can learn from experience and update and improve the guidelines over time.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Lamberto Zannier', with a stylized flourish at the end.

**Lamberto Zannier**  
*Secretary General*

# OSCE GUIDELINES

## Security Sector Governance and Reform

### Introduction

Security Sector Governance and Reform (SSG/R) is increasingly recognized by the OSCE and its participating States as playing an essential role in conflict prevention, early warning, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. In preparation for its Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2014, Switzerland mandated the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) to conduct a study on *The Role of the OSCE in Security Sector Governance and Reform* (CIO.GAL/18/14).<sup>1</sup> One of the recommendations that emerged from this study was for the development of guidance for OSCE staff in order to facilitate the provision of more effective and coherent support in the area of SSG/R. In response to the recommendations made in the mapping study and at the request of the consecutive Swiss and Serbian OSCE Chairmanships, the OSCE proposed that guidance be developed in the form of internal guidelines for specific topics, which would have an operational focus.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, it was noted that these guidelines would neither entail new commitments nor revise existing ones.

In order to develop these guidelines in an inclusive process and to ensure that they were tailored to the OSCE's specific working contexts, an internal focal point network was established across all OSCE executive structures, covering all three dimensions of security. The appointed focal points contributed with inside knowledge on their respective entity's work as related to SSG/R. At a first workshop hosted by Slovakia in Bratislava in October 2014, work on the Guidelines was launched and representatives of the newly established SSG/R Focal Points Network identified four priority areas for guidance development: cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R; impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R; needs assessments in the area of SSG/R; and approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R. This work was further consolidated with a second workshop hosted by the Republic of Serbia in April 2014. Developed on the basis of three rounds of drafting through the Focal Points Network, the guidelines reflect the OSCE's cross-dimensional approach, drawing on the expertise of the OSCE executive structures and Parliamentary Assembly across all three dimensions.

### About the OSCE SSG/R Guidelines

The guidelines provide OSCE executive structures and their staff with a tool for pursuing a coherent and co-ordinated approach to supporting nationally led SSG/R processes.

<sup>1</sup> DCAF, *The Role of the OSCE in Security Sector Governance and Reform* (CIO.GAL/18/14), available at: <http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Supporting-the-Development-of-the-OSCE-s-Approach-to-SSG-R>

<sup>2</sup> For more information on the OSCE partnership with DCAF in the framework of the project "Supporting the Development of the OSCE's Approach to SSG/R" please visit DCAF's website: <http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Supporting-the-Development-of-the-OSCE-s-Approach-to-SSG-R>

Their aim is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Organization's ongoing efforts.

The current set of guidelines consists of the following sections:

- *Cross-Dimensional Approaches to Security Sector Governance and Reform*
- *Impact-Oriented Approaches to Security Sector Governance and Reform*
- *Needs Assessments in the Field of Security Sector Governance and Reform*
- *Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on Security Sector Governance and Reform*

Regular updates of the present guidelines will ensure that lessons identified from ongoing work are reflected and integrated. Moreover, further guidelines will be developed according to needs identified in the field. For this purpose, a review process will be initiated in 2016 to assess their effective use and to identify emerging guidance needs.

### Acknowledgements

The Guidelines were produced with the support of the Secretary General, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, and the Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Ambassador Marcel Peško. The process was co-ordinated by Christian Wägli, Fabian Grass, and Alexandra Pfefferle, all from the Conflict Prevention Centre.

While it is not possible to thank all those who contributed to this process, special thanks go to the members of the OSCE SSG/R focal points network, who enriched the Guidelines through input and examples from their professional experience and working contexts throughout the drafting process and who actively participated in two special workshops on the Guidelines in Bratislava and in Belgrade: from the Secretariat, Marco Bonabello (OSR CTHB), Manuel Eising (TNTD/ATU), Biliana Hristova and Xhodi Sakiqi (External Co-operation), Mato Mayer and Andrei Muntean (OCEEA), Hanna Sands (Gender Section), Jelena Segan and Natia Esebua (PESU), Thorsten Stodiek (TNTD/SPMU), Bilge Kocyigit (Operations Service) and Bostjan Malovrh (Policy Support Section); from the OSCE Institutions, Omer Fisher (ODIHR), Kaupo Kand (HCNM) and Andrey Rikhter (RFOM); from the OSCE field operations, Mikhail Assafov (Centre in Astana), Samir Basic, Sanja Fitzgerald and John Martin (Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina), Vladimir Bilandzic (Mission to Serbia), Fabio Piana and Maciej Dachowski (Centre in Bishkek), Davit Harutyunyan (Office in Yerevan), Richard Wheeler and Guncha Nepesova (Centre in Ashgabat), Predrag Prelevic (Mission to Montenegro), Markus Puchwein (Presence in Albania), Neving Rudskjaer (Office in Tajikistan), Senad Sabovic and Vesna Vujovic-Ristovska (Mission in Kosovo), Anton Shevchenko (Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine), Juraj Smolek and Viacheslav Vorobiev (Mission to Skopje) and Steve Young (Mission in Moldova); and Marc Carillet and Francesco Pagani from the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.


The OSCE wishes to thank DCAF for its tireless efforts and its dedicated support to the development of the Guidelines, particularly Prof. Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer,

who led the project from DCAF's side, as well as Tatjana Eichert and Kathrin Reed. The Guidelines could not have been produced without DCAF's wealth of expertise, tailored assistance and professionalism in combining theoretical background and practical examples gathered through the OSCE Focal Point Network.

The OSCE remains grateful to the governments of Switzerland, Slovakia and Serbia for their generous support to developing the Guidelines project.

# Security Sector Governance and Reform

Cross-Dimensional Approaches to  
Security Sector Governance and Reform



## Guidelines

# Cross-Dimensional Approaches to Security Sector Governance and Reform

### 1. Purpose

These guidelines are intended to provide OSCE staff with advice on supporting cross-dimensional approaches to security sector governance and reform (SSG/R). The purpose of such approaches is to promote a move away from the kind of fragmented support that may have limited impact and towards the practice of establishing how to build on cross-dimensional synergies in order to provide coherent and effective support for the pursuit of common strategic SSG/R objectives. Support for a cross-dimensional approach must be based on a sound perception and understanding of the following factors: the intrinsic value of such an approach (section 2), potential synergies for SSG/R support in the three OSCE dimensions (section 3), and opportunities to implement such an approach (section 4); finally, the Guidelines contain a summary of key points (section 5). While the Guidelines are designed for the use of OSCE staff, they may also be of relevance to other national and international actors seeking to enhance their support in the field of SSG/R.

### 2. Rationale

The OSCE's work as a regional organization is founded on a broad understanding of the concept of security. It is based on the comprehensive approach reflected in its founding documents, which divide its work into three "baskets" or "dimensions": the politico-military (first dimension), the economic and environmental (second dimension), and the human (third dimension).<sup>3</sup> In this respect, the OSCE's approach to security is in itself cross-dimensional.

As all three dimensions of the OSCE feature activities aimed at enhancing SSG/R, this sector is well suited to the cross-dimensional approach. Activities such as police reform or defence reform generally fall under the first dimension. Activities that aim at supporting the good governance of the security sector usually relate to the second dimension. Finally, issues such as justice and corrections reform are typically part of the third dimension. Additionally, some activities are not always institutionally led by one dimension but may cut across several dimensions, and are thus known as "cross-cutting" activities. This is the case, for instance, with the OSCE's activities in the areas of combating human trafficking, countering terrorism, or promoting gender equality and human rights

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<sup>3</sup> See for instance the Helsinki Final Act which set out three baskets which have become known as dimensions. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1975, Available at: <http://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/helsinki/>

in the security sector, all of which require a bringing together of elements from all three dimensions. The following table illustrates how SSG/R activities fit into the OSCE’s traditional cross-dimensional framework.<sup>4</sup>

**Table 1: SSG/R-related activities within the OSCE dimensional framework<sup>5</sup>**

Politico-military dimension	Economic and environmental dimension	Human dimension
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defence reform</li> <li>• Police reform</li> <li>• Border security reform</li> <li>• Intelligence reform</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Efforts to enhance good governance (e.g., executive management and anti-corruption efforts in the security sector).</li> <li>• Customs reform</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Justice reform</li> <li>• Corrections reform</li> <li>• Oversight by independent bodies (e.g., National Human Rights Institutions, ombuds institutions, complaint committees)</li> <li>• Review of legal frameworks related to the security sector</li> <li>• Monitoring the facilitation of the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly by law enforcement personnel</li> </ul>
<p>Cutting across two or more dimensions: Strategic policy and law-making on SSG/R in line with democratic principles; parliamentary oversight of the security sector; informal oversight by civil society, including the media; gender equality and human rights in the security sector; non-discrimination within and by the security sector; combating trafficking in human beings; the role of the security sector in preventing and countering terrorism.</p>		

In order to ensure the effectiveness of OSCE support in the field of SSG/R, a cross-dimensional approach should be promoted and pro-actively sought in all related activities, irrespective of whether the activities “institutionally” fall under one security basket/dimension or another.<sup>6</sup> However, there is a risk that the cross-dimensional approach may be understood in terms of entities from each dimension providing support in their own area of SSG/R without seeking to contribute collectively to a common objective or to build on related synergies. It is thus necessary to move beyond this “one-dimensional” approach and to ensure that appropriate links between the dimensions are identified and supported. In a country-specific context, for instance, a cross-dimensional approach implies setting out common goals to which all dimensions will contribute in order to maximize overall impact. [\[See the OSCE Guidelines on Impact-Oriented Approaches to SSG/R.\]](#)

One of the characteristic features of SSG/R is the need for a holistic (or comprehensive) approach to reform which takes into account the inter-linkages between the various actors and components of the security sector. This approach recognizes the reality that reform in one part of the security sector may not be successful if it does not anticipate effects on the rest of the security sector. This is acknowledged in numerous OSCE commitments which highlight the importance of a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R.

<sup>4</sup> The table does not intend to promote where SSG/R activities should lie, but rather to understand to which dimension certain SSG/R activities are assigned according to founding OSCE documents. It mainly draws on the categorization of activities used in the OSCE Annual Report of 2013.

<sup>5</sup> This table serves to illustrate where different elements of SSG/R may fit across the dimensions. It is not intended to be exhaustive. Activities which have linkages to SSG/R but are not considered SSG/R activities are not included in this table. For instance, while it is recognized that support to democratic elections is a key pillar of long-term security and stability and may in some contexts provide an entry point for SSG/R efforts, it is not an SSG/R activity and as such is not included in the table.

<sup>6</sup> In some areas, this is already the case. For instance, some issues traditionally regarded as falling into one of the three dimensions are increasingly being recognized as carrying cross-dimensional implications. This is the case, for instance, with issues such as countering terrorism or organized crime.

For example:

- Ministerial Council Decision No. 5/06 on organized crime (2006) recommends participating States “to apply an integrated approach, mindful of the fact that every element of the criminal justice system impacts on the other elements”;<sup>7</sup>
- The 2012 OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities calls for efforts to “ensure their [police-related activities] complementarity with regard to reform efforts in other sectors of the criminal justice system”;<sup>8</sup>
- The 2012 OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism states that the Organization “promotes a comprehensive approach to security, linking the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions, thereby providing a framework for coherent and sustained actions in preventing and combating terrorism.”<sup>9</sup>
- Several Ministerial Council Decisions recognize that gender equality, human rights protection, and non-discrimination all require mainstreaming across all three dimensions, which naturally involves judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement actors within the security sector.<sup>10</sup> The same applies to efforts to ensure equality and non-discrimination for minorities. The 2003 OSCE Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area, for instance, underlines that action is required across various fields, including addressing the legislative framework, strengthening community policing, providing training to the police on respect for human rights, and addressing socio-economic issues.<sup>11</sup>

While these and other commitments call for a cross-dimensional approach, they have not always been fulfilled in practice. For instance, there has been a tendency for many SSG/R activities to be treated under the first dimension, thereby neglecting pertinent human dimension components.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, while issues such as gender or human rights are at times addressed in first dimension activities, they have in some cases only been treated as “add-ons” at the very end of the process, rather than being properly mainstreamed in a cross-dimensional approach starting at the planning stage. Likewise, opportunities to strengthen good governance of the security sector have sometimes also been missed on account of the issue being seen as a matter relevant only to the second dimension.

Failure to consider such linkages can result in considerably less effective and sustainable support. For example, when the provision of high-end forensic training for police investigators is not complemented with training for prosecutors and judges on the use of forensic evidence and on the relevant legal reviews of criminal procedure codes regulating the admission of forensic evidence in court, the achievement of results in the area

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<sup>7</sup> MC.DEC/5/06, [www.osce.org/mc/23060](http://www.osce.org/mc/23060).

<sup>8</sup> Permanent Council Decision No. 1049 (PC.DEC/1049), <http://www.osce.org/pc/92559>.

<sup>9</sup> Permanent Council Decision No. 1063 (PC.DEC/1063), <http://www.osce.org/pc/98008>.

<sup>10</sup> MC Decision No. 15/05 on preventing and combating violence against women (MC.DEC/15/05), <http://www.osce.org/mc/17451>; MC Decision No. 14/05 on women in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (MC.DEC/14/05), <http://www.osce.org/mc/17450>.

<sup>11</sup> Endorsed by MC Decision No. 3/03, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/17554>.

<sup>12</sup> See for instance the DCAF mapping study, *The Role of the OSCE in Supporting Security Sector Governance and Reform* (2014), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Supporting-the-Development-of-the-OSCE-s-Approach-to-SSG-R>.



of police reform will be hampered, as will their subsequent sustainability. As another example, the provision of crowd-control equipment, such as riot gear or water cannons, for police forces needs to be complemented with corresponding human rights training and protocols compliant with human rights.

The OSCE should therefore ensure that analysis is conducted from an early planning stage, in order to establish how support provided in one area of SSG/R may well benefit from linkages to other areas. A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support is not intended to create additional tasks for their own sake, nor does it imply the need to cover activities in all dimensions in every project. Its purpose is to identify and take advantage of synergies among already existing activities, and to give these a chance of contributing to higher-level OSCE strategic objectives in a given State. Ultimately, the purpose of supporting cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R is to enhance the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and impact of OSCE support. [\[For further information on this subject, see the OSCE Guidelines on Strengthening Impact-Oriented Approaches to Support.\]](#) Furthermore, it provides legitimacy to the OSCE when raising awareness among national actors about the need to adopt a comprehensive and holistic national approach to SSG/R.

For OSCE staff, taking a cross-dimensional approach requires an understanding both of the core SSG/R synergies that exist across the three dimensions (section 3), and also of the opportunities to support the implementation of a cross-dimensional approach through, among other things, enhanced co-operation (section 4).

### **Box 1: Example of a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R in the area of combating trafficking in human beings**

The 2003 OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings adopted “a multidimensional approach” which seeks to address the problem in a comprehensive manner, covering the protection of victims, the prevention of trafficking in human beings (THB), and the prosecution of those who facilitate or commit the crime, and also provides recommendations on how to best deal with “political, economic, legal, law enforcement, educational and other aspects of the problem.”<sup>13</sup> The Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) works to involve all criminal justice actors in its networking, capacity-building and confidence-building. The OSR/CTHB has often supported linkages between these actors through its country visits, on which the Special Representative meets with relevant national stakeholders (including senior representatives of the police, prosecutors, judges, and representatives of the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice), assesses the overall level of implementation of relevant OSCE commitments, and provides recommendations on what else should be done to combat trafficking in human beings more effectively. These recommendations

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<sup>13</sup> Endorsed by MC Decision 2/03 (MC.DEC/2/03), <http://www.osce.org/odihr/23866>.

often include such matters as improving/harmonizing relevant legislation, strengthening co-ordination and trust between criminal justice entities, and developing joint training curricula.<sup>14</sup> In co-ordination with key international partners and the OSCE field operations, the OSR/CTHB supports efforts to build the capacities of a wide range of national stakeholders, including criminal justice authorities, through training activities that have been conducted in, among other countries, Kyrgyzstan, France and Uzbekistan.

### 3. Identifying Potential Cross-Dimensional Synergies

One of the first steps towards a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R is to identify the potential synergies to be supported. Synergies across the dimensions have been identified between the following fields: police reform and judicial reform; independent oversight and reform of security providers; good governance and reform of security providers; civil society and reform of security providers; gender and reform of security providers; and human rights and reform of security providers. While it is not exhaustive, this list is intended to highlight some of the key linkages between dimensional areas of support; likewise, the following sections are intended to provide some indications on how synergies can be promoted.

#### 3.1 Police reform and judicial reform

The importance of supporting linkages between police reform and judicial reform is recognized in a number of OSCE documents, notably the 2012 OSCE Strategic Framework on Police-Related Activities. The success of police reform is highly dependent on parallel advances in the area of the judicial system. For instance, providing police with capacity-building on forensics should be accompanied by an assessment of whether the courts have the capacity and legal foundations to admit forensic evidence in proceedings before them.<sup>15</sup> Enhancing the capacity of the police to make arrests also requires reflection on whether there are sufficient numbers of adequately trained defence lawyers. Furthermore, it is important to support co-ordination between police and judicial actors; for instance, effective co-ordination is required to avoid cases of judicial verdicts being delivered without due knowledge of whether the defendant is a recidivist (habitual offender).<sup>16</sup> Failure to recognize such synergies between police and judicial reform can result in frustration among the population and lead to a lack of trust in the reform process and to a perception that those in authority enjoy a certain measure of impunity.

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<sup>14</sup> The country visit reports can be accessed under [www.osce.org/secretariat/107636](http://www.osce.org/secretariat/107636).

<sup>15</sup> See *the OSCE guidebook Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform*, TNTD/SPMU Publication Series, vol. 11 (2013), p. 27, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/109917>.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

Internal approaches to supporting this linkage include:


- Ensuring that any needs assessment on police reform also assesses the capacity of the criminal justice system, and vice versa. [See *the OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R.*]
- If the assessment identifies gaps which may hamper reform advances: ensuring that the corresponding OSCE lead (or international actor) is aware of this need and that a co-ordinated approach to support is provided as appropriate.

External approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Supporting efforts to strengthen co-ordination between police, prosecutors and judges (e.g., supporting the development of multi-agency risk assessments and risk management plans);
- In contexts in which prosecutor-led investigation systems have been introduced (see box 2 below): strengthening co-operation between the police and prosecution services;
- Enhancing mechanisms for storing and exchanging information (including the development of memoranda of understanding on these issues).

### **Box 2: Strengthening co-operation between police and prosecution services**

A number of South-Eastern European States have adopted new Criminal Procedure Codes introducing the new criminal procedure of prosecutor-led investigations. The aim was to give prosecutors a leading role in investigations and in finding evidence; they were also assigned a more active role in trial proceedings, as they had the task of establishing facts at trials. This new procedure has also had an impact upon the role of the police in the investigation process, especially with regard to such matters as conducting interviews with suspects, witnesses and victims. Since the application of the new procedures only started recently in most of the regional States, it remains to be seen whether the prosecutors and police will effectively fulfil their new roles and responsibilities, and, for instance, whether prosecutors will proactively seek evidence and direct the police to take specific investigative actions, or whether they will primarily rely on actions initiated by the police. The OSCE's regional field operations have supported their respective host states on this issue by providing training for police officials and prosecutors on the effective implementation of the new Criminal Procedure Codes.

 For more detailed guidance on supporting this linkage, see OSCE, *Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform*, TNTD/SPMU Publication Series, vol. 11 (2013).

### **3.2 Independent oversight and reform of security providers**

The principle that the security sector, just like any other public sector, must be subject to democratic oversight has been asserted by the OSCE in various documents, notably the

1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.<sup>17</sup> Independent oversight may be carried out by parliament, by the judiciary, or by independent bodies such as National Human Rights Institutions. Within the OSCE, varying degrees of support have been given to the independent oversight of the security sector. While some executive structures have developed a successful track record (e.g., supporting the establishment of parliamentary committees on security and defence, supporting the introduction of a legal basis for enhanced oversight), in other cases support in this area has been neglected. Common challenges include the phenomenon of support to democratic oversight of the security sector being perceived as too sensitive in a given context, or the problem that the cross-dimensional nature of support in this area has resulted in a lack of clarity on the institutional lead and hence is not adequately planned for. Democratic oversight is the cornerstone of SSG/R and should therefore be a core priority of the OSCE. Without effective oversight, it is not possible to ensure that the security sector is held accountable for fulfilling its mandate of protecting the people.

Internal approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Ensuring that support to independent oversight of the security sector is a key component in any needs assessment undertaken in the area of SSG/R. [[See the OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R.](#)];
- Clarifying from the outset which institution is taking the lead on this topic and how adequate co-operation and co-ordination mechanisms between OSCE staff from the three dimensions can be set up. The institutional lead should be responsible for reaching out to other departments/dimensions to encourage co-operation;
- Recognizing that the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security provides an entry point for engaging OSCE participating States in activities geared to strengthening democratic oversight of the security sector.

External approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- If there is a lack of understanding and initiative among national actors in connection with supporting independent oversight of the security sector: organizing workshops to raise awareness of the issue's importance; supporting participation in regional
- workshops to show how the matter is being addressed in other States; or using commitments enshrined in the Code of Conduct as an entry point. [[See the OSCE Guidelines on Supporting Regional Co-operation on SSG/R.](#)];
- Promoting a legal framework which provides independent oversight bodies with an adequate mandate to perform their duties, and providing capacity-building to ensure they are able to perform their duties;
- Supporting awareness-raising among civil society and the media on the role of these independent oversight bodies and on how to access them;
- Considering the need to accompany efforts to facilitate effective independent and external oversight structures with efforts to strengthen the security providers' inter-

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<sup>17</sup> See <http://www.osce.org/fsc/41355>. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has also recognized the importance of democratic oversight of the security sector, see the PA Resolution on the Democratic Control of the Private and Public Security Sectors of 2014, <https://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2014-baku-annual-session/2014-baku-final-declaration/1863-19>.

nal oversight mechanisms; external oversight mechanisms depend on effective internal control mechanisms.

- 📖 For more guidance on support initiatives in this area, see the *UN Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Democratic Governance of the Security Sector*, section 7.3 on strengthening independent oversight institutions and mechanisms.
- 📖 For more detail on parliamentary oversight, see Hans Born, Philipp Fluri and Anders Johnsson, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector* (DCAF Handbooks, 2003), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Parliamentary-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector>.
- 📖 For more information on ombuds institutions for the armed forces, see Benjamin S. Buckland and William McDermott, *Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces: A Handbook* (DCAF Handbooks, 2012), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Ombuds-Institutions-for-the-Armed-Forces-A-Handbook>.
- 📖 For more information on how to include gender issues as one of the cross-cutting topics into independent oversight, see Megan Bastick (OSCE/ODIHR/DCAF), *Guidance Notes on Integrating Gender into Security Sector Oversight* (DCAF Gender Tools and Resources, 2014).

### 3.3 Good governance and reform of security providers

As the security sector should be considered and treated like any other public sector, support needs to be given to its good governance. The OSCE has recognized that a public sector that is “based on integrity, openness, transparency, accountability and rule of law” is “a major factor of sustainable economic growth, and contributes to fostering citizens’ trust in public institutions and government.”<sup>18</sup> Moreover, a number of OSCE commitments call for the effective management of public resources through strong and well-functioning institutions, and recognize the role of the security sector in fighting corruption.<sup>19</sup> Good governance of the security sector requires national executive structures to possess clear internal control mechanisms and management practices, including human resource management, financial resource management, clear procurement rules, and information resource management. Within the OSCE, the second dimension has often led efforts to strengthen financial resource management. However, this has generally focused on strengthening budgetary management more broadly, without a specific focus on the security sector. With the exception of anti-corruption initiatives, efforts focusing on the security sector have often been neglected. Supporting internal accountability and management mechanisms is essential and contributes to enhancing the professionalism of the security sector. This is therefore an area in which OSCE executive structures across different dimensions should seek to enhance co-operation in the field of SSG/R.

Internal ways of supporting this linkage include:

- Recognizing that broad governance projects for the public sector (on financial management, for example, or human resource management) should also be rolled out to

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<sup>18</sup> See the 2012 Ministerial Council Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance and Combating Corruption, Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism (MC.DOC/2/12), <http://www.osce.org/cio/97968>.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

the security sector. Broad-ranging projects of this kind may offer an important entry point for engaging in SSG/R;

- Encouraging co-operation across the three dimensions in order to provide comprehensive support in this area. For instance, if the first dimension is seeking to strengthen anti-corruption efforts in the police, it should be sure to consult with the second dimension in order to learn lessons from the latter's experience on this issue in the broader public sector.

External approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Supporting the adoption and enforcement of laws and other measures against bribery, as well as efforts to safeguard the judiciary's independence in this regard. This includes, for example, supporting the development of public-private partnerships to counter the phenomenon of public officials being open to bribes;
- Supporting measures aimed at enhancing the management of the security sector. This includes promoting the review or development of institutional rules and procedures for human resource management, to ensure that they are in line with international good practice;
- Supporting the establishment of internal control mechanisms, including the development of and adherence to codes of conduct that provide standards of ethics and conduct for public officials, in order to fight misconduct.<sup>20</sup>
- Identifying existing incentives for malpractice and supporting their elimination. For example, crime clearance rates may not be the best indicator of the quality of police officer performance, as pressure on police officers to solve cases may, for instance, lead to the use of torture or ill-treatment to extract confessions.
- Sharing experiences and best practices on good governance on a regional level in order to manage the sensitive nature of this area of reform (see box 3). [See also the *OSCE Guidelines on Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R.*]





### **Box 3: Taking a regional approach to strengthening good governance of the security sector**

In 2014, the OSCE Mission to Skopje, in collaboration with the host country's Ministry of the Interior and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), held a regional conference on transparent internal oversight mechanisms within the police. Internal control mechanisms are important to ensure that the security sector operates in an ethical, transparent and legal manner. Among other things, the conference focused on strengthening human resource management in support of effective internal control mechanisms. The conference was part of a long-term commitment to strengthening professional behaviour and standards within the police. Other regional conferences in this series have focused on enhancing the prevention and repression of

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<sup>20</sup> See the 2012 MC Declaration on Strengthening Good Governance, note 16 above.

corruption in the police and on strengthening units for internal control.<sup>21</sup> As well as facilitating the sharing of good practices across the region, the regional approach has also contributed to successful management of the topic's sensitive character.

-  For more detailed guidance on this issue, see the *UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Democratic Governance of the Security Sector* (UN, 2012), section 7.5 on strengthening the management system and internal oversight, <http://unssr.unlb.org/Portals/UNSSR/UN%20Integrated%20Technical%20Guidance%20Notes%20on%20SSR.PDF>.
-  For the area of policing, see the *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (OSCE, 2008), which has sections on issues of corruption and police ethics, and of accountability and control, <http://www.osce.org/spmu/23804>.
-  The issue of preventing corruption is addressed in the OSCE guide on *Best Practices in Combating Corruption* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2012), <http://www.osce.org/eea/13738>.
-  On supporting States in their response to the threat of terrorism, see the *OSCE Handbook on Data Collection in support of Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing National Risk Assessments* (2012), <http://www.osce.org/eea/96398>.

### 3.4 Civil society and reform of security providers

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly has recognized the role of civil society in “providing assistance to the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”<sup>22</sup> Civil society can play an informal oversight role by holding authorities accountable for their actions through such means as lobbying and advocacy campaigns. Civil society also includes the media, which can act as an important facilitator of this oversight process by ensuring public access to information and providing a platform for the voicing of concerns. The protection of the freedom of the media which is vital for a democratic society has become an integral aspect of the OSCE's endeavours, particularly through the work of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Civil society also may possess expertise and/or knowledge on specific local and regional issues that are having an impact on the security sector; when this is the case, it can share it with the security sector and communicate the security needs of the population to policymakers. This being the case, it should play an important role in contributing to dialogue on reform priorities. Co-operation between national authorities, police and civil society is essential on issues such as monitoring hate crimes, countering human trafficking, preventing and combating transnational threats (such as terrorism and cybercrime), monitoring peaceful assemblies, and building mutual understanding and trust between police, minorities and marginalized communities.<sup>23</sup> When civil society is not duly involved in State efforts

<sup>21</sup> OSCE, “Regional conference on transparent internal oversight mechanisms within the police”, October 2014, <http://www.osce.org/skopje/124380>.

<sup>22</sup> OSCE PA Resolution on Strengthening Civil Society Institutions in the OSCE Region (2013), <https://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2013-istanbul-annual-session/2013-istanbul-final-declaration/1663-26>.

<sup>23</sup> In April 2014, for example, the OSCE/ODIHR Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues organized an expert meeting on Police and Roma and Sinti – Current Challenges and Good Practices in Building Trust and Understanding, which brought together, among others, police officials and Roma and Sinti civil society activists to discuss means of co-operating on civil society monitoring of the work of law enforcement institutions. The final report of the meeting is available at: <http://www>.

aimed at combating human trafficking, for example, fewer victims are identified and assisted, which severely hampers the capacity of criminal justice actors to acquire important information/evidence, prosecute criminal networks, trace and freeze their assets, and compensate victims. Without a comprehensive approach incorporating civil society, it is therefore not possible to succeed in addressing essential priorities of SSG/R.

Internal approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Engaging with civil society as a source of information on the perceptions of beneficiaries to ensure that SSG/R support provided by the OSCE is grounded in real needs. This should be done both during needs assessments and on a regular basis;
- Including in a needs assessment the number of civil society organizations active in the area of SSG/R, their (potential) capacity-building needs, and whether or not they are ready to actively contribute to national dialogue on SSG/R. [[See the OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R.](#)];
- Mapping the civil society organizations engaged in independent monitoring of the work of various actors within the security sector, such as law enforcement personnel, to identify capacity-building needs and good practices to be promoted.

External approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Building the capacity of civil society organizations through such means as training or mentoring (see box 4 below). This may include, for instance, strengthening civil society organizations representing marginalized groups and minorities;
- Bringing together security sector officials and civil society, including the media, to engage in a forum on SSG/R-related issues. This should include ensuring that civil society organizations representing women and minorities are fully consulted, informed and able to submit their views prior to the adoption of policies and laws relating to SSG/R;
- Supporting workshops on media reporting on the security sector (e.g., training on topics such as investigative journalism in the area of corruption or awareness-raising on freedom of information law), and bringing together journalists and press officers from security institutions;
- Engaging with human rights NGOs to obtain a more comprehensive overview of the work of security sector institutions in the area of SSG/R.

### **Box 4: The OSCE Mission to Serbia's approach to supporting civil society engagement in SSG/R**

The OSCE Mission to Serbia has taken an innovative approach to supporting civil society's engagement in SSG/R. Through a call for proposals, the OSCE selected a few projects of local NGOs for the provision of financial support and advice. Most of the projects had a research component and were aimed at influencing policy on or public involvement in security matters. With little funds and some targeted mentoring, several such small projects at the local level made a difference. For



instance, a project in the locality of Tutin led to the adoption of a municipal protocol on multi-sector co-operation in the area of prevention and response to sexual and gender-based violence. Similarly, a research project on lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people and SSG/R resulted in recommendations that were discussed by police and representatives of the LGBT community at the first ever meeting of this kind in Serbia.

- 📖 For guidance on strengthening democratic policing, see OSCE/SPMU, *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2008), <http://www.osce.org/spmu/23804>.
- 📖 For information on integrating civil society, see OSCE/SPMU, *Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships* (2008), <http://www.osce.org/spmu/32547>.
- 📖 For guidance developed specifically for civil society organizations on the role they can play in democratic security sector oversight, see Eden Cole, Kerstin Eppert and Katrin Kinzelbach, *Public oversight of the Security Sector: A Handbook for Civil Society Organizations* (DCAF Handbooks, 2008), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Public-Oversight-of-the-Security-Sector>.

### 3.5 Gender equality and reform of security providers

Gender equality and women's rights are essential elements of the OSCE's concept of comprehensive security. The principal OSCE standards on gender equality are included in the 1990 Copenhagen Document<sup>24</sup> and the 1991 Moscow Document,<sup>25</sup> both of which commit participating States to promoting equality between women and men. The Moscow Document, for instance, recognizes that "full and true equality between men and women is a fundamental aspect of a just and democratic society based on the rule of law." In the field of SSG/R, OSCE commitments set out the need to "create equal opportunities within the security services, including the armed forces, where relevant, to allow for balanced recruitment, retention and promotion of men and women."<sup>26</sup> The need to promote the engagement of women in judicial, prosecutorial and law enforcement institutions has also been recognized,<sup>27</sup> as has the promotion of women in parliamentary oversight of the sector.<sup>28</sup> The OSCE has also called for efforts to support the police in dealing with sexual and gender-based violence.<sup>29</sup> In this regard, there is a particular need to establish a better understanding of the gender dynamics at play in certain security issues dealt with by security sector providers such as the prevention and countering of terrorism. Such an understanding could be advanced by including analyses of gender dynamics in needs assessments.

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<sup>24</sup> Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990), <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304>.

<sup>25</sup> Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1991), <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14310>.

<sup>26</sup> MC Decision No. 7/09 on women's participation in political and public life, <http://www.osce.org/mc/40710>.

<sup>27</sup> See MC Decision No. 15/05 on preventing and combating violence against women, <http://www.osce.org/mc/17451>.

<sup>28</sup> For example, in the 2014 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Resolution on the Democratic Control of the Public and Private Security Sectors, see note 15.


<sup>29</sup> In the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, <http://www.osce.org/pc/14713>.


Internal approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Recognizing that in some contexts efforts to strengthen gender equality may provide entry points for initiating dialogue on SSG/R when the latter is a too sensitive matter to be engaged with directly. This may be the case when States have committed themselves to strengthening efforts in gender equality across the public sector, through, for example, the adoption of an action plan;
- Similarly, in other contexts, broad memoranda of understanding between the OSCE and a component of the security sector may provide an umbrella for working with the security sector on gender issues. Staff working on SSG/R should therefore engage gender focal points on the opportunities for joint initiatives, and vice versa;
- Mapping the civil society organizations engaged in supporting gender equality in order to identify capacity-building needs.

External approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Supporting efforts to ensure equal access for women, including women from minority groups, to the recruitment and promotion process of security providers, such as law enforcement, intelligence-gathering and defence agencies;
- Supporting oversight mechanisms, such as internal affairs units or independent external commissions and gender advisers, to help address gender-based discrimination and inequality on the job;
- Supporting participating States in developing and/or implementing national action plans on UN Security Council resolution 1325;
- Raising awareness and building capacities of security sector personnel to address sexual and gender-based violence, including such violence within the security sector, and the provision of protection and support to victims;
- Ensuring that legislation provides for gender- and child-sensitive procedures in relation to search, arrest and detention, and to investigations and court proceedings;
- Supporting the collection of sex-disaggregated data on criminal cases by the police and other actors in the criminal justice system;
- Providing research grants to civil society organizations interested in advancing gender issues in the security sector (see box 4). This may include, for instance, research on women's participation in the security sector, or on standard police procedures in dealing with female victims of sexual or gender-based violence.

 For detailed guidance on gender and SSG/R, see *Gender & Security Sector Reform Toolkit* (DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and UN-INSTRAW, 2008), and the complementary publication *Guidance Notes on Integrating Gender into Security Sector Oversight* (2014), developed collaboratively by DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR and the OSCE Gender Section.

 For detailed guidance on the OSCE's promotion of gender equality, see the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, endorsed by MC Decision No. 14/04, <http://www.osce.org/mc/23295>; and the OSCE factsheet "Gender equality" (2013), <http://www.osce.org/gender/41497>.

### 3.6 Human rights and reform of security providers

The promotion of human rights is a fundamental principle of the OSCE. The Copenhagen Document (1990) recognizes that “all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law”. In the context of the security sector, OSCE commitments recognize that this principle is a coin with two sides: ensuring both that the security sector protects human rights (see, for example, the 2006 Ministerial Council Declaration on Criminal Justice Systems)<sup>30</sup> and that the human rights of security sector personnel are also respected (see, for example, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security).<sup>31</sup> Cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R entail the promotion of respect for human rights among security providers. Supporting human rights mainstreaming within the security sector may involve pro-active measures (e.g., preventive visits to corrections facilities, capacity-building, support on legislation, or elaboration of national policies and strategies) as well as reactive ones (advocacy for the investigation of torture allegations, timely documentation of traces of violence, or improvement of detention and working conditions).

Internal approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Ensuring that efforts are made to contribute to the capacities of duty-bearers (i.e., the security sector) to fulfil their obligations, and of rights-bearers (i.e., the general population, including those belonging to marginalized groups) to make use of these rights;
- Supporting the screening of SSG/R projects to ensure that they take a human rights-based approach. For instance, capacity-building of the security sector in the area of crowd control and facilitation of peaceful assemblies should be complemented with work to ensure that adequate human rights training and human rights-compliant protocols are in place. The same principles should apply to the victim-centric approach in human trafficking cases: the front-line professionals in the security sector should have protocols necessary for identification and rehabilitation purposes in place, and also for the non-punishment of victims, even in cases where the victim was, under compulsion, involved in some type of criminal activity.

External approaches to supporting this linkage include:

- Promoting a human rights-compliant and gender-sensitive legal framework which provides the main conditions and modalities for considering and responding to complaints concerning alleged human rights violations (including discrimination, harassment, and sexual harassment) and abuse of power by police officers not only against members of the public but also within the police force;
- Introducing legal provisions providing for a victim-centred approach at all stages of police intervention, investigation, prosecution and judicial proceedings to avoid “secondary victimization”;
- Providing specific capacity-building courses to train security providers in respect for human rights and in responding to violations (e.g., the ODIHR programme “Training

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<sup>30</sup> MC.DOC/4/06, <http://www.osce.org/mc/23017>.


<sup>31</sup> <http://www.osce.org/fsc/41355>.

against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement”,<sup>32</sup> and the 2008 ODIHR manual for law enforcement officers entitled *Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights*<sup>33</sup>;

- Providing security providers with specific capacity-building on international standards and good practices with regard to the policing of assemblies;
- Providing training on enhancing trust and understanding between police and vulnerable communities, such as the Roma and Sinti;
- Providing training on best law enforcement human rights practices in the context of countering trafficking in human beings;
- Facilitating meetings between police officials and human rights defenders to foster exchange and co-operation;
- Facilitating meetings and co-operation between security sector officials and civil society organizations (e.g., human rights defenders) to monitor the compliance of security sectors’ policies and practices with human rights and to work on issues such as security sector reform and oversight, and non-discrimination;
- Engaging National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in dialogue on reform efforts;
- Supporting monitoring visits (to military units, for example, or , to corrections facilities), and supporting reports on the findings of these visits;
- Supporting efforts to ensure diversity in security providers’ recruitment and promotion processes.

### **Box 5: The importance of a human-rights based approach to SSG/R**

The Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator on Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) adopts a multi-dimensional and human rights-based approach in combating trafficking in human beings. This entails working with a wide range of civil society actors, especially in the contexts of victim identification and victim assistance, and making sure that these important NGO efforts are fully co-ordinated with those of the criminal justice authorities called to investigate and prosecute the criminals. National Referral Mechanisms (NRMs) have been established in most participating States to ensure that all stakeholders involved in combating human trafficking work coherently and in close partnership. Such frameworks for enhanced co-operation, when adopted and properly implemented, ensure that victims are promptly identified and duly assisted, which in turn contributes to the more successful prosecution of criminal networks engaged in THB (as victims tend to co-operate more constructively with law enforcement officers if their rights are duly protected). The OSR/CTHB consistently promotes NRMs during country visits, in official reports, and in capacity-building exercises with international and national stakeholders.

 For guidance on addressing human rights issues in the security sector, see Hans Born and Ian Leigh, *Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel* (ODIHR, 2008), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/31393>, and

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.osce.org/odihr/tahcle>.

<sup>33</sup> <http://www.osce.org/odihr/29103>.

OSCE/ODIHR, *Guidelines on Human Rights Education for Law Enforcement Officials* (2012), <http://www.osce.org/odihr/93968>.

- 📖 On human rights and policing assemblies, see OSCE/ODIHR, *Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly* (2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 2010), <http://www.osce.org/odihr/73405>.
- 📖 For guidance on counter-terrorism investigations and their potential impact on human rights, see OSCE/ODIHR, *Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations. A Practical Manual for Law Enforcement Officers*, 2013, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/108930>.
- 📖 Further information on policing and minority rights can be found in OSCE/HCNM, *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (2006), and in OSCE/ODIHR, *Police and Roma and Sinti: Good Practices in Building Trust and Understanding* (2010).
- 📖 For guidance on addressing hate crimes, see OSCE/ODIHR, *Prosecuting Hate Crimes: A Practical Guide* (2014), and OSCE, *Hate Crime Data Collection and Monitoring: A Practical Guide* (2014).
- 📖 For guidance on compliance with human rights in countering terrorism, see OSCE/ODIHR, *Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A manual* (2007); OSCE/ODIHR, *Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism Investigations: A Practical Manual for Law Enforcement Officers* (2013); and OSCE/ODIHR, *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach* (2014).
- 📖 For human rights approaches in the investigation of THB cases see OSCE, *Resource Police Training Guide: Trafficking in Human Beings* (2013).

## 4. Applying a Cross-Dimensional Approach to SSG/R Support

Cross-dimensional considerations are too often not taken fully into account when planning SSG/R support. Reasons for this may include the lack of a strategic approach, of cross-dimensional expertise, or of adequate co-ordination mechanisms. Ensuring the practical application of a cross-dimensional approach entails four broad requirements: in any given State, promoting a strategic vision of support to which the different dimensions can contribute; using the emerging cross-dimensional approach as an entry point for engaging national actors on the importance of a holistic approach to SSG/R; defining roles and responsibilities; and supporting internal co-ordination mechanisms. In all these areas, the support of senior management is essential to guarantee that cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R are recognized and encouraged as a core element of OSCE support.

### 4.1 Promoting a strategic vision of support in a given State

A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support requires a strategic vision of the support provided by the OSCE (and international actors) in a given State. The development of a strategic vision for support should ideally be based on a needs assessment determining the national priorities for SSG/R support. [See the [OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R](#).] The strategic vision is to consist of a number of

specific goals that all OSCE dimensions will be expected to contribute to in a given State. In the case of field operations, the OSCE Head of Mission and his office will have an important role to play in encouraging a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R (see example in box 6).

### **Box 6: The OSCE Centre in Bishkek's approach to cross-dimensional co-ordination**

In 2013, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek pursued an innovative approach encouraging cross-dimensional planning. It consisted of identifying five strategic hubs which were considered to be mission-wide priorities, and of requesting each department to create a matrix detailing how they would contribute to each strategic area and co-ordinate with other departments with a view to achieving certain goals; the strategic hubs are: 1) gender mainstreaming, 2) promoting good governance, 3) rule of law, 4) inter-communal relations, and 5) transnational threats. In this case, the strategic hubs were closely related to several SSG/R priorities. Another alternative would be to consider SSG/R as one of the wider strategic hubs in order to encourage co-operation in this area. This is an initiative that other field operations could consider replicating in order to enhance coherence and co-ordination between the activities of the different dimensions.

### **4.2 Using the emerging cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R as an entry point for engaging national actors on the importance of a holistic approach to SSG/R**

OSCE internal efforts to adopt a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R may be an opportunity to engage national stakeholders on this issue. Indeed, a key challenge in SSG/R processes is to ensure the adoption of a holistic approach to reform which takes into account the linkages within the security sector. The adoption of a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R within the OSCE shares similar characteristics with the adoption by national stakeholders of a holistic approach to SSG/R. They both aim to reflect linkages between components of the security sector and to enhance co-ordination. This being the case, the OSCE might well increase the credibility of its advice on this issue if it were also seen to be seeking to expand its own internal approach in this direction. OSCE staff should therefore communicate the decision to take an internal cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support. This can provide an entry point for raising awareness among national actors on the importance of a holistic approach to SSG/R (see box 7 below). It may also provide opportunities to raise the possibility of undertaking a comprehensive SSG/R needs assessment in a given State. While the main purpose of such an assessment may be to help inform the OSCE's cross-dimensional approach, the findings may also be appreciated by national stakeholders who are seeking to understand how to apply a holistic approach to their own national SSG/R process. [\[For more information on undertaking SSG/R needs assessments, see the OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R.\]](#)

### **Box 7: The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina's approach to raising awareness on the holistic nature of SSG/R**

In 2013, the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina's Department of Security Co-operation gave its "Security Policy Project" a new name: "Security Sector Reform and Security Policy Development and Implementation Project". One of the reasons for this change was to signal to national stakeholders the importance that the OSCE accords to the concept of SSR. Moreover, it enabled the Mission to raise awareness on the holistic nature of SSR. For instance, the Mission sought to enhance inter-agency co-operation by underlining the linkages between different components of the security sector. Specifically, it provided advice on the likelihood that the abolition of military courts planned in the area of defence reform would have repercussions for the civil judicial courts. Similarly, the Mission sought to raise awareness on the role that the Ministry of Finance should play in the discussions on the reform of the security sector.

### **4.3 Defining roles and responsibilities**

Roles and responsibilities tend to become blurred when several executive structures, and/or departments within them, are working on a topic which cuts across all dimensions, without clarity on who is in the lead position. Once SSG/R priorities have been clearly identified (ideally on the basis of a comprehensive needs assessment), efforts should be made to define which dimension (or institutional entity) will take the lead in the provision of support in each priority area. This is of particular importance in areas of support which cut across dimensions to avoid cases where priority areas fall through the gaps because of a lack of clarity on which dimension they belong to (see box 8 below).

### **Box 8: The importance of defining roles and responsibilities**

At the OSCE Centre in Bishkek there was an initial lack of clarity on who would take the lead in supporting parliamentary oversight of the security sector. The institutions-building programme within the Politico-Military Unit did not focus specifically on the security sector but, rather, on the themes of political exchange and youth. The various programmes with a focus on the security sector, however, did not support structured engagement with parliament either, as engagement on this issue was perceived to be the role of the institutions-building programme. This initially led to a stovepipe approach to supporting parliamentary oversight of the security sector, which resulted in opportunities for providing comprehensive support being missed.

### **4.4 Supporting internal co-ordination mechanisms**

There are a number of internal co-ordination mechanisms that may exist or be set up to support cross-dimensional approaches. The recently established SSG/R focal points

network has a crucial role to play in raising awareness about the cross-dimensional nature of SSG/R and in contributing to enhanced co-operation. Additionally, focal points in related areas of support may support the mainstreaming across SSG/R support of the issues they cover. For instance, there are often gender focal points across the OSCE executive structures which promote gender mainstreaming throughout the work of the OSCE, including in the area of SSG/R. Similarly there are focal points on human trafficking that seek to mainstream prevention issues, or focal points on Roma and Sinti that can perform similar roles.

There is a need to recognize, however, that such focal point networks will only be useful if staff are given adequate time to effectively implement the tasks related to their focal point. Efforts should be made to encourage decisions by senior management to promote receptivity to the mainstreaming of such efforts. Other co-ordination mechanisms may include the development of matrices on common priorities (see box 6 above), or the enhancement of basic information exchanges on issues such as national stakeholders regularly engaging with representatives of different dimensions (see box 9 below). Such co-ordination mechanisms should be operated with full respect for the mandates of the respective OSCE executive structures.

### **Box 9: Example of an internal mechanism for enhancing co-ordination**

As has been noted,<sup>34</sup> in some field operations different departments are sometimes unaware that they are engaging with the same national stakeholders in parallel. This risks sending mixed signals to national counterparts on the Organization's coherence and may also contribute to overburdening national actors by inviting them to participate in multiple workshops and trainings. A possible way of overcoming this challenge is to introduce a matrix which maps the main stakeholders that each department engages with and indicates which individual may be attending a training course and when. Such a matrix could then be shared among departments on a regular basis and kept updated. In addition to providing a practical tool for managing engagement with national stakeholders in a more structured manner, it might also provide an entry point for enhanced cross-dimensional co-operation.

### **4.5 Recognizing that cross-dimensional co-ordination may require incentive structures**

Lack of cross-dimensional co-ordination is acknowledged to be often caused by bureaucratic hurdles, competition, and lack of prioritization and communication. In order to overcome such challenges, it may be necessary to consider developing incentive structures which encourage cross-dimensional co-ordination. For instance, in some field operations, project co-ordination units have been established in the office of the Head of

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<sup>34</sup> DCAF mapping study, *The Role of the OSCE in Security Sector Governance and Reform* (CIO.GAL/18/14), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Project/Supporting-the-Development-of-the-OSCE-s-Approach-to-SSG-R>.



Mission in order to ensure that project documents have been properly consulted across all the relevant departments of the field operation. Such units may have an important role to play in encouraging co-operation on pursuing a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support. Efforts may also be made at a departmental level to examine the extent to which cross-dimensional SSG/R linkages have been appropriately considered within project documents. Finally, performance-based management incentives may also be considered at the level of departments and administration in order to encourage appropriate planning for co-operation.

## 5. Key Points

These guidelines have identified a number of key points to be considered when strengthening cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R.

- ➔ **Consider that cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R are necessary to address the holistic nature of SSG/R.** One of the core principles of SSG/R is the need to take a holistic approach which recognizes the inter-linkages between the various components and actors of the security sector. This reflects the understanding that reform in one part of the security sector may not be successful if it does not take into account the potential effects upon the rest of the security sector. It is often a key challenge for national SSG/R processes to apply such a holistic approach, which requires effective co-ordination across security sector actors. It is important for the OSCE to capitalize on and strengthen its cross-dimensional and comprehensive approach to security to demonstrate that it takes the holistic nature of SSG/R seriously, with the ultimate goal being to contribute to the provision of more effective and coherent support.
  
- ➔ **Recognize that cross-dimensional approaches go beyond supporting SSG/R from the perspective of each dimension.** There is a risk that the sum of each dimension's individual efforts to engage in SSG/R may be considered to amount to a cross-dimensional approach. On the contrary, in real cross-dimensional support, an integrated approach is applied by identifying common objectives to which all dimensions can contribute in order to enhance the potential impact of support. A cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R support does not deliberately create additional tasks for their own sake but, rather, seeks to ensure that staff are aware of synergies that may need to be attended to in order for the support provided to be more effective. In particular, it is about recognizing that support to one area of the security sector may have an effect on another, and hence about facilitating the promotion of complementary approaches which build on synergies identified across the dimensions.

- ➔ **Support cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R through planning and implementation.** In order to be able to implement a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R, it is first necessary to identify the long-term objectives that the OSCE dimensions wish to contribute to achieving. It is then necessary to identify where there is potential for synergies favourable to these objectives. This requires looking at potential synergies across components of security sector reform, for example, between police and justice reform, or between gender equality and reform of security providers; during needs assessments, furthermore, roles and responsibilities should also be clearly defined to ensure that in cases where activities cut across dimensions, there is a clear understanding of who is taking the institutional lead. Finally, there is a need to build on existing co-ordination mechanisms, such as focal points networks.

# Security Sector Governance and Reform

Needs Assessments in the Field of  
Security Sector Governance and Reform

Needs Assessments  
in the Field of SSG/R



## Guidelines

# Needs Assessments in the Field of Security Sector Governance and Reform

### 1. Purpose

The present guidelines are intended to provide OSCE staff with advice on how to conduct needs assessments in the field of security sector governance and reform (SSG/R). Lack of comprehensive needs assessments has been identified as a particular weakness in strategic planning on SSG/R within the OSCE. After presenting the rationale behind enhancing engagement in the conduct of needs assessments in this field (section 2), the guidelines continue (section 3) by giving step-by-step guidance from an SSG/R perspective on the four phases of conducting a needs assessment: planning for the needs assessment; conducting preparatory desk-research; undertaking the assessment in the country in question; and following up on the assessment. The guidelines then provide a sample list of questions to be addressed during an assessment in the area of SSG/R (section 4), before closing with a summary of the key points dealt with (section 5). As a whole, the OSCE Guidelines on SSG/R complement existing OSCE documents, notably the OSCE Manual *Project Management in the OSCE*,<sup>35</sup> by providing practical guidance specifically relevant to the area of SSG/R. While the Guidelines are for the use of OSCE staff, they may also be of relevance for other national and international actors seeking to enhance their support to SSG/R.

### 2. Rationale

Needs assessments are a strategic planning tool used to determine priorities, strengthen decision-making, and subsequently enhance monitoring and evaluation (M&E). They are an integral element of the identification phase of the project cycle. According to the manual *Project Management in the OSCE*, the OSCE project cycle consists of the following five phases: Unified Budget Process; Project Identification; Project Development; Project Implementation, Monitoring and Controlling; and Project Self-Evaluation.<sup>36</sup> Needs assessments depend on OSCE programme/project managers engaging in dedicated analysis in order to understand a variety of factors, notably: the context in which their project will take place; the different stakeholders and their interests and expectations; and the specific challenges and the strategic options to remedy them. Furthermore, needs assessments assist in the identification of national priorities that may facilitate impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R support [[See the OSCE Guidelines on Impact-Oriented Approaches to SSG/R Support.](#)]

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<sup>35</sup> OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (2010), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

### Types of needs assessments

Assessments can be either internally or externally driven:

- Internally driven assessments are initiated by the OSCE to guide internal programming. They are considered a vital element of the OSCE's project cycle management and in particular of the project identification phase (see the OSCE Manual Project Management in the OSCE). In practice, internally driven assessments may be low-scale and draw heavily on desk research and a review of past evaluations and assessments. Efforts should be made, however, to go beyond desk-based research in order to avoid a solution-driven assessment that will yield predetermined results. It is particularly important to renew the assessment on a periodic basis (at least every three years) or at junctures determined by emerging needs and new avenues for OSCE engagement.
- Externally driven assessments respond to external demands. They may, for instance, be initiated by the Government in question to inform national SSG/R planning. They are likely to be more formal than internally driven assessments and to require more resources for an extensive review of needs.

Assessments in the area of SSG/R can either be comprehensive or focus on a component area:

- Comprehensive SSG/R assessments are carried out sector-wide and as such cover the entire security sector. Given that they require significant resources, the OSCE rarely conducts these assessments as part of regular project cycle management. Nonetheless, national authorities may request such an assessment when they aim to begin engaging in a comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) process.
- Component-specific assessments are those which focus on a specific area of SSR (e.g., police reform, prison reform). These assessments are more frequently conducted by the OSCE. Component-specific assessments should still take a holistic approach to SSG/R, and thus examine potential linkages with related components (see box 5 for details).

Needs assessments may have different functions depending on their context, including: supporting more effective programming; strengthening national reform processes; and providing the foundations for subsequent monitoring and evaluation efforts:

***Needs assessments facilitate more effective OSCE programming.*** Needs assessments play a vital role in the design of OSCE projects, and contribute to enhancing their relevance and effectiveness. In particular, needs assessments can contribute to:

- ***Strengthening engagement with national stakeholders:*** Needs assessments provide an opportunity to engage with national stakeholders in order to properly under-

stand their needs and their perceptions of OSCE support. Strong engagement with national stakeholders, including beneficiaries, facilitates the successful pursuit of impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R that are grounded in national needs and seek to contribute to shared goals. Engaging national stakeholders in discussion on potential avenues for support from the outset is also more likely to strengthen co-operation in the long run during the implementation phase of reform activities;

- **Supporting the identification of entry points for relevant support:** Needs assessments identify current gaps which should be filled, and thus facilitate the identification of relevant entry points for support. This helps to ensure that the support provided is “demand-driven” as opposed to “supply-driven”. Moreover, regular needs assessments can help to ensure that OSCE support routinely adapts to changing circumstances and needs, thereby maintaining the Organization’s relevance;
- **Supporting the identification of cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R:** By examining the relationship between different components of the security sector, a comprehensive needs assessment ensures that the support provided is holistic and recognizes potential inter-linkages. This facilitates, from the outset, the identification of where collaboration across OSCE dimensions may be required. [*See the OSCE Guidelines on Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R*];
- **Supporting the identification of potential challenges:** Needs assessments can support the identification of potential challenges for reform processes. Being aware of challenges makes it possible to identify risks for planning purposes, and to promote their mitigation at an early stage;
- **Strengthening co-operation with other international actors:** Needs assessments entail consultation with international actors in order to build a comprehensive picture of support already being provided, including support gaps. Mapping international support helps to avoid the duplication of activities. Moreover, engaging with international actors helps in the timely identification of potential areas for co-operation.
- **Needs assessments support national reform processes:** Needs assessments provide empirical proof of gaps and evidence for the establishment of priorities. On the one hand, this enables the OSCE to deliver tailor-made advice to national stakeholders on reform priorities. On the other, national authorities may directly use the results of the needs assessment by feeding them into their own decision-making processes. This is particularly relevant when needs assessments are either commissioned, or jointly supported, by national stakeholders.

**Box 1: The contribution of a needs assessment to national policy development**

In 2008, the OSCE Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) was requested by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan to undertake, in co-operation with the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, a joint needs assessment on police reform in Tajikistan. The focuses of the needs assessment included: the legal basis for policing in Tajikistan; the overall structure and efficiency of the police; community policing; police training institutions and their curricula; and forensic capacities for criminal investigations. It provided the basis for the Republic of Tajikistan's Police Reform Strategy for 2013-2020, which outlines national policy and actions for combating crime.<sup>37</sup>

- *Needs assessments provide baseline data for subsequent (national and international) monitoring and evaluation (M&E) efforts.* A common challenge in the area of SSG/R is the lack of baseline data against which to measure progress. Without specifically documented information on the situation at the beginning of the intervention, it is difficult to evaluate the programme's achievements. Needs assessments provide an important opportunity to overcome this challenge, as the data collected can often provide information necessary for developing a baseline against which to measure progress. This information can therefore be used to support the development of results frameworks, but also to track progress over a period of time. This data can subsequently inform both national and international M&E efforts.

### 3. Conducting a Needs Assessment

The process of conducting a needs assessment contains four main phases: planning for the needs assessment; conducting the preparatory desk research; undertaking the assessment in the country in question; and ensuring follow-up to the assessment. This section examines these phases, and provides advice from an SSG/R perspective.

#### 3.1 Planning for needs assessments

The first phase of the process should determine the general framework and objectives of the needs assessment. It is important to engage with national stakeholders during the planning phase in order to ensure that they have the opportunity to shape the assessment according to their needs, and to raise commitment to the implementation of recommendations that may result from the assessment. A key result of the planning phase should be the development of terms of reference and agreeing upon them with national stakeholders (see subsection 3.1.7).

The following are important issues to consider during the planning phase:

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<sup>37</sup> Republic of Tajikistan, "Police Reform Strategy 2013-2020", approved by Decree of the President for the Republic of Tajikistan, 18 March 2013, <http://police-reform.tj/index.php/en/k2/strategy>.

### **3.1.1 Defining the objectives and scope of the needs assessment**

OSCE staff should define the overall objectives of the assessment from the outset, as this will have an impact on timelines, resources needed, and expectations. A decision is required on whether the assessment on SSG/R will be broad (i.e., comprehensive) or deep (i.e., examining one or two subsectors, while still supporting a comprehensive approach). The objective should be clear and must be understood by all stakeholders involved.

In the context of SSG/R, it must be remembered that one of the key purposes of a needs assessment is to identify holistic approaches to SSG/R support which take full account of linkages between the various dimensions of security. In an ideal context, the OSCE would provide support based on a comprehensive needs assessment that has examined the entire security sector. In most cases, however, the assessment will only be on a narrow area of the security sector, such as the police services or the judicial system. In such cases, it is nonetheless important to reflect on what elements of the broader security sector may need to be included in the assessment in order to provide a full picture of needs and priorities. For instance, an assessment on the police also requires interviews with representatives of the judiciary in order to identify linkages between these two closely related subsectors. [\[For examples of how to take a cross-dimensional approach to SSG/R, which could also be applied to a needs assessment, see the OSCE Guidelines on Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R.\]](#)

### **3.1.2 Setting out roles and responsibilities**

There is a need to assign clear roles and responsibilities with regard to three factors in particular: the leadership of the assessment; contribution to the assessment (both human and financial resources); and the sharing of the results of the assessment. This is particularly necessary when the needs assessment is externally driven and has been requested by national stakeholders. One important factor to consider is who will lead the conduct of the assessment, which is a role that could be filled either internally or externally by a national or international expert. Regardless of who leads the assessment, it is likely to require expertise drawn from right across all the OSCE executive structures.

In an SSG/R needs assessment, roles and responsibilities may become blurred as contributions are often required from representatives of two or indeed all three dimension. This is particularly the case with comprehensive SSG/R assessments that reflect the cross-dimensional nature of SSG/R. If this is so, there may be a need to include expertise drawn from the politico-military dimension (e.g., on border security reform or defence reform), from the economic and environmental dimension (especially when examining issues related to corruption or good governance of the security sector), or from the human dimension (e.g., justice reform, reviewing the legal framework related to the security sector). Moreover, several elements of SSG/R are considered to cut across different dimensions and thus require cross-sectoral expertise (e.g., gender, human rights). In order to ensure appropriate conduct of the assessment, there needs to be clarity on the institutional lead from within the OSCE and how to co-ordinate across the dimensions. [\[See the OSCE Guidelines on Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R.\]](#)



**Box 2: Drawing on expertise across the OSCE area for the conduct of a needs assessment**

In 2013, the OSCE Mission in Bishkek supported a needs assessment to identify priorities for increasing the investigative and legal capacity of Kyrgyzstan's State Financial Intelligence Service. The aim of the assessment was to identify approaches to enhancing Kyrgyzstan's efforts in countering money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, with the particular goal of having Kyrgyzstan removed from the "grey list" of the Financial Action Task Force. The assessment was conducted by an expert on this topic, the First Deputy Head of Ukraine's State Financial Monitoring Service. The assessment consisted of meetings with representatives of Kyrgyzstan's law enforcement agencies, of international organizations and of diplomatic missions engaged in these activities.<sup>38</sup> During the assessment, the Ukrainian expert was able to share the experience gained by his own country through its success in having itself taken off the grey list. As a follow-up to the assessment, Kyrgyzstan has made numerous efforts to increase the capacity of the country's financial bodies to adopt modern investigative and anti-corruption methods, and to implement legislation. In 2014, Kyrgyzstan was formally removed from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force.<sup>39</sup>

**3.1.3 Engaging with national stakeholders from the outset**

During the planning stage it is important to ensure co-ordination among the different partners involved in the assessment. The needs assessment will often be initiated by national actors and conducted as a joint exercise involving national authorities, non-governmental actors, and civil society members. In such cases, it is important to ensure that national representatives are on the assessment team, have been consulted on the terms of reference (see subsection 3.1.8), and are engaged in a discussion on the findings prior to their dissemination. Stakeholders should agree on the appropriate format for disseminating the findings of the assessment. In internally driven assessments, the needs assessment will be conducted as an internal OSCE activity to identify entry points for engagement. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to: support national ownership by arranging meetings to explain the purpose of the assessment; request that the assessment be given practical support; and keep national stakeholders informed of the results of the assessment. Whether the assessment is internally or externally driven, the selection of national stakeholders for engagement should be carefully planned.

Two important considerations should guide the selection of these interlocutors. Firstly, actors who have a significant impact on the reform process must be consulted in the assessment. For example, this may include security sector officials, parliamentarians, or

<sup>38</sup> OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Press Release: OSCE facilitates co-operation on anti-money laundering between Ukraine's and Kyrgyzstan's Financial Intelligence Services, 12 July 2013. <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/103549>.

<sup>39</sup> OSCE Centre in Bishkek, Press Release: Kyrgyzstan removed from FATF non-co-operative countries list, with OSCE assistance, 3 July 2014, <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/120724>.

representatives of such bodies as the Ministry of Finance. Secondly, actors who will be directly affected by the reform process need to be included, in particular the intended beneficiaries of reform efforts. Assessments should thus seek to engage civil society actors, including civil society organizations (CSOs) representing the perceptions of marginalized and minority groups.

### **3.1.4 Identifying relevant benchmarks**

Benchmarks can be used to identify the priorities to be examined during a needs assessment. While there is no coherent set of internationally recognized benchmarks for SSG/R, there is general agreement that the security sector should be both effective and accountable. Therefore, some of the key benchmarks to be identified for SSG/R are related to effectiveness (e.g., adequate service delivery) and accountability (e.g., internal accountability and external oversight). There is also a need to assess more broadly the capacity of the security sector to engage in reform processes. [See section 4 for an overview of principal questions for assessing the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector, as well as the capacity for national ownership of reforms.]

In certain areas of SSG/R there may also be specific international standards which can be used to set benchmarks (see example in box 3 below). Additionally, the level of implementation of OSCE principles and commitments, national commitments, and policy plans may also be used as benchmarks, especially when the needs assessment is requested by a participating State. In terms of OSCE commitments, this may include, for instance, key principles in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security such as the need for each participating State to “ensure that the recruitment or call-up of personnel for service in its military, paramilitary and security forces is consistent with its obligations and commitments in respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms” or that “[e]ach participating State will provide for its legislative approval of defence expenditures”.<sup>40</sup> Regarding national commitments, this may include for instance national action plans such as those developed for implementing UN Security Council resolution 1325. The latter sets out important criteria such as ensuring the prosecution of those who are responsible for sexual violence against women and girls.<sup>41</sup>

#### **Box 3: Benchmarks guiding needs assessments in the area of prison reform**

In 2001, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe (CoE) conducted a joint needs assessment of Serbian Prisons. The assessment team conducted its analysis using the European Prison Rules and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. The assessment therefore compared needs to the benchmarks set out in these international

<sup>40</sup> OSCE, Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, 3 December 1994.

<sup>41</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women and peace and security, 31 October 2000.

standards (e.g., availability of fresh air in the prison cells, staff commitment to principles of human dignity). On the basis of this analysis, the report provides recommendations for addressing these needs and improving the general levels of compliance. A key recommendation of the report was the introduction of training programmes for prison staff. The results of the assessment therefore provided an entry point for prison reform and capacity-building in line with international standards.<sup>42</sup>

### ***3.1.5 Managing expectations***

As SSG/R can be a sensitive topic for some individuals and institutions, it must be remembered that national stakeholders may resist supporting the assessment. A number of approaches may be used to mitigate this challenge. Firstly, OSCE staff should take the time to explain the purpose of the needs assessment to national stakeholders, possibly also highlighting the benefits that they themselves may derive from the assessment (see example in box 1). Second, it is necessary to agree from the outset on whether or not the assessment will be made public or remain internal, and who it will be shared with. It may be necessary to agree with national stakeholders that the results of the assessment will not be publically released without prior approval. Alternatively, in order to build trust with interlocutors that have contributed to the report, it may be possible to agree on developing a short version for the public and a longer internal version containing the more sensitive information. There is also a risk of expectations being raised too high and of national stakeholders consulted during the process expecting that it will result in immediate funding. There is thus a clear need to give careful consideration to the messages that will be communicated in preparation for the assessment and following its conclusion.

### ***3.1.6 Supporting a cross-dimensional approach to the assessment***


Needs assessments can provide valuable entry points for identifying cross-dimensional approaches to SSG/R. Ideally, needs assessments should already integrate a cross-dimensional perspective at the planning stage. For instance, a cross-dimensional perspective can be ensured by including representatives drawn from different OSCE dimensions as members of the assessment team, or, alternatively, by consulting them during the assessment. Due to the wide variety of actors involved in the security sector, ranging from the military to parliamentarians and civil society actors, such a cross-dimensional approach can provide vital additional insights into the various needs with respect to security sector reform. For instance, if corruption within the police is an important issue, it will be valuable for an expert from the first dimension to be complemented by an expert from the second dimension who is familiar with approaches to tackling corruption in the public sector.

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<sup>42</sup> Council of Europe and OSCE/ODIHR, "Report of a Needs Assessment of the Serbian Prisons Conducted Jointly by the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights From 27 May to 4 June 2011", [http://www.coe.org.rs/REPOSITORY/147\\_prison\\_assessment\\_report\\_-\\_final\\_version.docx](http://www.coe.org.rs/REPOSITORY/147_prison_assessment_report_-_final_version.docx).

### 3.1.7 Recognizing the challenges of data collection

Data collection, whether desk-based or in-country, is a challenging task, mainly because of the factor of data accessibility. Information related to the security sector is often considered sensitive, whether because of national security concerns or because of individuals' reluctance to share personal information on, for example, gender-based violence. It is important for the building of trust to have clear agreements with stakeholders providing information on how the findings of the needs assessment will be shared and disseminated, and on how information is to be stored. When the questions being asked are related to sensitive issues, face-to-face interviews are often more appropriate than questionnaires. The empirical obstacles related to the reliability and accurate interpretation of quantitative data (e.g., crime statistics) also need to be recognized. In order to increase the reliability and effectiveness of the needs assessment, it is also important to triangulate data sources by employing both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. [For more information on data triangulation, see the *Manual Project Management in the OSCE*.] In order to support the credibility of findings, data collection challenges or shortcomings must be mentioned in the assessment report, so that any methodological limitations are made clear. The terms of reference (see subsection 3.1.8) should set out the methodology for data collection. Ideally, this should consist of a combination of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods. Moreover, information collected on the perceptions of security among the population should be disaggregated by sex and population groups (e.g., minorities).

 For more information on data sources, see *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (OSCE, 2010), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.

### 3.1.8 Establishing the terms of reference

The terms of reference should summarize many of the key issues agreed upon during the planning phase. In particular, they should include information on the following matters:

- The objective of the assessment (e.g., whether it is intended to feed into internal OSCE programming, or to provide guidance for national stakeholders on reform priorities);
- The scope of the assessment (e.g., whether it will take a sector-wide approach or only examine sub-sectors). The time frame and available resources are important aspects to consider when deciding on the scope of the assessment;
- The key benchmarks and/or questions that are to guide the assessment (see subsection 3.1.4 on benchmarks, and chapter 4 for a set of key questions that the needs assessment will seek to examine);
- The methodological approach to be used (e.g., methodology for data collection, who will be consulted);
- Composition of the assessment team (e.g., internal and/or external, cross-dimensional representation, gender representation, professional skills and knowledge);
- Deliverables and timelines (e.g., whether there will be an interim report, whether the final report will be public or not, and when the different phases will take place);  
Budget (if applicable).

It is good practice for the terms of reference to highlight and clarify the need to take an inclusive approach to the conduct of the assessment. In the area of SSG/R this includes, for instance, setting out the need for consultation with representatives of civil society and non-state security and justice providers, in addition to the formal (state) security sector (for more details on who to consult with, see the discussion on taking an inclusive approach in section 3.3). The terms of reference should also outline the type of expertise required for the assessment team. In the field of SSG/R, expertise required may include the capacity to analyse the political context of SSG/R, understanding of the holistic nature of SSG/R, component-specific knowledge (e.g., on policing, on border management), or gender expertise. Moreover, the assessment team should be gender-balanced and should to the greatest extent possible include experts who speak the national language. If a decision is taken to hire an external consultant to lead and/or support the assessment, appropriate time must be factored in for identifying and hiring someone with specific expertise in SSG/R and, in cases where the needs assessment is component-specific, with detailed knowledge of the relevant special area.

### **Planning a needs assessment: Key questions to address**

- What is the objective and context of the assessment?
- What is the scope of the assessment? What resources are available and needed (time, personnel, funding etc.)?
- Who should be involved in the needs assessment?
- Does the assessment respect and aim to enhance national and local ownership?
- How will expectations be managed?
- How should the findings of the assessment be disseminated?  
How will it be ensured that the needs assessment process is transparent and accountable with respect to all actors involved?

### **3.2 Conducting the preparatory analysis (desk-based)**

The aim of the second phase is to make a preparatory analysis for the assessment through the gathering of information. The preparatory analysis is conducted through desk research and systematically gathers available data (secondary information). It maps the broad political, economic, security, institutional and legal context in which the security sector operates (i.e., situation analysis). Section 4 of the present guidelines contains a list of indicative questions for conducting a needs assessment in the area of SSG/R; these may be useful for structuring the desk research, and also for supporting the identification of questions that will need to be answered during the assessment phase. A comprehensive preparatory analysis helps in the designing of a purposeful in-country assessment phase and consequently contributes to saving resources. The following subsections cover the main elements of the preparatory analysis.

### 3.2.1 Reviewing relevant sources of secondary information

Information from multiple sources and institutions should be reviewed to ensure a broad understanding of the political context, the legal framework, and the roles and responsibilities of the security institutions. Gender-related aspects must be considered, such as the representation of women in senior positions and their role in decision-making within the security sector. Potential sources can include OSCE data such as State responses to the Questionnaire on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, or information from reviews of States' legal framework conducted by the ODIHR. Data from local civil society organizations should also be included. (See table 1 below for an overview of relevant sources of secondary information).

**Table 1: Relevant sources of secondary information**

<p><b>Strategic and legal framing documents</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace Agreement/s (if relevant)</li> <li>• National Security Strategy or Policy</li> <li>• Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</li> <li>• National Legal Framework pertinent to SSG/R</li> <li>• International conventions ratified by the host government</li> </ul>	<p><b>OSCE documents</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing OSCE Mission mandates</li> <li>• Former needs assessments</li> <li>• Overview of past activities by OSCE institutions and field operations, including former project evaluations and self-evaluations</li> <li>• Political and monitoring reports (e.g., by the ODIHR, High Commissioner on National Minorities, or Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media )</li> <li>• Thematic annual reports (e.g., on police-related activities, gender) and assessments (e.g., ODIHR field assessment visit reports on Roma and Sinti issues)</li> <li>• Former Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with host governments</li> <li>• Opinions on legislation related to the security sector (e.g., by the ODIHR)</li> <li>• Election assessment and observation reports (esp. by the ODIHR)</li> </ul>
<p><b>National documents</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sectoral strategies (e.g. police reform strategy)</li> <li>• Operational policy (e.g., human resources management policy, code of ethics)</li> <li>• National Action Plans (e.g., on gender, anti-trafficking, Roma and Sinti)</li> <li>• Crime statistics, victimization studies, public surveys, statistics on ethnicity of subjects arrested</li> <li>• Media reports</li> </ul>	<p><b>Documents produced by other international actors</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reports by Transparency International, Freedom House, International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, European Roma Rights Centre, etc.</li> <li>• Former assessments, evaluations, and progress reports by international actors (e.g., CoE, donors).</li> </ul>

### **3.2.2. Reflecting on the regional dimension**

During the desk research, it is important to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to the regional dimension, which is an important element of situation analysis (see also subsection 3.3.4). This may well entail examining, for instance, conflict dynamics, sources of cross-border tensions (e.g., organized crime, drug trafficking), and co-operation dynamics (e.g., regional networks or platforms). Such regional challenges may require specific reforms in the area of the security sector, such as the strengthening of international co-operation by intelligence-gathering agencies. Desk research should therefore seek to examine the following questions: Are there ongoing initiatives or existing commitments at the regional level which may provide entry points for reform efforts at the national level? Have other States in the region recently undergone a similar reform process from which lessons may be learned? Would a regional approach to SSG/R support be valuable? [See the *OSCE Guidelines on Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R.*]

### **3.2.3 Identifying priorities for the in-country assessment phase**

The secondary information should be analysed to identify priorities for the subsequent assessment phase. Priorities may be identified on the basis of:

- *Gaps in information:* The desk-based research may highlight areas where there is a lack of information. Such areas should be given special attention during the in-country assessment stage to ensure that interviews can help to complete the picture;
- *Emerging potential priorities for reform:* The research may lead to the identification of several potential gaps and priority needs for SSG/R. It is important to test these needs through interviews during the assessment phase to ensure that these hold true.

On the basis of this information, it will be possible to put together a list of key stakeholders who should be interviewed to fill specific gaps, in addition to a broad representative sample of interlocutors (see section 3.3 on conducting the assessment).

#### **Preparatory analysis: Key questions to address**

- What secondary data is available? How is the reliability of the data verified?
- Do other SSG/R needs assessments exist for this region/issue? Are there lessons learned that can be helpful for this assessment?
- What are the framework conditions of the security sector (e.g., bilateral agreements, recommendations)? Which actors are involved in areas of relevance to SSG/R?
- Does the preparatory research indicate potential initial priorities for SSG/R? Are there areas where data is missing?
- What kind of data needs to be gathered to expand or complement the initial desk research? Where and how can this data be collected?

### 3.3 Conducting the assessment (in-country)

The third step of the assessment process is the collection and analysis of primary data. The preparatory analysis (section 3.2) should have provided the foundations for tailoring the in-country assessment to the collection of information needed to fill gaps on knowledge and/or to test the validity of emerging priorities identified. This phase is generally conducted in-country and should draw on meetings with national and international stakeholders.

#### 3.3.1 Taking an inclusive approach to meetings with stakeholders

Assessments in the area of SSG/R must take an inclusive approach to the selection of interlocutors, and should seek to engage both with the implementers and with the beneficiaries. Moreover, it is necessary to recognize that the perceptions and security needs from within and outside of the capital may differ significantly. Efforts should therefore also be made to meet with relevant representatives beyond the capital. It is essential that appropriate efforts are made to meet with representatives of the following categories of interlocutors.

- **Security sector officials:** If the assessment is intended to be broad and comprehensive, it will be necessary to arrange meetings with a broad selection of security sector actors. Specifically, this may include representatives of the following sectors: defence, law enforcement, corrections, the judiciary, intelligence, border management, customs, and civil emergencies services.<sup>43</sup> If the assessment is intended to focus on a specific component area of the security sector (e.g., defence, criminal justice), it will nonetheless be important to attempt to meet with representatives of closely related sectors. For example, an assessment of the intelligence services will require meeting with representatives of these services and the relevant government ministry, as well as with actors that play a role in their oversight such as parliamentary intelligence oversight committees and judicial authorities responsible for reviewing their investigations. It may also be necessary to meet with representatives of other law enforcement agencies to examine how co-operation takes place with the intelligence services.
- **Civil society:** Representatives of civil society are often overlooked in needs assessments. Civil society groups, however, often possess knowledge of particular security challenges faced by the general population or by certain groups (e.g. women, minorities) and may thus have insights on the specific priorities that should be addressed through reform efforts. Engaging with civil society is therefore essential. This should include consultation with women's organizations, minority organizations and/or human rights groups, and independent think-tanks.
- **Oversight actors:** Representatives of parliament and other relevant national oversight bodies (e.g., ombuds institutions, commissioners) should be consulted. This is particularly important when reflecting on the accountability of the security sector.

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<sup>43</sup> These categories are adapted from the UN Secretary-General's report on "Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform". (General Assembly Security Council, 2008, [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/904B9EE812B7591FC12573F400322816/\\$file/Joint+Seminar\\_A-62-659\\_S-2008-39.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/904B9EE812B7591FC12573F400322816/$file/Joint+Seminar_A-62-659_S-2008-39.pdf))




- *International actors*: It is important to map current and future support provided by international actors to help identify gaps in support. International actors may also provide useful insights into the reform process from a different perspective.
- *OSCE staff*: Similarly, it is important to consult with in-country OSCE staff who may be able to contribute to a cross-dimensional analysis. In some States, the OSCE field offices in regions outside the capital may provide valuable information.

### **Box 4. The importance of drawing on the expertise of OSCE field offices**

The networks of field offices of field operations are often considered to represent one of the OSCE's significant comparative advantages. OSCE staff engaging in a needs assessment should ensure that they consult staff from such field offices with regard to the work of the security sector, the population's perception of the security sector, and on-the-ground challenges. In some cases, field offices have noted that they are not fully able to feed information into policy processes taking place in the capital. Needs assessments provide an ideal opportunity to ensure that this information is captured and shared with appropriate stakeholders.

### **3.3.2 Identifying data collection tools**

Different data collection tools and methods may be used in accordance with the scope and purpose of the needs assessment. These can include, among others, interviews, focus groups (particularly useful to engage with civil society and women's groups), and extensive population surveys (which have a higher cost but can provide useful empirical data on the needs of the population).

 For an overview of data collection tools in the context of project self-evaluation methods, see *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (OSCE, 2010), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>. Section 12.8 on “Data Collection, Analysis and Interpretation” provides an overview of secondary and primary data collection and various qualitative and quantitative data collection methods, with a particular focus on carrying out successful interviews.

### **3.3.3 Designing the guiding questions**

The assessment needs to be guided by a number of key questions related to the areas where information is needed; these are referred to as the “guiding questions”. The choice is likely to depend on the context and the purpose of the assessment, and the scope of SSG/R covered by the assessment. Section 4 provides a sample of indicative questions which are structured according to the following categories: mapping the potential for national ownership of reforms; mapping the effectiveness of the formal and informal security sector; mapping the accountability of the security sector; and mapping the perceptions of the population. The guiding questions should also be designed in

such a way as to ensure a comprehensive approach to the needs assessment – regardless of whether it will look at the entire sector or only at a component (for advice on taking a comprehensive approach, see box 5 below).

### **Box 5: Taking a comprehensive approach to the needs assessment**

Even if an SSG/R assessment focuses only on one sub-sector, such as police, border management or justice, it should still be guided by certain principles characteristic of a comprehensive approach.

Accordingly, any needs assessment in the area of SSG/R should still seek to examine:

- The overarching framework for democratic governance of the security sector;
- How the sub-sector interacts with other related sub-sectors and sectors – e.g., a needs assessment on police reform should assess the capacity of the criminal justice system and vice versa;
- The perceptions of civil society, in order to ensure that the needs of beneficiaries are adequately considered.

Additionally, any needs assessment in the area of SSG/R should ensure that:


- National ownership guides the approach used in undertaking the assessment;
- Gender and human rights are properly mainstreamed throughout the assessment.

### **3.3.4 Analysing the results**

Once a significant amount of information has been generated by the assessment, this information needs to be compiled and analysed in order to identify key findings and recommendations. The following are some examples of guiding questions for analysing the results of the mapping exercise, and for identifying potential options for the way forward.

- *Situation analysis*: How may the general political situation affect security sector reform? What is the general situation concerning human rights and gender equality in the State concerned? To what extent does this affect potential SSR efforts? Are there important regional dynamics that need to be factored in?
- *Stakeholder analysis/actor mapping*: What are the power dynamics? Which parties are likely to be positively and negatively interested in the SSG/R process? Is there willingness to engage in reform efforts? Is it likely to be sustainable? Are any groups (especially minorities) particularly vulnerable in the process? In which areas is there more likely to be political will to engage (either because it is perceived as a priority, or because it is a less sensitive issue)? Is there willingness to strengthen both the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector?

- *OSCE strategic options based on problem analysis:* What are the key security problems being faced by the population? What are the key constraints for the security sector in addressing these problems? Are challenges linked to political will, institutional capacities, or legislative gaps? Which areas of reform should be prioritized? Is it necessary to pursue “quick wins” in order to build confidence for more comprehensive reform efforts? Do the priority areas identified for support match the mandates, areas of expertise and capacity of the OSCE? If not, can the OSCE share these findings with other actors who may be able to provide support in this area? Are there issues on which it would be beneficial to seek close collaboration with other international actors?

 For more detail on how to undertake such analysis, see *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (OSCE, 2010), which sets out a step-by-step approach to undertaking situation analysis, stakeholder analysis and problem analysis.

### **Conducting the needs assessment: Key questions to address**

- What are the guiding questions for the assessment?
- Have efforts been made to ensure that the assessment is conducted in an inclusive manner?
- Has adequate attention been given in-country to the situation outside the capital in order to understand local perceptions of reform needs?
- What strategic recommendations are emerging from the assessment?

### **3.4 Following-up on the needs assessment**

The last phase of the needs assessment is the follow-up process. This includes determining how to present the findings and how to ensure that they are put to good use.

#### **3.4.1 Presenting the findings and recommendations**

During the planning phase, it should have been determined how and with whom the findings are to be shared and how they will be disseminated, how feedback on the assessment will be dealt with, and who will be responsible for taking up relevant recommendations. While in most cases the findings are delivered as a written report distributed to the main stakeholders (both the OSCE and the national partners), sometimes the reports will be disseminated more widely. In such cases, however, findings of the needs assessment should be shared with all stakeholders involved before they are released. Efforts should be made to discuss the findings with national stakeholders and to agree on how to address the emerging priorities.

### 3.4.2 Feeding the findings into planning and into monitoring and evaluation

Efforts should be made to ensure that the data emerging from the needs assessment is fed into planning mechanisms. In particular, the findings should inform the development of the strategic objectives that the OSCE should prioritize. [See the *OSCE Guidelines on Impact-Oriented Approach to SSG/R.*] Moreover, if findings are relevant to other dimensions, staff should ensure that these are appropriately shared. Finally, the data gathered through the needs assessment should be integrated into the OSCE M&E frameworks in three ways: firstly, by using it to help identify project/programme objectives and indicators; secondly, by using it to obtain important information with regard to risks and assumptions; and thirdly, by using it to generate the baseline data against which to measure progress through M&E.

#### Following-up on the needs assessment: Key questions to address

- In which format should the findings of the assessment be shared?
- Which audiences should the findings be shared with?
- How will the assessment be integrated into OSCE monitoring and evaluation activities?

## 4. Key Questions to be Addressed during an Assessment Process

A needs assessment should be guided by a set of core questions that need to be answered, and which should ideally have been reflected in the terms of reference (see subsection 3.1.8). These “guiding questions” should be referred to both during the preparatory desk-research phase and also during the in-country assessment phase. The following box provides some sample questions for SSG/R assessments, which are not intended to be exhaustive; for further material, see the list of resources and further questions at the end of this chapter. The questions are divided up according to four key themes (see benchmarks in subsection 3.1.4): mapping the potential for national ownership of reforms; mapping the effectiveness of the formal and informal security sector; mapping the democratic governance (including measures for accountability) of the security sector; and mapping the perceptions of the population.

#### Indicative guiding questions for needs assessments

**Mapping the potential for national ownership of reforms.** In order to assess the potential sustainability of OSCE support, it is necessary to examine the potential for national ownership. This can be assessed by considering:<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> These categories of national ownership are adapted from the UN system-wide guidance on national ownership of SSR (UN Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on SSR, 2012).

- *National security vision:* Is there a national security policy or strategy in place which defines the national vision? Does this national security policy/strategy provide clear guidance on priorities that may enable the SSG/R process to realize this vision? Was this national vision developed in a consultative manner and does it reflect the priorities of all national stakeholders (including civil society, minority groups etc.)?
- *National capacity to co-ordinate and implement the SSG/R process:* Does the government possess the capacity to co-ordinate and implement the SSG/R process? Is there a donor co-ordination mechanism in place led by national stakeholders? Are the financial and human resources of the security sector sufficient to implement the SSG/R process?
- *National financial responsibility:* Is the reform process entirely dependent on external funds or are there or will there be funds allocated by the Government for reform efforts? Are national funding decisions on the security sector in line with the national vision for SSG/R?
- *National capacities for monitoring and evaluation:* Is there a national M&E mechanism in place which tracks the implementation of SSG/R reforms? Is the government ready to implement recommendations emerging from monitoring and evaluation?

**Mapping the effectiveness of the formal (State) and informal (non-State) security sector.** The assessment should seek to map the security sector, and in particular, to determine how effective it is in delivering security and justice. Some relevant questions include:

- *Roles and responsibilities:* Are there clear provisions in the legal and constitutional framework which set out the mandates, roles and responsibilities of the security sector? Are there overlaps in the roles and responsibilities? Do the provisions in the legal framework correspond to the reality on the ground?
- *Human resources:* What are the numbers of personnel, and their rank/position (disaggregated by sex)? Are women equally represented in the security sector? Are minority groups (such as Roma and Sinti) proportionally represented in the security sector? What are the obstacles to the recruitment, retention and advancement of women and/or minority groups? Is the education/training provided to staff contributing to enhancing the professionalism of the respective institution?
- *Performance:* Does the security sector have the resources (human, financial and material) needed for it to fulfil its mandate? Does it have adequate management practices in place, enabling it to perform effectively? How is the security sector carrying out its mandate in practice? What are the gaps that will need improving?
- *Partnerships:* Are there functioning co-operation mechanisms in place to ensure co-ordination between related institutions, including non-state security and justice providers? What is the relationship between the police and prosecutors?

What is the relationship between civil society and the security institutions? What is the relationship between the security institutions? What is the relationship to other related sectors (e.g., Ministry of Finance)?

**Mapping the accountability of the security sector.** The assessment must examine the extent to which the security sector institutions function in accordance with democratic norms, both internally and externally.

- *Internal accountability of the security sector:* Are there mechanisms for internal control (e.g., codes of conduct, disciplinary mechanisms)? Are the mechanisms being used? Do investigations of misconduct result in appropriate action being taken? Is there evidence of corruption? Does the security sector respect human rights?
- *External oversight:* Are there clear provisions in the legal and constitutional framework to enable oversight bodies to play their role effectively? Are there appropriate mechanisms for external oversight (e.g., parliament, ombuds institutions)? Are these mechanisms performing their oversight role? If not, why not? What civil society organizations are active in the area of SSG/R? Do civil society and the media contribute to monitoring the security sector, including the non-state security and justice providers? Is the security sector subject to the same public financial management as other areas of the public sector? Does civil society provide expertise for parliamentary hearings? Does it have the capacity to do so?

**Mapping the perceptions of the population.** Importantly, an assessment is not complete if it does not identify the needs of the general population. As the latter may have and may voice different reform priorities from those identified by the government, efforts should be made to ensure that these priorities are understood and shared with government officials. Talking to the population about their experiences with security and justice (e.g., asking them what happens when a member of the general public commits a misdemeanour) can often provide useful insights into the way the security sector is functioning.

- What are the major causes of insecurity among boys, girls, women and men? Do current reform priorities effectively reflect the needs of girls, boys, women and men?
- Have the security perceptions and needs of minorities been recognized?
- Are efforts made to prevent sexual and gender-based violence? Is sexual and gender based violence reported, effectively responded to, and prosecuted?
- What happens when a crime is committed? How does the police react? How is this translated into justice?

- 📖 For a list of detailed questions to guide an SSR assessment of accountability, see Section 7.1 of the *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (2008), [http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/oeeddachandbookonsecurity\\_systemreformsupportingsecurityand-justice.htm](http://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictandfragility/oeeddachandbookonsecurity_systemreformsupportingsecurityand-justice.htm).
- 📖 For guidance on assessing the dynamics of power in the field of SSR, see DCAF/ISSAT, *Operational Guidance Note: Conducting a Security and Justice Assessment*, pp. 3–5, <http://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Operational-Guidance-Notes/Assessment/ISSAT-Assessment-OGN-Conducting-a-Security-and-Justice-Assessment>.
- 📖 For comprehensive guidance on assessing the criminal justice system, including specific questions for assessing the police, courts, prosecution and prisons, see the UNODC *Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit*, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/cjat\\_eng/CJAT\\_Toolkit\\_full\\_version.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/cjat_eng/CJAT_Toolkit_full_version.pdf).
- 📖 For assessment questions which examine the interaction between the different criminal justice sector institutions, other governmental agencies and non-state actors, see the OSCE guidebook *Police Reform within the Framework of Criminal Justice System Reform* (TNTD/SPMU Publication Series, vol. 11; 2013), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/109917>.
- 📖 For detailed guidance on how to integrate gender into SSR assessments, see Nicola Popovic, *Security Sector Reform Assessment, Monitoring & Evaluation and Gender* (Gender and SSR Toolkit, Tool 11; DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-INSTRAW, 2008), <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Reform-Assessment-Monitoring-Evaluation-and-Gender-Tool-11>.

## 5. Key Points

The present guidelines have identified a number of key imperatives for needs assessments in the field of SSG/R.

- ➔ **Reflect the principles of a comprehensive approach to SSG/R in all SSG/R-related needs assessments.** Ensure that any needs assessment in the area of SSG/R, even if it is only focused on a particular subsector, is guided by a comprehensive approach. This includes examining to what extent the security sector is both effective and accountable, and operates in a framework for democratic governance, identifying the synergies between related subsectors, and collecting the perceptions of beneficiaries. It also requires taking an inclusive approach to meetings with stakeholders, which should include representatives of relevant security institutions, oversight actors, civil society, international actors, and OSCE staff from all three or at least two dimensions.
  
- ➔ **Ensure the mainstreaming of national ownership and of gender equality and human rights principles.** National ownership requires engagement with national stakeholders from the very outset: on the assessment's objectives, on its scope, and on the subsequent handling of its findings. Moreover, it requires an inclusive approach to consulting with national stakeholders. Gender equality and human rights principles should also be effectively mainstreamed throughout the assessment. This includes ensuring that members of the assessment team possess gender and human rights expertise, that the assessment team is gender-balanced, that data collected is disaggregated by sex and minorities, that efforts are made to understand the perceptions of women and minorities, and, more broadly, that assessments examine the roles both of duty-bearers (i.e., the security sector) and of rights-bearers (i.e., beneficiaries).
  
- ➔ **Maximize the effectiveness of the needs assessment.** Adequate planning and implementation are essential to ensuring the success of a needs assessment. This includes clarifying roles and responsibilities in the conduct of the assessment, including co-ordination with other dimensions; recognising the challenges of data collection; and managing expectations on the assessment. Moreover, the assessment should be based on adequate situation, stakeholder and problem analysis that draws both on desk research and on in-country interviews aimed at identifying strategic priorities for OSCE support. Finally, efforts should be made to ensure that the findings of the needs assessment are adequately fed into OSCE project/programme planning. As well as appropriate dissemination of the findings, this also entails ensuring that the findings are adequately reflected in the development or revision of project objectives, and that data collected is used as a baseline against which to measure future progress.



# Security Sector Governance and Reform

Impact-Oriented Approaches to  
Security Sector Governance and Reform



## Guidelines

# Impact-Oriented Approaches to Security Sector Governance and Reform

### 1. Purpose

The present guidelines are intended to provide OSCE staff with advice on developing impact-oriented approaches to their support to SSG/R. The purpose of an impact-oriented approach is to ensure that the support provided will contribute to sustainable, long-term positive effects. This implies the need to: 1) plan for long-term results, and 2) provide support in such a way as to make it likely to have the desired effect and be sustainable. Specific guidance is provided on: the rationale for taking such an approach (section 2); how to programme for impact-oriented support (section 3); and how to mainstream impact-oriented approaches throughout the implementation of OSCE support (section 4). These guidelines are complementary to the OSCE approach of “performance-based programme budgeting” (PBPB).<sup>45</sup>

### 2. Rationale

Recent years have seen increasing recognition of the need to ensure that international support is contributing to positive and sustainable long-term change. For instance, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation has underlined that “having a sustainable impact should be the driving force” behind international support.<sup>46</sup> For the purpose of the present guidelines, “impact” is understood in the positive sense of the long-term effects of an intervention which contribute to positive change for the beneficiaries and their wider environment.<sup>47</sup>

In practice, international support has sometimes focused on activities and short-term results which are considered more feasible than on planning for and measuring their contribution to the long-term results required to effect sustainable change. This challenge is compounded in the field of SSG/R, where the sensitivity of certain reform efforts sometimes leads international actors to miss opportunities to link activities to broader strategies for promoting long-term institutional change. However, if support does not maintain a focus on long-term objectives, it is unlikely either to make a long-term difference or to be sustainable.

<sup>45</sup> OSCE, *Performance Based Programme Budgeting Orientation Guide* (2007); and OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (2010), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.

<sup>46</sup> The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, July 2012, <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/Busan%20partnership.pdf>.

<sup>47</sup> The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Glossary defines “impacts” as follows: “Positive or negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended,” see OECD DAC, *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management*, 2002, p. 24, <http://www.oecd.org/development/peer-reviews/2754804.pdf>. In the present guidelines, however, the term “impact-oriented approaches” means approaches to contributing to positive long-term effects. Furthermore, as noted on p. 98 of the OSCE Manual *Project Management in the OSCE*, “impact” is about bringing “real change to the beneficiaries and their wider environment”.

An impact-oriented approach is based on planning for long-term results and on identifying the mid-term and short-term results needed to achieve them. Moreover, these long-term results should be derived from, and aligned to, national priorities. Such an approach is essential to ensuring that support is not planned on the basis of vague assumptions that activities will lead to long-term change but, rather, on the basis of a clear and tested theory of change. Moreover, an impact-oriented approach will help to ensure that support is not supply-driven (i.e., based on the available expertise of international actors) but, rather, grounded in national priorities and policies that are set by States themselves. As such, impact-oriented approaches result in activities being undertaken as means to specific ends, and not as an ends in themselves.

The concept of “impact-oriented” support must be understood against the background of the OSCE’s move towards “results-based management” (RBM). The OSCE’s approach to RBM, known as “performance-based programme budgeting” (PBPB), is a management strategy used to define the intended *objectives* (long-term results), *outcomes* (medium-term results), and *outputs* (short-term or annual results) at the programme level. PBPB promotes the development of a coherent theory of change which identifies the results the OSCE seeks to contribute to across the results chain at the programme and project levels. Moreover, it foresees that all actors will contribute directly or indirectly to achieving a set of results, and ensures that their processes, products and services will contribute to the achievement of the desired objective.

**Figure 1: Programme-level results**



Adapted from: OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (2010), p. 23.

At the programme level, planning, monitoring and evaluating its contribution to impact are thus at the core of the Organization's strategic management, and are integral parts of its approach to PBPB. However, it often proves a challenge to ensure that programmes set objectives which are strategic enough to reflect long-term effects, and that projects are designed in such a way as to contribute to such programme objectives. This is why the present guidelines focus on "impact-oriented" approaches as opposed to "results-oriented" approaches,<sup>48</sup> and highlight the need to plan for long-term change (which is located at the level of programme *objectives*); during implementation, it is emphasized, project activities must be connected to overarching objectives and must be conducted in a manner calculated to enhance the sustainability of reform efforts.

An impact-oriented approach to SSG/R support should thus be pursued throughout the programming (see section 3) and implementation (see section 4) of OSCE support projects.

### 3. Programming for Impact-Oriented Support

There are a number of common challenges to the successful provision of impact-oriented support, all of which contribute to make it difficult to take long-term approaches into consideration. Two such challenges are the yearly budget cycles, which limit flexibility in adapting support, and high staff turnover, which may hamper capacity for long-term planning. Nonetheless, there is much that can be done to enhance potential for contributing to long-term results. Within the framework of existing limitations, section 3 of the present guidelines sets out the main approaches to programming for impact-oriented support in the field of SSG/R. The approach proposed entails the following elements: identifying national strategic priorities (see below, subsection 3.1); differentiating between the levels of programme results (3.2); using a theory of change to maintain the focus on objectives (3.3); connecting projects to longer-term programme strategies (3.4); engaging with other international actors in support of shared objectives (3.5); supporting cross-dimensional collaboration within the OSCE (3.6); supporting the sustainability of SSG/R through national ownership (3.7); recognizing the need to complement long-term strategies with quick-impact projects (3.8); planning for monitoring and evaluation of SSG/R support (3.9); and recognizing potential challenges to supporting impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R (3.10).

#### 3.1 Identifying national strategic priorities

The mandates of executive structures based on Permanent Council decisions are often broad, and are subsequently refined through the PBPB methodology. In this context, a first step towards pursuing an impact-oriented approach to support is the identification of national priorities which can inform the generation of specific objectives developed through PBPB. By aligning support to national priorities, the OSCE can enhance the provision of demand-driven support which matches the real and evolving needs of the

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<sup>48</sup> The title of the present guidelines was selected by OSCE SSG/R focal points at a workshop in Bratislava in October 2014.

security sector and the wider population. National priorities should therefore inform the development of the OSCE's long-term objectives.

One very important tool for mapping national priorities in SSG/R is the needs assessment. If a comprehensive needs assessment is not being or has not been conducted, then at the very least, national documents, such as national security policies, poverty reduction strategy papers, national action plans and the like, should be examined in order to determine whether priorities have been clearly established. Consultations should also be held with national stakeholders, including the intended beneficiaries of the support, to identify key needs. [For guidance on some of the questions to be used for assessing needs, see the *OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R*]. In the SSG/R field, the consultations require an inclusive approach which includes engaging with relevant Ministries (notably the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defence), oversight bodies (e.g., parliament), and ideally staff drawn from relevant security institutions. Additionally, it is important to make use of civil society organizations, women's groups and the like to consult the beneficiaries.

The national priorities identified should provide the basis for defining concrete programme objectives (see subsection 3.2 below). These should be aligned to the wider long-term strategy of the OSCE for a specific host country, participating State, or Partner for Co-operation. In cases where projects/programmes are ongoing, there is still a need to reassess national priorities on a periodic basis. Otherwise there is a risk of support becoming path-dependent, that is to say, either the same group of stakeholders is supported over a period of years (perhaps because they have shown receptivity to attend workshops), or a similar type of support (e.g., training) is provided continuously (often because it provides visibility). Informal needs assessments may be used by the OSCE to assess broader contextual changes or evolving needs, which should be reflected in revised programming. Moreover, regular national stakeholder consultations are considered a prerequisite for successful programming and, ultimately, for the achievement of positive results.

### 3.2 Differentiating between the levels of programme results

In OSCE programme management terms, an *objective* is at the highest level of the results chain. It is the intended impact that the programme aims to contribute to over several years. As such, it should reflect results that contribute to “real change for the beneficiaries and their wider environment”.<sup>49</sup> Long-term results are beyond the control of the OSCE, as they are nationally owned. For this reason, the OSCE can only seek to *contribute* to the achievement of objectives, with other actors also contributing to the same nationally owned long-term results. When formulating its objectives on the programme level, in order to underline its role in contributing to such results, the OSCE talks in terms of “advising”, “assisting” or “supporting” host country authorities. While the OSCE does not have control over results at this level, it is nonetheless important to ensure that all programmes set out clear objectives to which support is to contribute in

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<sup>49</sup> OSCE, Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers (2010), p. 98, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.

the long run. This helps ensure that programmes are meaningful and are likely to promote positive change. It also supports monitoring and evaluation efforts (M&E), which are intended to track the extent to which support has contributed to longer-term results.

One common challenge during the planning phase is ensuring that objectives are identified at the right level of the results chain. For instance, the objectives of programmes in the field of SSG/R are at times formulated as “fostering dialogue between civil society and security institutions” or “enhancing awareness among the police”. However, these examples are not objectives: “fostering dialogue” is an activity and “enhancing awareness” is an output. As such they should not be confused with objectives. In the SSG/R field, long-term objectives are often about actually enhancing the security of the population, frequently through reform activities which aim to increase both the effectiveness and accountability of the security sector. An example of a genuine OSCE programme objective might be to “assist the host government in reforming the national police to promote a more inclusive security sector”.

The second highest level of result after the objective is the *outcome*, which is a mid-term result generated by outputs. Although the achievement of outcomes may be affected by outside factors, they should be within the reasonable control of the OSCE.<sup>50</sup> Outcomes often reflect behavioural or institutional change. One example of a change of behaviour might be that of parliamentary security committees for the first time beginning to play an active role in overseeing the security sector. An institutional change, on the other hand, may consist of an institution using new structures and processes to deliver services in a more accountable and effective manner.

The level at which to place outcomes depends on the intervention logic. For instance, the same outcome of “establishment of a human resource management system” may be assigned to a different result level in accordance with the intervention logic. If in one context the OSCE has directly financed the establishment of a human resources management system in the police, this is considered an *output* as it does not reflect behavioural change. This output, however, has the potential to lead to an *outcome*, if, for example, the police begins to use the human resource management system to enhance the internal accountability of its staff. In a different context, however, the police may decide to introduce a human resources management system by itself as a result of OSCE policy advice. This can be considered an outcome if it reflects significant behavioural change. In most cases, several *outputs* are necessary in order to achieve one *outcome*. For instance, the outcome of the police introducing a human resources management system may require the following outputs: 1) the police becoming aware of why the introduction of a human resources management system is important, and 2) the police having the skills to facilitate the revision of internal processes necessary to support the new human resources management system.

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

Programme *outputs* are the specific short-term results of products resulting from several OSCE activities,<sup>51</sup> for example, changes in knowledge, skills, awareness, or processes. One example of an output might be “enhanced awareness among staff of the Ministry of Interior on the need for a human resource management system”.

Figure 2 provides two examples of a simplified results chain in the field of SSG/R. While the first example examines a results chain in the area of training for police and prosecutors on addressing hate crimes, the second example sets out a potential results chain for the provision of policy advice on strengthening the representation of women in the security sector. These examples have been simplified for illustrative purposes: in practice, several outputs are typically required for reaching each outcome, and several outcomes may be needed to contribute to a particular objective (impact). In the case of example 1, for instance, in order to reach the desired outcome there may have been a need for an additional output consisting of “awareness raised among potential victims on how to contact the police when witnessing or experiencing a hate crime”.

**Figure 2: The results chain**

Activity →	Output →	Outcome →	Objective (intended impact)
<i>Provision of training, policy advice, etc.</i>	<i>Short-term results generated by OSCE support (e.g., enhanced awareness, enhanced knowledge, acquired sets of skills)</i>	<i>Use of the outputs (e.g., application of the knowledge learned or of the skills acquired)</i>	<i>Long-term effects of the outcomes</i>
<i>Example 1: Training for police and prosecutors on why hate crimes have to be addressed and how to address them</i>	Enhanced awareness and understanding among the police and prosecutors on how to address hate crimes	Members of the police use these skills to initiate investigations; and prosecutors use them to effectively prosecute hate crimes.	Assuming certain additional outcomes: Assisting the host country in its efforts to enhance the security of marginalized groups
<i>Example 2: Support to the development of a needs assessment featuring recommendations on improving the fair and equitable representation of women in the security sector</i>	Enhanced knowledge among national stakeholders on measures to be taken to enhance equitable representation of women in the security sector (based on the recommendations)	Relevant ministry adopts a number of these measures (e.g., develops transparent policy on career development, takes measures to facilitate the integration of women with families)	Assuming certain additional outcomes: Assisting the host country in supporting a more inclusive security sector (e.g., supporting increase in the number of women with high ranking positions in the security sector)

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 22.

### 3.3 Using a theory of change to maintain the focus on programme objectives

In the field of SSG/R, one challenge is often that programming takes place on the basis of assumptions that activities will inevitably lead to positive long-term change. However, as the assumptions are rarely tested during the planning phase, there is a risk that certain activities and results may not lead to the intended medium- and long-term results. In order to mitigate this risk, OSCE staff can develop a “theory of change” to highlight the sequence of results and the assumptions underpinning each causal link.

A theory of change takes a logframe a step further in that it offers a visual representation of the results chain accompanied by a narrative to map the various connections between each level of results. It acknowledges the non-linear nature of a results chain, and the fact that there may be multiple strands leading to a single result.<sup>52</sup> As such, a theory of change is particularly useful for maintaining a focus on long-term results and the changes required to achieve these. Moreover, it can help in understanding the complexity of SSG/R interventions, where multiple projects may be required to contribute to a single programme objective. It is also particularly useful for identifying ways in which different OSCE dimensions can contribute to a common overarching objective.

In order to develop a theory of change, OSCE staff should plan for the intended impact (objective) and identify the kind of change needed for this to be realized. This requires planning for support by moving backwards along the results chain, and by determining the changes that need to occur for each result to be attained. In addition, there should be reflection on the underlying assumptions of the theory of change. For each result, it is necessary to ask what assumptions would need to be fulfilled for the next result to be achieved.

For instance, using example 2 from figure 2 above, in order to move from the medium-term result of “the relevant ministry adopting a number of measures to enhance equitable representation of women in the security sector” to the long-term result of a “more inclusive security sector”, a number of assumptions would need to hold good. Among these, a core assumption would be that the measures taken to facilitate the integration of women (e.g., transparent policy on career development) will in fact be implemented in practice. Another assumption is that women are interested in climbing the career ladder to higher-ranking positions. By identifying these assumptions, it is possible to challenge the theory of change and to conduct further assessments of the feasibility of the desired results being achieved. It may also permit the identification of additional activities that may be required to support the achievement of certain results. In this case, for example, one additional activity might be raising awareness among female staff of the new policy on career development.

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<sup>52</sup> Isabel Vogel, *Review of the use of ‘Theory of Change’ in international development* (UK Department of International Development, London, April 2012), [http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/mis\\_spc/DFID\\_ToC\\_Review\\_VogelV7.pdf](http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/mis_spc/DFID_ToC_Review_VogelV7.pdf).



### 3.4 Connecting projects to longer-term programme strategies


At the project level, short-term budget cycles and high staff turnover have often been identified as challenges to planning for long-term impact. This has sometimes led to planning for short-term results at the level of annual outputs, principally in the form of workshops and training (see subsection 3.2). In order to move beyond this, OSCE staff should recognize that mandates and funding commitments are usually extended. This being the case, it is possible to plan for long-term results, even if it is acknowledged that these may take several years to materialize. In particular, staff should develop multi-year programmes which can be split into a series of shorter-term projects.

At the project level, a logframe is used to map the main components of the project (programme objective, project objective, results and activities). It may be useful to complement this with a project-level theory of change which sets out how the project will contribute to the broader programme strategy, and to test the related assumptions to ensure the feasibility of this contribution (see subsection 3.3 on developing a theory of change).

In order to strengthen the connection of projects to long-term planning, it can also be useful to develop a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with national stakeholders in order to lay down the mutually agreed long-term objectives of support, while recognizing that these will be dependent on the OSCE's continued presence in a participating State and/or availability of funds (see box 1). Additionally, extrabudgetary (ExB) projects can sometimes also provide opportunities to plan for long-term results. Indeed, by contrast with projects funded through the Unified Budget (UB) on an annual basis, ExB projects can run for several years, which makes it possible to develop long-term strategies for SSG/R-related projects. While the projects are subject to different financing mechanisms, ExB projects must still seek to contribute to the overall UB programme objectives with which they are connected.

#### **Box 1: The usage of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) for long-term planning**

The OSCE Mission to Serbia's law enforcement department took a long-term approach to planning its support by establishing the practice of negotiating an MoU with the Ministry of Interior every few years on the priorities for the OSCE's support in the subsequent period. It was recognized that this approach facilitated long-term planning and furthermore ensured that the support provided was tailor-made for the Ministry and targeted at their evolving needs. MoUs of this kind can also support mutual accountability when reviewing progress of reform efforts and support provided.

 For information on the OSCE approach to project identification and project development, including the conduct of problem analysis and the development of a logframe, see chapters 5 and 6 of *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (OSCE, 2010), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.

### 3.5 Engaging with other international actors in support of shared objectives

Ideally, all international actors engaged in a country should be contributing to the achievement of the same national long-term priorities. The OSCE should advocate for national actors to define long-term reform priorities and to lead donor co-ordination mechanisms in support of such priorities. If nationally led co-operation mechanisms are not in place, the OSCE should encourage co-operation with other international actors on identifying ways to contribute collectively to the achievement of common national goals. Approaches for engaging with international actors include regular meetings with other international stakeholders (international organizations and agencies, embassies) or the organization of donor co-ordination mechanisms. Beyond its importance as a means of eliminating gaps in support and avoiding the duplication of efforts, co-ordination is also essential to ensuring joint messages. This is particularly important in SSG/R. Given the political nature of some SSG/R reforms, it is important to have strong and co-ordinated messages from the international community on the importance of those national reform priorities that may be considered sensitive.

#### **Box 2: The promotion of a common goal among international actors**

The OSCE Office in Yerevan supported the development of the Armenian National Strategy on Human Rights Protection, which was adopted in 2012. The accompanying Action Plan, which included several provisions related to the security sector, became government policy in 2014. In order to promote its implementation, the international community showed their joint commitment to the process. In particular, the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Union (EU), the OSCE and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) urged the Armenian Government to enhance efforts to support the protection of human rights.<sup>53</sup>

### 3.6 Supporting cross-dimensional collaboration within the OSCE

Cross-dimensional collaboration within the OSCE is another important mechanism for making support more impact-oriented. It facilitates a move away from fragmented support (which may have limited impact) towards planning for long-term results which can be coherently supported from different dimensional perspectives. Field operations should ensure that strategic objectives are identified and supported by all dimensions in order to promote greater impact. [See *the OSCE Guidelines on Cross-Dimensional Approaches to SSG/R.*] The development of a theory of change may be an important tool for supporting a cross-dimensional approach to planning for results (see subsection 3.3).

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<sup>53</sup> Article by Marina Malkhasyan, "Armenia's Human Rights Action Plan: the beginning of a journey", UNDP in Armenia, 11 July 2014, <http://www.am.undp.org/content/armenia/en/home/presscenter/articles/2014/07/11/armenia-s-human-rights-action-plan-the-beginning-of-a-long-journey.html>.


### **Box 3: Strengthening strategic planning through cross-dimensional co-ordination**

Combating trafficking in human beings requires a cross-dimensional approach. The Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB) serves as a co-ordination mechanism within the OSCE for aligning relevant activities across the OSCE structures and institutions. The OSR/CTHB has established a network of focal points in all executive structures including those in the Secretariat (e.g., Transnational Threats Department, Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Gender Section). In 2014, all the structures used the network of focal points to keep each other informed on their activities related to combating trafficking in human beings, identified issues of concern and common priorities, set agendas, and optimized the use of limited resources by acknowledging and building on internal expertise. Regular exchanges and consultations helped them to share experiences and lessons learned, summarize and capitalize on ongoing efforts, and strengthen the Organization's institutional memory and expertise. In order to enhance strategic planning, in 2014 the OSR/CTHB organized a Secretariat Co-ordination Meeting devoted to joint planning. Two meetings of OSCE anti-trafficking focal points were also organized, in order to develop synergies and avoid overlap with relevant executive structures. Through such joint planning initiatives, the OSR/CTHB helps to avoid duplication of efforts and provides a more strategic, impact-oriented approach to support.

### **3.7 Supporting the sustainability of SSG/R through national ownership**

Impact is closely related to the concept of sustainability. If reform efforts are not sustained, then any impact achieved will be lost (or no impact will be achieved at all). Sustainability can only be attained if national actors are willing to sustain reform efforts and have the capacity to do so. National ownership implies that national actors lead the reform process, which they must have the capacity to steer, co-ordinate, monitor, and finance. According to the United Nations system-wide guidance on the subject, national ownership of SSR rests upon four main pillars: a common national vision to guide the reform process; the capacity to implement and co-ordinate the reform process; financial responsibility of the reform process; and nationally-led monitoring and evaluation of the reform process.<sup>54</sup> See box 4 for approaches to supporting national ownership.

 For more detail on how to support national ownership of SSR, see the United Nations *Integrated Technical Guidance Note on National Ownership of SSR*, available at: <http://unssr.unlb.org/Portals/UNSSR/UN%20Integrated%20Technical%20Guidance%20Notes%20on%20SSR.PDF>.

 For more detail on how to conduct assessments of national capacity for SSG/R, see the *OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R*.

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<sup>54</sup> UN Integrated Technical Guidance Note on National Ownership of SSR, <http://unssr.unlb.org/Portals/UNSSR/UN%20Integrated%20Technical%20Guidance%20Notes%20on%20SSR.PDF>.

#### **Box 4: Approaches to supporting national ownership**

##### *Ensuring that OSCE support flows from national priorities*

One important element of national ownership is the existence of a national vision of security sector reform from which OSCE objectives can be identified. A needs assessment is an important tool for identifying priorities on the basis of this national vision. If a full-scale assessment is not feasible, at the very least desk analysis of security-related documents should be undertaken to determine the national vision for security which may guide reform priorities. Moreover, the importance of re-assessing evolving needs to identify changing priorities should be recognized. Resources should be placed flexibly where there is clear interest and potential for impact. This necessitates a readiness to take advantage of opportunities when there is momentum for reform, by mobilizing flexible support capable of re-aligning resources to emerging priorities. OSCE staff can seek to encourage flexible approaches through MoUs agreed with national counterparts (see box 1) and through regular progress evaluations leading to the readjustment of projects and programmes on the basis of evolving needs (see box 5).

##### *Assessing national will to lead reform efforts*

When engaging with national stakeholders, and as a means of building meaningful partnerships, it is important to make adequate assessments of national interests (through stakeholder analysis). Priority should be given to engagement with national stakeholders who can contribute to institutional change and who have a clear interest in reform. These “champions for change” may play an important role in advocating reform among other actors and in other parts of the security sector. In this respect, it should be remembered that political processes in a State can lead to changes in stakeholders and partners, particularly after elections. This factor should be taken account of through appropriate risk mitigation plans and may result in the need for further needs assessments.

##### *Supporting national capacity for leading reform efforts*

In addition to identifying “champions for change” who are willing to lead reform efforts, it is also necessary to map capacity to lead such efforts. The carrying out of needs assessments to identify priorities for capacity-building is important to ensure that such support is aimed at existing gaps. National actors should be encouraged to take the lead on various matters, notably: identifying national priorities for reforms, implementing these reforms, establishing national/international co-ordination mechanisms on SSG/R, and monitoring progress in national reform implementation. There are various approaches to supporting national capacity to lead reform efforts in these areas. For instance, in the area of capacity for financial management of reform efforts, this may include supporting public expenditure reviews, agreeing on timelines for taking over the funding of certain reform efforts, supporting networking

between national actors and donors, and providing training on project management and reporting to enable national authorities to undertake fundraising. It is important to ensure the sustainability of support for capacity-building by anchoring it in broader institutional capacity-building strategies.

### *Engaging national stakeholders in dialogue with the OSCE on its support*

National stakeholders must be engaged throughout the programme cycle, from needs assessments through to implementation and evaluation. It is a good practice to hold an annual consultation meeting to jointly re-assess priorities on the basis of the evolving political and security environment. Further examples of good practice include steering committees and the provision of periodic presentations of results to national stakeholders. An inclusive approach requires the engagement of all relevant national stakeholders (national parliaments, government officials, civil society organizations, etc.).

### *Supporting the engagement of civil society*

One key principle of national ownership is ensuring that it extends beyond national authorities to include the perceptions and needs of the general population. This requires that support be given to dialogue between national authorities and civil society. A lack of involvement of civil society in the planning and implementation of national reform efforts may lead to the definition of reform goals that do not reflect the interest or needs of the beneficiaries. In the long run, reform efforts that do not meet the real needs of beneficiaries are unlikely to be sustainable. The OSCE should advocate an inclusive approach to national consultation which encompasses civil society, including civil society organizations (CSOs) representing minorities. Additionally, OSCE programming should itself be based on thorough consultation with civil society. For instance, consultation of this kind has shown significant value in the area of developing targeted training for law enforcement on dealing with hate crimes. This is because civil society can provide insights on the nature of hate crimes in a community and are subsequently also important partners in the planning and implementation of community-driven responses to hate crimes.<sup>55</sup> Civil society should be consulted in all OSCE needs assessments in the field of SSG/R.

### **Box 5: The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina's efforts to prioritize support through an impact-oriented approach**

In the context of the downsizing of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the Mission decided to re-prioritize its support; while it was to focus on fewer areas, those areas would be ones where it was likely to have maximum impact. Moreover, it

<sup>55</sup> OSCE/ODIHR, *Training against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE): Programme Description*, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/odhr/tahcle>.

sought to identify areas where national authorities could take over projects in line with the principle of national ownership. In order to contribute to implementation, the Mission's Human Dimension Department undertook an analysis to determine the most significant threats to internal stability, security and reconciliation in BiH. As a consequence, the HD Department mainly refocused its activities on projects related to dealing with the past and transitional justice. In its justice sector reform programme, it decided to concentrate its efforts on the more achievable objective of supporting the harmonization of criminal procedure codes as opposed to providing broader support in this area. This was because it had considered the role of other international actors engaged in support to the broader sphere of criminal justice. For example, it stopped its support to the area of juvenile justice because analysis had showed that there were several other international actors engaged in this area.

### **3.8 Recognizing the need to complement long-term strategies with quick-impact projects**

The OSCE should strive to ensure that its support has long-term impact and is sustainable. As part of a larger strategy, however, it may in some cases be necessary to invest in quick-impact projects which will strengthen confidence-building and lay the ground for longer-term engagement. Such projects are generally small-scale and of immediate benefit to the population or key stakeholders. They should make it possible to meet an immediate need. In the field of SSG/R, such short-term projects can contribute to building up the legitimacy or capacity of the security sector, which may serve to raise confidence among the population. They may also seek to increase a sense of professionalism among security sector staff, which can be beneficial by ensuring support for the implementation of more demanding reforms. In other cases, such projects can contribute to direct benefits for the population, thus raising their confidence in the reforms being undertaken and in the security services generally (see box 6). From an OSCE perspective, engaging in this type of project may contribute to strengthening interaction with key stakeholders during the project design phase, thus building confidence for co-operation on future projects which may be more sensitive. The design of these projects should rely on consultation with the intended beneficiaries to ensure that the projects will have the anticipated effects. Needs assessments are important tools for identifying where such projects may be of value. Such projects are only beneficial if they help to contribute to a greater measure of long-term sustainable engagement; therefore, they should not be developed in a vacuum, but must go hand-in-hand with the development of long-term strategies for support. Moreover, adequate attention must be paid to ensuring that short-term responses do not hamper long-term initiatives.

**Box 6: Examples of quick-impact projects as part of the Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan**

Following outbreaks of unrest in 2010, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek established the Community Security Initiative aimed at increasing police respect for and protection of human rights and building confidence between law enforcement agencies and communities. The programme mainly consisted of co-locating unarmed international police officers as advisors in district police stations. During the initial stages of the programme, small-scale community initiatives have been used to increase confidence between the police and the community. For instance, in a number of areas it was possible to re-establish police presence through the deployment of “mobile police receptions”. These customized minivans contain the basic equipment required for a functioning mobile police station. Since their introduction, police and community leaders have increasingly used them as places to raise and discuss problems.<sup>56</sup> In Chui Province, one of the challenges faced was that villagers could not find the neighbourhood inspectors when they were needed. A simple way of addressing this was to print business cards with mobile contact numbers. Finally, another initiative undertaken was to put up video surveillance in selected police departments in order to make it possible to check allegations of torture. As well as acting as a preventive measure, this gave a clear signal of a change in approach to communities. The support provided under the Community Security Initiative can therefore be characterized as low-budget but matching local needs, as it was based on a thorough understanding of specific challenges in each community. It has also built confidence between the OSCE advisors and their police districts, thus facilitating the more effective provision of advice; in addition, it has resulted in the programme being expanded to other districts.<sup>57</sup>

**3.9 Planning for monitoring and evaluation of SSG/R support**

Effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should start at the planning stage along with the development of logframes and/or theories of change. This requires the selection of a strategic objective (or intended impact), and a process of working backwards to identify the results needed to reach this goal. Once the results have been identified, it is necessary to develop indicators for each result and means of verifying them through data collection. It is also necessary to identify potential assumptions and risks. [See the OSCE Manual Project Management in the OSCE (2010), pp. 40–43.] In the OSCE, at the programme level, indicators are generally assigned to outcomes. At the project level, indicators should be assigned to all levels of the results chain. In order to maintain a focus on long-term results during project planning, it may be useful to also refer to programme-level indicators (from the programme outline) in order to provide a long-term

<sup>56</sup> OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “The Community Security Initiative”, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/106312>.

<sup>57</sup> OSCE Centre in Bishkek, “CSI areas of operation”, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/89660>.

reference point.<sup>58</sup> The following sections offer guidance for planning for subsequent monitoring and evaluation.

- *Mainstreaming SSG/R principles in the approach to monitoring and evaluation:* M&E should be planned in a way which is in line with key principles of SSG/R, for instance:
  - *National ownership:* Have adequate efforts been made to incorporate the perceptions of national stakeholders into planned M&E efforts? This may include engaging national actors on the decision of what to monitor, conducting focus group meetings with beneficiaries, and using national experts to collect data for the baseline;
  - *Gender-sensitivity:* Has data been sex-disaggregated to facilitate the analysis of different results for women, girls, men and boys? Does the evaluation team have gender expertise?
  - *Human rights-based approach:* Have the perceptions of both duty-bearers and rights-holders been collected? Have efforts been made to include the perceptions of minorities?
  
- *Clarifying the difference between activity indicators and output indicators:* Output indicators are at times confused with indicators that merely show that activities have taken place. For instance, when, as is sometimes the case, an indicator may refer to the “number of participants that attended the training”, this is only an indication that the activity has taken place, but does not show whether a short-term result (output) has actually been achieved. The indicator should reflect changes in capacity, knowledge, or processes. An example of a valid output indicator is: “percentage of trainees who stated that they had acquired enhanced understanding on how to address hate crimes”;
  
- *Clarifying the difference between output indicators and outcome indicators:* While recognizing that the level at which results are assigned may depend on context (see subsection 3.2), there are some basic differences between outputs and outcomes which hold good regardless. One common challenge is that output indicators are often mislabelled as outcome indicators. For instance, the output indicator of “skills acquired through training” may at times be mislabelled as an outcome indicator, even though it does not give an indication of whether the training has made a difference and is contributing to behavioural or institutional change. In order to examine the change that has resulted from this output, it is necessary to move up the results chain to examine whether the knowledge learned has been applied and whether this has led to improved practices and/or working methods. Given the output indicator “enhanced knowledge of international good practice among parliamentary security committee staff”, one corresponding outcome indicator might be the “extent to which parliamentary security committees have adapted their working methods in line with international good practice”.

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<sup>58</sup> OSCE, *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (2010), p. 40, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.



- *Managing expectations on indicators:* While indicators are important for tracking progress, they are not able to explain why progress has occurred. Indicators also have resource implications in that they require the collection of data. This being the case, efforts should be made to limit the number of indicators selected, and to identify the indicators most relevant to illustrating the information needed. In particular, indicators should be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound. At the same time, it must be recognized that in some contexts it may not be possible to collect data that correlates directly to a desired indicator. This is often the case for indicators at the objective level, where there may be a need to develop indirect indicators (known as proxy indicators). For instance, while it may not be possible to identify a direct indicator to measure “increased security for marginalized groups”, it may be possible to measure this indirectly through a proxy indicator combining, for example, “levels of hate crimes against marginalized groups” with “perceptions of security among these groups”;
- *Developing both quantitative and qualitative indicators:* With regard to outcomes in SSG/R, there is a need to recognize that qualitative indicators are sometimes better suited to capturing behaviour and institutional change than quantitative indicators. Unfortunately, there is often a tendency to give preference to quantitative indicators because they are easier to measure. OSCE staff should ensure that an appropriate balance is reached between quantitative and qualitative indicators. For instance, if a quantitative indicator looks at the “percentage of hate crimes investigated by the police”, there is still a need to establish whether these investigations were conducted in a way calculated to contribute to positive effects. An accompanying qualitative indicator based on observation or interviews may thus be needed in order to reflect the “extent to which investigations are in line with international good practice”;
- *Developing a baseline against which progress can be measured:* Without baseline data, it is not possible to have a reference point against which to measure progress. In certain SSG/R contexts, the identification of baseline data is a particularly common challenge. Ideally, such data should be identified prior to the start of a project, through needs assessments, for example, which may provide important baseline information through the collection of the perceptions of beneficiaries. [See the [OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R.](#)] Sometimes, however, baseline data is not identified prior to the project, often because of lack of time. In such cases, it is still possible to collect it at the beginning of the project when the effects of change are not yet likely to be visible. This may entail undertaking key person interviews or focus group meetings to assess the current situation. It is also possible to reconstruct broad baseline information on the basis of secondary data (e.g., civil society reports, former assessments of international actors, national crime statistics). To enhance the credibility of secondary data used, it should be assessed for its accuracy, its possible bias, and the time period covered, and should be triangulated with other data sources;

- Identifying sources of data:** As well as feeding into the baseline, data collected should also contribute to the analysis of indicators in the logframe. In the area of SSG/R it is sometimes challenging to access data which is not publicly available (e.g., administrative data such as police reports) because such information may be considered sensitive. However, the OSCE is able to collect primary data through key person interviews, focus groups or public surveys. Focus group interviews may be particularly useful for collecting information on the perceptions of CSOs or women’s or minority groups. Public perception surveys, while requiring more resources, provide valuable information on the population’s confidence in the security sector. Finally, data can also be collected through observation, for instance, by examining how parliamentary security committee hearings take place or how minorities are integrated into the police services. In order to ensure the credibility of data analysis, the data has to be triangulated, that is to say, the findings have to be verified on the basis of several different data sources and data collection methods. [See the 2010 OSCE Manual *Project Management in the OSCE*, pp. 101–105.]

**Figure 3. Example of indicators at different results levels**

Activity →	Output →	Outcome →	Objective (desired impact)
<p><i>Example 1: Training for police and prosecutors on why hate crimes have to be addressed and how to address them</i></p>	<p>Enhanced awareness and understanding among the police and prosecutors on how to address hate crimes</p>	<p>The police use these skills to initiate investigations, and prosecutors use them to effectively prosecute hate crimes.</p>	<p>Assuming certain additional outcomes: To assist the host country in its efforts to enhance the security of marginalized groups.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of training courses conducted for police and prosecutors (means of verification: OSCE projects documents; observation).</li> <li>• Number of participants attending each training course (means of verification: OSCE project documents; observation).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of trainees who state that they acquired enhanced understanding on how to address hate crimes (means of verification: post-training questionnaire).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of hate crimes that are investigated by the police (means of verification: administrative data; expert meetings).</li> <li>• Extent to which investigations are in line with international good practice (means of verification: document review; meetings with persons who have been investigated).</li> <li>• Percentage of hate crimes that are prosecuted (means of verification: administrative data; expert meetings).</li> <li>• Extent to which prosecutions are conducted in a way which is in line with international good practice (means of verification: document review; meetings with persons who have been prosecuted).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Extent to which marginalized groups voice confidence in the ability of the police to stop hate crimes (means of verification: public survey/focus group).</li> <li>• Number of hate crimes against marginalized groups (means of verification: administrative data).</li> </ul>

### 3.10. Recognizing challenges to supporting impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R

There are a number of potential challenges to supporting impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R, notably the following:

- *Lack of political support for impact-oriented reforms:* SSG/R is a political process which can result in changes in power balances. For this reason, political support may at times only be available for ad hoc activities such as training and workshops, and not for long-term reforms likely to result in sustainable changes. OSCE staff should identify opportunities to raise political support for long-term reforms. This may be done by using existing OSCE commitments as entry points (e.g., the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security), by supporting regional workshops where it may be possible to address an issue that is too sensitive to discuss at the national level [see the *OSCE Guidelines on Regional Approaches to SSG/R*], or by making use of the capacities of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Undertaking a stakeholder analysis to understand who stands to benefit or lose out from a reform process is important for identifying “champions of change”. Similarly, lobbying for the establishment of liaison officers within the different security sector institutions and ministries responsible may subsequently facilitate access to counterparts who are open to discussing opportunities for long-term support. Finally, supporting the capacity of civil society is important to ensuring that they are able to monitor the effectiveness of reforms, and advocate further reforms needed;
- *Balancing national ownership with impact-oriented approaches:* While national ownership is the foundation for supporting impact-oriented approaches, it must be recognized that in some contexts, the necessary precondition of a clear national vision for long-term reform may not exist. In such cases, the OSCE may be called upon to contribute to various different reform efforts which are nationally initiated, but do not necessarily contribute to an overarching long-term national goal. When this is the case, a balance must be found between promoting national ownership and supporting impact-oriented reforms. While it is important to ensure that support is planned in a way which is likely to result in long-term impact, it must also be recognized that responsibility for the prioritization of reform efforts lies with national actors. Sometimes small steps are needed to build confidence and raise awareness on the importance of long-term reform priorities before it is possible to engage in discussion on more strategic issues. However, such steps should nonetheless be framed within a longer-term OSCE strategy, and should be reassessed if there are no signs of a move towards support for long-term nationally driven reform efforts (see box 6);
- *Dealing with the fact that impact which can be expected in one context may not be feasible in another context:* When planning for impact-oriented approaches, it is necessary to recognize that impact takes on different meanings in different contexts, and that benchmarks cannot be transferred from one context to another. For instance, while in one State the drafting of a national security policy may be considered a significant step forward in the reform process, in another context progress can only

be measured with the implementation of the national security policy. Similarly, the timeline needed to contribute to impact may vary widely from State to State and from region to region. For this reason, it is important to include contextual information in relevant project documents from the outset, explaining what reforms would be considered as constituting progress towards achieving significant impact. This makes it possible to use project documents as baselines against which to measure subsequent change.

### 4. Implementing Impact-Oriented Approaches

This section offers concrete suggestions and food for thought on how to implement impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R support across the typical programmatic approaches used by the OSCE. For the purpose of these guidelines, the OSCE's support to activities in this field can be grouped in broad terms according to the following programmatic approaches, which are considered in five subsections below: development of research-based products (4.1); promotion of norms and good practices (4.2); provision of legal advice (4.3); provision of policy advice (4.4); and capacity-building (4.5). Each programmatic approach should be undertaken in such a way as to maximize the potential for achieving long-term and sustainable results. In particular, this requires ensuring that all types of support are connected to their respective overarching objective, and that thought is given to how to enhance the sustainability of support. Subsection 4.6 continues by considering ways of monitoring and evaluating progress towards achieving these results.

#### 4.1 Research-based products

The OSCE often develops and publishes research-based products in the form of guidelines and handbooks which may be used to raise awareness on topics or to support national actors in implementing certain reform efforts. In-country, the OSCE also supports targeted research through assessment reports or monitoring reports.

Approaches to enhancing the impact of research products include:

- *Ensuring that the development of research products has a clear objective:* The development of research products is sometimes a prerequisite for effective OSCE support. For instance, the development of empirically based research products which seek to provide recommendations for national stakeholders may contribute to enhancing the credibility of OSCE policy advice. The development of guidance products may be useful as a means of strengthening capacity-building efforts. It is important, however, that the development of such products is not conducted in isolation from other projects but, rather, as part of a contribution to an overarching objective;
- *Ensuring that research products are relevant to needs:* The conducting of a gap analysis to identify national needs for guidance and research is a useful way of tailoring such products to a specific target group. National stakeholders may at times be lack-

ing important data on the basis of which to take policy decisions. The OSCE can support civil society organizations in conducting research which is likely to fill important gaps. For instance, human rights monitoring reports have often been considered useful by national actors, as their results are based on empirical data which may be lacking in-country. Planning should ensure that national actors are interested in such products and that there will be opportunities to apply the findings (see box 7 below);

- *Raising awareness of the products, both within the OSCE and beyond:* At times, while much effort is invested in developing products, efforts are not made to ensure that the target group is aware of their existence and how to use them.<sup>59</sup> During the planning stage, efforts should be made to establish how awareness will be raised on these products, what languages they may need to be translated into, and whether training will be necessary to support their use. This should be budgeted for from the outset;
- *Monitoring and evaluating the provision of research products:* Efforts should be made to examine whether the products provided are being used by the intended audience and that their use is contributing to positive change. This may be done through questionnaires to the target audience of the research products requesting information on their usage, and by observing whether recommendations provided are being applied.

### **Box 7: OSCE report as a contribution to the establishment of the National Preventive Mechanism in Kyrgyzstan**

In 2011, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek supported monitoring groups active country-wide which were tasked with monitoring human rights in places of detention and other closed facilities, under the auspices of the Ombudsman and with the involvement of NGOs. That there was a need for large-scale research was clear from the lack of adequate documented data on the human rights situation. The monitoring visits provided detailed empirical data which resulted in a consolidated final report<sup>60</sup> analysing the monitoring findings for the year. The report was channelled to relevant policymakers and State authorities, including the Ministry of the Interior and the Prosecutor's General Office, and was publicly discussed at a round table which brought together more than a hundred participants. The findings and recommendations of the report served as a solid reference in pursuit of the establishment of the National Preventive Mechanism, and were also subsequently used to support national and international advocacy.

## **4.2 Promotion of norms and good practices**

In the area of the promotion of norms and good practices, the OSCE often supports workshops and conferences in order to raise awareness of international norms and in

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<sup>59</sup> This is also applicable to the relevant OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) resolutions, which serve to provide policy guidance in this field.

<sup>60</sup> Ulugbek Azimov, Dinara Sayakova and Elmira Esenamanova, "Torture Prevention in Temporary Detention Facilities under the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic: Monitoring, Reaction, Rehabilitation", OSCE Centre in Bishkek, 2011, <http://www.osce.org/bishkek/93782>.

particular of OSCE commitments. For example, meetings or forums are organized for the exchange of good practices on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Other approaches to supporting norms promotion include the organization of study visits to facilitate the sharing of experiences.

Approaches to enhancing the impact of norms promotion include:

- *Ensuring that workshops/study visits are perceived as a means to an end:* At times, workshops are supported as if they themselves were the objective, when in fact they are simply means of contributing to achieving change. Workshops should not be planned in isolation as single activities of a given project but, rather, should be complementary activities for reaching clear objectives with focused follow-up planned and budgeted. Thought should also be given to how, during workshops, to support in-depth discussions on reform needs, on plans in line with norms, good practices, and OSCE's long-term strategy, and on how to support the development of concrete recommendations or agreements for moving forward. This requires ensuring that the target audience of workshops is carefully selected (see box 8 below for advice on selecting participants), and that the agenda is crafted in a way to permit the collection and summarizing of recommendations;
- *Considering how to engage national stakeholders in the organization of workshops:* At times, national stakeholders may have the capacity and desire to organize or co-organize such workshops. With a view to supporting sustainability, and as part of the OSCE's approach to strengthening national ownership, the OSCE should tend to support events organized by national stakeholders rather than taking the lead in the organization of such events where this may no longer be necessary. Civil society organizations, for instance, may have the capacity and interest to engage in the organization of such workshops. Efforts should therefore be made to map the capacities of CSOs to engage in such activities, and to assess whether the context is too sensitive or not for these organizations to take the lead;
- *Monitoring and evaluating support given to the promotion of norms:* It is important to monitor whether or not the workshops/study visits are leading to concrete recommendations or agreements, and whether or not these are subsequently being implemented. Norms discussed during workshops/study visits should, for instance, be monitored to assess the extent to which these have been integrated into work processes. Activities that are not leading to such results should not be repeated without thought being given to how to increase their impact.

### **Box 8: Raising the potential for impact of study visits**

The OSCE often organizes study visits to encourage participants to learn from others' experiences. In the field of SSG/R this has often been considered useful in order to build the confidence necessary to undertaking sensitive reform efforts. Such study visits have at times had significant results. For instance, an OSCE study visit

of Bosnian parliamentarians to Germany resulted in the parliamentary decision to set up a military ombudsman. In some cases, however, study visits are supported when they are unlikely to have an impact – this may be the case, for instance, when participants are regularly selected without a fully transparent and strategic approach. In order to increase the potential for study visits to contribute to change, terms of reference for the study visit should be developed containing a clear objective, immediate results expected, the audience being targeted, and follow-up. In particular, the participants of these study trips have to be well selected. Their position must be relevant to the overall goal of the study trip; furthermore, they should not be assigned out of favouritism, nor should the same personnel participate in several successive visits or in unrelated visits. Secondly, participants should ideally be in positions that give them the authority to make decisions. Thirdly, participants in study visits should be encouraged to report back in a formal manner and disseminate knowledge acquired. Finally, study visits should be monitored and evaluated to ensure that they contribute to concrete results. If there is no evidence of clear results – when, for instance, recommendations deriving from the study visits are simply not implemented – then support for such visits should be reconsidered.

### 4.3 Provision of legal advice

The OSCE may be called upon to undertake a review of the entire law-making process in a participating State, or to comment on a particular law related to the security sector (e.g., giving opinions on draft laws on the police, or on the prosecution office). Recommendations from the OSCE field operations or opinions provided by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), often jointly with the CoE's European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), assist States to ensure that their laws comply with OSCE standards. The OSCE can also support the subsequent implementation of the laws.

Approaches to enhancing the impact of legal advice:

- *Taking a comprehensive approach to support:* Planning for a full cycle of support can contribute to raising impact. This may include, as required: performing legal reviews; providing direct support to the drafting body; supporting peer-to-peer communication to exchange lessons on implementing the law; the provision of capacity-building to implement the law; and monitoring the implementation of the law following its adoption;
- *Engaging directly with legislators:* Legal advice is often reported to have greater impact when the OSCE is able to directly advise and participate in the working groups or commissions responsible for drafting. Direct interaction with legislators can help to ensure that legal advice is well received and that cultural realities are adequately reflected in the advice provided;
- *Promoting assessments of the potential social and financial impact of the legislation:* The OSCE should promote and support impact assessments of potential legislative

amendments. It is important that assessments of the potential impact of a law are undertaken at an early stage of the drafting process, so that legislators can consider whether legislative amendments will work well in practice, and thus be sustainable. In particular, assessments should examine the potential social and financial impact of passing a certain law. It is also helpful to identify at an early stage the capacity-building needs for the subsequent implementation of the law.

- *Monitoring and evaluating the provision of legal advice:* The OSCE should examine to what extent its legal advice has been taken on board by national actors. Monitoring should consider not only the support to the legislative drafting process (e.g., whether the OSCE support to the drafting process was considered relevant or promoted an inclusive approach), but also the subsequent implementation phase (e.g., if it led to legislative amendments), if applicable. If the country is lagging behind in the implementation of legal amendments, the OSCE may consider supporting follow-up activities to assist in their implementation.

### **Box 9: Taking a long-term approach to the provision of legal advice in Moldova**

In February 2010, during an OSCE ODIHR assessment visit to the Republic of Moldova, the ODIHR engaged in discussion with the Ministry of Justice regarding amendments to existing hate crimes legislation. The ODIHR subsequently provided recommendations on how the legislation could be brought fully in line with international standards.<sup>61</sup> In order to build on the momentum, the OSCE Mission to Moldova joined the European Union High Level Policy Advice Mission to the Republic of Moldova and the UN Office in Moldova in organizing an event to discuss how hate crimes can be better addressed through legal and policy reform.<sup>62</sup> The discussion, which was attended by Moldovan politicians, national representatives of the judiciary, civil society representatives, and international legal experts, resulted in the development of recommendations to the judiciary and legislators. In recognition of the fact that legal reform needs to be accompanied by increased efforts to implement the law, the OSCE Mission to Moldova supported efforts to ensure that police, prosecutors and judges have the capacity and the skills to identify and record hate-motivated incidents and crimes properly. In 2013, the OSCE Mission to Moldova, the ODIHR and the General Prosecutor's Office of the Republic of Moldova held a training course focusing on strengthening national capacities of the criminal justice system response to hate crimes.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>61</sup> ODIHR and OSCE Mission to Moldova, "OSCE holds roundtable discussion on hate crimes legislation", press release, 23 June 2010, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/69478>.

<sup>62</sup> OSCE Mission to Moldova, "OSCE supports discussion on strengthening action against hate crimes in Moldova", press release, 11 June 2012, <http://www.osce.org/moldova/91182>.

<sup>63</sup> OSCE Mission to Moldova, "Responding to hate crimes theme of OSCE seminar for prosecutors, police officers in Moldova", 18 October 2013, <http://www.osce.org/moldova/107227>.



### 4.4 Provision of policy advice

Providing policy advice to a participating State is an effective way to support States' reform efforts. Policy advice can take many forms, from advice on the potential options for reform, to advice on the review of national plans or on the development of strategies.

Approaches to enhancing the impact of policy advice include:

- *Engaging with other international actors:* Policy advice has a stronger impact if it is harmonized and agreed upon by all major actors in-country, so that the same messages are sent. OSCE staff should reach out to other major actors to communicate policy priorities and to co-ordinate messages;
- *Encouraging an inclusive approach to policy-making:* The implementation of policy changes is likely to affect a wide range of stakeholders. This being the case, it is essential to encourage an inclusive approach to policy-making which includes all relevant national stakeholders, including representatives of civil society. Moreover, dialogue should be extended beyond the capital to the regions, as there are often great differences in the challenges faced across a country (see box 10 below);
- *Advocating adequate budgeting and monitoring:* Policy advice should include efforts to ensure that actors are aware of the financial implications of the reform activities planned. For instance, the OSCE can advise on the development of implementation plans to accompany the development of new laws or policies. Moreover, the OSCE should, as relevant, advocate the development of a national monitoring framework for tracking the implementation of new policies and plans;
- *Considering supporting the appointment of liaison officers:* In particularly sensitive areas of SSG/R it can be useful to identify liaison/co-ordination officers, who have the potential to provide important entry points for the provision of policy and technical advice;
- *Monitoring and evaluating the provision of policy advice:* The contribution to a wider regulatory framework in line with OSCE commitments is an important element for evaluating OSCE policy support. For instance, national policy documents can be examined to assess the extent to which they correspond to guiding norms and good practices promoted by the OSCE. Efforts should also be made to monitor their implementation and to identify areas of lesser progress which may require further capacity-building or advocacy efforts.

#### **Box 10: Supporting a common understanding of policy reform in Albania**

Efforts to support policy changes require effective dialogue among national stakeholders. In 2010, in co-operation with the Albanian State Police, the OSCE Presence in Albania organized a series of thirteen round-table discussions in various cities of the country in order to promote a common understanding of policy goals among national stakeholders. The round tables took place against the background of efforts of the Albanian police to implement a long-term strategy on community policing. The

round tables served to introduce OSCE guidance on policing which the Albanian State Police was intending to use in its reform efforts. These events created a platform to engage local officials, and civil society actors, including minority and media representatives, in order to ensure a broad dialogue across stakeholders. Moreover, the round tables provided the opportunity for local law police directorates to present their regional strategies and action plans on the matter, which increased confidence and contributed to local ownership. In addition to strengthening dialogue on planned reform efforts, the round tables served to provide a first step towards enhancing relations between law enforcement agencies and citizens.<sup>64</sup>

### 4.5 Capacity-building

Strengthening national capacities is crucial to supporting long-term and sustainable reform efforts led by national actors. Capacity-building may take the form of enhancing the development of individual skills (e.g., training) or support to broader institution-building (e.g., supporting the establishment of structures and processes).

Approaches to enhancing the impact of capacity building include:

- *Embedding capacity-building initiatives in long-term institutional reform strategies:* Capacity-related support should not aim solely to improve an individual's performance but should also be integrated into a long-term framework of reform at the institutional/organizational level. This requires reflection on how capacity-building will be connected to broader structural changes. Additionally, there should be agreement on how to institutionalize both regular training needs assessment processes and individual training, whether through "train the trainers" programmes or by supporting the inclusion of training into a national training college's regular curriculum;
- *Managing turnover of trained experts:* One common challenge in the area of training is that trainees are subsequently transferred to other structures, thus limiting the ability for new skills to be used and transferred to others. One possible approach to mitigating this challenge is to require written agreements with national stakeholders that the staff who are to be trained will continue to work in their current positions for a certain period of time in order to ensure that they are in a position to apply and transfer their new skills. The establishment of alumni networks of experts and officials engaged in SSG/R could also contribute to sustainability;
- *Selection of candidates:* A clear selection method and terms of reference (ToR) should be developed to guarantee that participants nominated by authorities to participate in capacity-building initiatives have relevant experience and interest to strengthen their skills, and that they will have the opportunity to apply them (see box 8);
- *Monitoring and evaluating the provision of capacity-building:* On the basis of the evaluation of the capacity-building process and its results, a review process should be initiated that involves all stakeholders and focuses on all stages of the capacity-build-

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<sup>64</sup> OSCE Mission to Albania, "OSCE, Albanian State Police conclude roundtable series on community policing", press release, 7 July 2010, <http://www.osce.org/albania/69551>.

ing process. Any capacity-building activities that have not proven to be successful should be thoroughly redesigned. In the area of training more specifically, one weak link is often the lack of adequate follow-up with beneficiaries on assessing OSCE support for the enhancing of awareness and knowledge in practice. For instance, evaluation of training courses is often limited to recording the number of participants. Instead, evaluation should focus on the increase of knowledge and skills of participants and, in particular, how the relevant knowledge and skills are being applied; one example of good practice is the conduct of time-delayed surveys (e.g., six months later) asking for precisely this information. Developing questionnaires for the trainees' supervisors on the changes they have observed is also useful for evaluating impact. This can furthermore contribute to increasing awareness among the supervisors on the potential trained staff possess for contributing to institutional processes. More broadly, there is a need to assess the extent to which individual capacity-building has been linked to broader institutional reform processes.


### **Box 11: Pursuing an impact-oriented approach to capacity-building: “Training against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement” (TAHCLE)**

An example of an impact-oriented approach is provided by the ODIHR's programme on “Training against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement” (TAHCLE).<sup>65</sup> Following a request from a participating State, the ODIHR develops an MoU with national authorities in order to agree on roles and responsibilities. Then the host State appoints a national liaison officer and a national implementation working group to support programme development and implementation. This ensures that national actors are able to shape the process and strengthens the context-specific character of the curriculum developed. In addition, the TAHCLE programme is preceded by a needs assessment conducted by the ODIHR to assess the current police responses to hate crimes, the legal framework, and the extent of hate crimes. In order to increase the impact of the training delivered, the ODIHR invests in a “training of trainers” methodology aiming to train local police staff as instructors who then are able to train their colleagues. The training of trainers is subject to monitoring and evaluation, with the ODIHR attending, for instance, some of the training sessions delivered at the national training institutions. One example of such an approach is provided by the implementation of the programme in Montenegro in 2013, when the ODIHR delivered the train-the-trainers course to investigators, public order police officers, and police academy trainers. In order to follow up on this project, the ODIHR met with the trainees a year later to discuss progress and challenges faced and to assess whether potential follow-up activities were necessary.<sup>66</sup> This form of evaluation may offer an entry point for identifying further areas where institutional capacity building

<sup>65</sup> OSCE/ODIHR, “Training Against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement (TAHCLE): Programme Description”, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/odihrtahcle>.

<sup>66</sup> See event summary of ODIHR, “Training against hate crime for law enforcement (TAHCLE) follow-up meeting”, workshop in Podgorica, 24–25 April 2014, <http://tandis.odihr.pl/?p=ki-hc,ev-sect>.

may be required. For instance, at the request of national authorities, the ODIHR can assist the police in developing additional practical tools for addressing hate crimes, such as standard operating procedures, which can help police with the effective implementation of skills acquired during training. So far, the TAHCLE programme has been implemented in Bulgaria, Croatia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland and Ukraine.

 For guidance on the role of capacity-building in police reform, see Frank Harris, *The Role of Capacity-Building in Police Reform* (Department of Police Education and Development, OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2005), <http://polis.osce.org/library/f/2643/527/OSCE-SRB-RPT-2643-EN-527.pdf>. Among other things, the publication underlines the need for a capacity-building strategy which displays clear interlinkages with broader institution-building.

#### 4.6 Monitoring and evaluating SSG/R support

Effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is essential to ensure that support will lead to long-term results. In practice, M&E in the field of SSG/R is often weak. Some challenges are general (e.g., lack of financial and human resources); the proper response to these is to ensure that monitoring is properly planned and budgeted for, and that awareness is raised on its importance. Other challenges are SSG/R-specific. For instance, it is sometimes considered difficult to track change because of the qualitative nature of the effects of SSG/R (e.g., increased confidence of the population in the police). Another challenge in the SSG/R field is the fact that relevant data (e.g., number of victims of sexual and gender-based violence, military expenditure, level of corruption) may not be available because they are considered too sensitive to share. This hampers the development of baselines and is an obstacle to the collection of data to populate the indicators (for more information on planning for M&E, including the identification and collection of data, development of indicators, and establishment of baselines, see subsection 3.9). In order to ensure that M&E is focused on the OSCE's contribution to long-term results, it is necessary to ensure that the monitoring and evaluation of results goes beyond mere outputs.

Approaches to enhancing the monitoring and evaluation of impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R support include:

- *Monitoring beyond outputs:* Monitoring is the continuous analysis of progress towards the achievement of results. It consists of the collection of data, the analysis of the data against set indicators, assumptions and risks, and the validation of this data. Within the OSCE, monitoring at the project level tracks the carrying out of activities and the achievement of results and objectives. While at this level monitoring outputs is important to ensure that projects are on track, it is nonetheless also essential to reflect on contributions to the achievement of objectives, and in particular, on con-

tributions to the broader programme strategy. At the programme level, progress is generally reviewed in the area of outputs and outcomes. At this level, it is of particular importance to ensure that the examination of outcomes is not neglected. Monitoring at the outcome level requires analysis of whether outputs have contributed to behavioural and institutional change. Progress cannot be measured by simply summarizing the numbers of workshops organized or the extent of skills acquired through training. There is a need to go beyond outputs to consider whether, for instance, the skills are being applied, and whether this is making a difference. Additionally, the OSCE should as far as possible seek to assess whether outcomes appear to be contributing to long-term results which are making a difference to the lives of beneficiaries;

- *Identifying what type of evaluations to support:* Evaluations are important mechanisms for examining how outcomes (e.g., behavioural and institutional change) are affecting the ultimate service-receivers, i.e., the general public. The OSCE defines four types of evaluation: ex-ante evaluation (prior to project implementation), progress evaluation (during project implementation), final evaluation (after project implementation), and impact evaluation. All four types of evaluation can provide important mechanisms for enhancing impact-oriented support, with “impact evaluations” providing the closest link. Ex-ante evaluations may be important to assess the strength of project design, and in particular, to assess whether planned support may plausibly contribute to long-term results. Progress evaluations are similar to a comprehensive monitoring exercise. They facilitate the re-adjustment of projects and programmes on the basis of changing needs, in order to ensure that results are likely to continue to contribute to outcomes and objectives. As such, they offer an important mechanism for strengthening an impact-oriented approach which encourages flexibility and considers evolving national needs. Final evaluations are important in that they contribute to internal learning and self-reflection. As such, they offer opportunities to reflect on lessons learned and to feed these into subsequent projects and programmes; in addition, they contribute to broader learning by offering an opportunity to identify whether the assumptions identified in the theory of change were the right ones. Finally, impact evaluations take place between one and five years after an intervention and as such are suitable for examining whether support has contributed to positive (or negative) change for beneficiaries. Impact evaluations are generally conducted by external evaluators. Given that they require dedicated funds they often only take place for complex, multi-year programmes. Such evaluations are very closely linked to assessing impact-oriented support, as they specifically examine whether the expected long-term impact has occurred and, if so, whether it is sustainable. OSCE staff also engage in the conduct of self-evaluations. Across all these types of evaluation, it is important to test the contribution of short-term results to the achievement of medium- and long-term goals. [For more details, see the *OSCE Manual Project Management in the OSCE (2010)*.]

- *Mainstreaming principles of SSG/R into monitoring and evaluation:* Evaluation within the OSCE is based on the five criteria of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC): relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability; and on two adapted European Commission (EC) criteria: internal coherence within the OSCE, and the OSCE's added value. In addition to this, M&E in the SSG/R field should seek to examine the extent to which support provided has been in line with SSG/R principles. This includes looking at:
  - *National ownership:* To what extent has OSCE support been provided in a way which encourages national ownership?
  - *Gender-sensitive:* To what extent has SSG/R support reflected on the different security needs of women, girls, men and boys? Have women, girls, men and boys benefited from long-term results?
  - *Human-rights based:* To what extent has support been guided by a human rights-based approach which seeks to support both the duty-bearers (i.e., the security sector) and the rights-holders (i.e., the general population)?
- *Incorporating the views of national stakeholders and beneficiaries into monitoring and evaluation:* In order for support to remain relevant, it is good practice for monitoring to incorporate the views of national stakeholders and beneficiaries. Consequently, the OSCE should promote mechanisms for the continuous joint reviewing of progress, which can also act as important mechanisms for supporting mutual accountability (see box 12 below for an example of such a mechanism). Involving national parliaments in benchmarking the achievement of the objectives of SSG/R is also good practice, and is a process in which the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly can play a facilitating role;
- *Feeding monitoring and evaluation into decision-making:* Pursuing impact-oriented approaches is about ensuring that support provided is in line with national priorities and is likely to produce long-term effects. As such, it requires the ability to adjust support according to changing circumstances and lessons identified. M&E plays an important role in this respect, as its key findings can make it possible to re-adjust projects and programmes in line with progress and lessons learned. It is important to ensure that recommendations emerging from M&E also feed into decision-making regarding, for instance, the development of new projects or the identification of assumptions.

### **Box 12: The OSCE Mission to Serbia's annual implementation review meetings**

In order to strengthen its dialogue with national stakeholders, the Democratic Security programme of the OSCE Mission in Serbia began organizing annual implementation review meetings to discuss the support provided over the past year and the lessons identified. The meetings gathered together all project partners, including donors, parliamentarians and NGOs. In addition to providing a formal mechanism for jointly discussing the type of support provided by the OSCE, the meetings also made it possible for the lessons identified to be fed into the programme's own self-evaluation.

- 📖 For more information on how to collect and analyse data and how to carry out monitoring and self-evaluations see *Project Management in the OSCE: A Manual for Programme and Project Managers* (OSCE, 2010), <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/70693>.
- 📖 For guidance on M&E in the area of SSR, see United Nations Inter-Agency SSR Task Force, *Integrated Technical Guidance Note on Monitoring and Evaluation of SSR* (forthcoming).

### 5. Key Points

The present guidelines have identified a number of key points to be considered when supporting impact-oriented approaches to SSG/R support.

- ➔ **Programme for more impact-oriented results.** In OSCE programme management, an objective is the intended impact of support, that is to say, the long-term results the OSCE wishes to contribute to over a number of years. On the basis of national priorities for reform, it is important to identify the long-term programme objectives to which OSCE support is intended to contribute. There is sometimes a tendency to confuse the levels of results. For example, setting “enhanced awareness of human rights principles among the police” as an objective is wrong, because it is only a short-term result. In the field of SSG/R, long-term results should contribute to positive change for the beneficiaries and their wider environment, for example, increased security of marginalized groups or more inclusive and accountable security sectors. Once the programme objectives have been identified, a theory of change should be constructed to make it possible to map the changes needed to contribute to the objective, and to identify the assumptions that underpin each causal link. Once a programme strategy is in place, projects can be developed which feed into the broader programme objective. Among other things, it is essential to the sustainability of long-term results that national ownership is adequately supported throughout the planning process.
- ➔ **Ensure that activities are implemented as means of contributing to long-term results.** OSCE staff should reflect on how to implement activities in ways that support an impact-oriented approach, notably by ensuring that activities are conducted as means to an end and not as ends in themselves. This requires connecting all types of activities, including workshops and training sessions and courses, to an overarching objective. Additionally, thought should be given to supporting the sustainability of such activities by, for example: strengthening national capacities to take over some of the support typically provided by the OSCE (e.g., organization of workshops); ensuring that the financial implications of reform efforts are understood by national actors and are sustainable; or embedding individual capacity-building initiatives in long-term institutional reform strategies.

- ➔ **Monitor and evaluate progress in terms of contribution to sustainable impact.** There is a risk of M&E efforts focusing on progress made through the achievement of short-term results. While it is important to track this kind of progress, it does not shed light on whether OSCE support is contributing to sustainable long-term impact. Appropriate M&E needs to be started at the planning stage, by clearly setting out the long-term results the OSCE is seeking to contribute to and collecting baseline data against relevant indicators. In the field of SSG/R, while it is often difficult to collect data that is considered sensitive (e.g., number of victims of sexual violence), it is nonetheless possible to construct primary data or to use proxy (indirect) indicators to track progress. M&E should take place at each level of the results chain, with determined efforts being made to establish whether the OSCE appears to be contributing to medium- and higher-level results. In the SSG/R field, M&E should also reflect on the extent to which the support provided has been in line with SSG/R principles such as national ownership or gender equality.



# Security Sector Governance and Reform

Approaches to Strengthening  
Regional Co-operation on  
Security Sector Governance and Reform

## Guidelines

# Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on Security Sector Governance and Reform

## 1. Purpose

These guidelines are intended to provide OSCE staff with advice on supporting approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R. The purposes of such approaches may be, among other things, to strengthen such national reform efforts as require transnational collaboration, to provide entry points for engaging in support for national reform efforts, or to support exchange of good practices on how to overcome challenges related to reforms. The Guidelines clarify the rationale for pursuing a regional approach to SSG/R (section 2), provide examples of regional approaches that OSCE staff can support (section 3), highlight ways to implement a regional approach to support (section 4), and provide a summary of key points contained in the Guidelines (section 5).

## 2. Rationale

The OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization and is founded on the principle of strengthening security co-operation and dialogue in order to ensure peace, democracy and stability. The OSCE therefore fully recognizes the importance of strengthening regional co-operation, including regional co-operation on SSG/R. This is reflected in several OSCE commitments calling for support for regional co-operation, particularly in the area of transnational threats. The mandates of certain OSCE field operations also highlight the need to support regional initiatives (see box 1).

### **Box 1: Regional mandates of field operations in Central Asia**

That the OSCE is intended to pursue a regional approach in Central Asia is reflected in the mandates of several field operations. For instance, the Programme Office in Astana is explicitly mandated to implement projects in the “politico-military dimension, focusing on regional security” and “regional projects ... which may include assistance in arranging OSCE regional events, visits to the area by OSCE delegations, or other events with OSCE participation”. The OSCE Centre in Bishkek is similarly mandated to assist “in arranging OSCE regional events, inter alia, regional seminars and visits to the area by OSCE delegations, as well as other events with OSCE participation”. Moreover, the OSCE Office in Tajikistan is specifically mandated to “liaise and co-operate closely with the other OSCE field operations in the region in order to maintain coherence of the regional approach of the OSCE”. Several field operations in Central Asia thus have strong mandates to support regional co-operation, including regional co-operation in the field of SSG/R.

In the SSG/R field there are various rationales for support being provided through a regional lens:

*Regional approaches are necessary for addressing issues of a transnational nature.*

Many SSG/R-related issues that are of a transnational nature require regional approaches, for instance, combating transnational organized crime, combating human trafficking, or strengthening intelligence co-operation. The regional nature of these issues is recognized in several OSCE commitments. For instance, the OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities tasks the Organization with strengthening law enforcement co-operation at the international and regional levels in the fight against transnational organized crime, and with facilitating regional capacity-building and the exchange of information and best practices in investigating cybercrime (for more examples of OSCE policy documents that set out the need for regional approaches to addressing transnational issues, see box 5). Supporting regional exchange among national security institutions is also important in order to promote confidence-building as a prerequisite for collaboration on addressing transnational challenges.

### **Box 2: A regional approach to the investigation of migrant smuggling**

An effective response to the growing challenge of illegal migration requires a comprehensive approach to combating migrant smuggling. Recently, the Organized Crime Advisory Section (OCAS) within the OSCE Mission in Kosovo<sup>67</sup> organized an exercise entitled Regional Joint Investigation of Migrant Smuggling to train Kosovo law enforcement agencies in preventing, recognizing, combating and investigating human smuggling in the region. It aimed to assess regional co-operation mechanisms, identify shortcomings, and provide recommendations on how to investigate and combat human smuggling more effectively. One important feature of the exercise was the participation and support of representatives of law enforcement agencies and public prosecution offices from Turkey, Bulgaria, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro. Strengthening the mechanisms for tackling irregular migration in one State without having a concerted regional approach is likely to result in a “waterbed effect” in which the irregular migratory pressure will just shift to other surrounding countries, thus impeding efforts to manage migration flows effectively. The involvement of all countries in the region is therefore expected to contribute to the longer-term sustainability of OSCE support in the task of addressing this transnational challenge.

*Regional approaches may provide entry points for SSG/R support at the national level.*

Certain SSG/R issues may be perceived as too sensitive to be discussed at the national level, for example, democratic oversight of the security sector, gender mainstreaming

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<sup>67</sup> All references to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text should be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1244.

in the security sector, or addressing human rights abuses by security providers. However, advances can be made in de-sensitizing and raising awareness on such issues through discussions at the regional level (see box 3 below). Moreover, supporting the development and/or implementation of regional commitments may make it easier to advocate support on certain issues at the national level. Another key challenge in the field of SSG/R is to bring together different stakeholders such as security sector officials, parliamentarians, and representatives of civil society, youth, and different ethnic groups. Providing a regional platform for exchange makes it possible to bring together a variety of actors who may not have been able to meet in a more sensitive setting at the national level. This can also contribute to confidence-building among different stakeholder groups.

### **Box 3: A regional approach to promoting the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security**

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is a cornerstone document for the principle of democratic governance of the security sector. Since 2008, regional seminars on the Code of Conduct have taken place annually across the OSCE area (including Central Asia, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Black Sea region, the Baltic Sea region, and the Mediterranean). An OSCE-wide workshop was also held on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Code of Conduct (Serbia, 2014) and a Joint Serbian-Swiss OSCE Code of Conduct workshop was organized during their consecutive OSCE Chairmanships (Belgrade, 2015). The seminars have aimed at explaining how the Code of Conduct is relevant for all participating States, which has helped to put politically sensitive commitments into perspective and has ensured that no State is excluded from the process or left in isolation. The seminars have also enabled other participating States with comparable contexts and backgrounds to exchange experiences and lessons learned. With a view to supporting outreach on the Code among the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, the Code was translated into Arabic in advance of the Malta OSCE Mediterranean Conference of 2013. This was recognized to have been an important step in facilitating regional discussions, and in supporting outreach beyond the area covered by the OSCE participating States.

*Regional approaches facilitate exchanges of good practice in reform processes.* SSG/R is a challenging process in any country. Participating States can therefore benefit greatly from sharing experiences – whether positive or negative – of the implementation of reforms in the security sector (for examples, see boxes 4 and 6). Regional approaches can help to ensure that common experiences are identified and shared. For example, the OSCE assists participating States in initiating and/or strengthening National Action Plans developed in the context of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1540. The adoption of such Action Plans subsequently offers entry points for SSG/R

through the implementation of relevant benchmarks. Regional exchange of good practice on the implementation of such plans can build commitment to their implementation and support ongoing reform efforts.

### **Box 4: Regional co-operation among OSCE ombuds institutions for the armed forces**

The ODIHR has organized regional ombuds institution conferences which seek to bring together representatives from different National Human Rights Institutions in the OSCE area in order to facilitate an exchange of their experiences in working with the executive, judiciary, legislature, and civil society, and to identify good practices.<sup>68</sup> According to the ODIHR/DCAF mapping study entitled *Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces in the OSCE Region*<sup>69</sup>, co-operation between national ombuds institutions is greatly facilitated through their participation in international forums, events and seminars. Such co-operation was registered among more than half of the ombuds institutions surveyed. All ombuds institutions surveyed reported that they consulted with each other on matters concerning common interest, “either through direct communication or during international meetings and forums”.<sup>70</sup>

Supporting initiatives at the regional level may thus result in the promotion of confidence-building, facilitate dialogue and exchange, and contribute to broader conflict prevention.

### **Box 5: Overview of the basis for the OSCE’s engagement in supporting regional co-operation**

A number of OSCE commitments provide the basis for supporting regional co-operation in the field of SSG/R. For example:

*In the area of support to police-related activities:<sup>A</sup>*

- One of the guiding principles for the OSCE in this area is “enhanced co-operation among participating States and international and regional organizations” (para. 10). Accordingly, the OSCE provides support to “subregional co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms” (para. 23).
- In the area of organized crime, OSCE support is to follow the principle that the Organization “enhances the institutional capacity of the relevant stakehold-

<sup>68</sup> See for instance the OSCE/ODIHR Conference for National Human Rights Institutions (ombuds institutions, human rights commissions, institutes and other mechanisms) in the OSCE area, 13-14 July 2011, Lithuania, Agenda, <http://www.osce.org/odihhr/80774?download=true>

<sup>69</sup> ODIHR/DCAF mapping study on “Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces in the OSCE Region”, 2015, <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Mapping-Study-Ombuds-Institutions-for-the-Armed-Forces-in-the-OSCE-Region>

<sup>70</sup> ODIHR/DCAF mapping study on “Ombuds Institutions for the Armed Forces in the OSCE Region”, 2015, p. 47, <http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Mapping-Study-Ombuds-Institutions-for-the-Armed-Forces-in-the-OSCE-Region>

ers and strengthens law enforcement co-operation at the international, regional and national levels” (para. 15).

- In the area of cybercrime, the OSCE “facilitates, at the regional and national levels, capacity-building and the exchange of information and best practices in investigating cybercrime and dealing with cyber evidence” (para. 19).

*In the area of support to border security management:<sup>B</sup>*

- The OSCE will “ensure a continued political dialogue on border-related issues, through discussions in an appropriate consultative working structure on the implementation of the commitments and the future development of co-operation by the participating States in this area” (para. 11).

Against the background of the OSCE being a forum for co-operation with sub-regional organizations, “increased co-ordination on border security and management at the subregional level may constitute a stepping stone towards the OSCE-wide establishment of open and secure borders” (para. 16).

*In the area of the fight against terrorism:<sup>C</sup>*

- The OSCE’s comprehensive approach is considered “well suited to address at the regional level challenges posed by terrorism, to ensure respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms; to identify and address the factors conducive to terrorism; and to explore synergies in addressing new and emerging transnational threats and challenges to security and stability” (para. 12).
- The OSCE is to “enhance co-operation and build capacity at the national, regional and subregional levels to prevent and combat terrorism, inter alia in the areas of criminal justice, law enforcement, and border security and management, within a framework based on the rule of law and respect for human rights” (para. 16).

*In the area of combating trafficking in human beings:<sup>D</sup>*

- “The Strategic Police Matters Unit and the Office of the OSCE Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) will facilitate the exchange of information between participating States on best practices to be used by relevant investigating units to check the possibly criminal and trafficking-related origin of suspicious assets” (para. 10.2).

<sup>A</sup> OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities, PC.DEC/1049, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/pc/92559?download=true>.

<sup>B</sup> OSCE Border Management and Security Concept, MC.DOC/2/05, 2005, <http://www.osce.org/mc/17452?download=true>.

<sup>C</sup> OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight against Terrorism, PC.DEC/1063, 2012, <http://www.osce.org/pc/98008?download=true>.

<sup>D</sup> OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, MC.DEC/2/03, 2003, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/23866?download=true>.

### 3. Identifying Potential Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R

This section sets out five main approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R. These include: supporting capacity-building at the regional level; promoting regional collaboration and information exchange between security sector actors; promoting the implementation of international commitments; supporting regional professional networks and associations; and supporting bilateral co-operation as a first step towards regional initiatives.

#### 3.1 Supporting capacity-building at the regional level

Capacity-building at the regional level is pursued by bringing together national stakeholders from different States in a given region at workshops or training events. This may be of particular value when States are facing similar challenges in reform efforts (see box 6). The practice of different States sharing experiences in overcoming challenges to implementing reforms may contribute to confidence-building. Moreover, capacity-building at the regional level can also enhance learning through “peer-to-peer” exchange and encourage the collective identification of issues and lessons learned. In the area of border management, for instance, the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe offers opportunities for enhancing knowledge among senior border security officials from the region through joint training, which can also build confidence for future collaboration. At the same time it has to be remembered that capacities and approaches, including approaches to regional border security, vary across a given region; consequently, regional capacity-building initiatives have to be adjusted accordingly.

Approaches to providing support may include:

- Identifying challenges which are shared by participating States in a given region, and determining whether the States could benefit from regional exchange and/or training;
- Supporting capacity-building at the regional level through regional workshops and “peer-to-peer” seminars;
- Ensuring that, where appropriate, a broad range of governmental and civil society stakeholders, including civil society organizations, are invited to participate in regional capacity-building events to promote confidence-building among stakeholders. This may subsequently be valuable for efforts to support co-operation between the security sector and civil society at the national level.

#### **Box 6: Using a regional approach to capacity-building in addressing a common challenge**

Participating States in South Eastern Europe have recently introduced new criminal procedure codes that have replaced investigative judges with prosecutor-led investigations. Given that all the participating States concerned were experiencing similar

challenges in the implementation of the new legislation, the relevant OSCE field operations, with the support of the Transnational Threats Department's Strategic Police Matters Unit (TNTD/SPMU), organized a number of regional workshops to address the issue. These brought together police and justice representatives and resulted in the exchange of practical experiences in the introduction of the new criminal procedures. In addition, the ODIHR is currently undertaking a regional assessment in South Eastern Europe that focuses on how these new criminal procedures impact upon respect for selected fair trial rights as a result of changed roles for police, prosecutors, judges and defence counsels. Regional approaches thus have a distinct potential for offering innovative ways to deal with challenges shared by a number of different States.

### 3.2 Promoting regional co-operation and information exchange among security sector actors

Many security-related challenges require concerted action and information-sharing across borders: transnational organized crime, for example, border security management, mass migration, and cybersecurity. In connection with issues such as these the OSCE supports efforts to enhance cross-border co-operation. For instance, joint simulation training exercises which bring together agencies from different States can promote better co-operation and build trust and confidence. Cross-border co-operation can also advance mutual understanding of legislation and procedures applicable in different States.

Approaches to support may include:

- Facilitating networking between the agencies of neighbouring States (e.g., through joint simulation exercises, or the development of regional manuals, as illustrated in box 7 below);
- Promoting the benefits of regional co-operation (e.g., through the sharing of best practices on study visits);
- Supporting the development of shared norms and practices (e.g., through the provision of joint training for representatives of security institutions from different States), which can support co-operation efforts and help to build confidence;
- Supporting the establishment of co-ordination mechanisms between agencies, including the appointment of focal points;
- Supporting the development of regional strategies (e.g. regional action plans) to respond to opportunities to jointly address common challenges such as transnational threats.



### **Box 7: Development of a regional manual on good practices in enhancing collaboration**

Following the recommendations of a joint OSCE/UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) meeting in 2008, the SPMU worked together with the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC, at that time known as Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime, SECI) on developing a police manual on controlled delivery that was specifically targeted at South Eastern Europe; the result, achieved in collaboration with 17 participating States, was the *Controlled Delivery Manual for South-East European States*. In recognition of the fact that States have different rules and legislation governing requests related to controlled deliveries, the manual seeks to improve co-operation among law enforcement officials and the judiciary in South Eastern Europe. In particular, it describes the legislation and rules governing controlled deliveries in each of the 17 States, and explains how collaboration mechanisms are to be applied. In order to promote regional collaboration, it also provides practitioners with the names and contact details of authorizing persons in neighbouring States.<sup>71</sup> To ensure that it remains a useful tool for law enforcement, the manual is regularly updated by SELEC.

### **3.3 Promoting the development and/or implementation of international/regional norms and standards**

Norms and standards developed at the regional or international level can provide important entry points for SSG/R. For instance, the ratification of international/regional treaties and conventions offers an entry point for promoting measures that comply with these norms and standards. Reviewing progress in implementing such commitments at the regional level ensures that States are not left in isolation but are part of a wider review process. It can also help to build commitment through, for example, peer States encouraging fellow States to move forward on implementation. Examples of such conventions/commitments include the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security.

Approaches to support may include:

- Mapping international/regional commitments which States are yet to ratify and/or implement in order to identify possibilities for support;
- Raising awareness on the importance of ratifying relevant commitments, and/or offering support for the national implementation of international commitments relevant to the State concerned;

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<sup>71</sup> OSCE and Southeast European Law Enforcement Center, "Controlled Delivery Manual for South-East European Countries", TNTD/SPMU Publication Series, vol. 8, 2008 (not publicly available).

- Supporting capacity-building initiatives on how to implement SSG/R-related elements in commitments;
- Organizing regional workshops to discuss progress towards implementation of relevant commitments and to exchange experiences in implementing norms and standards. A workshop with representatives of a certain region may also be organized outside the region, for instance, in the form of a study visit.

### **Box 8: Regional seminar to examine the application of part of the UN Convention against Corruption**

The United Nations Convention against Corruption obliges States Parties to adopt legislative and other measures that will permit their competent authorities, upon a request made by another State Party, to return, as applicable, confiscated property to the requesting State.<sup>72</sup> In order to examine how this could be supported in the OSCE area, in 2012 the OSCE organized the Regional Seminar on Identifying, Restraining and Recovering Stolen Assets in the OSCE Region, in co-operation with the UNODC and the Stolen Assets Recovery Initiative of the World Bank, and with support from the Irish OSCE Chairmanship and the Basel Institute on Governance. The aim of the seminar was to bring together experts and practitioners from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation to discuss and exchange experience on: asset recovery cases and issues related to legal instruments, the identification of risk groups, asset tracing, and international and regional co-operation frameworks. The seminar was attended by senior officials dealing with anti-corruption and anti-money-laundering issues (e.g., anti-corruption agencies, financial intelligence units, investigative and law enforcement agencies, investigating magistrates, prosecutors, and legislators) as well as representatives of financial institutions.<sup>73</sup>

### **3.4 Promoting regional professional networks and associations**

Promoting regional platforms or networks of experts can be an effective means of advancing the sustainability of regional co-operation. It ensures that focal points within these networks can continue to share experiences beyond their participation in ad hoc events (e.g., by sharing contact details or developing a newsletter). Professional networks such as associations of women lawyers or Roma police officers can contribute to the sharing of experiences in supporting reform efforts. Training associations, for instance, can support the harmonization of training in accordance with good practices and minimum standards. Examples of existing networks include the Police Co-operation Convention for Southeast Europe and the Association of European Police Colleges.

<sup>72</sup> OSCE, "Seminar on Identifying, Restraining and Recovering Stolen Assets in the OSCE Region", Background Paper, SEC.GAL/159/12/Rev.1, <http://www.osce.org/eea/93326?download=true>.

<sup>73</sup> OSCE, "Regional Seminar on Identifying, Restraining and Recovering Stolen Assets in the OSCE Region", 2012, <http://www.osce.org/eea/92150>.

Approaches to support may include:

- Mapping existing networks and identifying opportunities for engagement with them. This can be done through an actor mapping exercise, ideally integrated in a broader needs assessment, and/or by consulting host authorities on their national needs with respect to regional co-operation needs;
- Raising awareness among national counterparts about existing regional professional networks and associations that they may wish to join;
- As appropriate, providing support to such networks and associations;
- As applicable, supporting the development of new regional networks designed to respond to emerging needs.

### **Box 10: Supporting the creation of an informal regional network of experts in cybercrime investigations**

Between 2010 and 2014, the TNTD/SPMU, in co-operation with field operations and participating States, organized a number of cybercrime investigation trainings at the regional level, starting with a joint cyber investigation training course for 18 police investigators from six States of South Eastern Europe (Albania, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia). Over the years, the same group of trainees has been provided with advanced training courses on IT Forensics, Network Investigations, Forensic Computer Skills, and Using Linux as an Investigative Tool. The training courses have featured partnerships with Europol, the European Cybercrime Training and Education Group, University College Dublin, Microsoft, the German Bundeskriminalamt, and the Association of Public Prosecutors of Serbia. As the same group of trainees has been the target group of these training courses throughout the years, not only have their skill sets been continuously enhanced but they have also established good mutual relations, providing a basis for developing an informal network for facilitating the exchange of information across borders. Following the success of the regional training initiative in South Eastern Europe, in 2014 TNTD/SPMU organized Central Asia's first regional cybercrime investigation training course in Bishkek, which was attended by cybercrime investigators from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and a training course in Tbilisi for cybercrime investigators from Georgia and Armenia.

### **3.5 Supporting bilateral co-operation as a first step towards regional initiatives**

Support for regional co-operation may at times need to start with small steps, particularly in cases where regional co-ordination mechanisms are missing or there is an absence of political will for closer regional co-operation in SSG/R-related activities. Such steps may include supporting interested States in participating in important events in the region, which may contribute to broader confidence-building or to raising awareness of norms or issues that are gaining prominence in the region (see box 10). Another such small step may be to support the enhancing of bilateral exchange between two or

more States in the region. Strengthening bilateral co-operation between two States that either face similar challenges or share cultural similarities can be an effective strategy for enhancing regional co-operation. Such co-operation should aim to build national capacities and promote the open exchange of experiences and sharing of best practices. For instance, the OSCE Programme Office in Astana facilitated a study visit to Serbia for officials of Kazakhstan as a means of supporting Kazakhstan's initiative to learn about Serbia's National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Human Trafficking.

Approaches to support may include:

- Funding national participation in relevant regional events which are likely to promote confidence-building or raise awareness of norms related to SSG/R;
- Supporting study visits to other States of the region which have undergone similar reforms (on the ways in which study visits can enhance national capacities, see box 12).

### **Box 11: Regional workshop to address transnational challenges**

In 2014, the OSCE Office in Tajikistan and the OSCE Transnational Threats Department organized a regional workshop in Central Asia on countering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. The workshop brought together over 150 government representatives and civil society experts from a wide range of OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation. The workshop took place within the broader context of the need for shared international responsibility in addressing the phenomenon of radicalization. Because the workshop recognized the critical importance of regional approaches in effectively countering the threat of foreign terrorist fighters, it set itself the task of developing a regional forum of competence designed to support the development of a regional network of experts. Moreover, its work is expected to enhance trust between law enforcement agencies in the region.

## **4. Implementing Approaches to Strengthening Regional Co-operation on SSG/R**

Support for regional co-operation needs to take place within a framework of broader support for SSG/R. This being the case, approaches to strengthening regional co-operation should not be pursued in the form of ad hoc activities but, rather, be clearly linked to the overarching objectives of SSG/R support provided by the OSCE in any given State. *[See Guidelines on Impact-Oriented Approaches to Security Sector Governance and Reform.]* Once the need to support regional approaches has been identified, efforts should be made to support their implementation. The main factors to be taken into consideration in implementing approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R are:

- Including the regional dimension of SSG/R in planning;
- Ensuring that regional approaches are pursued within a broader framework of support;
- Following an incremental approach;
- Promoting the understanding that regional approaches can be cost-effective and serve to strengthen national/regional ownership;
- Recognizing that regional approaches have their limitations;
- Ensuring that regional approaches do not undermine national needs in the field of SSG/R; and
- Capitalizing on existing internal co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms.

### 4.1 Including the regional dimension of SSG/R in planning

OSCE staff engaged in planning SSG/R activities should ensure that the challenges and opportunities of regional approaches are considered during their project's planning stage. For instance, OSCE needs assessments should include the regional dimension of SSG/R in order to ensure identification of the regional approach's benefits and feasibility, which should subsequently inform project development (see box 12 below). Among other things, this involves understanding the regional dynamics of co-operation and conflict, and assessing common SSG/R-related challenges in a given region. Assessments should also consider existing regional initiatives and commitments, which may provide entry points for reform efforts at the national level. Finally, assessments should also take into account lessons learned from the experiences of other States in the region in implementing similar reform efforts. [See *OSCE Guidelines on Needs Assessments in the Field of SSG/R.*]

#### **Box 12: Enhancing regional co-operation between criminal justice actors**

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina has long recognized the value of taking a regional approach to supporting their efforts in the area of judicial reform. Indeed, in the context of war crimes, a regional approach was considered particularly suitable because the relevant archives, prosecutors, victims and witnesses are often located right across a certain region. In this context, the Mission's efforts have been effectively integrated into the OSCE/ODIHR War Crimes Justice Project, co-operating closely with other field operations in the region. The project aims to support justice actors (police, prosecutors, judges, witness protection providers) in the region of South Eastern Europe in prosecuting and adjudicating war crimes. As a result, a major regional conference on the implementation of international humanitarian law was held in 2014, in co-operation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Swiss Embassy and the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### 4.2 Ensuring that regional approaches take place within a broader framework of support

Regional approaches should be linked to clear objectives for SSG/R within States. For instance, regional approaches may be identified as a priority for OSCE support if a na-

tional objective is to enhance the fight against transnational organized crime. Careful consideration is also needed on how to enhance the sustainability of regional support, with particular reflection on building the capacity of national actors to lead such co-operation, on ensuring that follow-up to regional initiatives is planned from the outset, and on placing such support within a broader framework of SSG/R engagement. For instance, in the context of accession to the European Union, one tool often used for supporting bilateral co-operation is “twinning projects”, in which one EU Member State offers its expertise and experience on the implementation of EU legislation to another (through workshops, expert missions, study visits etc.).<sup>74</sup> While this does not apply directly to the OSCE, the approach of twinning may be a useful strategy for embedding study visits in a framework of longer term co-operation and experience-sharing in order to support participating States in the implementation of OSCE norms, principles and commitments (see box 13 below).

### **Box 13: Linking a study visit to concrete national needs**

Study visits should be part of a wider programme of support. In 2014, the OSCE Office in Tajikistan and the OSCE Centre in Bishkek, in close co-operation with the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), organized a study visit to Estonia for participants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on good practices in border demarcation and delimitation. One key challenge faced by the two States is that their border is not clearly demarcated. In this case, the visit was organized as part of a broader response to a series of incidents that took place along the border shared by the two States in late 2013 and 2014.<sup>75</sup> The aim of the study visit was to give participants a first-hand impression of how the Estonian border service is organized in areas of the Estonian-Russian border that are similarly not clearly defined. The participants of the study visit also took part in a training course on conflict prevention which sought to identify common forms of confidence-building measures in the field of protecting State borders.<sup>76</sup> Participants in the study visit included representatives of Tajikistan’s Presidential Apparatus, Foreign and Justice Ministries, and Border Troops, and of Kyrgyzstan’s Presidential Apparatus, Foreign Ministry, Government Secretariat on Border Issues, and Border Troops.

### **4.3 Following an incremental approach**

The OSCE has a special role to play in supporting nationally led regional approaches to enhancing co-operation on SSG/R. When, as is sometimes the case, the will necessary

<sup>74</sup> See descriptions of the European Commission/European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, “Twinning”, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/twinning/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/tenders/twinning/index_en.htm), and European Commission/International Cooperation and Development, “EU Neighbourhood & Russia: Twinning”, [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/eu-neighbourhood-region-and-russia/interregional-cooperation/twinning\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/eu-neighbourhood-region-and-russia/interregional-cooperation/twinning_en).

<sup>75</sup> OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE organizes study visit of Tajik, Kyrgyz experts to Estonia on border delimitation and demarcation”, Press Release, July 2014, <http://www.osce.org/tajikistan/121635>.

<sup>76</sup> OSCE Office in Tajikistan, “OSCE trains officials from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan on conflict prevention”, Press Release, July 2014, <http://www.osce.org/tajikistan/120723>.

to bring such initiatives forward is lacking, the OSCE must recognize the fact. In order to support the development of national interest in regional initiatives, the OSCE may consider taking an incremental approach, initially only aiming to support regional co-operation on the technical level by, for instance, supporting the participation of experts in regional training courses. As well as building confidence between participating States, this may also help to highlight the benefits of a regional approach. In its turn, this may pave the way for support for a more comprehensive form of regional co-operation led by national stakeholders, such as the development of joint action plans for addressing common threats.

#### **4.4 Promoting the understanding that regional approaches can be cost-effective and serve to strengthen national/regional ownership**

At times there may be a need to raise awareness on the importance of regional approaches – particularly when regional initiatives require more resources. It is important to underline that investing in regional approaches that enhance co-operation between participating States may have a long-term impact that will offset initial costs. This may be the case, for instance, when support to regional structures enhances regional capacities and ownership. It can be beneficial for the OSCE to work with existing regional structures in order to strengthen their capacity and thus increase the long-term sustainability of support for reform efforts in the region. Moreover, in some cases there may be cost benefits when expenses for paying international training experts are shared, or resources for event co-ordination are pooled (see box 13). Finally, the OSCE should raise awareness of the fact that, from a national perspective, it may be more cost-effective to tackle challenges such as transnational organized crime or trafficking of human beings through regional co-operation. At the same time, however, there is a need for proper analysis to ensure that the benefits of regional approaches outweigh the costs (see 4.5. below).

#### **Box 14: Engaging existing regional structures**

In some regions there are already regional co-ordination and co-operation mechanisms in place that can provide a starting point for co-operation in the field of SSG/R. Amongst these are the Regional Cooperation Council in Sarajevo (RCC), the South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), and for South Eastern Europe the Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre (RACVIAC), now known as the RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation. RACVIAC is a regionally owned international organization with the mission of fostering dialogue and co-operation on security matters in South Eastern Europe. Rather than duplicating the efforts of such structures, the OSCE can generate added value by providing necessary expertise. For instance, in 2015 the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit supported RACVIAC on its five-day border security and management training course Exam-

ination and Detection at the Border – Persons, Cargoes and Vehicles. While RACVI-AC hosted the workshop, the OSCE provided an expert lecturer for the course.<sup>77</sup> Engaging with existing regional structures may contribute to building comparative advantages and strengthening regional capacity and ownership of SSG/R efforts.

### **4.5 Recognizing that regional approaches have their limitations**

In some circumstances regional approaches may not be beneficial, when States are at different stages of implementation of a certain reform process, for example, or when a participating State does not share (or does not perceive itself as sharing) similar challenges or characteristics with neighbouring States, or when a State does not consider itself part of a particular region. Moreover, sometimes the mandates of OSCE field operations in a given region vary too much to allow for coherent support. Furthermore, certain field operations do not have regional mandates and require assistance from one of the OSCE institutions or the OSCE Secretariat if they are to give effective support to a regional approach. Appropriate assessments, including timely communication with host authorities, are essential to ensuring that the benefits and challenges of a regional approach are understood in advance.

### **4.6 Ensuring that regional approaches do not undermine national SSG/R needs**

Although States in a given region may share similar challenges, specific national requirements must not be overlooked. Regional analysis may indicate good reasons for supporting measures which may not be the national priorities of a given State. Regional priorities should thus be carefully examined against national priorities to ensure that there is complementarity and, hence, a rationale for supporting.

### **4.7 Capitalizing on existing internal co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms**

Supporting regional initiatives requires co-operation across OSCE structures engaged in a given region. It is important to capitalize on existing co-ordination and information-sharing mechanisms in order to identify opportunities, common challenges, and best practices. The regional meetings of OSCE heads of missions or heads of components (e.g., law enforcement departments) provide a useful opportunity for the co-ordinating of potential SSG/R support at the regional level. Focal point networks also offer an opportunity to share experiences and documents with neighbouring field operations. Focal points can, among other things, support efforts to identify common regional needs, share expert advice, find opportunities for pooling resources, and create informal networks. Information-sharing mechanisms (e.g., web-based platforms) can also provide an important avenue for enhancing regional co-operation among OSCE staff as well as acting as useful tools for civil society (see box 14 below).

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<sup>77</sup> RACVIAC Centre for Security Cooperation, "Border Security and Management Course Begins at RACVIAC", News, 10 February 2015, <http://www.racviac.org/news/index.html#item72>.



### Box 15: Utilizing information-sharing tools

In recent years, various OSCE structures and institutions have developed online sharing tools to enhance exchange of information, ensure access to important documents, and in some cases to serve as a resource for civil society. One example in the area of policing is POLIS<sup>78</sup>, an online resource managed by the TNTD. Among other things it collects best practice and lessons learned from field operations, and relevant legislation, reports and training materials that can be used by OSCE staff and civil society across a region. Focusing on human rights protection, the ODIHR has launched the Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System (TANDIS)<sup>79</sup>. TANDIS is organized according to State and thematic issues. As well as containing information on relevant OSCE activities in the area of policing and prosecuting hate crimes, for instance, it also includes the contact details of the national specialized institutions that deal with this topic. Tools like this one can be useful for civil society organizations wishing to engage with counterparts in other States in order to exchange lessons learned. Another example is DocIn<sup>80</sup>, the OSCE's electronic document and record management system. This platform allows OSCE staff to store, share and distribute substantive, programmatic and administrative information, and to subsequently benefit from project knowledge gained through the OSCE field operations, institutions, and Secretariat.

## 5. Key Points

In the course of composing the present Guidelines, a number of key points were identified that must be observed when supporting approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R.

- ➔ **Consider how supporting regional co-operation on SSG/R can contribute to broader OSCE objectives in this field.** Efforts to support regional co-operation on SSG/R should not be conducted as ad hoc activities but, rather, must be designed to contribute to broader OSCE objectives. Supporting regional initiatives may be particularly useful to strengthening national efforts to engage in SSG/R issues requiring transnational collaboration; to providing entry points for supporting national reform efforts; and to facilitate the sharing of good practices on how to overcome challenges related to reforms. Moreover, supporting regional approaches may at times be a prerequisite for other activities. For instance, supporting broad confidence-building among security institutions through regional workshops may be necessary for the success of subsequent efforts to support trans-border investigations.

<sup>78</sup> OSCE, POLIS, <http://polis.osce.org/>.

<sup>79</sup> OSCE/ODIHR, TANDIS, <http://tandis.odihr.pl/>.

<sup>80</sup> OSCE, DocIn, <https://login.osce.org/nidp/idff/sso?id=13&sid=9&option=credential&sid=9>.

- ➔ **Identify approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R.** Numerous approaches are suitable for encouraging regional co-operation on SSG/R, including the promotion of regional exchange of good practice (e.g., through study visits, workshops, regional professional networks and associations), advancing the development and/or implementation of regional norms and standards, and supporting joint co-operation efforts (e.g., developing joint action plans or undertaking joint training and cross-border exercises). Additionally, where appropriate, supporting the participation of a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society organizations, in regional capacity-building events can contribute to confidence-building among the actors involved.
- ➔ **Support the effective implementation of approaches to strengthening regional co-operation on SSG/R.** Effective implementation starts with the appropriate consideration of regional approaches during the planning stage. In particular, needs assessments should be carried out to consider the potential value of regional approaches. It must be recognized that regional approaches are not relevant in every context and may also have their limitations. If regional approaches are important in a given context, there is a need to assess the extent to which national actors have an interest in participating in such endeavours. The OSCE should ensure that it facilitates but does not lead regional initiatives. It may thus consider taking an incremental approach towards building interest in regional approaches through such measures as supporting the participation of experts in regional events or promoting bilateral experience-sharing.

# Security Sector Governance and Reform

Abbreviations and Acronyms

Key OSCE commitments related to SSG/R

OSCE Publications related to SSG/R

Recommended further Reading

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>CSOs</b>	Civil society organizations
<b>CoE</b>	Council of Europe
<b>EC</b>	European Commission
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>ExB</b>	Extrabudgetary
<b>DCAF</b>	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
<b>HCNM</b>	High Commissioner on National Minorities
<b>MoU</b>	Memorandum of Understanding
<b>M&amp;E</b>	Monitoring and Evaluation
<b>NHRIs</b>	National Human Rights Institutions
<b>NRMs</b>	National Referral Mechanisms
<b>OECD DAC</b>	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
<b>ODIHR</b>	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>OSR/CTHB</b>	Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
<b>POLIS</b>	Online resource in the area of policing managed by the TNTD
<b>OCAS</b>	Organized Crime Advisory Section within the OSCE Mission in Kosovo
<b>OCEEA</b>	OSCE Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities
<b>DocIN</b>	OSCE's electronic document and record management system
<b>PESU</b>	Programme Evaluation Support Unit
<b>PBPB</b>	Performance-based programme budgeting
<b>RACVIAC</b>	Regional Arms Control Verification and Implementation Assistance Centre
<b>RCC</b>	Regional Cooperation Council in Sarajevo
<b>RBM</b>	Results-based management RBM
<b>ROFM</b>	Representative on Freedom of the Media
<b>SEESAC</b>	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>SELEC</b>	Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre
<b>SSG/R</b>	Security Sector Governance and Reform
<b>TANDIS</b>	Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System
<b>THB</b>	Trafficking in human beings
<b>TAHCLE</b>	Training against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement
<b>TNTD</b>	Transnational Threats Department
<b>TNTD/ATU</b>	Transnational Threats Department's Action against Terrorism Unit

<b>TNTD/SPMU</b>	Transnational Threats Department's Strategic Police Matters Unit
<b>UB</b>	Unified Budget
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCAC</b>	United Nations Convention against Corruption
<b>UNTOC</b>	United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

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The background of the page is a solid blue color. In the lower half, there is a stylized, light blue map of the world, showing the continents. Overlaid on this map and extending upwards are several interlocking gears of various sizes and shades of blue. The gears are arranged in a way that suggests a complex mechanism or process. The overall aesthetic is clean and professional.

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